The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[SWJED]

A (Slightly) Better War: A Narrative and Its Defects - LTC Gian Gentile, World Affairs.

The U.S. Army’s new strategy in Iraq—launched in February 2007, along with a surge of 25,000 additional American troops—qualifies neither as particularly new nor even as a strategy. Better to call it, instead, an enhanced reliance on tactics and operational concepts previously in use. Or, put less charitably, an over-hyped shift in emphasis that, on the one hand, will not necessarily yield an American victory in Iraq but, on the other, might well leave the United States Army crippled in future wars.

Properly understood, the surge narrative is really not about Iraq at all. It is about the past and future of the U.S. Army. It resurrects dubious battlefield lessons from the past—Vietnam, principally—applies them to Iraq, and extrapolates from there into an unknown future. On all three counts—past, present, and future—the narrative suffers from numerous and irreparable defects. Its reading of the past, grounded in the cliché that General Creighton Abrams’s “hearts and minds” program “won” the war in Vietnam, is a self-serving fiction. Its version of the more recent past and even the present is contrived and largely fanciful, relying on a distorted version of both to tell a tale in which U.S. forces triumphed in Iraq in 2007 and did so despite the misguided efforts of their predecessors even a year before. More than anything else, the surge narrative stakes a claim on the future, instructing us that its methods of counterinsurgency will be uniquely suited to the next war and to the one after that.

From the surge, its most fervent advocates have extracted a single maxim: that they and only they have uncovered the secret to defeating insurgencies. Prior to the surge, in this telling, only a few exceptional units were engaged in proper counterinsurgent operations...

Much more at the link.

[Ken White]

trick pony people go on about.

Having agreed with him that the force is out of balance -- but disagreed on how far and how dangerous that is at this time; having agreed with him that good units in Iraq were doing the right things prior to the surge -- but disagreed on how many were doing it well; having agreed with him that conventional warfare and major combat operations are really the graduate level of war -- but disagreed that COIN is totally unimportant; having agreed, I thought, that we must have a balanced force with some elements able to excel at each of the spectrums of warfare, I've said about all I have to say on the topic (as I hear Gian breathe a sigh of relief... ).

I did note his final words in that well written article:

More than that, Iraq bids to transform the entire force into a “dead army walking.” We who believe this to be the case may be in error on some counts. Preparing to fight the last war will not be one of them.

Those words cause me to note what I believe is an astounding lack of faith in the Army and to ask; then those who believe that to be the case are preparing for precisely what?

[patmc]

As a former Artilleryman (switched to MI this month), I agree that FA is in trouble as a branch. Officers, NCO's, and Soldiers are not universally pleased with non-standard ILO missions, but do them because that is their duty. We've lost a lot of the FA technical skills that are highly perishable. But does that mean all the branches are in trouble?

Our infantrymen and tanks are fighting as squads, platoons, and companies/troops, not as battalions/squadrons, brigades, and divisions; but in reality, squads and teams actually fight the war, so is this an overly bad thing? It may make higher level commanders rusty, but for the trigger puller who only sees the men to his left and right, the experience he is gaining in OIF/OEF is immense. Can anyone better attest to this?

This article points out that some units were fighting COIN before it became sexy and official. I drove around Iraq throughout 2006, and I never saw any Combat Outposts. A couple patrol bases, but not the forward presence we have now. We went many a convoy without seeing any US troops (other than the other convoys). If not original, "The Surge" changed the Army-wide mindset, and made it the new stategy. The data I read about IEDs on convoys shows that something new is working, as attacks are WAY down from my time there. That is a great thing, regardless of who gets credit for it.

From the article:
"Critics of this decision ought to ask themselves: If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would the ground phase of the 1991 Gulf War have been completed in four days? Would the 2003 drive to Baghdad have been accomplished in three weeks?"

Just some Monday morning quarterbacking, and in no way an insult to any of those Soldiers who fought in the invasion, but would we now trade a longer invasion for a shorter occupation? If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would there have been a plan B for after capturing Baghdad?

[Gian P Gentile]

Ken:

Even when we have disagreed on things (probably most of the time) I have learned much from our discussions.

Patmc: At least in Baghdad, i think the notion that the cops have been a key factor in the lowering of violence has been way overstated. For the size of the city there have just not been that many put out there and many of the points that have been called cops are actually Joint Security Stations which had been in place as ISF fobs.

