The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[Bob's World]

COL Gentile is clearly a well intentioned officer, who is obviously bright, and presumably accomplished in his own service and field of expertise; and I mean no disrespect whatsoever to make the observation that while he may be able to spell "COIN," his knowledge of the nature of insurgency and elements of an effective counterinsurgency campaign probably end there.

I will agree that many of the "born again" COIN experts in the conventional force that cut there teeth in Iraq tend to confuse what has been taking place there as COIN as well. Much of it is, much of it is not.

But COL G needs to understand that "The Surge" was neither a strategy, nor even a campaign plan, it was a resourcing requirement to enable the execution of a comprehensive campaign plan that was rooted in sound tenants of COIN. In fact, it is more accurately "Combat FID" than COIN, as COIN is what the Iraqi security forces are conducting. He also needs to understand that COIN is about neutralizing the insurgency, not defeating the insurgent. Convincing parties to representing various segments of the populace to at a minimum remain neutral, or at best to join in the solution is all critical to effective COIN.

He also implies that an Army that just a few years ago thought it could solve any military problem with a "shock and awe" assault now believes with equal fervor that it can solve any military problem with a COIN or FID campaign. I refuse to believe that we are that polarized in our actions or simplistic in our thinking.

The Army still has a great deal to learn about FID, but I suspect the Army will continue to get a great deal of practice. Hopefully they will also be able to keep an edge on their more conventional warfighting skills as well; and have leadership that recognize when to apply which to achieve the desired endstate of any given operation. The SF community continues to be the real keepers of the flame on this topic though, and though they don't have proponency and lead for the Army's positoins, if one listens carefully, these "quiet professionals," are out there.

And yes, we will still need the airforce to support us. To get us to the fight, to provide us with fires when needed, to provide aerial ISR, etc. But while COL G may raise some valid points, the effect is lost in his larger ignorance of the context in which he is trying to make them.

[Entropy]

This is a drum Col. Gentile beats often, and it's one I agree completely with. From the article:

Many army officers and Department of Defense thinkers seem to be able to think only about how to apply the perceived counterinsurgency lessons from Iraq to Afghanistan. A recent group of colonels asked the question "how should the army execute a surge in Afghanistan," instead of the more important questions of whether the army should use the surge counterinsurgency program there. A professor from a major Department of Defense university has gone so far as to call for the surge and its counterinsurgency techniques as the model for American strategy and policy throughout the entire Middle East.

He's right to be skeptical of what sounds like the simplistic importation of the Iraqi "surge" into Afghanistan. One of many problems is there seems to be no accepted definition of what exactly the surge in Iraq consisted of. Another serious problem are clarity issues at the policy level with respect to Afghanistan. Until those get worked out, it seems premature to declare that a surge in Afghanistan is either useful or necessary. And even if he's wrong, Col. Gentile is performing a valuable service by questioning and challenging the conventional wisdom.

[datroy]

Bob, I would disagree with you ever so slightly. The increase in troops sure enough was a resourcing requirement. "Surge," however, was a terrible name to apply to what we did. It was not just increasing troops. It was taking a COIN approach that had worked in various locations and applying it to the entire country. So the new COIN tactics, assisted by more troops, created the security that allowed the Awakenings (which had started before the "surge," but again only because of COIN operations at the local level that led to improved ability to protect the population) to spread. But then we went and called it the "surge" so it will probably forever be reported and explained as the "surge" or the "surge in troops" that turned Iraq around.

[Eden]

The Gentile article is not his best - I can't help but notice that when our best thinkers begin writing op-ed pieces for the mainstream press their IQ seems to drop a few notches.

Anyway, I think the problem is that we are fixated on our operational approach to Afghanistan before we have clearly articulated what our strategic goals are. Will more troops in Afghanistan help us do more of what we are doing now, only better? Yes. Is what we are doing now the right thing? How can we tell without a clearly defined objective?

I would argue that Afghanistan has been a continuous sad example of mission creep since 2001. There has never been a clear end state besides the standard (and useless) boilerplate of "strong and stable democracy capable of providing for its own defense yadayadayada..." that we foisted onto NATO and Europe some years ago while we fought our own unilateral counter-terrorist campaign.

I just got back from a talk where a two-star admiringly said of Petraeus that he never wanted to hear the words "success" or "victory", only "progress". Yikes!

As the philosopher said, "Any road is fine if you don't know where you're going." If we don't know what constitutes success, how do we know we are progressing in the right direction?

[Entropy]

Great comment Eden.

[Ken White]

...........

[Ron Humphrey]

In regards to this:

I just got back from a talk where a two-star admiringly said of Petraeus that he never wanted to hear the words "success" or "victory", only "progress". Yikes!

As the philosopher said, "Any road is fine if you don't know where you're going." If we don't know what constitutes success, how do we know we are progressing in the right direction?

As you seem to have pointed out, its kinda important to know where your going, and the fact that in order to adequately plan from there ,one really needs to know where they are at not to mention what avenues are available would definately lead one to looking for a map

That said also realizing that your trips success is likely to be affected by those whom you may encounter it is also good to know who they are, where they are (NOTE: also requires a map) and what exactly they might be doing

Until somebody finds the "marauders map" it looks like getting all that together fast enough to please everyone might just be a little difficult.

