Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Ken White]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

" 'Give a good leader very little and he will succeed. Give a mediocrity a great deal and he will fail.' - General George C. Marshall."

[J Wolfsberger]

There's also a large difference between an Abrams and a Stryker/LAV. On top of that, and this can be the source of a lot of confusion, there is a dramatic difference between MOUT and COIN. I won't get a chance to read the paper till this weekend - maybe some who have can shed light on whether the authors captured these distinctions.

[Merv Benson]

Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.

We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.

It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.

I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.

[Ski]

I'm not sure if mechanization leads to stalemate or defeat more often. I have to read the paper with more attention to detail when I have more free time.

I do understand that mechanized forces are far more expensive to operate and maintain, and that we are spending vast amounts of cash in order to achieve results that are mediocre on average.

A lot to chew on here - my gut feeling is that this is a piece to a much larger puzzle - that includes leadership, adaptability by individual and unit, tactics, cultural/religious/ethnic differences, and maybe a few other major criteria.

Until I get into the weeds, I'm certainly not sold on mechanization = defeat in COIN, but I;m not dismissing it completely.

[Tom Odom]

I will read it also. I have long thought there is a significant internal cultural difference between heavy and light forces when it comes to dealing with people and dealing with systems. Many heavy leaders are by their training and inclinations "systems" as in combat systems oriented. They think by nature of their training in map sheets not kilometers aand almost never in meters. Light leaders are prople oriented and all planning and think is human-centric and done one foot at a time. That makes many light leaders more adaptive (or accepting) of human-centric adaptations.

Now before RTK and CAVGuy shoot me, I used the term many and not most. It is always a question of leadership and some leaders are adaptive and some are not. But in a macro sense, I see this as a trend that has continued for some time. How it plays out in COIN is certainly debatable.

But I would also say that we do have to be careful in talking COIN in an urban environment versus a full-blown MOUT fight. No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Tom,

No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

If I can amplify a bit on combined arms: I'll concede to the Air Force the potential utility of a 2000 lb. bomb in MOUT. In COIN, I not only can't see any utility, I think ANY use would be seriously counterproductive.

By the same token, an Abrams in COIN has a terrific psychological effect, one I'm sure is more profound than a Stryker/LAV. But I also believe, and I'll defer to RTK and CavGuy, that the Stryker/LAV has much greater COIN utility as transport and occasional base of fire for the dismounts. And it's the dismounts who will ultimately decide the outcome.

[Dennis]

I also haven't read this in depth yet, but my first response is is there really a difference between getting out of a brad/striker to getting out of an uparmored vehicle?

[goesh]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

[Schmedlap]

This reminds me of a study that concluded that homes with more books in them tend to have children who are better readers. One should not conclude from that study that if you drop your entire paycheck at Barnes & Noble that your 6-year-old will be reading at the 12th grade level. It was not the presence of the books that made the kids better readers. The parents thought that reading was worthwhile and that good reading skills were important, so they owned lots of books. The children inherited the values of their parents. They thought that reading was enjoyable and important and put forth more effort to become better readers.

Likewise, there is a root cause to mechanization that correlates with a reluctance to do necessary dismounted work, but this does not imply a causal relationship. I would assert that militaries become more mechanized only after their country has modernized. An increase in modernization correlates with less tolerance for casualties in the so-called “middle wars” that include COIN. Less tolerance for casualties leads a military to reduce exposure to enemy actions by placing more armor between the Soldier and the enemy, as in Iraq, or to neglect the armor protection and then retreat in short order after fatalities hit double-digits, as in Mogadishu.

It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

[Rob Thornton]

I don't know if we've just mitigated it through leadership and training, or its a question of adaptation over time, but I do know this. While there I saw three different BCTs rotate through Mosul. The 172nd SBCT out of AK was on the ground when I first got there - and after their RIP TOA with 3/2 SBCT from FLW they went South. 3/2 was on the ground just long enough to get things laid out (however this was much of that units 2nd time in Mosul) before they too were sent South. 3/2 was replaced with 4/1 CAV out of FT Hood. They were all good units, had quality leaders and good soldiers.

