I do not take issue with the fact that War is violent and that COIN is war – in my reading of 3-24, I don’t think it does either. Part of this is my preference to always view doctrine as descriptive and not prescriptive (Unit SOPs are generally prescriptive). I’d also say that I never saw guys on the ground contemplating if it was a good idea or a bad one to shoot a clearly identified AIF setting an IED, carrying an RPG, or PKC, or even setting up a mortar – nobody was confused about the best way of immediately securing the populace was to kill those AIF actively engaged in violent activity. If there was information on a cache or meeting of AIF conducting plans or related activity – a mission was generated as quickly as possible to capture or kill them. The Iraqis and CF I worked with understood that until physical security was established, the other LLOOs would be compromised – they also understood that you had to prepared to quickly transition from conducting a Community Engagement type activity to pouncing on the enemy if he showed the will to contest our control of an area.
At the level where dyed in the wool insurgents seek to impose their will on the population it is a duel & no amount of LLOOs is probably going to convince them to give up - this minority is going to have to be captured or killed by either HN or CF.
I don't think 3-24 advocates sacrificing Tactical success - it just acknowledges that you can't pursue purely lethal Tactical operations and expect that success at that level will translate to Operational and Strategic success in COIN, or for that matter any type of war. Do we want it - you bet - every time we meet that enemy we should relentlessly pursue him until he is captured, killed, denied any freedom of movement, expelled, etc. Tactical success is credibility, and it permits our (friendly forces) own freedom of movement to pursue the LLOOs that can be translated to Operational and Strategic success in a COIN environment.
Clausewitz’s duel where there are winners and losers is appropriate. Within a province or city where insurgents have the initiative and unrestricted freedom of movement then COIN forces (HN or CF) will not – it’s a zero sum game – you either have the initiative or you don’t at what ever level you are considering. The priority for COIN forces at that point goes to seizing and retaining the initiative. This begins with lethal operations at the Tactical & Operational levels, but does not end there. 3-24 recommends transitioning to a mix of security operations and other LLOOs to develop the PMSEII so that while those who will not re-enter society are captured or killed, the conditions which lend credibility to the insurgent message and attract people to the insurgent cause are changed.
Within the COIN environment there are ongoing operations that are going to feel more like the “Other then War” we once doctrinally used to describe those missions. The problem with that doctrinal description was that increasingly those environments proved that they could go to “War” on one side of a city, while on the other side of the city it remained a “Other then” environment. However, you can’t sacrifice the gains you’ve made that permitted a transition on one side of the river to a mix of lethal and LLOOs; and you can’t sacrifice the gains that permitted a larger transition at the provincial level – these are the operations that provide the long term gains because they address the conditions that made the insurgency possible.
At the lower tactical echelons the focus is going to be sharper by comparison with larger echelons. If a BCT has the bulk of a province, it may have two TFs focusing primarily on LLOOs because the conditions permit it. However, the other TF may be clearing insurgents for months – the enemy gets a vote, and may have decided that he is willing to fight and die within the battlespace assigned to that TF. However within the Battlespace assigned to that TF – the part of the city assigned to a specific Company or CO TM may have a local leader that has galvanized the community against the goals of the insurgents – the violence within that community might be limited to assassinations and car bombs targeting the community leadership from insurgents infiltrating that company AOR– but its still lethal. The higher the echelon in COIN, the greater the chance that it contains different types of threats, must pursue different types of LOOs and LLOOs.
I don’t think LTC Nagl or any other contributor to the 3-24 would take issue with that. On the Daily show – he made the remark – I have to paraphrase – “be prepared to kill”. Operrations on the ground would seem to reflect this – the number of AIF killed or captured, the number of caches seized and the limitations of AIF freedom of movement started with, or were generated from our ability to impose our will on the enemy through the use of violence. However, that tactical success was built upon with other LLOOs that engaged the communities and secured additional benefits that could not be attained otherwise. The NGO community and passive IOs can’t conduct COIN because they don’t have the capability to employ violence or contest the armed resistance employed by insurgents – we do. However, because COIN occurs in a Social setting, and is a contest for the will and support of the citizen – we must be able to follow up security by generating the foundations for stability.
No doctrine IMHO should be a prescription for a problem – this is Clausewitz’s recognition that there is a subjective nature to War. Every War is going to be unique in the subjective due to the political context which surrounds it. There are all kinds of political goals by the various enemies we find in Iraq – the subjective nature of War may be different in Baghdad, then Anbar – that’s just the way it is. If we conduct a COIN campaign in another part of the world, those conditions will change along with the subjective nature unique to that War. The Objective nature, that War is violent, it has winners and losers, it is rife with fog, friction and chance, and the more protracted it is- the more chance plays a role, it is a social activity, it makes no sense when divorced from its political context is valid in any War.
The problem with any doctrine that addresses the complexity of War is going to be its interpretation – I’m not sure you can have a doctrine that is going to change that while remaining broad enough in scope to acknowledge both the Objective and Subjective nature of War. Take what works and apply it to the War you (your element) are in, and save the rest when conditions change – that is the value in descriptive doctrine.
Best regards, Rob
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