The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[CR6]

Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too.

Which is precisely why we're seeing these new digital camouflage patterns.

[Ken White]

The point that I was ineloquently trying to make was that down at a 'tactical' COIN environment me, the snuffy, and the grunt have to be sensitive to social, political, and ideological issues as we prosecute the campaign.

Been my observation that's also entailed in conventional war -- different levels to be sure but the issues are still there.

These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect.

At the risk of inviting a fire storm, I suggest the level of training and capability of the opposition has a strong bearing on whether those things need to be considered and how much rolling and blasting one is going to do. A fairly low level opponent allows unthinking violence -- you try that with one that thinks and is equipped as well or better than you and you're going to get a shock. In Korea, as my ever wise Company Gunny pointed out, "Them Chinese ain't got a lot of stuff we got but they're smart, shifty and there sure is a bunch of 'em and they won't quit."

My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat Soldiers and Marines obey the orders given, almost without question.

I strongly disagree with that-- while conceding that you are right . What you say is true because in most units, that's the way it's done because it's easier on the NCOs and Officers.

That's also in large measure because we have not done in any war time training since 1945 -- the mothers of America don't want the training loss that realistic training would force so we soft pedal and half train people. We train better now than we ever have -- far better, in many respects -- than when I went through P.I. but we're still only half training the kids.

There are some units that encourage Snuffy to think and while that puts a bunch more work on the chain, those units function better. In fairly low level combat such as that of the last 30 years, that's okay that just some units function really well instead of adequately -- but in a major war, that will not be adequate. EVERYBODY has to think. In COIN and low tempo Ops, the NCOs can direct Joe -- given a major war of movement, they can't-- Joe has to know what to do. So do the NCOs -- and the LTs; the Bn Cdr won't be micromanaging...

If the orders are to lay waste to every living thing in your path, we certainly can do that; but if the orders are to be nice to all the people because we're here to protect them (even though we may suspect some are assisting the bad guys), we can do that too. The former requires the synchronization and orchestration of a very deadly war machine, the latter a more attuned sense of social, political, and ideological issues. While in both instances Soldiers and Marines will follow orders and utilize basic combat skills, in the first instance, that of 'conventional battle,' there are additional very specific skills needed to ensure the that the plethora of weapons systems are properly employed.

True -- and I submit that to really do that well takes more training, smarts and effort that does the COIN bit. COIN operations are a pain in the tail, are tedious, frustrating and challenge your social skills. But they are not complex, they're just common sense and decent behavior.

I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too.

Not a bad simile but I strongly suggest you consider the quality of the opposing Aussie Rules team -- that makes a very significant difference in the way your teamwork and synergies work out -- and you find that it takes a whole bunch more than brute strength to eke out a draw, much less a crush against a team that's as smart and strong as you are. One that will pay no attention whatsoever to attempts to impress...

Those folks that say COIN is the graduate level of war are, I believe, wrong. Major conventional operations against a peer opponent as well or better equipped than you are the graduate level, fail the test and you're out-- COIN against even skillful opponents but basically low tech equipped is all the anxiety, tedium, squabbles and pain of the 8th grade all over again. Neat thing is you can get a few Ds and Fs and still move on...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions.

Alas I do not benefit from the infinite array and vast range of experience you possess; probably because I was not issued leggings and an M1 in boot camp.

However, by "obey orders" I did not mean in an automaton way. I meant in the way that if we are in a full up battle with a peer opponent and I order the platoon to take a position, they apply all the violence necessary to take the position. In COIN if I order the squad to go into a village and help the people and do no harm, that's what they do. If we were barbarians it would be easier in COIN just to wipe out the village. No one shoots at you if they are all dead or cowering in a hole. Counterproductive in COIN...certainly; is it "easier"... yes.

When we rolled into Kuwait we were supposedly facing an enemy that was battle hardened, well trained, and would inflict huge casualties on us. Hindsight proved otherwise. But I wouldn't call it "unthinking violence." If I'm in a battle zone where there are only combatants I know that anyone I lay my sights upon is either a good guy or bad guy, thus I am fully authorized without seeking prior approval to waste the bad guy. COIN has more subtlty in whom you can kill. If that makes any sense.

