The Col. Gentile collection and debate

[slapout9]

Bob,First all crimes and wars are committed by people, so it makes sense that any major counter strategy must include a population based solution, hence my interest in your PCE theory. However control of the terrain is critical in fact land ownership and usage is often at the base of some insurgencies. There was actually a paper that was published about how fencing should be our main strategy, I think it is in the SWJ library somewhere.

Second Rank Am raises a very important point in that many infrastructure projects can actually enable the insurgency and we should be careful about building them.

Which goes back to my original point about defining our enemy. Part of SBW is the OPS theory. Other Peoples Stuff. Criminal organizations/Drug Dealers do this all the time and so do Terrorist Organizations and they can be very difficult to track and to attack because the cure can be worse than the disease. They use other peoples terrain but don't own it,they use other peoples money but not their own. We do not fight these organizations very well because of this. There is no COIN solution for them and Gian is right in that respect in that we should not go hog wild on COIN everything as opposed to creative use of more conventional forces.

IMO how we should fight AQ and UBL in Astan has nothing to do with COIN or at least it shouldn't have. We got into a lot of trouble when we attacked the Tali-ban instead of staying focused on AQ.

Gian, is also right in that we haven't Won anything yet.....we have certainly improved the situation through COIN TTP's but it ain't over by no means.

[Bill Moore]

Some interesting dialouge, not sure where it is going. Bob is once again trying to redefine everything, Slapout has presented an unorthodox theory, and Rank Amateur has redefined populace control.

Bob wrote,

Insurgency and COIN are internal to any given state. No outsiders involved. The populace wages insurgency to change the politics, and there are three broad categories of insurgency: Resistence against a foreign invader, revolution to change the government of the entire state, and separatist to break a segment away (note, all three of these have been going on in Iraq, and all require unique solution sets). COIN is the efforts of the state to resolve these family disputes.

FID are the efforts of an outside third party to influence this state dynamic on the behalf of the current government. FID runs a tremendous scale, from routine exchanges with allies that have very stable governments, to full scale combat like we have been experiencing in places like Vietnam and Iraq.

I think your trying to over simplify for clarity, and as I argued elsewhere when you oversimplify a problem you fail to adequately address the scope of the problem. Old Eagle already addressed part of the issue by pointing out the foreign intervention in support of insurgents, which you hand waved off as UW, but it is not that simple. In many cases there wouldn't even be an insurgency without outside intervention to mobilize a select target audience, then train and equip and advise them. I disagree with your argument that all insurgencies are internal (most may be, but not all). Second you state that one of the forms of insurgency is resistance against an invader. Following that logic, if the foreign invader has become the defacto government like we did in Iraq during the transition period, then we were conducting COIN against the insurgents.

Rank wrote,

I also believe there is huge confusion between "protecting the population" and "population control." You stop insurgencies by physically preventing the population from supporting insurgencies. The most effective way to do that is by building fences.

Rank, protecting the populace is a subset of populace and resource control (PRC), which is a wide range of activities designed to control the populace and designated resources to isolate the insurgents. PRC facilitates 3 objectives:

1. Isolate the insurgents from human and resource support.
2. Isolate the insurgent from the populace.
3. Identify and neutralize insurgent infrastructure.

Since many insurgents (if not most) use coercion to garner support from the populace, at least during the initial phases, then protecting the populace is key to severing the insurgent influence on the populace. I don't disagree with the requirement for fences, but is it feasible for the U.S. to advocate and support locking large groups of people up behind fences like the Brits did in Malaysia in 2008? How long do you think world opinion would allow us to continue now that path?

Slapout wrote,

We talked about this in detail a good while back. My position was that according to our form of government there are only two types of War. Declared and Undeclared! By it's very nature declared war is conventional...by declaring it we define it. Undeclared war by it's very nature is not well defined....hence the other side will break all the rules, because their aren't any.

I don't get it? We declared war on Japan and Germany, and while the conventional war was the main effort we supported substantial unconventional operations, terrorist tactics, assassinations, fire bombings, and even the A-Bomb. In our war against insurgents we have actually been forced to follow more restrictions than we would in a declared war.

