The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[selil]

...but who are the anti-COIN crowd? No one I know says "we don't do COIN." What I'm against is the "nation building, armed social work," stuff. Securing a population is warfare. It is based in fighting skill.

Sorry but the United States military does much more than HIC. It is the primary operational response force within the United States during times of disaster (read the national response framework). The United States military is the primary agency for large scale pandemic/civil disturbance/etc. The United States military has a seat at every table where a disaster or incident of national significance occurs. This is including the fires raging in California right this minute. Oh, and since they are basically the same force sure you can say National Guard, but sorry that differential is eroding.

The United States military does much more than HIC we just seem to get wedded to our own opinions to quickly. A lot of that stuff looks like nation building/civil support to me.

[William F. Owen]

Sorry but the United States military does much more than HIC. It is the primary operational response force within the United States during times of disaster (read the national response framework). The United States military is the primary agency for large scale pandemic/civil disturbance/etc. The United States military has a seat at every table where a disaster or incident of national significance occurs. This is including the fires raging in California right this minute. Oh, and since they are basically the same force sure you can say National Guard, but sorry that differential is eroding.

The United States military does much more than HIC we just seem to get wedded to our own opinions to quickly. A lot of that stuff looks like nation building/civil support to me.

I agree with all that. Same is true of almost all NATO armies.

Providing trained bodies of manpower to aid the civil authority requires very little training if any, so armies don't train to do it. - and sometimes it provides good training.

That is all completely different from going to a far foreign land and having an army build schools, churches/mosques and hospitals, as part of a political activity aimed at creating a government friendly to yours..

- and while war is a political act, those parts of it which are NOT demonstrably about creating exploiting or supporting the application or threatened application of violence, are not (or should not be) a military mission.

.... and yes sometimes you have to do it because your government lacks the political will to ensure that the right people do it.

[selil]

That is all completely different from going to a far foreign land and having an army build schools, churches/mosques and hospitals, as part of a political activity aimed at creating a government friendly to yours..

- and while war is a political act, those parts of it which are NOT demonstrably about creating exploiting or supporting the application or threatened application of violence, are not (or should not be) a military mission.

The United States Navy has been involved in substantial missions to our southern neighbors with the primary goal being medical care to communities that have none or very little. The mission "Operation Comfort" is a very soft power mission, from what the LACC communities have said it is very successful. The same ships that have medical facilities are escorted by ships that could topple regimes in seconds.

I think the idea of COIN/soft power/stability is very much a part of the American way of doing business. "Speak softly carry a big stick" whether true or not is still part of the American narrative. It is when we walk away from that idea that polarization and schizophrenia of political process starts.

I have a very controversial hypothesis (everybody tells me I'm wrong then offers me medication), I believe that the cold war was a long aberration of American politics with moments of lucidity. America doesn't do the "World Police" role very well, domestically doesn't like it, and it is fed by corporate needs more than political requirements.

If it wasn't for the cold war Israel would never have gotten the support it got, same for the Shah of Iran, Norriega, and any of dozens of other regimes. I think, though have no ability, knowledge, or capacity to prove, that what we are seeing is the break down of the cold war mindset. It just appears or seems that much of the LIC and HIC discussion isn't about COIN, but is about a fundamental Kuhn type paradigm shift in American political military presence.

American's see themselves like Canadians, act often like Germans, sympathize with the French, and mope about their mistakes like the British, while worrying about the Russians.

Meanwhile the Chinese build five more carriers and triple the size of their navy.

[Steve Blair]

I have a very controversial hypothesis (everybody tells me I'm wrong then offers me medication), I believe that the cold war was a long aberration of American politics with moments of lucidity. America doesn't do the "World Police" role very well, domestically doesn't like it, and it is fed by corporate needs more than political requirements.

If it wasn't for the cold war Israel would never have gotten the support it got, same for the Shah of Iran, Norriega, and any of dozens of other regimes. I think, though have no ability, knowledge, or capacity to prove, that what we are seeing is the break down of the cold war mindset. It just appears or seems that much of the LIC and HIC discussion isn't about COIN, but is about a fundamental Kuhn type paradigm shift in American political military presence.

No controversy here, actually. The Cold War WAS an aberration in terms of American policy. A careful reading of just military history shows this. The US has always had an internal focus, with a few flailings outside our borders, until the end of World War II.

[AmericanPride]

The US has always had an internal focus, with a few flailings outside our borders, until the end of World War II.

Robert Kagan made a convincing counter-argument.

[Steve Blair]

I didn't consider Kagan's argument especially convincing, actually. Laden with ideological postures, certainly.

[AmericanPride]

How then is the narrative of American isolationism reconciled with the country's history of expansionism?