I totally agree that ‘conventional’ warfare is the graduate level, and that is why we still need to train up to that level. I think that is the crux of what Gian worries about, that the Army will sacrifice the graduate level training it needs in order to mass produce too many community college grads.

[Ken White]

...Alas I do not benefit from the infinite array and vast range of experience you possess; probably because I was not issued leggings and an M1 in boot camp.

Because the leggings permanently remove all the hair off your legs from ankle to below the knee which means you look funny to your kids in swimming trunks. Plus having the seven digit serial number of that first M1 running around in your head almost 60 years later can be mildly annoying when you're trying to recall a newer phone number...

I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions.

Me neither -- so we can both sleep good...

However, by "obey orders" I did not mean in an automaton way. I ...certainly; is it "easier"... yes.

I figured that but the fact that we force these kids (well, most of 'em, anyway...) to under achieve has always irritated me. They'll do what you train 'em to do and they can do more than most people are willing to let them do, unfortunately. That and our very poor initial entry training are my pet rocks.

... COIN has more subtlty in whom you can kill. If that makes any sense.

True dat. One of the reasons why it's so frustrating -- sometimes the one you can't zap tries to get you the next day. Enough to hack off the Pope.

I totally agree that ‘conventional’ warfare is the graduate level, and that is why we still need to train up to that level. I think that is the crux of what Gian worries about, that the Army will sacrifice the graduate level training it needs in order to mass produce too many community college grads.

Also true. Worries me as well...

[William F. Owen]

The point that I was ineloquently trying to make was that down at a 'tactical' COIN environment me, the snuffy, and the grunt have to be sensitive to social, political, and ideological issues as we prosecute the campaign. These are issues that I never needed to consider as we rolled across the Kuwait desert and blasted the s*** out of everything that appeared, human and machine. However, on Grenada we had to much more circumspect.

...and I was being pedantic at your expense. ...but you raise an excellent point, and that is training, and doctrine. At the risk of being boring, the US is or was failing to differentiate War from Warfare. A certain vision of War, creates a certain type of warfare.

My feeble dissertation was an attempt to point out that at the lowest level of combat

Nothing feeble and good on you. That's the critical bit.

I guess to throw in an awkward sports analogy: 'conventional' warfare is akin to Aussie Rules Football: you use teamwork, synergy, and brute strength to crush your opponent; while COIN is akin to ballroom dancing: you use teamwork, synergy, and an understanding of the judges to impress them. Good shoes and a flashy outfit help too.

Interesting analogy. I actually know far more about ballroom dancing that I do Aussie Rules!!

[Bob's World]

William, you raise an excellent point, and share a position that is fairly common. My short answer for why it is important to differentiate between types of war is so that one can put together a proper solution that will achieve their desired ends.

Goes to Old Carl's point of "the first thing is to know what kind of war you are in."

The conventional force in the US is new to this business, and learning most of its lessons in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, and using that experience to provide context to the study of Insurgency to draft the current COIN doctrine and TTPs that are coming out. This stuff is pretty good. Where it is off is usually by a few degrees of azimuth; but for those who have experience with indirect fire or long distance land nav, you know how far off you can be from the intended target if you are off by a small azimuth error at the start.

I tend to be a purist on definitions, and tend to wince when varioius sources start mixing terms. Its all part of staying on azimuth.

Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved. The populace wages insurgency to change the politics, and there are three broad categories of insurgency: Resistence against a foreign invader, revolution to change the government of the entire state, and separatist to break a segment away (note, all three of these have been going on in Iraq, and all require unique solution sets). COIN is the efforts of the state to resolve these family disputes.

FID are the efforts of an outside third party to influence this state dynamic on the behalf of the current government. FID runs a tremendous scale, from routine exchanges with allies that have very stable governments, to full scale combat like we have been experiencing in places like Vietnam and Iraq.