Now this I like a lot:

Criminal organizations/Drug Dealers do this all the time and so do Terrorist Organizations and they can be very difficult to track and to attack because the cure can be worse than the disease. They use other peoples terrain but don't own it,they use other peoples money but not their own. We do not fight these organizations very well because of this. There is no COIN solution for them and Gian is right in that respect in that we should not go hog wild on COIN everything as opposed to creative use of more conventional forces.

Slapout can you send me the link to Tom's paper you referenced?

[Bob's World]

Good discussion all, though to be fair, it is the neo-COIN community that is revising definitions, and I can post open source quotes from Admiral Olson, CDR of USSOCOM that essentially take the same position on definitions that I laid out above.

I also agree that dealing with non-state entitiies that use other peoples terrain and populaces for their own means is, while often intertwined with insurgent movements, a very different problem set requiring different solutions. We produced an unclassified strategic appreciation of the dynamics going on in the world today, and one of the major overarching themes is that of "a competition for sovereignty." BLUF is that people have greater choices than just the state these days for the various things they need. Charitable NGOs, profit oriented corporations, states, and transnational criminal organizations, and politicallly motivated state and non-state actors.

Though all of this is indeed very complex, and deriving effective solution sets even more complex, it is possible and extremely helpful to bin these players out into the simple, enduring categories that I laid out so that you can begin figuring out how to deal with each. Today's environment is much more complex than the old Red vs Blue world that our intel community still tries to bin everything into; or even "your either with us or against us."

One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace. It would include the full DIME, CT, etc. I beleive this is more helpful than just labeling a state as "rogue" or an organization as "terrorist" At the end of the day do we need to "defeat" AQ, or do we simply need to neutralize them? In fact there are many that think that AQ is fading due to its overreliance on violent ways, and failure to adapt more political wings like the IRA and Hezbollah. If this is true, I think instead of cheering the demise, we need to be very concerned about what replaces them. The conditions that gave rise to AQ still exist in spades. Here I agree with Gentile, there is no victory. By changing our campaign to a more holistic counterUW campaign aimed at neutralizing AQ by rendering them irrelevant to the populaces they seek to influence we have a better chance of not giving rise to a second, more sophisticated generation of non-state actor that comes in behind them to continue the mission. Counter UW works for states also. Clearly we do not want to "defeat" Iran to prevent them from waging UW in Iraq, or Lebannon, but we do need to devise a sophisticated, holistic scheme of engagement to counter this UW effort and it destabilizing effects that are counter to our national interests.

So, yes it is complicated, I fully appreciate the complexity. Any simplifications I offer, however, are based upon refining that complexity down to its essence, which is far different than just scraping a simple observation off of the top.

Bob

[Tom Odom]

Slapout can you send me the link to Tom's paper you referenced?

Bill not my paper but an anthology gathered by a friend at CSI

Compound Warfare: An Anthology

[slapout9]

Bill Moore, under declared war we did the one thing we have not done and should have done. We mobilized our entire country to fight the war. Which gave us the resources to do anything necessary to win. In short we had a plan for victory...it was all Strategic and Stuff. Now we have a very good and professional Army that is being worn out. That sucks and it ain't right to keep doing that. If this GWOT,Iraq,Astan,Mexico, is truley a war for our national survival than we need to fight it as a nation, not just the Army (Army/USMC all military don't mean to leave anyone out).

I read Tom's paper while eating chicken wings at work, best way to do it I know it's not Tom's paper but Tom posted it so I just call it that for short. Important paper and worth the read.

Bob's World, there is actually a book online about the history of UW,Guerrilla warfare that talks about renaming missions just like you propose, In fact it was done that way for awhile. It talks about creating counter organizations for specific enemies. Anyway I will find the link and post it for all to read.

OPS is a critical part of understanding how to fight these RICO organizations because that is what they are IMHO more than anything else.

Alabama lost: but it was a good game. Roll Tide!