[William F. Owen]

The United States Navy has been involved in substantial missions to our southern neighbors with the primary goal being medical care to communities that have none or very little. The mission "Operation Comfort" is a very soft power mission, from what the LACC communities have said it is very successful. The same ships that have medical facilities are escorted by ships that could topple regimes in seconds.

Providing medical care is not building or re-building. This activity as part of diplomacy makes sense and always has. - but it should not be part of operations or an element of your combat and security strategy. "Soft Power" is for use against those who support you or want to. Soft Power is an instrument of diplomacy.

If it wasn't for the cold war Israel would never have gotten the support it got, same for the Shah of Iran, Norriega, and any of dozens of other regimes.

If you want to throw in every member of NATO, as well, I'd absolutely agree with you.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to War on the Rocks, where Crispin Burke reviews Gian Gentile's latest book, Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency with some pithy comments and some good marks:http://warontherocks.com/2013/08/the...terinsurgency/

Link to Amazon:http://www.amazon.com/Wrong-Turn-Ame.../dp/1595588744

In case you wonder why this post is on an old thread, read on.

Moderator's Note

Being an outsider to the protracted debate in the USA over COIN I am familiar with some of the names and prompted by a new book review of Colonel Gian Gentile's latest book, I have merged six threads today. On a quick review some were single posts and others longer discussions here. This thread was called 'Eating Soup with a Spoon' and is now 'The Col. Gentile collection and debate'. Somehow I suspect there are other threads as 'Gentile' appears in 162 threads, but for now this is enough.(ends).

[davidbfpo]

I missed that on SWJ Blog there is an discussion going on about Col. Gentile's views, based on a shorter e-article 'Counterinsurgency: The Graduate Level of War or Pure Hokum?' and includes reviews of the book itself:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cou...-or-pure-hokum

Since Col. Gentile often refers to British COIN, here is a contrary viewpoint by a British academic from 2012:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...that-never-was

[John T. Fishel]

Crispin Burke generally critiques Gian Gentile's new book very well but he appears to accept Gentile's critique of the myth of the savior generals without serious question. A careful reading of Woodward's The War Within, Linda Robinson's Tell Me How this Ends. and Tom Ricks' The Gamble paints a far more complex picture than Gentile presents or than Victor Davis Hanson articulates in his book of that name (and elsewhere). Indeed, John Nagl in his chapter called "The Emprire Strikes Back" begins it with the quote of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery where he says that first Malaya needs a plan, then a man. In the previous chapter, John goes into detail on the Briggs plan which was adopted by Templer (the man).

I tend to lean part way toward the "savior general" hypothesis but as I noted above it is much more complex. Who is in charge does make a difference. But also the question is: in charge of what. It certainly made a difference that Lincoln was president and not Buchanan or Stephen Douglas. Leadership is about both choices and the intangibles that make one want to follow the leader. Weber called it charisma. Gentile argues that Abrams approach showed operational and tactical continuity with Westmoreland. But Nixon's strategy marks a real change from LBJ's and Abrams was the man who carried it out. That said, it was a significant change of leadership from Westy to Abrams both in style and substance. Abrams imposed a unity of command and sense of purpose that did not exist under Westy. (I served under Westmoreland in the Pentagon when he was CSA. My shop produced the daily current intel brief for the SECARMY, CSA, VCSA, and the rest of the senior DA staff. The Secretary and the Vice (GEN Bruce Palmer), and every other recipient read the book in the presence of the courier/analyst except for Westy who had his WO receive it and called for it to be picked up at the end of the day. The only thing Westy seemed interested in was that officers' haircuts met the regulation!)

While GEN Abizaid and Casey followed the conventions of COIN they both analyzed the problem in Iraq as too large a US footprint. Those who designed the surge - and Petraeus was only one of a fair sized group - made a different analysis. More important was that Petraeus and his State counterpart, Amb Crocker recognized the ambiguous structure of authority for US actions in Iraq and THEY determined not only that they would always speak with one voice but how they would go about making sure that this happened. It was their solution to the problem that the Brits solved in Malaya by making Templer "supremo." It is interesting that Crocker's successor in Iraq, Amb Chris Hill, refused such a relationship with Pretraeus's successor, Odierno.

Another point, returning to the trio of books I mentioned at the beginning of this post, is that Woodward focuses on the leadership of Steve Hadley (NSA), retired GEN Jack Keane, Fred Kagan, and of course Pres Bush while Robinson focuses on Petraeus and Crocker, and Ricks on Odierno. So, there is no single savior general but rather a number of key leaders exercising effective leadership. Contrast this with the story Woodward tells in Obama's Wars.

People matter.

Cheers

JohnT