The majority of posters agree with you
and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.
The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.
Nailed it in one.Originally Posted by Ken White
Touche...
I agree he can come off as overzealous (was unaware of the personal attacks) but unfortunately in the big machine that is the Army, and DoD for that matter, it is the squeaky wheel that gets the attention. Just ask Charlie Dunlap.
"What is best in life?" "To crush your enemies, see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentation of the women."
strategy
Eden raised the point re strategy, which is a drum I beat, but on the political dimension of COIN. Military strategy is all to the good, but what of the political? Are we fighting for a credible political vision in Afghanistan? The analogy is to Vietnam, as Jeffrey Race describes, where the conceptual model was wrong; and the political roots of defeat were established in 1956-60, before the US presence expanded. Fall emphasizes the political for COIN as well as insurgents, one example being the Huk, where Magsaysay implemented social and military reforms which drew support to the government.
To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.
Sam Liles
Selil Blog
Don't forget to duck Secret Squirrel
The scholarship of teaching and learning results in equal hatred from latte leftists and cappuccino conservatives.
All opinions are mine and may or may not reflect those of my employer depending on the chance it might affect funding, politics, or the setting of the sun. As such these are my opinions you can get your own.
This has always been my concern with the debate. Warfare is not a binary proposition. I've had issues with historical cherry-picking by BOTH sides in the debate as well.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Gian is running from something that ain't chasing him. His overstatements tend to polarize the issue, something I find unhelpful. IMHO there is no "surge dogma", and Gian does not succeed in making the case that there is.
Nor is doctrine a zero-sum game. The addition of FMs 3-24 and 3-07 to fill gaping holes in existing doctrine does not mean that we're not going to "fight" anymore.
I thought that SECDEF's Foreign Affairs article struck a very balanced, well-reasoned, and articulate chord.
As a matter of rhetorical strategy, one technique that often gains success is to overpolarize the situation and then present a "middle ground" solution." While this may not have been the overt plan, it is what has happpened (Gentile V. Nagl, with the SECDEF getting to be the "good guy" with the compromise solution). In fact the debate has managed to get folks to swallow a "dual track" force that will actually be a more expensive propostion than either of the other alternatives--all conventional or all irregular warfighting capability. I'd say it is a pretty slick bit of persuasion.
Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit
The greatest educational dogma is also its greatest fallacy: the belief that what must be learned can necessarily be taught. — Sydney J. Harris
I know what you mean
(emphasis Ron)
From my limited perch it almost seems like the requirement for integrating COIN/IW practices firmly into bureaucratic circles has happened at the cost of that continuum understanding.
Sort of like there exists blank number of blocks for a certain type of warfare and the only way the other gets brought into the fold is through a 1 to 1 swap.
In some ways this may make sense (resource allocations, training limitations,etc) but although I can't put my finger on it something doesn't seem quite right. Lets just hope that those who represent each are able to balance their way through to reasonable exchanges in order to keep some sort of equilibrium otherwise in the end Gentile's consistant concerns might not have been as unnecessary as they sometimes may seem
Any man can destroy that which is around him, The rare man is he who can find beauty even in the darkest hours
Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur
I think that both the content and method are suspect.
Regarding method, the author argued in an earlier piece on the assumption that our successes since 2007 somehow detract from the sacrifices of his Soldiers in 2006 and earlier. But he cannot seem to argue his case without indirectly belittling the sacrifices made since early 2007. He mischaracterizes those sacrifices as simply "buying off" our adversaries or ignores them completely by assuming that Sadr simply had a change of heart. Those arguments form the core of the issue that he seeks to address. Those arguments are bogus.
If it were as simple as "buying off" former insurgents then this conflict would already be over. See an earlier response from Cavguy. And I am still amazed that in December 2008 the author still thinks that Sadr's decision to scale back the tomfoolery of his militia was unrelated to our seen and unseen efforts. I understand that the author left Iraq in 2006 and may not have visibility over what we did in the meantime to specifically, deliberately, and relentlessly force Sadr's hand, but I would think that even without that knowledge, one would still find the notion that Sadr just had a change of heart to be absurd on its face.
He may have the right conclusion regarding Afghanistan, but how he gets there and how he backs it up detracts from his argument. I think it should be reason for pause when the editors at IHT eat this stuff up, but the crowd at SWJ chew it up and spit it out.
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