The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Gian P Gentile]

I don't think anyone disagrees with this - but - how do we educationally prepare soldiers for full-spectrum ops?

I, like many others, did not feel that the army provided sufficent grounding in COIN basics prior to 2003 as part of our professional military education, and as a result we committed major avoidable errors in tactical COIN 2003-2004.

I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

It may be easy to criticize Galula, but I would submit if more officers had read that book as part of a general military education (alongside all other works), we may have created less problems than we ultimately did in OIF.

Niel

Niel: right, and now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved. Now the Coin advocates response is well, really, so what, because we must win the wars we are in now so don’t worry about the future. I don’t buy that logic, and I think it to be irresponsible. This gets to your question about education. Certainly at places like the Army War College and other defense educational institutions there is an important place for coin, irregular war as subjects for education. But we should not turn these places into Coin Academies where that is all that they do there. Why? Because we must be able to think beyond the current wars in terms of policy and strategy, do otherwise would be to ignore a duty that we have to our elected leaders and the people of the United States.

finally, you and I will never agree on your other points. I think it is just flat-wrong to think counterfactually that if more soldiers had read Galula things would have turned out differently. You cannot prove that anyway. But what I can prove at least through the record as it is given to us from the most recent credible histories written is that the majority of American Army tactical units transitioned quickly to full-spectrum operations and within that were conducting many best practices in coin. Were these capabilities as wide-spread as they were under the Surge? Probably not, but they still were wide-spread and the delta so to speak was not decisive.

Such arguments of "if we had done this or that" are really a big large trope within the american army for trying to fight vietnam all over again in iraq but this time win.

gg

[Cavguy]

Sir,

Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's? I feel they should have an understanding of the principles of all forms of conflict, supported by broad reading.

Yes, we adapted quicky, but I (along with many observers) think we missed our window in Iraq between April 10 and August 17 (UN Bombing, IIRC). Yes, we "rapidly" adapted tactically, slower operationally. In my view, we did lose whatever chance we had to gain the cooperation of the population in that period, mostly through ignorance of COIN principles. The fact that we learned later doesn't mean that it was okay to not know in the first place. If you read Kalev Sepp's taxonomy of best/worst COIN practices, it largely describes everything we did in 2003-2004.

You do have a point that no amount of better tactics would have fixed the lack of strategic clarity and direction at that time.

Niel

[Ken White]

Bayonet Brant said:

"...I wonder if at least some of the 'muscle memory' that's ben referred to above is less about the difference between COIN/HIC and as much, or more, about risk aversion."

That, too. I 'd say in about equal measures across the board, varying in percent of each between individual commanders.

RTK said:

"Basics and fundamentals don't change. Their application may, but basic battle drills, action drills, contact drills and reports are the exact same. Dealing with other people in other cultures and our own in the way they should be treated as equals and peers and not in the "I'm-American. I'm- wicked-way-smarter-than-you" methodology we've been known to use
doesn't have to be a battalion training event."

Couldn't have said it better m'self...

CavGuy said:

"I think the answer lies more in professional education versus training, as I look back at my OBC and CCC I realize nearly all of it was training. In line units, only three commanders (two BN and one CO) of mine had any regular sort of formal OPD program.

Having run an instructional branch charged with training OBC and AOAC students at the Armor School for five years and having come up with some fairly innovative -- and effective -- training at the time only to see it go back to below humdrum in a matter of months after I left and being broadly familiar with the Infantry versions over the years, I can believe that your experience was all training and little education. Mostly poor training and not nearly enough of it at that.

That's why I continually beat the drum about the fact that our initial entry training does not prepare people for service in a professional army. We are still training people as if they were destined for a rapidly mobilizing wartime force. It's stupid. I know that both the OBC and CCC curricula are undergoing changes -- good ones -- but we haven't gone far enough. We're doing better than we used to but we can do even better.

CavGuy later added:

"Understand, but I just think we need to develop a broad based, rigorous "liberal" education for our officers covering the "full spectrum" of warfare.

As of this moment, TRADOC has no such beast or articulation therof - what are our educational learning objectives/standards for our Officers and NCO's. I feel they should have an understanding of the principles

I strongly agree but would suggest you better do that for the NCOs as well or you'll suffer later.

I'd also suggest that education has to start for both officers and the enlisted folks at entry. Most everyone who comes in the Army will operate in jobs at least one and often two ranks higher than that actually held BEFORE they go to the level of school to 'equip' them for the higher position. Our PME has never adapted to that fact. At Knox, in the 70s, almost all Captains had commanded and been on a staff before they came to the advanced course. We had one ANCOC course where every single student had already been a Platoon Sergeant...

Gian said:

"...now with the operational demands of coin we must train our formations to perform the mission they are getting ready to conduct which means until we ramp-down we must maintain our operational training focus on coin. But as I said that comes at a cost, there is risk involved."

True and the risk has to be accepted for now but given the effort to turn the overly massive bureaucracy that is TRADOC it is time to start setting in place revised POIs for all training and education, IET through the War College that truly, at lower levels thoroughly inculcates the basics of the profession and at upper levels encourages calculated risk taking, decentralization and independent thought.

We are not going to restore our ability to trust subordinates until we do that and no armed force can operate effectively without trust.

ADDED: And what Max161 said; train the basics on entry, educate the leaders...

[Surferbeetle]

Cherry picked from the White House Web site on Defense (got the link from SWJ - thanks!)

President Obama and Vice President Biden will invest in a 21st century military to maintain our conventional advantage while increasing our capacity to defeat the threats of tomorrow. They will ensure our troops have the training, equipment and support that they need when they are deployed.

Invest in a 21st Century Military

* Rebuild the Military for 21st Century Tasks: Obama and Biden believe that we must build up our special operations forces, civil affairs, information operations, and other units and capabilities that remain in chronic short supply; invest in foreign language training, cultural awareness, and human intelligence and other needed counterinsurgency and stabilization skill sets; and create a more robust capacity to train, equip, and advise foreign security forces, so that local allies are better prepared to confront mutual threats.

[Ken White]

that it was carried forward to the WH Web site. I have no quarrel with any of that provided it is done sensibly and as truly needed based on a thorough assessment, is not done automatically mostly as a counterpoint to the predecessor and does not get in the way of full spectrum capability. We need to and can do all those things without going overboard.

I doubt he'll pay much more attention to me than Bush did but I can hope they'll do right instead of just doing something...

[marct]

I find it intriguing that "training" is often listed as a component of PME; it shouldn't be.

Sam is quite correct in his critique of the differences but, while he says that it isn't a discussion of semantics, it is really. "Semantics" is the science of meaning (or the study of meaning) and that is exactly what this entire training vs. education debate is about, and it is also one of the reasons why people are talking past each other.

[Ken White]

Nor, I know, did you say I was...

However, to clarify...

My goal is better training -- particularly upon entry -- which will give people a thorough grounding in the basics of performance required to survive and to be successful in combat. That training must include a smattering of education because the new career includes subject matter never before acquired or even in many case encountered or considered.

Follow on PME should be mostly education -- but the application of that education in practical exercises at the educational institution constitutes some training as well. Too many years of practical effort have pretty well proven that even purely cognitive skills can be embedded with three practical repetitions of application.

Aside from institutional training and education, continued self-education is required and in the conduct of day to day business and in field exercises, all previous training and education should be put into practice in what the Armed Forces usually call 'training.' As is sometimes said "Everything is training is everything."

Thus the conmingling.