New Interagency COIN Manual

[jcustis]

That's an interesting perspective sir. I've been following a very good debate on another forum b/n a Marine and a former SF Soldier with regard to Kilcullen's utility, Petraeus as the lead warrior in iraq.

The debate pretty much centered on the issue that prior to OIF I, he had not served in combat, and his experiences were shaped by his infantry and mechanized command time, not conducting FID.

What are your views on the argument that the man selected to lead develop COIN doctrine and lead the Iraq effort should have been from a SF background?

[SteveMetz]

What are your views on the argument that the man selected to lead develop COIN doctrine and lead the Iraq effort should have been from a SF background?

I would disagree. I absolutely love the SF community and have worked extensively with them over the year but, in my opinion, most of them retain kind of an A team perspective. That is perfect in an El Salvador type sitaution where the U.S. footprint is very small and is primarily focused on small unit advice and support, but less so in an Iraq type situation where we bascially have to rebuild security forces from the ground up at the same time that we ourselves undertake large scale stability operations.

Phrased differently, SF is the most exquisite tool on earth for certain situations, but they are not the right tool for everything irregular.

[Old Eagle]

While I laud progress made in the COIN arena recently, it addresses only a part of the non-MCO mission facing the military and the rest of the interagency in the future. We have to get better at conducting missions even BEFORE insurgencies that need "countering" develop.

Instead of publishing a COIN manual, the Air Force lumped all the IW missions together in a single manual. If done correctly, that may provide a more holistic approach for the military and the interagency.

[SteveMetz]

Instead of publishing a COIN manual, the Air Force lumped all the IW missions together in a single manual. If done correctly, that may provide a more holistic approach for the military and the interagency.

There's an important conceptual distinction here though: 3-24 reflects the idea that counterinsurgency is not simply a form of warfighting. By lumping it with irregular warfare the Air Force took a different approach that--unfortuantely from my perspective--distills it down to destroying targets.

I saw a full court press from the Air Force on this last week at the Carr Center/Army War College seminar on counterinsurgency in DC. The highlight was a panel that included Maj Gen Dunlap and LTG Chiarelli. While I am not an objective observer, I though Chiarelli eviscerated the Air Force arguments.

[slapout9]

Eviscerated! Whew... you can talk that talk man. You should run for something.

[SteveMetz]

Eviscerated! Whew... you can talk that talk man. You should run for something.

I'll probably have to run for my life once the Air Force gets my grid coordinates. I guess I'll just have to live in a cave and release the occasional video to al Jazeera. Or Fox.

[slapout9]

Make sure you take that special COIN Bar-B-Que grill you have.

[LawVol]

I'll probably have to run for my life once the Air Force gets my grid coordinates. I guess I'll just have to live in a cave and release the occasional video to al Jazeera. Or Fox.

We have them.

[Steve Blair]

There's an important conceptual distinction here though: 3-24 reflects the idea that counterinsurgency is not simply a form of warfighting. By lumping it with irregular warfare the Air Force took a different approach that--unfortuantely from my perspective--distills it down to destroying targets.

I got the same impression when I looked at the AF's IW doctrine. It also looked very rushed. I think they'd benefit from going back and taking a hard look at it and fleshing it out.

[LS]

I would disagree. I absolutely love the SF community and have worked extensively with them over the year but, in my opinion, most of them retain kind of an A team perspective. That is perfect in an El Salvador type sitaution where the U.S. footprint is very small and is primarily focused on small unit advice and support, but less so in an Iraq type situation where we bascially have to rebuild security forces from the ground up at the same time that we ourselves undertake large scale stability operations.

Phrased differently, SF is the most exquisite tool on earth for certain situations, but they are not the right tool for everything irregular.

I don't completely disagree with your statement above. I have over 15 years in Army SF, and over 25 associated with SOF in general, and have to say that some of the flag-level officers who "get it" the best don't have direct time in SOF. While some from the SOF community are focussed almost exclusively on the kinetic door-kicking aspects of Special Operations.

But where I think your observation falls short is two-fold. Your statement implies a static situation (and therefore a static solution). As the situation changes on the ground, the mental agility and predilictions required of the commander might change as well. Second, I think that this "post conflict" phase of the engagement there is the ~perfect~ match for a commander with SOF experience. And I don't just mean exposure to SOF, but actual experience in and with the units.

SOF doesn't obviate a capacity for and competence in good old-fashioned ass-kicking warfare; Army SOF are required to have at least one tour under their belt as a "regular solider or officer" before coming aboard. But it does extend the skill-set and (I would suggest) exponentially expand the conceptual approaches to conflict management in ways that traditional military training doesn't (or hasn't yet).

In my civilian life I pull-together teams of military, prior-service, civilian and others to do nation-building around the world. What I like about the SOF mentality is that their going-in position is to think out of the box. They recognize that if an off-the-shelf solution would adequately address a particular problem it'd have already been solved by other competent and respectable elements of our national power.

Thanks for the interesting debate.

LS