A new twist with globalization is the rise of non-state powers, and also the greater connectivity of populaces with like populaces from other states. This does not change the nature of insurgency, but it certainly changes the environment in which it occurs, and requires new tactics from those employed successfully in the past when populaces could be isolated. It also means that non-state entities can now act in state-like ways by using networked operations, and also without the achilles heel of a state that can be targeted, or that must be defended. Think AQ

That brings us to UW. UW is the efforts of an outside party to incite or exploit an insurgency on the part of the insurgent. This is what the US did in the initial phase of Afghanistan (then we transitioned to the FID we are doing there now). This is also what AQ is doing through out the Middle East. Note, that this is the MISSION of UW. We in the SOF community use UW skills and tasks in FID and COIN as well.

Mao described three phases of insurgency, essentially starting with organized low-level violence. As I have studied the problem, I find it helpful to in effect add a phase zero to Mao's time proven model. If one considers that every populace is waging insurgency, and every government is waging COIN at all times it helps in two major ways. First, it recognizes that what most think of as insurgency is caused by the failure of government to meet the expectations of its populace. That this effort is continuous, and that it is largely civil in nature and requires civil lead. Second it helps the military responder to remember that he is last in and should be first out in helping to resolve a situation that has grown beyond the civil governemnt's ability to handle. It also helps the military to remember that the insurgent is part of the populace, and that their mission is not to defeat the insurgent, but instead to help resolve the problem. Most governments and populaces are happily down in phase 0, but by monitoring phase 0 closely, one can implement efforts early, far short of conflict, to keep everything stable. Every Cop, every garbageman, every politician, etc is waging COIN everyday. I believe that if they recognized and embraced that noble role, there would be far fewer "classic insurgencies" that we all think of with G's and the military going at it.

The last real American Insurgency and COIN was the Civil Rights movement. This was a shining moment for COIN, as the civil government recognized that it was wrong, and conceded powers to the insurgent that it did not have too, causing the insurgency to move back down into a more peaceful norm short of bringing in the military to suppress or defeat the insurgent. This raises the common issue of "appeasement." A government can not appease its own populace. To meet the needs of ones populace is the duty of government. Appeasement is when government act counter to the needs of its own populace to make concessions to the government or populace of another.

Purpose for action and status of parties, and a true understanding of the environment in which such a conflict is happening are all critical pieces of information for the FID or COIN elements if they want to design and implement an effective campaign.

Just 2 cents from an SF guy.

[slapout9]

We talked about this in detail a good while back. My position was that according to our form of government there are only two types of War. Declared and Undeclared! By it's very nature declared war is conventional...by declaring it we define it. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined....hence the other side will break all the rules, because their aren't any.

[Schmedlap]

The issue drawing potshots is not Gian's position...
... the complaints are mostly about method, not content.

I think that both the content and method are suspect.

Regarding method, the author argued in an earlier piece on the assumption that our successes since 2007 somehow detract from the sacrifices of his Soldiers in 2006 and earlier. But he cannot seem to argue his case without indirectly belittling the sacrifices made since early 2007. He mischaracterizes those sacrifices as simply "buying off" our adversaries or ignores them completely by assuming that Sadr simply had a change of heart. Those arguments form the core of the issue that he seeks to address. Those arguments are bogus.

If it were as simple as "buying off" former insurgents then this conflict would already be over. See an earlier response from Cavguy. And I am still amazed that in December 2008 the author still thinks that Sadr's decision to scale back the tomfoolery of his militia was unrelated to our seen and unseen efforts. I understand that the author left Iraq in 2006 and may not have visibility over what we did in the meantime to specifically, deliberately, and relentlessly force Sadr's hand, but I would think that even without that knowledge, one would still find the notion that Sadr just had a change of heart to be absurd on its face.

He may have the right conclusion regarding Afghanistan, but how he gets there and how he backs it up detracts from his argument. I think it should be reason for pause when the editors at IHT eat this stuff up, but the crowd at SWJ chew it up and spit it out.

[Bob's World]

Slap, I hope you aren't serious.

[slapout9]

Slap, I hope you aren't serious.

Yes, I am. I take it you have a few issues with this?

[Tom Odom]

Yes, I am. I take it you have a few issues with this?

Just don't call him, Shirley

[Bob's World]

Well, it would certainly make things easier.
"Congress, how do you want to play this one"? The military would ask.

"We believe we'll issue a declaration of war." Congress would say.