The two SBCTs had lots of soldiers in vehicles tailor made to move lots of Infantry quickly, with good protection for the conditions and enough firepower to overcome any enemy you'll find in most COIN conditions I think - there are about 170 soldiers in a SBCT Rifle Co, you get three of those in an SBCT BN, and a good size HHC as well - lots of snipers in the BN MTO&E and within the BDE you get lots of extras to provide lots of organic Combined Arms. You also get a lot of C4ISR and in addition to the three IN BNs you get a RSTA Sqdn, an EN CO, and a AT CO - so as Ken points out - the number of folks you can put on the ground is substantial. I promise even though Shek and I are products of the SBCTs - we're not biased (much) This provides lots of options for the CDR. Both of those SBCTs were well led and well employed both in Mosul, Baghdad and Baquba.

However, the unit that seemed to adjust the quickest to its surroundings and be able to move from lethal to non-lethal-to lethal, etc. (I could use kinetic/non-kinetic - but it just seems anti-septic to do so) was 4/1 CAV. I really wondered about that - so I started just asking the EMs, NCOs, LTs and CPTs about their experiences. For many, this was their 2nd and 3rd tours - many had been to different places and gone with different types of units. Many also discussed their MRE (Mission Readiness Exercise) at the CTC - all agreed the training had gotten to where within reason (talking resources) it reflected what they knew about the COIN environment, many had gone through the COIN Academy in Taji - and said that the training there was valuable, many had been involved with LPDs/OPDs/NCOPDs focused to COIN at Home Station, undergone special training with EMS, LE and other Civil organizations. They were well read. They were smart. These soldiers and leaders could run in Bradleys and Tanks on one day and work out of 1114s the next with no issues.

This is not to sell the two previous units short - just to point out that over time (not very long at all if we are looking at individuals, leaders and specific units) we have gotten much better at COIN regardless of the type of unit. Also that conditions change in an area - 1/25th SBCT had been in Mosul prior to the 172nd and had a different set of challenges, and I believe the situation got progressively better to where when 4/1 came in they had 1 x IN TF conducting CF ops (but partnered with a variety of folks to include ISF) and 1 x AR TF that had been given the mission to stand up an ISF cell and partner with what was then the IAG TTs at various levels (DIV through BN) to provide greater training capability with the ISF - so you have to consider the requirement to be flexible and take advantage of opportunities as they emerge.

As others have pointed out, its really about providing leadership at every level, and being able to employ the right tool or adapt it to the task at hand. I found few (if any) stereo-types in those three units, just leaders trying to the best they could (and their best was very, very good) as they understood the mission - as time has continued, our soldiers and leaders understand the mission and supporting tasks better and better -

I think at this point the light/heavy comparison is OBE except in the raw sense of MTO&E. If we're talking about the formations that provide the most flexibility in those terms - then I'd advocate more soldiers and more capabilities as it applies to good mobility (keep in mind while more and more people live in urbanized areas - some still live in remote, hard to get to places), adequate protection given the conditions of METT-TC, enhanced C4ISR - (everything from low level comms, to access to raw information and feeds), reasonable firepower that means in a COIN environment we are never the ones who show up to a gunfight with a knife, and the host of low density MOS that seem to be ever more critical and ever growing since DOD is the 800lb gorilla and the Inter-Agency just can't fill out fast enough. These types of units are going to be expensive because there are allot of people, and allot of capabilities and you have to provide them with the type of training that sets them up for success. This is not meant to translate directly into a SBCT - but you could come up with a hybrid given the amount of MRAP we are trying to acquire - the actual vehicle is just a platform that we have wired up with good computers and comms - the important piece is the soldier and leader.

