Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Shek]

Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

[Granite_State]

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

That was my suspicion, that a heavily mechanized Army (probably unavoidable up to the present) reinforces some of the worst aspects of the "American Way of War." Especially given the current situation.

[Ken White]

Mech, to include Strykers doesn't do that. Mech has to protect their vehicles and Rob misunderstood my earlier comment; yes, Mech can put out a substantial force (particularly the SBCTS) but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles. There is also a comfort factor, the Mech guys I've know were reluctant to get too far from their vehicles. That may not be the case with SBCTs but I suspect it is with the Bradley guys...

Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...

That's not to take anything away from the re-roled guys who are doing better than expected or anyone who's over there busting their hump.

I agree that the mounted mentality adversely impacted our efforts in Iraq early on; that and I'll also restate my earlier point that the right Commander will do his METT-T thing and do well regardless of background or type of unit involved and the wrong one will err regardless of what type units available.

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,
good point:

but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles.

There is certainly a trade - if you give anybody the mobility of organic vehicles of any flavor - they now have to be protected and crewed. If you organic crews to the MTO&E it does not take away from your squads and platoons, but if you don't you have to get them from somewhere. If you have vehicles you have to either be willing to cut them loose - i.e put somebody in charge and tell them to return to a place out of contact (like getting dropped off), place them somewhere where organic TTP and vehicle weapon systems can handle the force pro, or limit your movement to where you can always cooperate - i.e. you can't just abandon them without compromising their force pro in an environment where an enemy on foot who blends in well with the population has a natural advantage. Any crew of any combat vehicle is going to have their attention split between seeing to the vehicle, and their other duties. Leadership has pretty much found the balance.

However, there are things you get by having the vehicle. Some I mentioned already - but you also get the powerful communications system - having a VRC with a power amp to get you through the interference found in a city is a good thing, a satellite based BFT or EPLRS FBCB2 with a crew to relay new information, or reach back to request combat multipliers - and bring them into range of dismounted comms allow CDRs to extend their AOR - and more flexibility in planning operations.

I've seen guys operating in sections - but always with at least three vehicles - that is pretty much the rule. The problem with using 1114s or other HMMWV variants for any organization is that it limits the number of people who can dismount. It means that to conduct dismounted operations in normal organic formations, teams, squads and platoons must first assemble at the dismount point. The folks that can retain their mobility in combat vehicles that allow for teams and squads to be dismounted as a unit have an advantage here - hopefully the type of MRAP vehicles which best account for this will find their way into the units which are tasked with doing patrols.

Hey Shek,

However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

Another good point. The effects of technology can be so subtle that once you and everyone else are surrounded by it, it becomes normal. The same can be said with the doctrine and training we followed to put that technology to best effect and fulfill task and purpose. Tom had referred to the days when the MOUT site at Shugart-Gordon was different then it is now. We considered our MOUT sites as independent blocks or villages where when all was said and done, we just could not see visualize the impacts of the tactics we were using to seize or clear it - those were generally the tasks.

Now its hard not to consider those training sites without seeing them plugged into a much larger social system, full of people who have made their homes their for generations, who have no where else to go, families of families who have 6 or more kids all living in small rooms - where we were lucky to get a few folks to a building before (JRTC has come a long way since then).

There is also the problems with heavier vehicles operating on infrastructure that in some cases was built when trade traffic was light, and technology was limited - there have been more then one case where a M1 or M2/M3 crushed some subterranean sewage or water piece that led to further problems. However, those same Brads caught the AIF way off guard when they first appeared and using thermals and coaxial MGs dirupted quite a number of AIF IED complex ambushes to good effect.

Its a tough call, as COL Foresman pointed out in AFJ we have to be capable of full spectrum operations in the complete range of conditions. We want the best tech, but ideally we don't want to be constrained by it. We appreciate leaders who can negotiate and know when to use restraint and let the situation develop and get solved from the inside out, but we also recognize the need for those who can recognize when to kill without hesitation.

So overall I guess our doctrine, mindsets, national and service cultures, TTP, and technology did hinder us in conducting COIN at the outset. However it was the same set of predispositions which was needed to send a large force to the other side of the world, pursue multiple LOOs of division sized elements and sustain them through the fight with minimal casualties. Also worth remembering is the fight in Falluja - now some will say if we'd had the appropriate sized force at the outset, the conditions that gave rise to making that city an insurgent stronghold might never have occurred, but I believe its beside the point. Fog/Friction/Chance will always conspire to throw you a curve ball, and the enemy will always seek to disadvantage you - he gets a vote - the units that cleared Falluja fought a hard combined arms fight and did so to a determined enemy's disadvantage. Also worth considering are some of the other fights that have required a large scale jump up the lethal line - Mosul 11/11/2004, Ramadi in 2006, Baquba was just recently a serious fight, and there are certainly others. It brings me back to the "there are no easy answers, only compromises for the tough questions".