However, I do think that in Talafar in 2005 with 3ACR and in Ramadi in 06/07 with 1/1 AD cops may have played a significant role. Neil Smith's recent article in Military Review on 1/1 AD in Ramadi makes a pretty convincing case (albeit without viewing things from the Iraqi side) that there were enough cops in Ramadi to have made a significant difference; combined of course with the other efforts of the brigade, like co-opting the tribes to ally with them to fight alqueda.

gian

[Ken White]

...
From the article:
"Critics of this decision ought to ask themselves: If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would the ground phase of the 1991 Gulf War have been completed in four days? Would the 2003 drive to Baghdad have been accomplished in three weeks?"

Just some Monday morning quarterbacking, and in no way an insult to any of those Soldiers who fought in the invasion, but would we now trade a longer invasion for a shorter occupation? If Abrams had chosen otherwise, would there have been a plan B for after capturing Baghdad?

Abrams made the logical decision to put the main effort into ability to deter a peer competitor as he should have done. He did not take COIN or FID off the table; that was done later by Donn Starry at TRADOC and affirmed by Bernie Rogers as CofSA. The Army kept some semblance of effort at LIC until John Wickham left the job. Then it got almost totally wiped out by a series of Artillerymen and Tankers with a lot of European experience.

To put the principal effort into Europe post Viet Nam made all the sense in the world. To downplay COIN and FID made sense. That was true in 1972 and it remained true until the late 80s. However, to later eliminate anything to do with LIC, particularly after 1991 was simply wrong. Still, even that and the foolish Weinberger and Powell doctrines -- abrogation of which by both Clinton and Bush 43 prove that DoD cannot influence US Foreign policy to the extent they'd like to believe -- were not the real problem.

The problem that created the lack of planning for the post attack phase was poor training; specifically BCTP. In that training regimen, the war was played by the Generals and Colonels, active on one side and retired on the other and it was good solid and very effective training. However, it had a flaw. After the last big US attack, the victory was won -- then they turned off the computers and the lights and left the room...

The problem in Iraq was no one had trained on what to do so they effectively did nothing for a year and a half. That's been fixed. The even better news is that BCTP has also been fixed in current iterations.

What is worrying is that Eurocentricity still seems to be with us...

That's not the last war, it was three wars ago...

[Rob Thornton]

The U.S. Army’s new strategy in Iraq—launched in February 2007, along with a surge of 25,000 additional American troops—qualifies neither as particularly new nor even as a strategy.

Interesting statement, and one worth discussing-

One way of expressing strategy is in ends, ways and means. Did any of these change? When did they change and why did they change? Did they change all at once, or over time? Were they explicit changes or implicit changes that became explicit over time. Was it a combination of bottom up changes that were codified into something else at the right time? Was it sausage? Does it matter?

I think over time we've gotten much more pragmatic about our ends, probably an acceptance of realism over idealism - meaning we'll settle for a more acceptable outcome vs. the ideal outcome. Again I emphasize that happened over time and that realization allowed us to adjust our expectations some.

With regards to "ways" I think those have also shifted over time. It was not an overnight shift, but it was codified in the MNF-I CDR's guidance I saw early in 2007, and that did have an effect. I believe it changed the way units approached their mission before they arrived vs. the 3-4 month adaptation curve I saw in previous units. It changed the subordinate commander's intent, and that changed the operational and tactical focus, and the allocation of resources - at least that is what I attribute s the cause - I say that after having asked several BCT and TF CDRs if it made a difference in the way they saw their key tasks - nothing new there - its doctrine. However, the codification of a change in guidance into the CDR's intent combined with other environmental factors - the increase in means (U.S. and Iraqi) and some misteps by the enemy facilitated a shift in "ways" on a scale that registered. Its not mono causal, but a CDR's understanding and intuition of when to shift operational focus is his responsibility - had it failed, had he erred in his judgment the CDR would certainly be held accountable.

An increase in troop end strength and an increase in funding is certainly a strategic increase in means. The decision to focus that increase primarily in MND-B is an operational increase in means - and it is also a change in ways. Baghdad was regarded as decisive for a number of reasons from credibility of the Iraqi government and our continued efforts (our domestic will) there, to countering the focus of enemy efforts, to providing the center of Iraqi government an air of increased security where political issues could be brought up and addressed in an environment that showed the potential for progress.

