The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Schmedlap]

I don't know who Looking Glass is, but I like the cut of his jib.

Just look at the MITT/ETT program... the treatment and support of these teams when they operate in another's battlespace tells most of all how much our Army "gets" COIN.

Gentlemen, while you address this matter in such scholarly fashion, men are in crude places poorly supported and repeatedly countermanded by senior officers, your brethren, who just plain don't "get it." As long as that is a consistent narrative, any discussion of, "has our Army gone too far with this COIN thing?" is pointless.

EXACTLY! This never-ending debate is like the kid who checks under the bed and checks the closet every night, afraid that the bogeyman is there. He's not. But the kid keeps worrying. Gone too far with COIN? The doctrinal publications are very nice. They have neat illustrations and interesting concepts. The cover designs are swell. But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country." And back home, over half of the pre-deployment training is the same old weapons qual, reflexive fire, squad/section evaluations, and Table 8/Table 12. Procurement is still churning out big heavy vehicles, boats, and aircraft. And Officers are still learning how to draw big sweeping arrows (though now in PowerPoint format, projected on a 42" plasma screen).

Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?) responds:

Your quip about our discussions here of being "scholarly" has a whiff of condescension and implies a muddy-boots view of the ivory tower... this blog has many participants some with experience, but most with lots of knowledge and interest in these important matters.

It's a damned good muddy-boots view of the ivory tower, in my opinion. The discussions are purely academic, in spite of the operational experience of the participants. The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers. Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.

[Gian P Gentile]

Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?)

Since you ask I am an active duty Army Colonel presently posted as an associate professor of history at West Point where I run the military history program. I have done two runs in Iraq. The first was in 2003 as a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit and the second was again in 4ID in west Baghdad in command of an armored recon squadron in 2006.

For whatever it is worth I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the Air Force's World War II Strategic Bombing Survey and in it I was highly critical of the air force for using it to shape their future visions of an independent air arm.

I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

[Fuchs]

Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."

It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.

Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.

Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.

[Ken White]

Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

"It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."

We could do that but is seems a waste of effort to me because most military folks and civilian military analysts are fully aware that it's a truth and that the politicians don't pay much attention to it.

It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.

Two ifs; big ones...

I don't recall any western democracy including the US taking that route. All have tried other options -- perhaps not the right ones but they tried. I cannot recall any instance since WW II where western nations have elected war as a first choice.

Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.

That was the purpose of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines; they guided US policy in that vein from 1984 until 2001. The thrust was no COIN ops, don't go to war unless major US interests were involved. George W. Bush ran for election as President essentially saying "...no nation building, no sticking our nose in other peoples business." After we went to Afghanistan, he got roundly criticized for not doing what he said he would do. Lyndon Johnson got elected in 1964 saying his opponent would expand the Viet Nam war -- got elected and proceeded to expand it himself.

The problem is that the politicians aren't going to war so the fact that some are harder than others doesn't matter to them.

Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.

I doubt it. Most of 'em aren't smart enough to figure that out. They've been known to threaten people with blunt swords. The US has gone to big wars eight times, Viet Nam was the last (Desert Storm was not a war and neither Afghanistan or Iraq is a big war by any definition) -- all eight of those saw us with an essentially blunt sword and the politicians knew and went anyway. Aside from those wars, we have since 1801 engaged in over 200 incursions, raids and what have you on the sovereign territory of others; swords were blunt most of those times.

The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again. You may be a nice guy and opposed to war -- there are a lot folks out there who aren't nice and will start a war in a second...

[ipopescu]

Ken said:

The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again.

Ken,
I think this pretty much nails it, and I don't think many people really object to this. I would only add that the probability of an eventuality should determine the emphasis given to it in terms of resource allocation, training, doctrine, etc. At the end of the day, in the US system elected civilian leaders are responsible for the decision to engage in the wars that they judge to be necessary to protect the national interest. If current leaders came to the conclusion that a COIN is something the US needs to be involved in now and in the near future, it is normal for the US military services to adapt accordingly to what's being asked of them. My prof Peter Feaver, a former Bush NSC official, recently summarized what I believe may be a commonly held position inside the former administration here on the Foreign Policy website. One of the paragraphs for this thread is pasted below;
Ionut.

"First, anti-COIN is a convenient way to argue against American military involvement in any fashion because the most urgentnear-term threats requiring military operations involve COIN... If the U.S. military cannot or will not do COIN, then the U.S. military cannot and will not be operational."

[Rob Thornton]

For those capable of accessing AKO - the Army has hung its UNCLASS "Army Strategy 2008" document there (just run a search). This is a good document - it is not so much a strategy as we might consider the NSS or NDS, however it does reference them. It is more of a capability generation strategy and addresses the full spectrum of required capabilities. I like that it frames the discussion in terms of "strategic choices" and "strategic questions".

There is a good deal of thought devoted to IW capabilities, SFA capabilities, MCO capabilities, ARFORGEN, personnel practices, areas of relevant DOTMLPF, spin out capabilites and modernization, AC/RC practices. etc.

If you have access, I think it will inform much of this and other discussion. Its the first time I've seen such a document. I think it is the appropriate focus for the Army as a force and capability provider to the GCCs.

