The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Steve Blair]

As far as your comment of not wanting to have the army repeat “its past mistakes from Vietnam” I couldn’t agree with you more which is why I have been thinking and writing about this topic. But brace yourself here: it is not me who is repeating these past mistakes but you. The mistakes from Vietnam as you imply were that the American Army became so consumed with conventional warfighting that they ditched and refused to consider problems of unorthodox war. Well, inversely, as I see it that is what we are doing now with Coin and to our detriment. I know this idea does not go over well with many because so called Coin experts and practitioners after being pushed to the sidelines during the Cold War now are enjoying their place in the sun and anything that challenges and questions their dominance is attacked.

Onward social science warriors….

I still fail to see where you can find a precedent for COIN replacing the sort of warfare that the Army has always preferred to prepare for. Training was reoriented during Vietnam, as was a certain level of doctrine (the level depended on the branch in question), but all that was quickly phased out as soon as the conflict ended. If memory serves the real peak for such training came in 1968-69, and most lessons had faded by 1975 or so. I have seen little to convince me that the same thing will not happen again. After all, we were "surprised" by Somalis using RPGs against helicopters...

If the political objectives of the United States call for the Army to be involved in COIN frequently (which is very possible given the number of failed states and the looming creation of AFRICOM), then at least some percentage of war preparation should be directed to that end...and not just a token 10% or so. That's just responsible planning.

[Van]

Rank Amateur et al;

There are no military solutions to Iraq’s political problems.

Better to say "There are no military solutions to political problems". I'm certain that most members of the Council understand this at least intellectually, and a majority have really internalized the concept. At the end of the day, militaries only buy time for politicians to sort out the solution*. This having been said, synchronization and deconfliction of combat and non-combat measures in Small Wars (including COIN) is essential to success (per the U.S.M.C. 1940 manual and other sources). The problem is often one of persuading the civilian leadership that the military is not the correct wrench with which to pound screws.

Re: optimism- In Iraq, we should be guardedly optimistic. It won't sort itself out in a fashion that will be to our liking, but if we can sever the outside support for the insurgents, not make any more gaffs on the scale of Abu Ghraib, and stick with it for the full decade it takes to succeed in COIN, we've got a great chance of success. Sadly, the media and the self-serving defeatists are doing every thing in their power to make this impossible, no matter the strategic damage they cause us. Note the long lasting geopolitical damage we suffered from the precipitous pullout from Somalia. Now increase that by an order of magnitude...
- In the GWOT, if we can avoid validating the allegations that the West is waging war on Islam, there is plenty of reason to be optimistic, especially as Muslims are coming out against violence and the irhabi. If the popular meme reverts back to a "Christian vs Muslim" perception of the conflict, it could rapidly degenerate into calls for genocide from both sides. Again, guarded optimism is in order, but we must remain cognizant of the risks and possible consequences.


*In a republic with civilian control of the military, won't comment on other arrangements.

[goesh]

Gentile states that when the Tal Alfar lessons were applied to Baghdad, our troops were subjected to "supreme tactical vulnerability". That's pretty serious stuff to taxpayers like me and ol' Mom & Pop back home. How much of that statement is a reflection of reality on the street and how much of it is a reflection of the inherent friction that is becoming readily apparent between COIN proponents and for lack of better word, old school (geezers?), traditional military thinking? More importanty, how much is this in-house war detracting from success of the mission in Iraq?

[Rank amateur]

It won't sort itself out in a fashion that will be to our liking,

I agree: regardless of how many kinetic vs. COIN ops we run.

The paradoxes in FM 3-24 are nothing more than Sun Tsuisms for the 21st Century.

I didn't find any paradoxes in Sun Tsu. I'd say it was more of a philosophy that the right thing to do depends on a number of factors. Whose correct in this dispute about tactics? Both and neither. It depends. But if neither tactic will achieve the objective, then it's neither.

[Ken White]

unit in the US Army is going to forget that the reality of war and fighting is no longer apporopriate because it is not it an FM...

LTC Gentile says:

"I believe that FM3-24 has become the defacto operational doctrine of the United States Army and it has not been questioned or seriously debated as such."

Sweeping statement. It certainly seems to be the case that it is for operations in Iraq at this time -- as it probably should be. Does that necessarily mean it is the de facto operational doctrine for the entire Army. I doubt it. I'd also suggest that the nominal Soviet quip is probably apocryphal and it was earlier alleged to the Brits -- though it is essentially correct -- and the American Army hasn't changed, that'll always be correct.

We're too independent and egotistical for that. Most Commanders take the mantra and adapt it to their needs and do their own thing. And that's good.

He may be correct in that we will go overboard on the COIN side; we as an Army have a tenedency to do that to the detriment of training. We must be a full spectrum Army, no question -- and that is a heavy training task and it is expensive; there are a lot of pressures to focus more narrowly. Having been in and around the beast for 45 years, I've watched that oscillation too many times. I think there are enough people coinvinced that we need to do the whole deal to avoid the trap this time. We'll see.

I spent a lot of time training to fight a land war in Europe. Never stationed or fought there -- but I ate a heck of a lot of rice. Pity, I dearly love Bratwurst...