So if an expression of strategy is ends, ways and means, and one of those changed significantly, then did the strategy change? It may have been sausage over time, but we did not realize and codify it until about 2007. We hang the mark there for some good reasons.

WRT risk in Army capabilities and capacities - there is always risk. We cannot and should not count on policy to produce objectives that conform to the expectations for which we have spent the most $$ preparing. Its the other way around. Yes, we must be full spectrum, but in order to secure the policy objective with available resources we may be required to accept risk in other parts of the spectrum at various times. It is our job to point out those risks, but it is also our job to accept them (and mitigate where possible) once the policy objective has been decided.

Post policy objective I believe we will balance out - it will not be as before where we were absent a portion of the spectrum - we will and should move to account for those missing capabilities. As such we will not look as we did in 2000. We will and should be a bit different. We are working toward what we've always said we must do - provide ready and relevant land power, the operational environment has caused us to redefine some what is relevant to those types of conflicts we anticipate, and as such we are changing some to ensure our readiness to meet the challenges we may be called on in pursuit of policy.

Best, Rob

[Mark O'Neill]

been Attack of the strawman. I think that even a casual review of posting history on this site reveals that Gian has several deeply entrenched positions on this issue. Nothing wrong with that. There are plenty of us who have similarly strongly held views on a wide range of issues.

The problem I perceive with some of the argument presented is that a false dilemma is being postulated . No one - from Secretary Gates through to Nagl is on record as advocating abandonment of US conventional abilities and the US' obvious superiority in this field. You only have to look at where the rubber hits the road in terms of planned expenditure on capital equipment and systems over the next decades to find further proof of this point. And yet, it only takes one or two (or a dozen...) folks to speculate openly and in an logical fashion about the last five years of 'unconventionality' 'might mean' and the cry goes up that the conventional sky is falling in.

Of course, there is no doubt that that some skills, conventional or otherwise, may have perished through lack of use whilst the US Defense force has been preoccupied with its tasks in Iraq and Afgahnistan. Realistically, that is to be expected. It has happened in every war before these ones and will no doubt happen during the next one as well. This is why we have the Services and Service Chiefs and charge them with 'raise, train and sustain (and reconstitute)' functions. This 'loss' of skills is really only an issue if you do not trust in either the Services or the Service Chief's abilities in this regard - but that is a different argument to the 'be aware of the COIN Bogeyman' one.

Regarding Gian's recycled point (from other posts) that folks prior to the surge were doing COIN as well - I do not detect any real disagreement from anyone who actually is in the 'know' about this point. The point (that has been stated previously) is that it (the COIN practice) was just not necessarily as coherent or effective as what has developed since. Such an observation is neither a personal attack nor a slight on the hard fought and valiant efforts of any serviceman or servicewoman (or unit) pre- surge, it is simply a statement of fact.

The point I will conclude with is that the 'dilemma' that Gian presents is not a zero sum game. National Security planning never has been - it is about the art of balancing finite resources against a world of possibilities and trying to strike an appropriate balance. Picking winners in such a game is never easy - but picking turkeys is - they stand out by a mile. And for my money, either an 'all conventional force' or an 'all COIN force' approach (or variations on similar themes) are both turkeys. Picking a 'winning approach' is not served by creating false dilemmas.

[Gian P Gentile]

been Attack of the strawman...
The problem I perceive with some of the argument presented is that a false dilemma is being postulated . No one - from Secretary Gates through to Nagl is on record as advocating abandonment of US conventional abilities and the US' obvious superiority in this field...Picking a 'winning approach' is not served by creating false dilemmas.

Mark: Well said (Rob, Ken, et al too):

I do not think I have set up a strawman or created a false dilemma. Of course folks like SecDef and John Nagl have not called for abandoning conventional capabilities, just like I have never said we need to ditch irregular/coin/stability capabilities. But it is fair to say that our conventional capabilities have atrophied over the past 5 years. Most reasonable folks would agree with that statement. The seriousness of that atrophying is what is in question and how long it will take to recover. Clearly our Army and sister services have gained much in the way of combat experience; but as I have agrued before that combat experience in Iraq and Astan is not directly transferable especially in terms of combat functions to other forms of conflict. Those who think that it will be should consult history; specifically the British 7th Armored Division who learned and eventually ended up fighting well in north Africa, gained much combat experience from that theater, but when in June/July 1944 they had a very rough go making just the 20 some-odd miles up to Caen in the face of a superior German tactical fighting ability. The logic of combat experience being universal and transferable from one form to another should have meant that the British 7th marched right up to Caen on Day 2.