"Excellent, then this is a conventional war and we will execute such a strategy immediately."

"Good job men, we'll see you all back here for Christmas, parades, and awards ceremonies!"

[slapout9]

Bob, not exactly. I will have to kind of bring you up to date so this will wander a bit.

Our for fathers being incredibly wise figured out that there are two types of war. Declared usually conventionally state on state but not necessarily. They also realized that there would be situations where military intervention would be needed because of an emergency situation that would require them to act without the formal consent of congress but the authority of the president. And at that time they would generally fall to the Navy and the Marine corps.

If they could not be resolved quickly then a declaration of war would be required at which time the ARMY would submit a plan to cover men,material and costs of such a war.

In short the USMC would be the first to FIGHT but the ARMY would be the first to FINNISH, and would require a more diverse nature and capability set.


Part two guerrilla warfare,terrorism,subversion are more a discussion of what TTP's will be allowed(by law) by our side than it is a type of war or warfare.

Make any sense?

[Bob's World]

Slap,

I will say that your position makes sense in that I understand what your position is.

As to it making sense in that I agree with your logic, I can't go there.

It would take volumes to address every component of your position, so I won't even try, but I've read enough of your posts to know that you are able to consider new arguments to help you refine your viewpoints.

1. When America was founded, the world was made up of Kingdoms, and war between kingdoms (I.e., funded by the sovererign's purse for his goals) is a far simpler affair than wars between nations (the full resources of the populace behind the effort, and not controlled by one man).

2. Similarly, the environment that popular uprisings occur within has changed dramatically as well with the communications tools that fuel globalization.

3. "small wars" back in the day were also typically purely an assertion of will by the strong over the weak for economic purposes. Empire building. Now, while there remains plenty of economic motivations for warfare, we also have a lot of conflicts today that are the backlash of suppressed populaces, either against the colonial master directly, or more often, against a "puppet" government that has been sustained in power over them by some outside power that is extracting resources from their country.

So, much has changed in terms of the environment that warfare occurs within.

The only other comment I would offer is that I believe that the full spectrum of warfare could fall under either of your two umbrellas, so I don't think it is very helpful. At the end of the day, you have to take each conflict as a unique problem set, make sure you understand exactly what it is you are trying to accomplish for your nation, and then make sure you fully understand the environment that you are going into, the threat you are facing, and tailor a campaign plan accordingly.

One new development to help staffs be more effective at this are two competing processes for developing this broader understanding. One is the "Commander's Appreciation and Campaign Design," that is favored by the Army and is being codified currently by TRADOC. The other is "Systemic Operational Design," which is a more eclectic process developed by Brig Gen Naveh, a brilliant retired Israeli officer.

I'm all about seeking simplicity, but recognize that lot of complex thinking has to occur first to achieve the simple.

Bob

[slapout9]

Hi Bob, yes much has changed. It was actually being dealt with in the original posts ahwile back. Yes you could have both types of operations under each umbrella. Which is what Tom Odom brought up with his friends paper "Compound Warfare" or my newer SBW (Slapout Based Warfare)

The reason to declare or not declare war is still valid today and hasn't changed. In fact it is more important than ever because it will establish our moral, legal authority and it will also define or should at least our enemy..nation,group or person. We have a big problem with this.

As for your last point about SOD and OP Design we have been talking about that since I came here...I believe in the original Systems theory as taught by Col. Warden (5 Rings analysis) and was involved with it in LE in Counter drug and some other things not the EBO crazy stuff that it turned into.

But SBW beats em all. "Use people as soldiers that don't look like soldiers,use things as weapons that don't look like weapons, and use places as battlefields that don't look like battlefields."

Will pop in and out to discuss if you want but have to get ready for the Alabama vs. Florida game. Rollllll Tide


PS Tom Odom....Shirley

[Bob's World]

Football time here too. Since OSU let the Ducks crush them last week, I have to hang my Rose Bowl hopes on UCLA taking down USC today and opening up the back door.

Best of luck to your Alabama boys, because down here in Florida I'm hearing a lot of smack from the Gator gang... I don't buy into Florida schools having a right to win any more than I do California schools (yet today I have to root for one. Go Bruins!)

