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Thread: The Col. Gentile collection and debate

  1. #141
    Council Member Piranha's Avatar
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    Great stuff indeed, food for thought ...
    I'll add Abu Muqawama's site to my list, thanks for the hint.
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  2. #142
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    Thumbs up Am

    Yes, Ex and crew do a great job at AM.

  3. #143
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Good catch, Entropy. Thanks for posting it.

    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I'm sure a lot of people here are regular readers at Abu Muqawama's site - I know I am. I found this exchange between Col. Gentile and an anonymous (but well-informed) poster very fascinating and informative. Scroll down and look for the exchange between "Looking Glass" and Col. Gentile. Great stuff:

    Read the whole thing. I think he was able to poke more holes in Col. Gentile's arguments than anyone else I've read, and I consider myself more a "Gentilist" than not.
    What the articulate Looking Glass says in even more words than I would use is that:

    - We blew the well done fighting entry into Iraq because we had no doctrine for, had not trained for and did not plan for Phase 4 / occupation -- and the likely ensuing activity. True. Most all of that simply due to a lack of training; we wiped it out of syllabii and no one knew what to do.

    - We're not really practicing COIN operations in many ways because we're still in a pre-2001 NTC mindset. True -- but hopefully he realizes that's because all the Generals and Colonels are products of that period and are reverting, as we all do, to the way they were trained *...

    - We can probably produce a force that can do both MCO and LIC if simply train correctly. True.

    - Our training is pathetic. True.

    So, yeah, he's got it pretty well right and he's trying to educate Gian...

    * Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.

    [ Count the number of times the word 'train' or its derivatives appear in this post. ]

  4. #144
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    I'm always a bit perplexed that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.
    Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
    It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.

    Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).
    The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
    It sucks.
    Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).
    There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.

    It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)


    Preparations for more small wars in the future?
    Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice.
    Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).

  5. #145
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I'm always a bit perplexed
    Not to worry, give it some thought...
    that the 'COIN and/or HIC discussion' is usually (pretty much always) discussed from the lens of order-receiving military personnel.
    Some give orders too; over here they're asked for their opinion -- sometimes they're listened to, sometimes not but here everyone has a right to state their opinion and most of us will.
    Even generals aren't at the top of the food chain; politicians are.
    It needs a political analysis to decide the matter, and politicians need to think about much more/different things than troops.
    You're living in a dream world; most western politicians today have stayed as far away from the armed forces as they possibly could.
    Most importantly, they decide whether warfare is advantageous or not (at least they should).
    Agree they should, shame they don't -- or when they do, don't do a better job of it...
    The effort / benefit ratio of COIN in distant, even non-allied countries is about as good as if you wanted to fight lung cancer by throwing chewing gums (substitute to cigarettes) from a plane.
    It sucks.
    Yep. Makes no difference. Those politicians you talked about earlier will keep sending soldiers off to do work that sucks...
    Tell me a single COIN war in a distant country that justified the effort (fiscal effort and damage to society & individuals).There's a reason why we know so few bright, shining exemplary COIN wars; they suck as a category.
    Greece. Philippines -- didn't we do this before? Why bother; what's past is irrelvant; politicians not only can't spell Army, few of them know much history.
    It's in my opinion absolutely intolerable to prepare an army for small wars in the future because that's simply wrong planning; it's planning for moving intentionally into terrible situations. It's stupid. (Yes, I believe that Gates is a terrible SecDef, one who makes others feel good and who knows how to look as if he makes good decisions, but he's terrible.)
    I'll forward your recommendation to the White House; you'll hear from them soon, I'm sure.
    Preparations for more small wars in the future? Prepare some special forces, military intelligence and the military police for COIN, that will suffice. Downsize the rest to what's necessary to keep the alliance safe (no-one who doesn't promise to stand by us in advance deserves to be protected by us, so let's just care about allies) - and determine this size by taking into account all allied forces/powers (which means: The new size would be small and truly affordable).
    There you go, being logical -- you don't need to tell us all that -- tell the politicians.