While we must get better at COIN - because I also believe that is probably the majority of the types of conditions we will find ourselves in over the next decade or two - we cannot afford to not be able to fight force on force and have the advantage in doing so (how much of an advantage is needed is debatable). If we divorce ourselves too much from our former selves, somebody else will fill that vacuum - and then one of our tools in bad neighbor behavior modification will be less a couple of teeth. If we want true specialization so we can be good at everything its going to require a much larger force (and allot more $$$) so we can have enough Schlitz to pass around for every occasion - otherwise we have to live with some kind of balance. My cautionary note comes as I more often hear "if all you have is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail" becoming a panacea cliche' to describe all doctrine & force structure solutions. In our business, some (not all) problems will remain nails - and if you have ever tried to drive a nail with a Gerber multi-tool I don't recommend it. We flat out have to be good (better then the other guy) at the full range of military operations.

Best to all, Rob

[slapout9]

In the back of the article he talks about the imaginative commanders of the 3RD ACR at Talafar and how they fought as Dragoons "corralled their horses" motor pooled their tanks and fought as dismounted infantry. He also mentions in the back a question about why were some mechanized units able to fight so well why others could not. It short it is the Cavalry Dragoon doctirne (mounted Infantry) is what he is talking about. I will comment more on this later at my day job.

[Rob Thornton]

This thread made me think about an Armor officer buddy of mine who remarked as he was reading "The Sling and the Stone", that he thought COIN was much harder then HIC - if you guys remember prior to that some of the high level thinking was that if you could do HIC well, the rest would follow.

Imagine though, if you were under the other premise, and your organization and doctrine, your training and acquisition priorities were similarly associated. How different would we have looked? Take it one step further and consider if threat was a Joint outlook?

We often take for granted why we are what we are because our concern for the present and immediate future alters the context of the decisions made in the past - this is the curse of the fortune teller I guess.

It was pointed out to me that the Army is often asked why it requires so much of a LOG tail when other services and allies do not. We (the Army) campaign - we come and we stay, and although we desire certain expeditionary capabilities, our ability to sustain a difficult and enduring land campaign is something that nobody else does like us. The Joint Force (and this is not to deny they have their own sustainment/LOG capabilities, or provide the means to bring it in and take it out) and allied forces heavily rely on US Army Logistics when campaigning on land - much of their (our Joint and allied) capability truly is expeditionary, and as such is built to get there quickly, but not necessarily to support an enduring campaign. I am still not entirely comfortable with including "campaign quality" and "expeditionary capabilities" in the same sentence -but it reflects the realities of today's requirements to remain "ready and relevant"

I'm not sure where the mean of pendulum should be. I know that if you have always had something, you tend to take it for granted, and its hard to conceive of the work that was required to build it to that point, or how seemingly minor changes can have secondary and tertiary consequences, or the work that would be required to fix it. Fortunately we are evolutionary, so I think we will find the right balance over time. We must be able to do it all, because within a major COIN campaign today there is likely to be times when the enemy will use very lethal, portable and available firepower to challenge us on his terms, and there is the also the very real possibility that we will be asked to destroy another's conventional means of making War.

Best Regards, Rob

[Jimbo]

I see from the post, that there are some "vintage" or "retro" perspectives out here. The biggest change I have seen during my time in Iraq, is that the light guys have come to see that the mech guys aren't really all that different. Whoever posted about the what is the difference between dismounting soldiers from an M1114 HumVee or a Bradley hit the nail on the head. Personally it is easier to dismount from a Bradley/Stryker because of the ramp, and you do not have to bleed off squad members to man the vehicles. A mech IN company has 9 rifle squads in it. So a mech company commander/platoon leader you are fighting squads and vehicles I never had a problem with sending squads out on patrols independent from the Bradley. During my time in Iraq, I have seen many armored vehicles patrolling/overwatching without Infantry squads on the ground. The advantage that he mech forces have is that the Bradley makes a very effective platform at supporting the Infantry.

As far as mindset, there are some differences. Before the war in Iraq, the biggest difference that I noticed was the concept of areas of operation. I remember light company commanders an PL's only needing a small section of the map based on their mobility while mech guys were operating across greater differences. The joke was that a light guy could get into trouble pretty fast, but that mech guys got into trouble at 40 miles an hour. Stryker units a something of hybrid between the two. They have a lot of benefits of both communities.

Comparing mech and light unit effectiveness in COIN. If you want to draw those conclusions, then one would have to look for an example where a mech unit and a light unit had operated in the same area of operation. As many have stated, Iraq is a mosaic. Each area has it own challeneges. You have to look at the security situation as far as the people who live there, the physical terrain (especially how much you own), and how many troops you have available. When those factors are similar, then you can draw a fairly accurate comparison.