So until then perhaps the only option open besides sitting waiting for it is to get a basic direction and keep heading towards it.

[Mark O'Neill]

I am increasingly sceptical of the increasingly shrill drum banging about this issue. I think it is time to move onto other issues and writing Gian.

Cheers,

Mark

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Since this forum is small wars/LIC/COIN centric it seems that Gian Gentile’s pontifications take a greater share of potshots from this audience for his position.

However, in many ways I feel he is right in his concerns. Why? (Allow me to take few moments to position and climb atop my soapbox).

Soldiers and Marines are trained to obey orders. (no disrespect to the Navy and Air Force but this diatribe is aimed at the footslogger). At the very basic level Soldiers and Marines are trained to mete out death and destruction with a variety of small arms. However, they typically only do so in response to orders from higher authority. Soldiers and Marines are also trained to shoot, move, and communicate at the lowest levels of tactical warfare.

In “conventional” battle there are times when Soldiers and Marines must seek assistance in the meting out death and destruction, thus they call for even more destructive weapons to assist them. These weapons are typically operated by others and are employed at the request of the Soldier or Marine. If several of these weapons are called upon (tanks/arty/CAS) to act in unison there must be discipline, synergy, and orchestration to ensure these disparate weapons systems are brought to bear upon the enemy and not on the Soldier or Marine. “Conventional” battles are usually fought in areas free of innocent bystanders, thus allowing full application of weapons with little chance of “collateral damage.” This is not an easy task to accomplish and takes precise training and exacting practice on the part of the Soldier or Marine to achieve the proper coordination and orchestration to both destroy the target and not harm our own troops.

COIN is not “conventional” war; it is small war, typically absent large enemy military formations armed with “heavy” weapons (tanks, aircraft, heavy artillery). COIN is predominantly social, political, ideological warfare where the battlefields are ambiguous at best, and typically cluttered with a variety of non-combatants. In COIN the basic skill set of the Soldier and Marine isstill applicable: shoot, move, and communicate with a greater emphasis on communicate and move rather than shoot. In COIN the Soldier and Marine act more in the role of very heavily armed police officers. Police officers try to maintain the peace without resorting to firepower. In COIN the Soldier and Marine must do the same, although unlike the police officer they typically have a much greater arsenal at their disposal should they need it. The key is that, while they need the same skills to employ these weapons of greater destruction, they must be much more judicious in their employment. Collateral damage is highly counter-productive in COIN.

So where is this all leading?

After Vietnam the Army seemed to toss aside over a decade’s worth of COIN/LIC/IW lessons in favor of concentrating totally on conventional warfare with a peer competitor (the “Fulda Gap” syndrome). Despite the fact that from 1975 to 1991 all our military engagements were of the COIN/LIC/IW variety the Army was well skilled for Desert Storm. Again in 2003, despite the lessons of Somalia and Bosnia, the Army and Marine Corps conducted a conventional blitz into Iraq and defeated Saddam Hussein (again). But the Iraq campaign then changed into something very different, it became a COIN/LIC/IW campaign. The Army and Marines adopted ever so slowly but soon enough had rediscovered those lessons ignored from Vietnam and before.

I believe Gian sees this new emphasis on COIN doctrine as rapidly becoming dogma and the Army is now seemingly forsaking conventional warfare training and skills for those of COIN.

COIN is warfare as the small unit level using small arms. Every infantry Soldier and Marine knows how to use these weapons. But COIN is not a weapons system; it is a capability, one which requires a variety of often disparate tactics, dissimilar methods, and many systems to employ.

A tank is always a tank, whether an American, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, or Sudanese operates it. We know what tanks are typically used for, what they are capable of, and how to defeat them. Yet an insurgent, while always a man (or woman), is not always the same. Insurgents come in different shapes, sizes, capabilities, ideologies, religious beliefs, and moral standards. Insurgencies are at once the same and different.

I feel that Gian sees the ever-increasing emphasis on a COIN centric Army as being very detrimental to the Army’s capability to wage conventional warfare with a peer competitor. He feels the pendulum is in danger of being allowed to swing too far away from center (although it certainly wasn't there pre-Iraq). A prime example is NTC. NTC was the place where Soldiers learned the various skills required of the subtle ballet that is synchronizing and orchestrating the vast array of weaponry possessed by the Army and bringing it to bear on a like enemy. Currently, however, NTC is becoming more of a COIN-training center. This is a bad precedent for the army. It will gradually lead to the deterioration of Soldiers with the requisite skills to conduct effective conventional warfare.

In many respects I agree with Gentile’s concerns and do not believe he is anti-COIN. The Army needs to have a robust capability to fight in both types of warfare. IMHO it is much easier for a Soldier who is highly trained in the complexities of employing the variety of weapons systems in conventional warfare to quickly adapt to a COIN/LIC/IW situation than it is for a Soldier who is trained predominantly in COIN to function at his optimum when thrust into the chaos of conventional war.