  6. #146
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    I don't know who Looking Glass is, but I like the cut of his jib.

    Just look at the MITT/ETT program... the treatment and support of these teams when they operate in another's battlespace tells most of all how much our Army "gets" COIN.

    Gentlemen, while you address this matter in such scholarly fashion, men are in crude places poorly supported and repeatedly countermanded by senior officers, your brethren, who just plain don't "get it." As long as that is a consistent narrative, any discussion of, "has our Army gone too far with this COIN thing?" is pointless.
    EXACTLY! This never-ending debate is like the kid who checks under the bed and checks the closet every night, afraid that the bogeyman is there. He's not. But the kid keeps worrying. Gone too far with COIN? The doctrinal publications are very nice. They have neat illustrations and interesting concepts. The cover designs are swell. But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country." And back home, over half of the pre-deployment training is the same old weapons qual, reflexive fire, squad/section evaluations, and Table 8/Table 12. Procurement is still churning out big heavy vehicles, boats, and aircraft. And Officers are still learning how to draw big sweeping arrows (though now in PowerPoint format, projected on a 42" plasma screen).

    Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?) responds:
    Your quip about our discussions here of being "scholarly" has a whiff of condescension and implies a muddy-boots view of the ivory tower... this blog has many participants some with experience, but most with lots of knowledge and interest in these important matters.
    It's a damned good muddy-boots view of the ivory tower, in my opinion. The discussions are purely academic, in spite of the operational experience of the participants. The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers. Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.

  7. #147
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    Gentile (Is he a LTC, LTC(P), or COL?)

    Since you ask I am an active duty Army Colonel presently posted as an associate professor of history at West Point where I run the military history program. I have done two runs in Iraq. The first was in 2003 as a BCT XO in 4ID in Tikrit and the second was again in 4ID in west Baghdad in command of an armored recon squadron in 2006.

    For whatever it is worth I wrote my doctoral dissertation on the Air Force's World War II Strategic Bombing Survey and in it I was highly critical of the air force for using it to shape their future visions of an independent air arm.

    I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.

  8. #148
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Schmedlap View Post
    ...The debate has become a past-time among military buffs that is occasionally perceived by outsiders as something mirroring reality. It's more of a hobby for the participants and a free online broken-record seminar for onlookers.
    Totally true and it will have no effect on what really happens -- but I'm retired and don't have much else to do...

    It doesn't really mirror reality because most of those decisions have been made for the next five years and the few that haven't been will be made mostly by Congress and not be me or anyone involved in the debate including the big names or the Think Tanks -- or their graduates. Or Gian. Or Looking Glass.
    Anyone who thinks that we've gone too far with COIN, or are in danger of doing so, significantly overestimates how far we've actually gone. While some leaders "get it" they are still unable to implement it. And, not to worry - most don't "get it" anyway.
    I don't think we have and know we will not go far enough to get good at it -- we can and likely will go far enough to do okay for the most part.

    I still contend however, that we should avoid it where possible; it's un-American. That, BTW, is a serious comment, we're too impatient and selfish to do it well. More importantly, we are too widely disliked in most of the world to do it because we become targets, everybody wants a shot at the big guy. On top of that, the One Third and Two Year rules apply.

  9. #149
    Council Member Fuchs's Avatar
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    Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

    "It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."

    It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.

    Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.

    Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

    Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.

  10. #150
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    Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
    I find it personally ironic that in a previous life most of my scholarly work was in criticism of the Air Force and airmen; now I am teamed up with an Air Force MG and providing critical views of the American Army's approach to coin.
    That is interesting. I need to read your dissertation on Strategic Bombing, I saw it mentioned on the loop the other day.
    "A Sherman can give you a very nice... edge."- Oddball, Kelly's Heroes
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  11. #151
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I don't think you've been paying attention to the US on that score.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    Well, Ken, then let us begin all future statement about "HIC and/or COIN" with

    "It's a political failure to enter small wars abroad, but when the politicians force the armed services to ..."
    We could do that but is seems a waste of effort to me because most military folks and civilian military analysts are fully aware that it's a truth and that the politicians don't pay much attention to it.
    It's badly misleading if the first choice is widely accepted as achievable but not available dud to political failure and the second choice is discussed publicly as if it was a first choice.
    Two ifs; big ones...

