The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Van]

Rank Amateur et al;

There are no military solutions to Iraq’s political problems.

Better to say "There are no military solutions to political problems". I'm certain that most members of the Council understand this at least intellectually, and a majority have really internalized the concept. At the end of the day, militaries only buy time for politicians to sort out the solution*. This having been said, synchronization and deconfliction of combat and non-combat measures in Small Wars (including COIN) is essential to success (per the U.S.M.C. 1940 manual and other sources). The problem is often one of persuading the civilian leadership that the military is not the correct wrench with which to pound screws.

Re: optimism- In Iraq, we should be guardedly optimistic. It won't sort itself out in a fashion that will be to our liking, but if we can sever the outside support for the insurgents, not make any more gaffs on the scale of Abu Ghraib, and stick with it for the full decade it takes to succeed in COIN, we've got a great chance of success. Sadly, the media and the self-serving defeatists are doing every thing in their power to make this impossible, no matter the strategic damage they cause us. Note the long lasting geopolitical damage we suffered from the precipitous pullout from Somalia. Now increase that by an order of magnitude...
- In the GWOT, if we can avoid validating the allegations that the West is waging war on Islam, there is plenty of reason to be optimistic, especially as Muslims are coming out against violence and the irhabi. If the popular meme reverts back to a "Christian vs Muslim" perception of the conflict, it could rapidly degenerate into calls for genocide from both sides. Again, guarded optimism is in order, but we must remain cognizant of the risks and possible consequences.


*In a republic with civilian control of the military, won't comment on other arrangements.

[goesh]

Gentile states that when the Tal Alfar lessons were applied to Baghdad, our troops were subjected to "supreme tactical vulnerability". That's pretty serious stuff to taxpayers like me and ol' Mom & Pop back home. How much of that statement is a reflection of reality on the street and how much of it is a reflection of the inherent friction that is becoming readily apparent between COIN proponents and for lack of better word, old school (geezers?), traditional military thinking? More importanty, how much is this in-house war detracting from success of the mission in Iraq?

[Rank amateur]

It won't sort itself out in a fashion that will be to our liking,

I agree: regardless of how many kinetic vs. COIN ops we run.

The paradoxes in FM 3-24 are nothing more than Sun Tsuisms for the 21st Century.

I didn't find any paradoxes in Sun Tsu. I'd say it was more of a philosophy that the right thing to do depends on a number of factors. Whose correct in this dispute about tactics? Both and neither. It depends. But if neither tactic will achieve the objective, then it's neither.