[Rank amateur]

I am not in a position to influence any of this. Thus my punditry is that of many rank amateurs in the MSM: totally without any responsibility or repercussions.

you say that like it's a bad thing.

I'm really glad Gian has used the word dogma. I'm an ad guy and the one thing I'm qualified to comment on is people's perceptions, beliefs and actions. I really believe we got into a mess in Iraq because a bunch of people said things that sounded true "democracy is a good" and treated it like dogma, when they should have been on the lookout for evidence that we just might need to offer a little bit more than democracy.

Things that disturb me: the belief that since counter insurgencies take a decade or two, everything will work out all right if we hang around for a decade or two. No. If we're wrong about something, we need to adjust now; if we wait a decade or two before adjusting, you won't see any results for 20 to 40 years.

I also believe there is huge confusion between "protecting the population" and "population control." You stop insurgencies by physically preventing the population from supporting insurgencies. The most effective way to do that is by building fences. ("Pre surge" Iraqi insurgents used to go back to the areas we left. Now, we build a fricken fence so they can't go back. The biggest problem in Afghanistan: no fences. (You have a bunch of people who dogmatically believe the things you do after the fences have been built to try to build support for the legitimate government - i.e. build better roads - will fix the problem. They won't. The population can use the roads to support insurgents.))

All dogma is bad. Semper gumby.

[Rank amateur]

Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved.

Sorry if this sounds like a rude question. It's not meant to be. Where does "spreading democracy," "draining the swamp" and "denying safe haven" fit into your definitions?

[Old Eagle]

Insurgencies are seldom "internal". In fact, some factors we need to deal with are external sanctuary and external support. There are several great threads relating to those issues.

Getting back to the mainstream thread -- I disagree with Gian and more recent posters that my Army has adopted COIN as a "dogma". Big green Army is hunkered down in the fetal position, hoping that this inconvenient COIN thing (and other IW unpleasantries) blow by it, so it can get back to business as usual. Hence, my original post -- from where I sit, there are still not enough folks even trying to understand COIN challenges, much less adopting COIN as a dogma.

[Bob's World]

To Rank Amatuer and Old Eagle.

First, totally agree that rare is the insurgency that is not influenced by outsiders waging either UW or FID, depending on which side they wish to prevail. That does not change the need to understand what insurgency itself is. Also, rare is the insurgent who will not take advantage of a convenient border, or any other legal ploy, to gain some advantage in such a conflict.

As to "spreading democracy," in my opinion this is the most arrogant and flawed aspect of our current strategy, and completely at odds with our own ideology captured in the second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence. Better that we back off from trying to make everyone like us (we know how we felt when the Soviets were trying to make everyone like them...) and instead take a more pure position. I recommend we support "Popular Sovereignty." While we lose some control (last I checked, these weren't our countries or our populaces) we are less hypocritical if when we intervene we simply level the field so that the populace and the government can sort out their differences. Any form of government they choose for themselves, is better than any form of government we impose upon them.

As to "draining the swamp," that is what 95% of FID is that we are doing around the world everyday. Preventing insurgency is far wiser than allowing it to fester to a degree where the military is required to help counter it. But even in combat FID the main effort when applying the Indirect Approach remains in effect, draining the swamp. As we build capacity in the HN government that we are assisting, we also guide them to similarly making this their main effort for COIN.

Last you ask about "denying safe haven." Excellent question. This is one of the greatest areas of misconception in COIN theory. Many seem to believe that sanctuary lies within ungoverned spaces. If this were true, AQ corporate HQ would be in Antartica. Insurgency is a people business. Sanctuary lies within a populace, not any given terrain feature. Granted, some terrain is more favorable than others, but at the end of the day, if you have popular support (to include the kind that comes from fear and coercion) you can hide in plain sight. AQ is in the FATA because of a favorable populace first, terrain second, border to hide behind third.

These are the types of subtle nuances of insurgency that were missed in big Army and big Marine Corps rush to publish a COIN manual. There are older SF COIN manual's out there that are better resources. Also if I was only going to read one book I'd read Galula. He discusses all levels Strategic to Tactical, and gives great examples.