    I don't recall any western democracy including the US taking that route. All have tried other options -- perhaps not the right ones but they tried. I cannot recall any instance since WW II where western nations have elected war as a first choice.
    Maybe the politicians wouldn't start small wars in the future if the armed services tell the world that small wars abroad are a no-win proposition because they're exceedingly difficult to win with less harm than benefit to the own nation.
    That was the purpose of the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines; they guided US policy in that vein from 1984 until 2001. The thrust was no COIN ops, don't go to war unless major US interests were involved. George W. Bush ran for election as President essentially saying "...no nation building, no sticking our nose in other peoples business." After we went to Afghanistan, he got roundly criticized for not doing what he said he would do. Lyndon Johnson got elected in 1964 saying his opponent would expand the Viet Nam war -- got elected and proceeded to expand it himself.

    The problem is that the politicians aren't going to war so the fact that some are harder than others doesn't matter to them.
    Let's assume that the armies of the NATO countries are well prepared for COIN in structure, training, doctrine and equipment. You can bet that this would lead to a lot of ####ty, avoidable and probably outright criminal wars launched by our politicians.

    Show them a blunt sword and they'll think twice.
    I doubt it. Most of 'em aren't smart enough to figure that out. They've been known to threaten people with blunt swords. The US has gone to big wars eight times, Viet Nam was the last (Desert Storm was not a war and neither Afghanistan or Iraq is a big war by any definition) -- all eight of those saw us with an essentially blunt sword and the politicians knew and went anyway. Aside from those wars, we have since 1801 engaged in over 200 incursions, raids and what have you on the sovereign territory of others; swords were blunt most of those times.

    The armed forces of any nation have a responsibility to be as prepared for all eventualities as possible. The US, for example was not prepared for stability operations in Afghanistan or Iraq -- we erred. We should not do so again. You may be a nice guy and opposed to war -- there are a lot folks out there who aren't nice and will start a war in a second...

  12. #152
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    Default What is the COIN debate about?

    I'm not going to fool anyone, I have been involved in the COIN debate with other SWJ members for a few months. I don't know if my apparent flip flopping on whether I support or oppose Gian's views are due to some underlying medical issue, or if I'm just not sure what the debate is really about.

    Posted by Ken,

    * Equally hopefully, Gian realizes that he is correct on the need to emphasize conventional warfare but that if we simply change the way we train as ol' Looking glass, I and others have been advocating, then the problem seen by Gian on the one hand and the COIN advocates on the other will no longer exist.
    I have agreed with Ken on this point several times, and I'm not sure why we feel obligated to support one position or the other? The argument seems to be dividing us unnecessarily, if you support COIN you're in the Moose Party and if you support conventional war you're in the Bear Party. Fortunately, our situation isn't that complex. We're American fighting men and women who took an oath to defend our Constitution against "all enemies" foreign and domestic. Many of our potential foes present a conventional military threat, while many of our foes present an irregular combatant threat. There is no debate, we "must" be prepared to fight and win against both. How we prepare is arguable, and in Gian's defense I don't think he ever argued that we ignore COIN or the irregular threat.

    I found much to agree with Looking Glass's post, and unfortunately the truth frequently hurts. There is a big difference between really getting and doing it and paying lip service to it; it being COIN.