[slapout9]

BobW, and everyone else here is the link to the book I was talking about. Since it's inception the US COIN, special warfare community has been trying to define what it is and does according to this book. It is well researched and provides extensive references. Also seems to favor the USMC small wars approach above all the Sneaky Pete type stuff.
You can read by chapters online or print by chapters. Excellent research and historical source. I found this a couple of years ago and should have posted it then but stuff happens.

http://www.statecraft.org/

[Bill Moore]

Tom, thanks for the link. Slapout, this document is over 300 pages, that is a lot of chicken wings brother!

Responses to Bob,

one of the major overarching themes is that of "a competition for sovereignty." BLUF is that people have greater choices than just the state these days for the various things they need. Charitable NGOs, profit oriented corporations, states, and transnational criminal organizations, and politicallly motivated state and non-state actors.

First, understand that ADM Olsen proposed this hypothesis about FID and COIN, I just don't think it will hold water when it is put into practice. I'm going off memory, but I believe COIN (probably an outdated book) was mission set under FID? I'll look it up someday, it is a worthwhile discussion that will help focus policy, doctrine, and training. Back to your quote above, Ken and I debate this frequently when I challenge the legacy definition of COIN. After reading your post, I'm not sure sovereignty is the right word (I guess I should look it up ), but many of these organizations are interested in overthrowing the State government, but rather controlling some terrain (physical, human, cyber, etc.) within that State and others, so they can defy the State's laws and implement their own law of the land. It is an immature idea that I need to further develop, but by all means please tell me where you think I might be off track.

One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace.

I like this, and it might be useful to refresh DoD's and the USG's knowledge base on how to wage this type of war. I think we did a decent job countering unconventional warfare against the Soviets during the Cold War. There is much, much more to it than chasing HVIs, which we still tend to confuse with decisive operations (there usually isn't a decisive operations in this environment). One area I think that is sorely lacking is the counterintelligence field, we seem to have diverted (at least in the military) CI focus from rooting out subversives to locating HVIs, which is a misue of a critical asset in counter UW. More to follow on this whole discussion of counter UW.

Posted by Slapout,

under declared war we did the one thing we have not done and should have done. We mobilized our entire country to fight the war. Which gave us the resources to do anything necessary to win.

When we expanded GWOT into Iraq, I was frustrated about the lack of mobilization also. However, for mobilization to be most effective, it needs to be implemented during patriotic phase of the conflict. I think attempting to mobilize the populace now to reinforce our tired ranks would be counter productive, due to the potential second order effect of giving the anti-war movement more propaganda material. Also, now that we're attempting to shift our main effort to more of an indirect approach, there may not be a need for mass mobilization. Good points.

[Ken White]

that it was / is necessary for this effort? Or, more importantly that it could have been done with over 30% of the voters opposed to invading Iraq before the fact? Or would / could have been sustained with over 60% opposed to it at one point?

Slap, one thing you might want to consider about 'declared war' is that we've been in several since the last that had an actual Congressional Declaration of War and that during that war and its concomitant full mobilization a number of laws were passed that gave the Federal Government some truly awesome and draconian powers during a 'state of war' i.e., a declared war IAW the Constitution. Avoidance of triggering those laws is one significant thing has driven Congress to deliberately avoid declaring war since 1945...

I'd further suggest that your theory of declared versus undeclared wars has merit with respect to the intent of the founders but have to question whether a literal interpretation along your lines affords the flexibility needed today. While there is no question that the Armed forces could be restructured to operate within your parameters, I suggest you'd be confronted with an Army that sat stateside and trained along with an Air force that was minimally employed and a Navy an Marine Corps that were overworked.

Obviously, the Navy and Marines could be enlarged and better funded but this would have to be at the expense of the CONUS based Army and AF which would impact their size, equipping and training. Those services would wither. Not a big deal to me but some would get ferociously upset at that -- the more important issue is not the politics, it's the practicality of such an eventuality.

An item to note is that the current system has produced the most combat experienced armed forces in the world today and most other nations Ministers of Defense are well aware of that and don't want to consider a couple of million combat experienced Americans anywhere near their nation. I doubt they'd be that concerned if we were talking about just a few hundred thou Marines and an Army that had been sitting at home training marginally -- and peacetime training is ALL marginal, CTCs or no.