[Cavguy]

Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...

Ken,

I don't necessairly disagree with you, but will make two observations from Iraq experience:

1) Your dismounted, vehicle unsupported squad is attacked by 5-10 AIF. Your soldiers return fire and the enemy begins to displace. Your soldiers give chase, but are unable to move quickly enough to catch them because he is weighted down with 25 lbs of armor plus his weapons, ammo, etc. Being able to rapidly mount, maneuver, and disembark a team in urban warfare is key to getting the insurgents. Secondairly, if you get pinned down, joint patrolling near your vehicle provides cover, firepower, and rapid CASEVAC.

2) In my Sa'ad neighborhood efforts in Tal Afar, my infantry platoon patrolled exclusively dismounted. We began to discover more and more small IED's hidden that were only effective against dismounted troops. While reacting to a mortar attack against the patrol base, one of these IED's killed one and wounded two more of my soldiers in what I believe was a baited ambush. The IED was a remote controlled IED, which a HMMWV with countermeasures following the squad would have interdicted.

I completely agree that COIN must be done dismounted and interacting with the people, but in urban warfare getting too far away from your supporting vehicles can be dangerous, in my experience.

(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

But I think we agree in principle.

[Ken White]

Ken,
. . .
. . .
. . .
(Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

But I think we agree in principle.

agree in principle. Sorta boils down to METT-T

With the all three 'Ts' being a big factor in how who does what and where...

[Steve Blair]

Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

My take is more that mechanization plays into how segments of the military prefer to fight their wars. It's more of an extension of the Word War II mindset. Helicopters increased mobility, but one of the biggest destructive factors in Vietnam aside from airpower was artillery; good old WW2 era-guns. The helicopter also had its downside in the amount of logistic support it required, creating a need to open and secure roads and tie down assets keeping those roads open (many of which were mechanized...a number of division cavalry squadrons spent the bulk of their time securing roads).

Doctrine is also tailored to fight the preferred conflict, not the one that may be close at hand. Thus mechanization is, in my view, tailored to fight "the big one," not to deal with smaller conflicts.

We agree on the impact of doctrine, I think, but I also feel that divorcing mechanization from doctrine (which the study authors seem to do) really undermines their main point. Mechanized units can and have played very important roles in COIN efforts. They make outstanding reaction forces for outlying posts and garrisons; they have the ability to escort relief supplies and protect local improvement projects; and they can respond quickly to any emergency (be it combat or humanitarian)...much quicker than a leg unit in many cases.

With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.

[Shek]

With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

Steve,

I agree that the commander is an omitted variable, but one that I think would be hard to quantify and thus should be addressed qualitatively in the paper. The question is what bias this creates, and the section that I highlighted from your post is what I'd argue is what happens on average, and thus, the bias would be very low.

Commanders are selected based on their performance within the chosen doctrine of the force, and the current incentives reinforce this - grad school is poo poo'd as time spent away from the force while muddy boots assignments are the "tickets" to success. While there is lip service that grad school is good now (although the incentives haven't been changed to match this, e.g., telling boards that civilian graduate school is the equivalent as a second command in Ranger Regiment), I don't think that it is much more than that. Thus, a GEN Petraeus or LTG Chiarelli that can adapt on the first go around in a non-doctrinal scenario is the exception and not the rule. The necessities of the scenario will cause others to adapt and become more effective as time goes on, but I'd still argue that mechanization does have a causal impact (through the effects of doctrine and mindset) on the probability of winning a counterinsurgency.

Essentially, what we would consider a good full spectrum commander may not be the commander that is promoted because the doctrine/mindset doesn't have the same definition of good.

Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.

Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?

[Steve Blair]

I think another issue with mechanization in COIN is the basing and logistics requirements it brings. Basing equals a larger "foreign" presence, which in turn creates an issue that an insurgent force can exploit. Since mechanized forces consume and need more in the way of supplies, they require a more extensive support network than light units, in turn creating insurgent-exploitable issues and targets.

You make a good point regarding the possible causal impact of mechanization; one that I think the original paper missed. As for the million-dollar question...it may come down to having units/forces that are trained/optimized for COIN and others that deal with larger conflict issues (which as I recall was one of the original arguments for the light divisions). Mechanized units have a clear place and utility in COIN, but their role is different than what you would see in a more conventional conflict. That might require different training and equipment (a good role for the traditional-style dragoon force slapout mentioned...or the traditional function of US cavalry prior to the world wars). Usually it's a question of force scale, and sadly our institutional "either/or" mindset hinders our ability to find that balance.