The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Shek]

And in this sense I believe that my critique of the paradoxes is still valid.

LTC Gentile:

Sir,

Thanks for the reply. I don’t disagree that one cannot neglect the moral/spiritual domain; however, the path that your argument uses to link the paradoxes and their potential impact on the moral/spiritual domain requires the use of a strawman – the claim that “tactical success guarantees nothing” should be read “accomplishes nothing.” If tactical success are not needed, then why would the manual not state that? However, this is not enough, and you then proceed to flail tactical failure by the counterinsurgent, which in no way, shape, or form is advised by the FM. So, your causal link between the tactical success paradox and a negative impact upon the morale of the fighting soldier requires a particular interpretation that removes the paradoxes from the reality of chapter in which you can find them.

Next, while recognizing that you have some great insights to offer about the moral/spiritual domain of soldiers at the unit level based on your squadron’s experience in Iraq, I don’t see how this experience provides you with any special insight on how to read and/or interpret the meaning the paradoxes (it can provide some special insights on how other officers serving in Iraq interpreted the paradoxes, but this is not the same as having a special line to the best reading of the paradoxes). As you look at your discussion of the paradoxes, you remove them from the reality of their purpose, which is to “stimulate thinking” and not to “limit it.” Additionally, you can read the ten pages prior to the paradoxes and find the following excerpts (emphasis mine):

1-105. The purpose of America’s ground forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. Throughout history, however, the Army and Marine Corps have been called on to perform many tasks beyond pure combat; this has been particularly true during the conduct of COIN operations. COIN requires Soldiers and Marines to be ready both to fight and to build—depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The full spectrum operations doctrine (described in FM 3-0) captures this reality.

1-106. All full spectrum operations executed overseas—including COIN operations—include offensive, defensive, and stability operations that commanders combine to achieve the desired end state. The exact mix varies depending on the situation and the mission. Commanders weight each operation based on their assessment of the campaign’s phase and the situation in their AO. They shift the weight among these operations as necessary to address situations in different parts of the AO while continuing to pursue their overall objectives. (See figure 1-1.)

1-107. Offensive and defensive operations are integral to COIN. COIN differs from peacekeeping operations in this regard; indeed, this is a key point. In peacekeeping operations, combat is not expected and the goal is an absence of violence. In COIN, such an absence may actually mask insurgent preparations for combat. This was the case, for example, in the Sadr City area of Baghdad in 2003.

***

1-128. It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. Clearly, killing or capturing insurgents will be necessary, especially when an insurgency is based in religious or ideological extremism. However, killing every insurgent is normally impossible. Attempting to do so can also be counterproductive in some cases; it risks generating popular resentment, creating martyrs that motivate new recruits, and producing cycles of revenge.

***

1-141. Any use of force generates a series of reactions. There may be times when an overwhelming effort is necessary to destroy or intimidate an opponent and reassure the populace. Extremist insurgent combatants often have to be killed. In any case, however, counterinsurgents should calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be applied and who wields it for any operation. An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.

If one believes that the introductory chapter, of which the paradoxes are a part of, removes the reality that counterinsurgency doesn’t involve offensive operations or killing, then there is certainly an issue, but not one with the paradoxes.

Lastly, the senior officer example that you use involves a fundamental misinterpretation of the manual. As I indicated earlier, this is not an indictment of the manual, but rather, an indictment of the OES and OPMS that has allowed someone to advance through the ranks and to positions of responsibility that cannot holistically digest newly written doctrine or even worse, only reads a small segment of the manual. Paragraph 1-107 above clearly demonstrates that the statement by the senior officer to the reporter that "if we are shooting, we are not having a good day" is not categorically true.