You also have USSOCOM to deal with. Whatcha going to do with them?

[Ken White]

BobW, and everyone else here is the link to the book I was talking about.
http://www.statecraft.org/

However he also has some flawed ideas -- and an agenda:

Michael Mcclintock.

[Schmedlap]

I second Selil's earlier comment regarding COIN/conventional as being a continuum, rather than an "either/or". I would also add that I think Rupert Smith has it right in The Utility of Force*: "if a decisive strategic victory was the hallmark of interstate industrial war, establishing a condition may be deemed the hallmark of the new paradigm of war amongst the people... as the political aims have changed, so has the use of force: the conflicts are fought for sub-strategic objectives."

I think he's generally correct regarding the changing nature of our objectives - and thus - the changing nature of how we must fight. I don't know anyone who thinks that COIN is the end-all-be-all of the future of warfare, nor do I know anyone who thinks the same of conventional, but there certainly are too many who think one is significantly more important than the other. Selil is right in that the two are part of a continuum over which we may frequently shift back and forth from day to day. After all, that is how we are currently fighting. Even in 2005, my battalion was kicking in doors one day, providing medical screening to kids at a school the next day, and then doing a joint Army-Marine WWII-style hammer-and-anvil sweep through the desert 3 days after that. It's a continuum that we shift back and forth across.

* - By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.

[Devil's Advocate]

By the way - does anyone know of any criticism of Smith's book? I thought he had it right, but I'm curious if there are any opposing views.

Schmedlap, here are a few I found. I keep bumping the book down my to read list, but now I think I will crack it open.

http://www.d-n-i.net/dni_reviews/the...y_of_force.htm

http://johntreed.com/utilityofforce.html

I offer these two not as a endorsement, but rather because they offered some good fodder.

[slapout9]

Bill Moore, 300 pages that is what I said. I took Tom's advice read a little, chew a little.


Ken White, I understand your point but you wouldn't have to do it like that. One, the criticisms of Draconian measures you mentioned are valid and I hoped we have learned from that. Two, we would not have to mobilize the entire country like WW2 but certain arrangements should have been made to insure we had immediately available back up production of needed machines and materials and even a modified national service program to support and relieve combat units and perform support services that are being contracted out at a huge cost to the country and a war tax to avoid borrowing the money.

No modification of Navy/USMC needed. In fact that is the point of the declaration to state what we need in terms Army,Air,Space Navy,USMC,Special Warfare. All which was done in WW2, we should have done it on an appropriate scale based upon the....drum roll....METT-TC!

Forgot, I agree it is to late to do it now, but there will be another one...sooner or later.

[Ken White]

I understand your point but you wouldn't have to do it like that.

Wouldn't have to what like what???

One, the criticisms of Draconian measures you mentioned are valid and I hoped we have learned from that.

The point with those measures is that they are still on the books as laws and become automatically active IF a war is declared, that's why Congress is not going to declare a war unless it becomes a truly and obvious existential requirement.

Two, we would not have to mobilize the entire country like WW2 but certain arrangements should have been made to insure we had immediately available back up production of needed machines and materials and even a modified national service program to support and relieve combat units and perform support services that are being contracted out at a huge cost to the country and a war tax to avoid borrowing the money.

We can disagree on most of that; is partial mobilization like being partially pregnant? The only problems with materiel were due to laws Congress passed about the DoD acquisition system that put that huge inefficient bureaucracy in place; every thing that was NEEDED -- not everything that was wanted or the ignorant media got on about -- was provided as soon as the system could get it there. Both the body armor and the MRAP things were way overblown by the dumb press and partisan stupidity in Congress. You want something to get upset about; the M855 5.56 round and that stupid M9 pistol the army insists on hanging onto...

I do not support or agree with a national service program; a lot of folks agree with me and I believe more do than would support it. Nor do I agree with more taxes -- better distribution of what's there, yes -- not more.

No modification of Navy/USMC needed.