    Once an operatonal mold is set, it is hard to break out of it. I remember one of the dumbest statments I heard from a very smart senior officer. Don't worry about it Bill, it's Iraq, so we got it, which was one way of saying we been there before and we're going to do the same thing again when we go back, don't worry about the new intelligence reports. Most leaders are not as courageous and intelligent as GEN Petreaus in my opinion, and his leadership has been courageous and decisive, and I think his surge strategy (or right sizing) was instrumental in reducing the violence in Iraq. By no means was the surge the sole factor, but I don't believe all the other contributing factors would have made much of an impact without the surge. The argument is academic at this point because we'll never really know what would have happened if we didn't surge, but still I would like to hear Gian's arguments on why he believes the surge wasn't effective in reducing the violence?

    Now I'm going to flip flop (I'll see the doc tomorrow) and support one of Gian's arguments. His point about our COIN doctrine being largely focused on counter-Mao insurgency strategies is accurate, and it is a major shortfall. To be fair it does address other types of insurgencies, but it doesn't address different strategies for dealing with them. In many areas of the world there will not be a large majority of fence sitters in the affected populace just waiting to be won over by either the insurgent or the counterinsurgent. Who they support is sometimes a given, especially in identity based insurgencies/struggles. How do you wage a successful COIN campaign when the populace will not support you (and the HN you're supporting) with our current doctrine? I think the courses of action available (regardless of feasibility) are obvious, even if some of them are not politically correct. But onward to the most important post,

    Schmedlap posted,

    But back in the real world, the SSG, 1LT, and CPT don't even have a decent interpreter. The MITT needs to bum batteries off of a line unit's supply sergeant. Commanders deploy overconfident that they're the next Robert Thompson and within a month revert back to what they are comfortable with: raids, ambushes, cordons & searches, OPs, "presence patrols", and the like. The average infantryman still exudes the attitude that, "these people should show some fricken gratitude - we liberated their damn country."
    COIN is a reality, we'll have to be proficient at it at all levels and we're not. There is much to fix; and to fix with a great sense of urgency. We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?

  13. #153
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default This is true

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    ...We have guys and gals in harms way now who are not properly trained or resourced for the fight they're in today, which is sinful this far along into the fight. So once again, what is the COIN debate about?
    The debate is, at this level, whiling away time and stating opinions. Most of the big decisions for the next five years are already in concrete in any event.

    Wat is not in concrete is our training. That can be changed -- and, as you point out, it needs to be...

  14. #154
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    excellent discussion...

    thanks for pointing this exchange out here. have felt that the "adaptive" application of the numerous tools in our weaponry at the full spectrum of diplomacy through total warfare is called for. this spontaneous improvisation may be the true measure of genius in small wars.

  15. #155
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default This debate is degenerating....

    To jump in behind Bill Moore

    OK, I have no dog in this fight, but as an "informed" outside observer it strikes me that this debate between Col Gentile, and the post-modernist is getting off track in terms of being useful.

    What I find extremely useful in Gentile's attitude is his forewarning that the loss of Combined Arms dispersed mobile warfare skills, against a peer or even near peer competitor, are extremely easy to loose and very expensive and difficult to recover. It is this level of operations which armies find difficult to do.

    COIN is the basic standard for ALL armies, or should be. It's cheap to train for, relies mostly on education, and is very context specific.
    (EG: for the UK, force generating units like the Ulster Defence Regiment was extremely easy compared to force generating Armoured Infantry regiments)
    Sadly is not often done well, because of these things. Cheap is bad, and "education is for pussies", while "training is for warriors."

    It is neither true nor useful to say that all future wars will be small wars. Does the US need to improve it's COIN training and education - YES!
    Can it afford to let its High End slide - NO!

    The solution all lies in the correct training and doctrine, constrained by a limited budget and finite time and resources. Unless some fundamentals are put in place, this debate serves neither side well.
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    Visit any unit in Iraq or Afghanistan and tell me that what you see is a COIN force, rather than a conventional force occasionally engaging in COIN. I think you'll be hard pressed to do so with a straight face. In terms of organizational culture, MTOE, and the basic mindset of the average Soldier, we are a conventional force engaged in LIC. This is even more apparent if you observe training, stateside. I think people on both sides of the COIN too-much vs not-enough debate overestimate how well we've adapted. The debate is academic and the views and memories of the participants have been clouded through the passage of time and overexamination, imo. I think that a lot of very smart people are wasting their time, arguing themselves into irrelevance. The new doctrine, the continuous churning out of new op-eds, and the glossy think tank studies are neat. But training is not keeping pace with the rhetoric.

