The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Van]

In an ongoing discussion on this subject with an Air Force officer currently attending U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, I find myself coming to the conclusion that the Cold War model of a smooth continuum from low intensity to high intensity conflict is broken. The break occurs between Low and Mid intensity. The spectrum of conventional conflict, from the smallest fight to superpowers with nukes is a smooth continuum, but Small Wars operations fall in a discrete spectrum.

COIN falls in the Small Wars spectrum. It may be contemporaneous with a conventional fight, as Churchill tried to arrange for the Germans with the SOE and OSS units, and as the Germans arranged for themselves by invading the Balkans. It may be sequel to a conventional war, as for the Allied forces in Germany after WWII, and in Iraq today. It may be a prelude to a conventional war as in Indochina/Viet Nam and as envisioned in classical Latin American guerrilla theory. COIN may also occur in isolation from a conventional fight.

The bottom line is that COIN requires a different skill set than conventional war, and the U.S. military has to be ready for both. The British model as used Ireland and Bosnia is to train for the conventional war, retrain for COIN, and re-retrain after returning from COIN duty. The Canadians dual equip mechanized units with LAVs (wheeled) and tracked vehicles. I hope someone with better knowledge of Canadian doctrine can confirm or deny that they dual train also.

I don't know what would work best for the U.S. We seem to train for the current fight and continue until we've been burned by the other type of fight and throw everything the other direction until the wheel turns and we get burned again. U.S. officers (the ones I talk with at least) seem to like conventional conflict training better, and want to stay in their comfort zone, but they understand that you have to adapt, like it or not. The danger here is that we'll repeat the Air Force's mistake from the fifties and early sixties of thinking that one size of doctrine fits all (the early nuclear Air Force doctrine). (Actually, the Army wasn't much better with the Pentomic Divisions of that era.)

Utter heresy, but perhaps we should indulge the young firebrand Army, AF, and Marine Captains and Navy LTs. Find the smartest and most contrarian, and allow them a shot a writing the new model. It won't happen because of senior egos and rice bowls, but the younglings have some brilliant ideas and radical methods, and giving them looser reins could pay huge dividends.

[Ken White]

and I'm carnivorous. Not to mention you can eat it with a knife or a spoon, whichever's easier and works best (METT-T for MRE's?)...

Van has it right, I think.

Seems to me that LTCs Gentile and Kilcullen are having a techniques disagreement. That's good for everyone. I think FM 3-24 is basically okay, if a tad touchy-feely and I also agree with much of what LTC Gentile says. Thus there's some merit to both sides, IMO -- I suspect, as usual , the average commander will fall in between, most will do it right and ol' METT-T will be the determinant as it always is...

While LTC Gentile alludes to the paradoxes as potentially introducing a mindset it seems to me that he accords it more power than any other document I''ve seen the Army or the Marine Corps publish. I'm afraid our mindset is too deep for one pub to change.

I do disagree with him on one point -- in his comment above he says that the Army has done pretty well in Iraq with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. I agree broadly but would submit the errors in the first eighteen months due to the lack of doctrinal effort and training emphasis on occupation, nation building and counterinsurgency throughout the Army from 1975 until I retired in 1977 and continuing until I retired as a DAC in 1995 were responsible for many those errors. There were a number of people pointing out the likely future and they were diligently ignored. Sort of understandable in the 1975-1990 period; bad ju-ju post 1990, the proverbial handwriting was on the wall...

Which gets to my point (and Van's) -- we have got to be a full spectrum Army.

Along that line, there's another article in the AFJ, Culture Battle by Colonel Henry Foresman Jr. That I think speaks to both 3-24 proponents and believers in LTC Gentile's approach. The culture is the problem. He says several things that I think are pertinent:

"This is not to say we should have an Army or military that is not prepared to fight grand wars; rather, we need an Army and a military capable of fighting grand wars and conducting peacekeeping operations, providing military support to civil authority and executing stability and support operations."

He agrees with me; smart guy...

However, he also makes a very valid point that it seems to me that both 3-24 and LTC Gentile barely touch upon:

"As Iraq has shown, they can defeat us through information dominance — shaping the message the world sees, whether that message is true or not. They can defeat us by eroding the will of the nation to stay the course."

I believe that is a critical point and the last phrase is the reason. I don't care how good we are. Goesh pointed out that Mr. & Mrs. America are basically cool with body bags but they want results. My sensing is he's absolutely correct and if the perception of Mr. & Mrs America is that we aren't doing well; they'll pull th plug. Techniques then become irrelevant.

"The current Army leaders have matured in a culture where they were taught what to think, not how to think..."

My perception also. Good article and bears reading.