If they're going to pick up the slack in todays world for the Army which you want to retain statside to train for a big war, they'll need modification.

In fact that is the point of the declaration to state what we need in terms Army,Air,Space Navy,USMC,Special Warfare. All which was done in WW2,

You're mixing apples and kiwi fruit. Here's the declaration of War for WW II LINK. Note what it says. Actually, the WW II armed forces were effectively decided upon and designed in 1939-40 and early 41 BEFORE the war was declared.

we should have done it on an appropriate scale based upon the....drum roll....METT-TC!

Actually, it WAS done to that criteria -- you just don't agree with the way it was done (I don't either). A 'declaration' was not going to happen and wouldn't have changed much; as you can see from the WW II job, it effectively gave FDR a free hand.

Forgot, I agree it is to late to do it now, but there will be another one...sooner or later.

Of course there will -- and unless it is a war of national survival, it won't be declared either...

[slapout9]

Ken, read this WW2 Mobilization plan.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm

[Ken White]

Ken, read this WW2 Mobilization plan.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/mobpam.htm

and mobilization was one of my core tasks. What does that have to do with declared versus undeclared war or to do with the forays into Afghanistan or Iraq?

Not trying to be difficult, I just don't understand the connection...

Er, you did note that it confirmed what I said -- most of the mobilization planning took place before the Declaration of War (and that Pamphlet Gordy Sullivan put out before his Louisiana Maneuvers refreshed my memory on that score back in '92.

[jmm99]

The difference in language between these two acts by Congress evidences a difference in national strategic policy.

WWII Declaration of War (link by Ken)

.... the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

The language is very specific in ratifying an armed conflict with a single nation, to bring that conflict to a successful termination, and all the nation's resources were pledged.

On the other hand, we have the Tonkin Gulf resolution, which is here.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

The language is specific in ratifying armed force; but does not focus on a single nation; does not focus on a specific armed conflict, or in bringing that conflict to a successful termination; and certainly does not pledge all of the nation's resources.

What was going on here ? The resolution is area-focused - on SE Asia and maintenance of peace and security in that area - read that as limitation of communism in that region, and as a rejection of an agressive roll-back policy. The termination condition was when "the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions".

That portion of the resolution does not mention Indochina (or its then four component parts), except indirectly (Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were "protocol states" under SEATO). That evidences the continued primary focus on SE Asia as a whole - of which, South Vietnam was but a component part - and, individually, not a very important part.

-------------------------------------------
Now, my point is not to debate the relative merits of these two acts of Congress - or what speculative alternatives any of us might draft as being "better". My point is that the two different national strategy approaches resulted in different approaches by the "National Command Authorities" in military strategy, operations and tactics in each conflict.

The result of our military action in Vietnam (no matter how flawed or unflawed you want to make it) was consistent with the termination condition set in the national strategy evidenced by Tonkin Gulf (and other NSC statements, as well). Ran into the following by GEN Westmorland in Infantry Magazine (Garland), A Distant Challenge, which is available here:

A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)
Foreward

Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.

Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.

William C. Westmorland
April 1983

The salient point is that, regardless of the technical form of the Congressional act, the national strategic policy and the resultant military plans must mesh. Otherwise, we do get mired in dogma - and disputes about what should or should have been done in the past (e.g., Summers vs. Krepinevich).

Since we don't have a single nation to declare war against, what is our area national strategic policy for South Asia in 2009 ? I haven't the foggiest idea beyond killing Bin Ladin, Zawahiri and AQ there.

[slapout9]

JMM, can you declare war against an Organization? I know of no precedent or standing to quote. It would take care of the problem with just declaring war on a single country as you pointed was done in Vietnam...ah SE Asia.

[jmm99]

only nations and some international organizations are recognized.