Best Regards, Rob

[reed11b]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?
In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone? Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC. Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support. There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers. Cavguy can probably give some strong examples. Rob's example of the Strykers calling them "trucks" is a good start on how to avoid what you describe. The one thing I don't like about strykers is that they appear to be complicated to operate, i.e. need additional training. The IMV's that I like look and operate like a "truck". Now I have never served in an SBCT so my belief in there complexity may have no basis in reality, but there expense is certainly more then is required for a good IMV.
Reed

[Ken White]

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?

The assigned drivers for the 2 1/2s in the Airborne units. Now ask me who drove the Tracks from the APC Battalion in the 7th Inf Div (ROCID) in the late 50s. Or ask me who drove the tracks in the Mech Bde I was in in during my 75-76 tour in Korea. Answer's the same, the drivers -- what's your point? Mine is that vehicles need drivers (a person), usually some security (another person or two) or to leave the area. The real point was in a discussion of Mech or mounted units (i.e. assigned vehicles) units, not transported infantry.

In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone?

Because in addition to the driver (who as you point out, was not in your examples a member of the Platoon but of a support or another element...) with most modern vehicles you have to leave someone to man the gun. In the Bradley because of the capacity, you also have to leave a third guy behind to pass up additional 25mm to the gunner. So you're confronted with the fact that your seven dismounts (IF you have all of them) are reduced to five or six. You're also stuck with the fact that mounted troops are absolutely not going to get too far away from their vehicles under most circumstances. Recall again, the discussion is on units with assigned vehicles.

Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC.

There's that word again. if, indeed...

Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support.

No question about that. I however, have no clue how we ever won a fight without all that sruff...

There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers.

Sorry, don't understand that???

[William F. Owen]

Here are my conclusions on Infantry Mechanisation.

A.) The platoon ORBAT is/should be optimised to fight/operate dismounted. Mechanisation means picking up and transporting folks who are "Light Infantry."

B.) Driving and fighting almost any modern armoured military vehicle is a specialist skill requiring a good dedicated course of instruction. The vehicle crew (always 2 or 2+) does not have to be infantrymen.

C.) The vehicle crew should not be considered part of the section/squad or platoon. Personally, I can see great merit in having a Mech Platoon (14-16 vehicles , so 28-32 men) at the Company level. BN would have "Mech" companies.

D.) There is a world of difference between operating with an MRAP vehicle and a MICV. They are two entirely different doctrines.

MRAPS/JLTV and APCs are protected mobility for "Light Infantry". IMO, It is the minimum standard for all infantry!

MICVs are another thing entirely. Yes, I confess there is now a lot of cross-over between an MICV and some APCs, but my basic contention is that it is almost entirely to do with what you expect of the vehicle.

[reed11b]

you beat me too it. I agree w/ you Ken that Mechanization ; as in Bradlys or other IFVs, does reduce boots on the ground. At the same time it increases area reachable and range of operations. One way to reduce the loss of infantry skill would be to have the IFVs and there operators in a sepperate platoon. A Bradley requires a complex skill set that is very differnt from being an infantryman. There would still be less total troops in a Bradley company, but just as many available for dismount and they could focus on training on there dismount skill sets while bradley operators retained skills at fireing and driving a bradley.
As far as IMV's go, if they can be operated by anyone in the Bat. and you are using vehicles in "light" infantry ops anyway (becouse we and everyone else is too) how does making that mobility protected cost troops on the ground or infantry skills and abilities?
Reed
Sorry I know this could be clearer but it's late and I'm up past my nap time.

[Ken White]

I have some experience in the fighting on foot / picking up transporting "light infantry with non-dedicated vehicles. The US Army did that from the late 50s until the mid 60s. Problems: Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking (Yes, they need to be trained -- and plain old riflemen training is a good base from which to start), the track commanders were similarly poorly trained and the crew just wanted to transport and not get involved in the fight. Doesn't work that way. So, yes, the training of the crew is very important -- and they should at least have a basic understanding of Infantry tactics. They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.

A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided...