Like Steve, I take issue with some of LTC Gian's premises and essentially for the same reason. However, I do not agree that we haven't transcended the Cold war mindset -- I suggest, as does COL Foresman, we haven't transcended the WW II mindset. We are still structured essentially as we are in 1946. For those who say "Brigade Combat Teams," my response is RCT -- with which we fought most of WW II outside the North African Desert. Not to mention Korea then back to Brigades for Viet Nam. Lest I be misunderstood, Brigades are good, Divisions are bad (even if we did err in the structure ot the light infantry Battalions). Notice that we did not do away with the Division...

I think we did not to avoid the two star spaces loss; we may need them to mobilize -- just as we will need the 3K plus Colonels and 3K plus SGM/CSM even though those are the same numbers we had in 1960 with an Army almost twice the size of todays. Mobilization backup is what that's all about but 'mobilization' is (unfortunately and stupidly) a nasty word in Congress. Thus we dissemble to keep the ability to expand tremendously. Prudent; we should. I just think there are better ways to do that.

Creighton Abrams structured the Total Army to force the government to call up the RC to go to war. The tear down of that started in DS/DS because the then CofSA and then DCSOPS hated the idea and fought Congress demands to send ArNG Brigades to Kuwait. Post DS/DS, they continued to do that in various little ways, some effective and some not. What they did not do was prepare for the present (then or now...).

It's mostly about protecting the institution. To fight WW II.

We need to be able to do that but we could be a whole lot smarter in how we go about it and still be prepared to cope with the more likely threats in the next decade or so..

[Ski]

Great stuff here as always Ken.

and I'm carnivorous. Not to mention you can eat it with a knife or a spoon, whichever's easier and works best (METT-T for MRE's?)...

Van has it right, I think.

Seems to me that LTCs Gentile and Kilcullen are having a techniques disagreement. That's good for everyone. I think FM 3-24 is basically okay, if a tad touchy-feely and I also agree with much of what LTC Gentile says. Thus there's some merit to both sides, IMO -- I suspect, as usual , the average commander will fall in between, most will do it right and ol' METT-T will be the determinant as it always is...

While LTC Gentile alludes to the paradoxes as potentially introducing a mindset it seems to me that he accords it more power than any other document I''ve seen the Army or the Marine Corps publish. I'm afraid our mindset is too deep for one pub to change.

I do disagree with him on one point -- in his comment above he says that the Army has done pretty well in Iraq with the strategic and political cards it was dealt. I agree broadly but would submit the errors in the first eighteen months due to the lack of doctrinal effort and training emphasis on occupation, nation building and counterinsurgency throughout the Army from 1975 until I retired in 1977 and continuing until I retired as a DAC in 1995 were responsible for many those errors. There were a number of people pointing out the likely future and they were diligently ignored. Sort of understandable in the 1975-1990 period; bad ju-ju post 1990, the proverbial handwriting was on the wall...

Which gets to my point (and Van's) -- we have got to be a full spectrum Army.

Along that line, there's another article in the AFJ, Culture Battle by Colonel Henry Foresman Jr. That I think speaks to both 3-24 proponents and believers in LTC Gentile's approach. The culture is the problem. He says several things that I think are pertinent:



He agrees with me; smart guy...

However, he also makes a very valid point that it seems to me that both 3-24 and LTC Gentile barely touch upon:



I believe that is a critical point and the last phrase is the reason. I don't care how good we are. Goesh pointed out that Mr. & Mrs. America are basically cool with body bags but they want results. My sensing is he's absolutely correct and if the perception of Mr. & Mrs America is that we aren't doing well; they'll pull th plug. Techniques then become irrelevant.



My perception also. Good article and bears reading.

Like Steve, I take issue with some of LTC Gian's premises and essentially for the same reason. However, I do not agree that we haven't transcended the Cold war mindset -- I suggest, as does COL Foresman, we haven't transcended the WW II mindset. We are still structured essentially as we are in 1946. For those who say "Brigade Combat Teams," my response is RCT -- with which we fought most of WW II outside the North African Desert. Not to mention Korea then back to Brigades for Viet Nam. Lest I be misunderstood, Brigades are good, Divisions are bad (even if we did err in the structure ot the light infantry Battalions). Notice that we did not do away with the Division...

I think we did not to avoid the two star spaces loss; we may need them to mobilize -- just as we will need the 3K plus Colonels and 3K plus SGM/CSM even though those are the same numbers we had in 1960 with an Army almost twice the size of todays. Mobilization backup is what that's all about but 'mobilization' is (unfortunately and stupidly) a nasty word in Congress. Thus we dissemble to keep the ability to expand tremendously. Prudent; we should. I just think there are better ways to do that.