However, that being said, GC III Art. 2 recognizes "Powers" to an armed conflict - they do not have to be nation-states or recognized governments of nation-states (e.g., the Taliban, and possibly AQ). If such a "Power" accepts and applies the GCs, its combatants flow into Art. 4 (PW/POW status) provided they meet its requirements. Otherwise, their status is governed by Art. 3 (the non-international armed conflict provisions),

I see nothing problematic about declaring an armed conflict to exist between a nation-state and such a "Power"; but it would not be a formal declaration of war. In fact, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was aimed at communism and a region, SE Asia. Similarly, the AUMF was aimed at terrorism and was global - as they say in other contexts, overly broad and vague.

From the standpoint of US Con Law, the use of both formal declarations of war and joint resolutions was recognized early on - with both coming under the Congressional power to declare war. However, as Ken points out, a number of statutes and executive orders are best interpreted as requiring a formal declaration of war.

That's the law as I see it. Others will disagree.

PS: we might have "lost" the Vietnam War - Let the Summers-Krepinevich disciples argue that one out. We won the Southeast Asia Armed Conflict and that's where I count the guys and gals on the Wall - that one's an emotional issue to me which I don't like to argue.

[Bob's World]

I wrote a piece where I made a statement that our young men and women on the ground for the GWOT were giving an A+ effort to execute a C+ strategy; and that sadly the end result was a C+. That we as senior leaders owed them better than that, and that our populace expected better as well. Needless to say my Army War College professor had a cow.

Strategists and campaign planners let the force and the nation down in Vietnam, and it is happening again. Military victory that does not produce the required (not to be confused with "intended") strategic effect is sadly wasted.

With my oldest son, an E-4 11B on the ground in Iraq for his second tour, it is easy for me to stay focused on this as I wage the good fight with those who craft strategy and draft campaign plans to raise their game.

As to war and states vs non-states; this is one of the bold new areas that we enter into as the world flattens, as populaces become more connected and empowered, and as the Westphalian system morphs. Clearly now, while we still struggle (as are the Indians with their efforts to sort out how to respond to the Mumbai attacks) with how to effectively deal with an act of war committed by a non-state entity. To wage war against a non-state group? To wage war against a tactic? To attack a state who is perceived to have allowed this organization to develop the capability for the attack? There is no clear answer to this, and no precedent to rely on. We must move forward with an open mind and create new precedent. GWOT is a school of hard knocks for the U.S. in this regard.

It is, however, clear that an organization can wage war against a state, and that they can act in very state-like ways. Consider the UW campaign beign waged by Al Qaeda. They reach out to incite and facilitate popular uprisings around the Muslim world, each with it's own unique motivations, but all with a common thread, and collectively helping AQ move its own selfish agenda forward.

This is why I get a little tight when people try to make sense of what is going on by misapplying sound concepts. Everything is not COIN, and clearly all future battle will not be COIN. The U.S. military's no-fail mission is to fight and win our nation's wars, regardless of form. However, in this new and messy peace, they must create new and flexible capacity to apply tailored capabilities to conduct FID in ways they are not used to doing, and with command and control relationships they are not used to submitting to. Concepts like "global insurgency" aggragate diverse threats and facilitates the type of polarized thinking that Gentile warns against. Insurgency in a globalized world is a far different thing than global insurgency, and while we need to be able to mitigate and prevent these many uprisings from getting out of control, we must also regain and sustain our warfighting skills as a whole.

[Entropy]

I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:

Gentlemen, I am not a battlespace owner. I never will be. I am a guy who operated with his boots in the dust on a continuous basis and saw (and still sees) the spotty application of the tools that others have proven will work; not exactly in each case but adaptively to particular situations. While you discuss such lofty things as future procurement budgets, I'm telling you that we are at war now and the horses are still being machinegunned from under their riders as we write. Young company grade officers are still being blocked from doing what they know to be best in their AOR's. COIN is still something that has not reached the strategic Corporal. He can't be strategic; the strategic Captain can't even be strategic. While Colonels dicker about the new tank, the Captains are still horse-bound. The Army has still not bought the weapon of choice for the war in which primers are being dented daily. COIN is still a subject of acceptance. This was touched on in the "some units were doing good COIN while others weren't" discussions on this thread.

Would we have accepted such random achievement in a conventional conflict fought under AirLand?

Not just "no," but "hell no."

Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.