COL Gentile is clearly a well intentioned officer, who is obviously bright, and presumably accomplished in his own service and field of expertise; and I mean no disrespect whatsoever to make the observation that while he may be able to spell "COIN," his knowledge of the nature of insurgency and elements of an effective counterinsurgency campaign probably end there.

I will agree that many of the "born again" COIN experts in the conventional force that cut there teeth in Iraq tend to confuse what has been taking place there as COIN as well. Much of it is, much of it is not.

But COL G needs to understand that "The Surge" was neither a strategy, nor even a campaign plan, it was a resourcing requirement to enable the execution of a comprehensive campaign plan that was rooted in sound tenants of COIN. In fact, it is more accurately "Combat FID" than COIN, as COIN is what the Iraqi security forces are conducting. He also needs to understand that COIN is about neutralizing the insurgency, not defeating the insurgent. Convincing parties to representing various segments of the populace to at a minimum remain neutral, or at best to join in the solution is all critical to effective COIN.

He also implies that an Army that just a few years ago thought it could solve any military problem with a "shock and awe" assault now believes with equal fervor that it can solve any military problem with a COIN or FID campaign. I refuse to believe that we are that polarized in our actions or simplistic in our thinking.

The Army still has a great deal to learn about FID, but I suspect the Army will continue to get a great deal of practice. Hopefully they will also be able to keep an edge on their more conventional warfighting skills as well; and have leadership that recognize when to apply which to achieve the desired endstate of any given operation. The SF community continues to be the real keepers of the flame on this topic though, and though they don't have proponency and lead for the Army's positoins, if one listens carefully, these "quiet professionals," are out there.

And yes, we will still need the airforce to support us. To get us to the fight, to provide us with fires when needed, to provide aerial ISR, etc. But while COL G may raise some valid points, the effect is lost in his larger ignorance of the context in which he is trying to make them.