Soldiers, after all, are trained to obey orders, but to follow orders they need the skills. Conventional warfare requires solid skill sets, many of which that are also useful in COIN. COIN is more of an intellectual exercise requiring a common sense approach, an understanding of human behavior, and empathy with the local population, skills not necessarily taught or quantified in an FM.

[Ken White]

and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

[Mark O'Neill]

and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

Nailed it in one.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I agree he can come off as overzealous (was unaware of the personal attacks) but unfortunately in the big machine that is the Army, and DoD for that matter, it is the squeaky wheel that gets the attention. Just ask Charlie Dunlap.

[Shivan]

Eden raised the point re strategy, which is a drum I beat, but on the political dimension of COIN. Military strategy is all to the good, but what of the political? Are we fighting for a credible political vision in Afghanistan? The analogy is to Vietnam, as Jeffrey Race describes, where the conceptual model was wrong; and the political roots of defeat were established in 1956-60, before the US presence expanded. Fall emphasizes the political for COIN as well as insurgents, one example being the Huk, where Magsaysay implemented social and military reforms which drew support to the government.

[selil]

and with Gian -- based on what I've seen and recall. I do for one.

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position, it is that in the opinion of many he overstates his case, early on attacked people personally (he no longer does that) and beat his drum excessively loudly. IOW, the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.

[Steve Blair]

To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.

This has always been my concern with the debate. Warfare is not a binary proposition. I've had issues with historical cherry-picking by BOTH sides in the debate as well.

[Ron Humphrey]

To true. I for one would rather have a professor of the USMA poking holes in my over inflated theories than ignoring me. I don't want to be personally attacked I'm more than willing to listen to other points of view. As long as the other person is willing to listen (if not agree) to my point of view. That being said I am concerned that COIN and "conventional (sic)" warfare are being proposed more and more as "either/or" instead of continuums. That concerns me greatly.

(emphasis Ron)

From my limited perch it almost seems like the requirement for integrating COIN/IW practices firmly into bureaucratic circles has happened at the cost of that continuum understanding.

Sort of like there exists blank number of blocks for a certain type of warfare and the only way the other gets brought into the fold is through a 1 to 1 swap.

In some ways this may make sense (resource allocations, training limitations,etc) but although I can't put my finger on it something doesn't seem quite right. Lets just hope that those who represent each are able to balance their way through to reasonable exchanges in order to keep some sort of equilibrium otherwise in the end Gentile's consistant concerns might not have been as unnecessary as they sometimes may seem

[Old Eagle]

Gian is running from something that ain't chasing him. His overstatements tend to polarize the issue, something I find unhelpful. IMHO there is no "surge dogma", and Gian does not succeed in making the case that there is.

Nor is doctrine a zero-sum game. The addition of FMs 3-24 and 3-07 to fill gaping holes in existing doctrine does not mean that we're not going to "fight" anymore.

I thought that SECDEF's Foreign Affairs article struck a very balanced, well-reasoned, and articulate chord.

[wm]

Gian is running from something that ain't chasing him. His overstatements tend to polarize the issue . . .
I thought that SECDEF's Foreign Affairs article struck a very balanced, well-reasoned, and articulate chord.

As a matter of rhetorical strategy, one technique that often gains success is to overpolarize the situation and then present a "middle ground" solution." While this may not have been the overt plan, it is what has happpened (Gentile V. Nagl, with the SECDEF getting to be the "good guy" with the compromise solution). In fact the debate has managed to get folks to swallow a "dual track" force that will actually be a more expensive propostion than either of the other alternatives--all conventional or all irregular warfighting capability. I'd say it is a pretty slick bit of persuasion.

[William F. Owen]

COIN is predominantly social, political, ideological warfare where the battlefields are ambiguous at best, and typically cluttered with a variety of non-combatants.

All warfare is "social, political, ideological warfare." That is what War is, is it not?. It's warfare if it uses violence, for those purposes.

My point being I still fail to see the useful reason to differentiate COIN as something distinct from "War fighting", when history proves it is merely a modifying condition - or a condition requiring modification.

.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

All warfare is "social, political, ideological warfare." That is what War is, is it not?. It's warfare if it uses violence, for those purposes.

that warfare writ large entails all those things and much more.

The point that I was ineloquently trying to make was that down at a 'tactical' COIN environment me, the snuffy, and the grunt have to be sensitive to social, political, and ideological issues as we prosecute the campaign. These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect.

My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat Soldiers and Marines obey the orders given, almost without question. If the orders are to lay waste to every living thing in your path, we certainly can do that; but if the orders are to be nice to all the people because we're here to protect them (even though we may suspect some are assisting the bad guys), we can do that too. The former requires the synchronization and orchestration of a very deadly war machine, the latter a more attuned sense of social, political, and ideological issues. While in both instances Soldiers and Marines will follow orders and utilize basic combat skills, in the first instance, that of 'conventional battle,' there are additional very specific skills needed to ensure the that the plethora of weapons systems are properly employed.

I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too.