The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Norfolk]

From what I've seen, the learning curve has flattened out some and the war we find on the ground in Iraq is closer to the one we envision as the unit conducts its train up and deploys - this is not always true, but in the aggregate I think it is.

While I'm glad we have addressed some doctrinal shortfalls - be it 3-24 or 3-0 (and I hear there are some doctrinal reviews going on at JFCOM as well?), I give the credit to the soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen on the ground who are applying what works, modifying to suit the problem, and where required disregarding what is not applicable for an appropriate solution. Good doctrine enables soldiers and leaders to make good choices - and reflects the value of thinking individuals.

Best, Rob

Rob,

Would you be inclined to say that that, having undergone a sometimes difficult apprenticeship so to speak, the Army on the ground has now hit its stride and is at least a full journeyman, if not quite a master, of the COIN trade in Iraq? That, generally speaking, from top to bottom, from private to Petraeus, the Army knows what it wants to do, how to do it, and is slowly but surely defeating the insurgency? Is it accurate to say that the Army (and Marines) are succeeding in laying, from the bottom-up, a basis for something like an orderly and organized civil society (subject of course to matter beyond the Army's control)? Or is the situation in Iraq still too tenuous or unclear to comfortably make such observations?

[Rex Brynen]

That, generally speaking, from top to bottom, from private to Petraeus, the Army knows what it wants to do, how to do it, and is slowly but surely defeating the insurgency? Is it accurate to say that the Army (and Marines) are succeeding in laying, from the bottom-up, a basis for something like an orderly and organized civil society (subject of course to matter beyond the Army's control)? Or is the situation in Iraq still too tenuous or unclear to comfortably make such observations?

It is far too tenuous, in my view.

My sense would be that there has been (1) major progress, possibly permanent, in dealing with AQI; (2) contingent success (based on temporary alliances of convenience) in dealing with non-jihadist Sunni elements, but this is subject to future change; (3) no real success in dealing with Shi'ite militias.. indeed, if reports of JAM shifting greater weight to civic action are correct, they may become more strongly entrenched than a year or two ago, even if the problem of Shiite revenge killings/sectarian cleansing has declined (partly due to the surge, partly due to so much successful sectarian cleansing).

(4) Iranian influence--not a COIN issue, but certainly a key US strategic concern--has probably increased slightly.

(5) Civil society and institution-building--minor successes at best.

(6) Regional impact--still extremely negative, and a significant source of militant recruitment/mobilization elsewhere inside and outside the region.

To get back to your original point, parts of (1) and (2) are due to improved COIN doctrine and implementation. However, they are also due to AQI missteps, coupled with a sudden Sunni ability to count (that is, a realization post-Samarra by Sunni tribal and militia leaders that they needed protection against an angry, well armed, and larger Shiite community/militias).

(That being said, success is, in part, capitalizing on opponent errors.)

[Rob Thornton]

Would you be inclined to say that that, having undergone a sometimes difficult apprenticeship so to speak, the Army on the ground has now hit its stride and is at least a full journeyman, if not quite a master, of the COIN trade in Iraq?

I'd rather say we've gotten better at recognizing what needs to be done faster, and have figured out how to do it with less friction - and perhaps without undoing other things that we did not want to in the process. Sorry if that sounds like I'm qualifying it, but I think it deserves more then a yes or no.

That, generally speaking, from top to bottom, from private to Petraeus, the Army knows what it wants to do, how to do it, and is slowly but surely defeating the insurgency?

I think in the aggregate of units in Iraq the answer is yes (there is no way to account for evry guy or even every squad or platoon). This is due to MNFI-s leadership in terms of articulating CDR's intent, considering the reports from the lower echelons and making the best decisions it can with regards to campaign goals. I think we've got a much better loop going between units on the ground and those readying for deployment with what is going on in Iraq then we've ever had before. I think if you consider it in terms of AIF, I'd say yes, but if you extend it to the conditions which breed insurgency, make it a viable political recourse for Iraqis - we only have so much say, so much influence and limited resources - so if you extend it along those lines - the only folks who can finally defeat the insurgency are the Iraqis - I think they are starting to want security and stability at more then just one level. This would be a good thing.

I'm not willing to put forward an opinion on the rest of the Army - for various reasons there is still a considerable portion of the Army (in terms of those in Institutional and support positions) that have not deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan yet - until we can afford them that opportunity I don't think we will be at our best. Thee are in many cases valid reasons why these folks have not deployed yet - you can't take for granted all the things that built the Army, prepare it and sustain it - it takes a very large support system.