I am also not sanguine at all that somehow, by process, luck, hope, whatever, that we will end up with an appropriate balance. This especially worries me when I read what John Nagl writes in his RUSI book review of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. Nagl writes that in future wars and conflicts American soldiers who

...will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies...

The last clause in the above sentence takes my breath away in its implication for policy and American action in the world. As one, like many other SWC members, who has been on the business end of American foreign policy in foreign lands I am deeply suspect of the notion that deployed American military power can "change entire societies."

And LTG Caldwell's recent article in Military Review where he proclaims with troubling certainty that:

The future is not one of major battles and engagements fought by armies on battlefields devoid of population; instead, the course of conflict will be decided by forces operating among the people of the world. Here, the margin of victory will be measured in far different terms than the wars of our past. The allegiance, trust, and confidence of populations will be the final arbiters of success.

This sweeping statment about the nature of future war is equally arresting. It is underpinned by a vision of the future security environment as one of a global-counterinsurgency that applies a counter-maoist, protracted people's war approach. Such an approach at least implies a force structure that is heavily weighted toward stability operations and irregular war. So how will our army look in 10 years? If the new Army doctrine has anything to do with things the logic of it calls for an light infantry heavy force that can work "among the people" protecting them and convincing them of ours and the host nations righteousness. this is why i am worried and not at all sanguine that "balance" will some how just come about because we say it will.

gian

[Fuchs]

It is underpinned by a vision of the future security environment as one of a global-counterinsurgency that applies a counter-maoist, protracted people's war approach. Such an approach at least implies a force structure that is heavily weighted toward stability operations and irregular war.

Or towards saving defense expenditures (couple hundred billion USD) for a really stabilizing policy.

[wm]

A couple of points on this discussion:

1. Were we in a world that allowed the US military to have whatever it wanted, I can see the argument for ensuring that it was a full spectrum capable force. However, we are not. We are resourced constrained. And, being resource constrained means we need to prioritize how best to dispose of our resources. Folks usually seem to devote the greatest amount of resources to the problem that is most near to hand. Based on that hypothesis, it only stands to reason that the current fight gets more attention than future possibilities. Whether this phenomenon is as generalized as I propose, at least it seems to be a motivating factor for the current SECDEF. Perhaps that is a lesson that now former SECAF Wynne did not learn too well.

2. A psychologist named Gerald J.S. Wilde has written on an interesting phenomenon called risk homeostasis. In a nutshell, his theory is that we are each “hard-wired” to expect a certain level of risk in our lives. If things change so that our perceived level of risk goes down, then we will restructure what we do to bring the risk level back up. This is a link to the first edition of his book.
If Wilde is right about risk homeostasis, then Gian’s lament is as fruitless as is that of another who claims we are sacrificing too many resources needed for the current fight in order to prepare for a future conflict. Either course of action has significant risks, and each may be viewed as one way out of many for actualizing our obligatory risk seeking behavior. Instead of disagreeing about how risky the two alternatives are, perhaps we ought to be seeking a solution that maximizes our preparations for both ends of the spectrum while maintaining the current level of perceived risk through such a solution. Is this possible and if so, what would it look like?

[Schmedlap]

D'oh. I went and commented at the blog. Oh well.

patmc raised some good issues...

We've lost a lot of the FA technical skills that are highly perishable. But does that mean all the branches are in trouble?

I felt exactly the same way about the Infantry before we were sent to Iraq to improve our skills. Whereas today the Artillery is suffering due to a fundamental shift in training and operations, the Infantry is stronger than ever. Before 9/11, the Infantry endured the same crisis that the Artillery faces today. The system was designed to prevent us from worthwhile training. Now we have Iraq and Afghanistan - both are gigantic ranges with a 360 degree range fan, unlimited ammunition, no safety tower or range control personnel, a wide-open scenario, and just about every curveball you can throw into the mix.