If you have a .mil addy, ping me and I'll send it to you.

Best, Rob

[Cavguy]

I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

That is interesting. I need to read your dissertation on Strategic Bombing, I saw it mentioned on the loop the other day.

[Bill Moore]

I'm not going to fool anyone, I have been involved in the COIN debate with other SWJ members for a few months. I don't know if my apparent flip flopping on whether I support or oppose Gian's views are due to some underlying medical issue, or if I'm just not sure what the debate is really about.

Posted by Ken,

* Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.

I have agreed with Ken on this point several times, and I'm not sure why we feel obligated to support one position or the other? The argument seems to be dividing us unnecessarily, if you support COIN you're in the Moose Party and if you support conventional war you're in the Bear Party. Fortunately, our situation isn't that complex. We're American fighting men and women who took an oath to defend our Constitution against "all enemies" foreign and domestic. Many of our potential foes present a conventional military threat, while many of our foes present an irregular combatant threat. There is no debate, we "must" be prepared to fight and win against both. How we prepare is arguable, and in Gian's defense I don't think he ever argued that we ignore COIN or the irregular threat.

I found much to agree with Looking Glass's post, and unfortunately the truth frequently hurts. There is a big difference between really getting and doing it and paying lip service to it; it being COIN.

Once an operatonal mold is set, it is hard to break out of it. I remember one of the dumbest statments I heard from a very smart senior officer. Don't worry about it Bill, it's Iraq, so we got it, which was one way of saying we been there before and we're going to do the same thing again when we go back, don't worry about the new intelligence reports. Most leaders are not as courageous and intelligent as GEN Petreaus in my opinion, and his leadership has been courageous and decisive, and I think his surge strategy (or right sizing) was instrumental in reducing the violence in Iraq. By no means was the surge the sole factor, but I don't believe all the other contributing factors would have made much of an impact without the surge. The argument is academic at this point because we'll never really know what would have happened if we didn't surge, but still I would like to hear Gian's arguments on why he believes the surge wasn't effective in reducing the violence?

Now I'm going to flip flop (I'll see the doc tomorrow) and support one of Gian's arguments. His point about our COIN doctrine being largely focused on counter-Mao insurgency strategies is accurate, and it is a major shortfall. To be fair it does address other types of insurgencies, but it doesn't address different strategies for dealing with them. In many areas of the world there will not be a large majority of fence sitters in the affected populace just waiting to be won over by either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent. Who they support is sometimes a given, especially in identity based insurgencies/struggles. How do you wage a successful COIN campaign when the populace will not support you (and the HN you're supporting) with our current doctrine? I think the courses of action available (regardless of feasibility) are obvious, even if some of them are not politically correct. But onward to the most important post,

Schmedlap posted,

But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country."

COIN is a reality, we'll have to be proficient at it at all levels and we're not. There is much to fix; and to fix with a great sense of urgency. We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?

[Ken White]

...We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?

The debate is, at this level, whiling away time and stating opinions. Most of the big decisions for the next five years are already in concrete in any event.

Wat is not in concrete is our training. That can be changed -- and, as you point out, it needs to be...

[Bullmoose Bailey]

excellent discussion...

thanks for pointing this exchange out here. have felt that the "adaptive" application of the numerous tools in our weaponry at the full spectrum of diplomacy through total warfare is called for. this spontaneous improvisation may be the true measure of genius in small wars.

[William F. Owen]

To jump in behind Bill Moore

OK, I have no dog in this fight, but as an "informed" outside observer it strikes me that this debate between Col Gentile, and the post-modernist is getting off track in terms of being useful.

What I find extremely useful in Gentile's attitude is his forewarning that the loss of Combined Arms dispersed mobile warfare skills, against a peer or even near peer competitor, are extremely easy to loose and very expensive and difficult to recover. It is this level of operations which armies find difficult to do.

COIN is the basic standard for ALL armies, or should be. It's cheap to train for, relies mostly on education, and is very context specific.
(EG: for the UK, force generating units like the Ulster Defence Regiment was extremely easy compared to force generating Armoured Infantry regiments)
Sadly is not often done well, because of these things. Cheap is bad, and "education is for pussies", while "training is for warriors."

It is neither true nor useful to say that all future wars will be small wars. Does the US need to improve it's COIN training and education - YES!
Can it afford to let its High End slide - NO!

The solution all lies in the correct training and doctrine, constrained by a limited budget and finite time and resources. Unless some fundamentals are put in place, this debate serves neither side well.

[Ken White]

...The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers.

Totally true and it will have no effect on what really happens -- but I'm retired and don't have much else to do...

It doesn't really mirror reality because most of those decisions have been made for the next five years and the few that haven't been will be made mostly by Congress and not be me or anyone involved in the debate including the big names or the Think Tanks -- or their graduates. Or Gian. Or Looking Glass.

Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.

I don't think we have and know we will not go far enough to get good at it -- we can and likely will go far enough to do okay for the most part.

I still contend however, that we should avoid it where possible; it's un-American. That, BTW, is a serious comment, we're too impatient and selfish to do it well. More importantly, we are too widely disliked in most of the world to do it because we become targets, everybody wants a shot at the big guy. On top of that, the One Third and Two Year rules apply.