Is it accurate to say that the Army (and Marines) are succeeding in laying, from the bottom-up, a basis for something like an orderly and organized civil society (subject of course to matter beyond the Army's control)?

From what I see and saw, I think we are helping to provide the increased security for that process to take place (along with ISF and tribal allegiances) - but the basis has to be political in some sense - again, Iraqis have to buy into that at various levels. Iraqis have to take it and sustain it.

Or is the situation in Iraq still too tenuous or unclear to comfortably make such observations?

I think what has to be noted and accepted is that things change all the time - MNFI saw a success in Al-Anbar and was able to use that as something of a model to engage political buy in in other provinces - there are all kinds of internal and external things that can probably effect that. It could be from Turkey or Iran, it could be internal - If it were an assured thing we would not say we're going to be there for some time to come in some capacity or another.

These are my thoughts on it - but I'd say folks have to make up their own minds on what they see and hear. Overall, I think the folks on the ground have made significant strides forward in Iraq over the last 6 months - I noticed it in early 2007 - some things just take time to work out, and I think by then we were starting to understand things on larger scale.

Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

To get back to your original point, parts of (1) and (2) are due to improved COIN doctrine and implementation. However, they are also due to AQI missteps, coupled with a sudden Sunni ability to count (that is, a realization post-Samarra by Sunni tribal and militia leaders that they needed protection against an angry, well armed, and larger Shiite community/militias).

(That being said, success is, in part, capitalizing on opponent errors.)

I like it when the enemy screws up - it makes for less work, but don't sell short the ability to understand a mistep/screw up and capitalize on it. Too often an enemy gives us an opportunity and we ignore it, miss it, or screw it up.

I like your second part Rex - there is some art in being a good counter-puncher.

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

I will take it from the both of you then, Rex and Rob, that the US Army (and Marines) in Iraq are now and increasingly so, waging a Counterinsurgency campaign with sustantial, if still limited, success, and that the future, while unpredicatable, is more hopeful than a year ago or more - at least as things stand right now.

Starting with the fact that some of the insurgents (mainly Sunni), and especially those from AQI, have overstepped themselves, and are paying the price. AQI seems to be in quite the hurt locker lately, and I am inclined to believe that with its deliberate targetting of the civilian population in its last major terror "offensive", it succeeded in turning even the Sunni population more or less against it. Combined with a more or less successful Coalition adaptation to the requirements of COIN, the Sunni backlash against the excesses of many of their own extremists have led to Sunni tribal leaders' re-evaluation of which side the butter on their bread truly lies (at least for the moment). In the Sunni areas at least, Coalition (and especially US) forces are more and more being seen as allies, at least for the time being.

The Shi'a situation will have to be dealt with in time, particularly the Sadr'ists. I did notice a few years ago (around later 2004, maybe early 2005 - I am taking this purely from reported news and articles at the time - the Marines were clearing Fallujah and ordered to call it off just before finishing, whilst the Sadrists were rebelling in Najaf - and US troops dispatched to face them down) an increasing US awareness of the dynamics of the Sunni-Shi'a divide, and a developing ability to play them other off against one another. A strategy of divide and conquer, even if by necessity rather than design.

However, gathering from Rex's post, even if the Sunni tribes and the US reach a practical accomodation, the Shi'a extremists will pose the greatest challenge of all to bring to heel, and their strength may even be increasing.

Okay, I gather from what Rex has said that the situation is still too fragile to make evena tentative call on whether the US/Coalition forces are indeed slowly succeeding in defeating the insurgency; whereas Rob thinks that the situation is a little firmer and clearer than that, with the US/Coalition forces in Iraq having largely caught-on to the demands of the campaign, and succeeding in making things happen, so far. I think that it goes without saying that the Governmental side (above local tribal sheiks), which is formally outside the direct control of the US anyway, is a clear disappointment, but essential to the successs of the counterinsurgency.

Be that as it may. But I gather that it could be argued, with qualifications especially as to its tentativeness, that US/Coalition troops in Iraq have more or less caught-on to what needs to be done, within the limits of what is possible for them to do (necessarily excluding such matters as Iraqi governmental politics at all levels of government); and furthermore that both General Petraeus' Iraq strategy and the COIN Doctrine from which it derives are genuine, if qualified and still reversible, successes so far.