MRAPS are dangerous; vehicle hugging becomes a driving force (pun intended); the troops don't want to leave the armored (and today, air conditioned) cocoon. The vehicles are unwieldy, cannot ever offer 100% protection and thus provide a false sense of security (as does ALL armor). They need to be left in Iraq and not replicated. I'm not going to waste a lot of time discussing those expensive monstrosities with such limited use. I have no problem with buying special equipment for special purposes or units but the driving force should be military requirements and not a PR problem exacerbated by commentary from ill informed people (or equally ill informed partisan hacks in Congress).

Add to that that Armor can lull you into a false sense of security -- NOTHING is bullet proof, the heavier the vehicle, the less agility it possesses (and, generally, the less the using unit has tactically speaking); the fact that the vehicles must be protected; may or may not (and should or should not) be able to lend to the fight or mission with mounted weapons or even limited maneuver and I suggest that to say, categorically, that vehicles are good and the drivers / crews need not be infantry or a part of the unit is likely to be incorrect.

JLTV and APCs and protected mobility are not a panacea and their use should be totally METT-TC based; there's a time and a place for them, no question -- there's also the fact that they are inimical to some missions and do not suit all terrain and environments. I think the old dictum, 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.

Use of any vehicles by Infantry reduce the number of dismounts. In the old Airborne Battle Group and Battalion Recon Platoons with the M 151, a third of the strength was driving. My Sons Rifle Platoon in OIF II had a slew of unarmored HMMWVs with no turrets and ad hoc weapons mounts; they carried more people so he only lost a fifth of his strength to the vehicles. Later, in OEF IV (or V, can't recall) he had an Antitank Platoon, armored HMMWVs with turrets -- back to a third or fourth of the strength left with the vehicles. I do not see how anyone can argue that vehicles in a given situation do not impact the number of troops on the ground. That's true in any circumstance but certainly true if the vehicles are organic.

Mounted troops do not like to leave their vehicles and if forced to, they won't get too far away from them. That's logical and necessary but can be tactically limiting.

There is no question that Mech Infantry and 'Armored' Cavalry are necessary and that the application of force by such units differs from that of infantry. The issue is that in trying to blur the three, you end up with a hybrid that won't do any of the three very different jobs well. I'd submit our Cavalry already suffers from too much Armor / Mech blending and thus is really just a high speed mech outfit that doesn't do Recon at all well, though it's great at economy of force missions. Further, the 'mounting' of all infantry entails a loss of patrolling skill, perhaps the most important and critical infantry effort -- that, BTW, is documented IIRC from a Kilcullen Briefing; it got so bad in Iraq, they had to call in AWG to retrain infantry units in dismounted patrolling. That is pathetic, could have been quite dangerous and we're just lucky Iraq was a relatively benign environment that could tolerate such foolishness.

Cavalry is necessary and valuable, even if we don't do it right due to our impatience.

Mech Infantry is necessary and valuable. Walking infantry is equally necessary and valuable. 'Mounted' infantry is an idea looking for a home, is a hybrid -- and it will not do either job satisfactorily.

Long way of saying I disagree with both of you on this -- and that ought to be okay . I'd just posit that the METT-TC factors drive the train; there is no one size fits all and any use of vehicles entails a loss of foot troopies. Whether that loss is smart or not is totally situation dependent.

[reed11b]

Long way of saying I disagree with both of you on this -- and that ought to be okay . I'd just posit that the METT-TC factors drive the train; there is no one size fits all and any use of vehicles entails a loss of foot troopies. Whether that loss is smart or not is totally situation dependent.

But if I convert just one more to my point of view, I get a free toaster!
On the serious side, One of my disagreements with the SBCT concept is that the Styker is so fundamental to it, that even if the METT-TC demanded it, you will never hear "OK boys, were having additional aviation assets attached and were leaving the trucks behind." The current MRAPs are in fact better left behind, being poorly designed to do anything other then survive mine blasts, and the RG-31 and similar designs are not what I am referring to when I talk about an IMV. Ideally an IMV should affordable, simple, and provide some degree of protection and operational (not tactical) mobility. Even support vehicles need some degree of protection as we re-learned the hard-way..again.
Reed