Our infantrymen and tanks are fighting as squads, platoons, and companies/troops, not as battalions/squadrons, brigades, and divisions; but in reality, squads and teams actually fight the war, so is this an overly bad thing? It may make higher level commanders rusty, but for the trigger puller who only sees the men to his left and right, the experience he is gaining in OIF/OEF is immense. Can anyone better attest to this?

Agree 100%.

[Fuchs]

The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

[Randy Brown]

The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

My compliments on distilling large concepts into punchy insights that look good on our team's 'lessons-learned' wall. They're a good reminder for us to put any OIF/OEF lesson--from the smallest TTP to the biggest strategic shift--into historical context. Again, thanks!

[Cavguy]

The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

Real dangers, assuming that our soldiers are unthinking enough to not adapt to a different environment. That has not been shown. There are intangibles from our seven years in combat that provide benefit regardless of the battlefield.

The side effect is that we have experienced combat leaders who deal with unstructured problems very well, and are used to operating more independently than was true in the 90's. While certain HIC infantry fieldcraft has certainly been lost, that is easy to retrain/fix. We've got tons of FM's and ARTEPs that tell us how. Harder is to create junior leaders experienced in operating and thinking under combat stress and with immense responsibility in peacetime.

[Ken White]

The combat lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan will not be good ideas for major conventional war, though.

Not on the macro level but as pointed out by others, the little things are the killers, the basics -- and those things, Afghanistan and Iraq do aid.

Infantry can reveal itself, show presence day after day and survive with some armor in these LI conflicts.

Or without Armor if they're smart...

Infantry that shows itself to competent enemies is dead within seconds.

Depends. Can be generally true in most of rural western Europe that is developed and mostly unwooded; quite true also in the desert, on the plains or steppes -- but not at all true in jungles, mountains, heavily wooded terrain like boreal forest or taiga and absolutely not in an urban environment. Again, if they're smart, not totally true anywhere but in the latter types of terrain, they only have to be half smart...

[UrsaMaior]

You are probably all aware of a quote from Mao (in Protracted war) where he states that ALL his soldiers MUST be able to switch to mobile warfare and then back to guerilla-style. If so I aplogize for bringing it up.

[Mark O'Neill]

from John Nagl that Gian cited (about the ability to change societies). I will have to go back and check the context, but I cannot conceive of this as either a practical, desirable (or for that matter realistic) task for the US military or State to aspire to - now or in the future. If nothing else the result of the neo-conservative 'project' of 02/03 should suggest the utility of such ambition.

[Ron Humphrey]

from John Nagl that Gian cited (about the ability to change societies). I will have to go back and check the context, but I cannot conceive of this as either a practical, desirable (or for that matter realistic) task for the US military or State to aspire to - now or in the future. If nothing else the result of the neo-conservative 'project' of 02/03 should suggest the utility of such ambition.

It seems he is simply trying to emphasize the fact that DOD isn't going to be the only ones fighting but others as well. Specifically mentioning Info Agency.

Lends support to his recommendations for a return of said org and not necessarily unrealistic if you think about it. Armies don't make societies nor should they try, Those who have are many against which we have battled.

That said Wouldn't you consider changes in markets, infrastructure, societal norms, available employment, availability of press to public discussion, Education, etc all major societal changes. Long and short Empowerment does exactly that, it changes societies so in that context I get where hes coming from.

[Entropy]

Gian makes some excellent points in his last comment. It frankly astounds me how predictions about the future of US military conflict are so casually made with little analysis or justification. The idea that the future of warfare will "reside among the people" needs some serious critical examination, in my opinion. As it stands now, it seems so often repeated that it's become a kind of "fact" that proponents do not feel compelled to justify even though it forms the central foundation for their successive arguments.

Personally, I'm quite skeptical that US policymakers and the US public will willingly engage in a major "war among the people" for a generation or more - a war that would require the large infantry/COIN centric force that some envision. Proponents of this particular future of warfare do not seem to address this political aspect and they remind me, actually , of the early airpower advocates who believed strategic nuclear bombing would be the truly decisive form of future warfare. Those early airpower advocates failed to consider the political aspect as well and that politicians (for good reason) would place limits on their vision of the future of warfare.