Quote Originally Posted by Mark O'Neill View Post
been Attack of the strawman...
The problem I perceive with some of the argument presented is that a false dilemma is being postulated . No one - from Secretary Gates through to Nagl is on record as advocating abandonment of US conventional abilities and the US' obvious superiority in this field...Picking a 'winning approach' is not served by creating false dilemmas.
Mark: Well said (Rob, Ken, et al too):

I do not think I have set up a strawman or created a false dilemma. Of course folks like SecDef and John Nagl have not called for abandoning conventional capabilities, just like I have never said we need to ditch irregular/coin/stability capabilities. But it is fair to say that our conventional capabilities have atrophied over the past 5 years. Most reasonable folks would agree with that statement. The seriousness of that atrophying is what is in question and how long it will take to recover. Clearly our Army and sister services have gained much in the way of combat experience; but as I have agrued before that combat experience in Iraq and Astan is not directly transferable especially in terms of combat functions to other forms of conflict. Those who think that it will be should consult history; specifically the British 7th Armored Division who learned and eventually ended up fighting well in north Africa, gained much combat experience from that theater, but when in June/July 1944 they had a very rough go making just the 20 some-odd miles up to Caen in the face of a superior German tactical fighting ability. The logic of combat experience being universal and transferable from one form to another should have meant that the British 7th marched right up to Caen on Day 2.

I am also not sanguine at all that somehow, by process, luck, hope, whatever, that we will end up with an appropriate balance. This especially worries me when I read what John Nagl writes in his RUSI book review of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. Nagl writes that in future wars and conflicts American soldiers who

...will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies...
The last clause in the above sentence takes my breath away in its implication for policy and American action in the world. As one, like many other SWC members, who has been on the business end of American foreign policy in foreign lands I am deeply suspect of the notion that deployed American military power can "change entire societies."

And LTG Caldwell's recent article in Military Review where he proclaims with troubling certainty that:

The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.
This sweeping statment about the nature of future war is equally arresting. It is underpinned by a vision of the future security environment as one of a global-counterinsurgency that applies a counter-maoist, protracted people's war approach. Such an approach at least implies a force structure that is heavily weighted toward stability operations and irregular war. So how will our army look in 10 years? If the new Army doctrine has anything to do with things the logic of it calls for an light infantry heavy force that can work "among the people" protecting them and convincing them of ours and the host nations righteousness. this is why i am worried and not at all sanguine that "balance" will some how just come about because we say it will.

gian