Creighton Abrams structured the Total Army to force the government to call up the RC to go to war. The tear down of that started in DS/DS because the then CofSA and then DCSOPS hated the idea and fought Congress demands to send ArNG Brigades to Kuwait. Post DS/DS, they continued to do that in various little ways, some effective and some not. What they did not do was prepare for the present (then or now...).

It's mostly about protecting the institution. To fight WW II.

We need to be able to do that but we could be a whole lot smarter in how we go about it and still be prepared to cope with the more likely threats in the next decade or so..

[Rank amateur]

A number of things LTC Gentile says are undoubtedly right and he has identified the problem.

by and large the American army has done pretty well in Iraq—even prior to the surge--with the strategic and political cards it was dealt.

It has pushed us into doing things that make no sense to me: like arming the enemy of the government that we support.

It does not take into account the reality of conditions on the ground in Baghdad, the fact that there is civil war occurring, and those 25,000 additional combat troops simply are not enough to solve militarily what is essentially a political problem.

I’m going to suggest that you guys are such experts on trees, and so wedded to your particular tree related theories, that you can’t see the forest. Only the amateurs, and detached professionals, can see the forest. There are no military solutions to Iraq’s political problems.

The people haven’t abandoned you. (Strangers still show up at funerals for KIA. People still donate to charities for the wounded. Everyone is appalled by the conditions at Walter Reed.) They haven't lost faith. They just know that asking you to sacrifice your life in pursuit of an impossible objective is stupid.

COIN - in Iraq - is a knife. LTC Gentile’s approach is a bigger knife; it feels better, but is no more effective.

We know the resources we can apply. We know the tactics we can use. What we need is an achievable objective.

The country is hungry for a politician who will identify a reasonable objective, and without bull####, tells us how long it will take to achieve, what price we need to pay and why it’s worth paying.

We’re not optimistic.

[Ken White]

I don't know anyone here or anyone in any of the services or retired therefrom -- and that's a large crowd of tree experts -- who ever thought there were any military solutions to Iraq's problems.

I think you're missing the point. I don't know anyone who believes the Nation has abandoned them -- I do know many who disagree with this statement:

"They just know that asking you to sacrifice your life in pursuit of an impossible objective is stupid."

simply because they know that the objective isn't stupid. They also know that many who have not been there think it is stupid and mostly, they're cool with that.

They don't see it as an impossible objective; the objective was to open a window and let the Iraqis make their own decisions. That window was opened and is being held open. It likely will continue to be held open regardless of who's elected next year and mostly, the largest regret is that too many here do not understand all that. Regardless, the tree experts will confound the amatuers and "detached professionals" (whatever they are...) and continue to do their job in spite of that lack of understanding. Like they always have.

The country may be hungry for a politician who will identify that objective and without BS tell them how long it will take, what price they need to pay and why it's worth paying. I suspect they will be disappointed in all those desires, particularly the 'without BS' part.

I could point out that the country has in one form or another been told everything I said two paragraphs above; the problem is that, for some, those things are inadequate or insufficient cause to be there. Nothing any politicians says or does will change that; those minds were mostly made up and they aren't going to be changed. You may or may not be aware there some in the Armed Forces who fall in that category as well. They'll mostly still go and do their thing because they believe that how well one does something that one does not want to do is a mark of value.

Pessimists are never optimistic, it's contrary to their nature.

[skiguy]

A number of things LTC Gentile says
The country is hungry for a politician who will identify a reasonable objective, and without bull####, tells us how long it will take to achieve, what price we need to pay and why it’s worth paying.

Well,only speaking for myself here, but there are some who will NEVER listen to or believe what any politician says and only listens to, believes, and learns from what the likes of Petreaus, Nagl, Gentile, et al have to say.They've made it clear what the cost is, and they've made it clear that it requires patience. And they've made it clear that there is undeniable progress.

We’re not optimistic.

Some of us are. If I had to just rely on what the president or the media says, I'd have lost hope by now. But after listening to Petreaus and Crocker, researching what has been done by others, and reading what the folks here have to say, I'm very optimistic. I understand progress isn't the number of Muslims killed or the number of major cities blown up, it's the number of would-be terrorists who aren't that way anymore and who don't want me killed. It's watching before my very eyes Islam turning into the religion of peace they claim to be.
To say I'm impressed with what I'm hearing and reading about what our guys (military and civilian) have done and are doing, is an understatement. Awe-inspriring would be a better word. I can't begin to tell you how much I want to be a part of this and how much motivation it's giving me to get through the required (and boring) math and science classes until I start taking the more interesting courses.

Don't underestimate us. There are many of us (not as many as I'd like, but enought to have a voice) inexperienced, commom, everyday, civilian shmucks who know perfectly well what's going on and what it all means and who go FAR beyond just putting yellow "support the troops" bumper stickers on our SUV's.

Ken