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    Default Niel will be proud of me!!

    Niel: The little thing was turned into a book by NYU Press a few years back but don’t buy it since the price has become somewhat prohibitive. I bet the Leavenworth library has a copy of it. Anyway, just as you quipped a few weeks ago that I would be proud of you for mentioning the need to maintain hic capabilities I think you would be pleased with my criticism of the air force and airmen in their zeal to create an independent air arm and the arguments they were making at the time for the absolute decisiveness of air power.

    Bill: Agree and good question: "what is the Coin debate about?" To me it is not a maximalist set of arguments of an either or proposition on things. As I have said before, the different view always acknowledge the others positions; eg, Niel acknowledges the need to maintain conventional capabilities, or John Nagl always does the same too. And I have never said that the army should not maintain its capability to do coin because it must. I think where the debate is at, prompted rightly by discussions on the SWJ and AM and specifically by folks like Herschel Smith, is to get at a clear and detailed understanding of what we really mean by "balance." Ken has weighed in often very clearly on these matters. It seems to me that as Herschel stated we have to take out the red-pen, we have to make choices. And I imagine if you put a Coin proponent in a room with me as a "Con" proponent and said take this list of defense resources and start cutting, then produce a scheme for how to organize and train the military and specifically the army for the future, well at that point agreement would most likely go away. I for one, in simplistic terms, would not want to trade-off armor and firepower in the force for more light infantry and soft-power-like systems. Certainly there is a need for the latter, but if it came to a tradeoff (which invariably all of these things must come to that) my vote would be for firepower and protection as a key element in the force.

    Schmedlap: Well the exchange between me and LG has been interesting. I have made my points about his well articulated but in my mind still discrete views. But stepping forward a bit, if he is correct along with you about a bunch of rhetoric out there as to how Coinized the army has become but in reality it is not even close to that ideal, then I think we are in actually more trouble than less. That is to say we have the worst of both possible worlds here; an army that still can’t do Coin and an Army that in so trying to do Coin has become deficient in its capabilities at the higher end of the fighting spectrum.

  18. #158
    Council Member BayonetBrant's Avatar
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    In discussing the debate on COIN around the office here (small IT defense contractor with about 40% prior-military or current reservists), we are all of a similar mind about one thing: The Army might train for a lot of COIN missions, or undertake a lot of COIN operations - and we've done so for a large part of the existence of the US military (ie, the Indian Wars from 1800-1890 or so). But at this point in time, there are a variety of agencies involved in COIN/SASO operations - USAID, State, CIA, USDA, etc - but only one agency responsible for, and capable of, fighting a war, and that's DoD.

    This is not to say that COIN/SASO needs to be sloughed off onto a variety of other agencies. What it does say is that the US military cannot lose sight of its primary purpose to fight and win the nation's wars. And any task that takes away from that basic mission should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism and analysis to truly assess the need/value of that task.

    I think COL Gentile's statement about "tradeoffs" above rather well-encapsulates that idea, and I support his assertions, as do most of my co-workers here.
    Last edited by BayonetBrant; 01-21-2009 at 01:52 PM. Reason: typos... those damn typos...
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Perhaps a New Thread?

    Simple Thesis.

    It is easier for a Conventional "war fighting unit" to learn COIN skills, than it is for a COIN trained unit to learn or recover "War fighting skills"

    If someone wants to jump in with the antithesis, or state the thesis more usefully, then I suggest that we the grounds a useful debate.
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    BayonetBrant: Agree.

    Wilf: Agree with your thesis. Moreover, history generally suggests this to be the case too.

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