Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Rob Thornton]

. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

I'd agree with you for the most part.

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Ski]

Rob

Sorry if I wrote my response in a snotty tone - didn't realize it until I posted it...

My point about how units are deploying is exactly the problem. The force structure we've built is not what is being used in theater, and since we've had to buy Billions worth of HWMMV's (and possibly MRAP's), and we've been forced to change how we fight and train for the current wars, I think we've created a force for an enemy we aren't fighting now (and who knows if the structure we've created will be used any time in the future). We've borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars to sustain military operations that is going to have to be paid back - at some time. We may not have the fiscal flexibility in the future...

Yeah - 21 IBCT's now...lots of good reasons why the force changed...

It'll cost more to move the Heavies into the USAR than its worth, and all the issues that surround the HBCT's in the ARNG will migrate over there...but you'll have all the individual augmentees you want from the USAR.

All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...

FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

As I said, we live in interesting times.

"Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.



I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.



What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.



My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.



Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

I'd agree with you for the most part.



Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.



And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.



Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Ski - no worries - I believe a little passion in a discussion is a good thing - keeps us from getting too comfortable in our ideas.

Good point about the MRAPs - I've heard the Marines are considering shrink wrapping a portion - while the MRAPs has degrees of utility in OIF (based on where and which MRAPs get fielded and what units use them for (Joe will probably find a good use for any piece of equipment) - In Afghanistan conditions create different requirements - I don't suspect you'll see to many heavy MRAP in the high altitudes. So maybe our answer is like the Marines - and coincides with Ken's point about Multi-Purpose forces vs. GPF on the "Retooling the Artilleryman" thread - if a BCT was going to be tagged with working a COIN mission set in supportive terrain - maybe they get fielded a supporting package to include among other things a suite of MRAP vehicles as opposed to going with what is on there books. I don't know - but that might work.

Agree with you about the fiscal flexibility - particularly when t applies to supplementals - we need to make some decisions about where we're turning this super tanker pretty soon - I did read something today ref. justification for a larger % of the GDP toward Defense and other security related stuff.

All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...

This is something we're going to be struggling with for awhile I think - at least until we can regain some flexibility that allows for better planning - hard to do with a limited strategic reserve - maybe that will change over the next year.

FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

Largely agree with you here as well - I think the big value that will come out of this to us is contingent on how we view its utility. If its viewed as a program to test and field useful tech to enable the soldier then we're probably in good shape - the moment we view it as a panacea or as a replacement for people - we've lost sight of how war is different then anything else. Allot of what is under the FCS umbrella of tech makes it to the Force in other ways - I think in the end - no matter if we call it FCS or not - it will be a gradual evolution of stuff that better equips the Force - in some cases it will just come across as some new LINs with a NET program, or maybe it'll be even more transparent. I worried allot about the FCS MGVs when I sat in a mock up - however I know the EBCT CDR down at Bliss and have enough faith in him a leader to believe he will not mortgage our future - personalities matter and he is the right 06 - one that understands well how to tell more senior leaders why something does not work, and how Industry might be trying to hide it. Honestly, among the best leaders I've ever known.

As I said, we live in interesting times. "Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"

Agreed - ultimately its comes down to our ability to play a better game with the cards we've been dealt then the other guy - and to hope his hand sucks more then ours
Best, Rob

[Coy R. Greer]

Sirs and Senior NCO's
Normally in a forum such as this, I would just read and learn. However, for a long time and in a quite a few articles that have been published surrounding the units that responded to and fought in Sadr City on April 4, 2004, one unit who attacked straight through the middle of the city has either been overlooked completely or Identified as something it was not. That unit was C Troop, 1st Squadron 2D ACR. We went right through the middle of the city, leapfrogging intersection to intersection, 2 platoons at a time. After a couple of unsucessful assaults by Militia while halted and defending in the intersections, the troop made linkup with a tank company from 2/37 at the Sadr Bureau. A platoon from this company took the lead, and the 4 Commanche Troop 1/2 ACR Scout platoons along with the Mortar platoon continued to run and gun right up the middle of Sadr city. We then went over towards Al Rasheed and Hit a few enemy combatants there as well. This Assault through Sadr City was conducted from Unarmored Humvee's with no doors! In the case of the Mortar Platoon, they piled in the back of 1SG Semerena's 6 pack and one of their own 6 packs, ripped off the covers, and took a knee back to back facing and engaging with M203, Saws, and M16s. Our troop was awarded 8 Arcoms w/V, numerous more Arcoms, and I believe 2 Bronze Stars. In spite of this, the Article listed here https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/c.../6moore04c.pdf
claims that the force that attacked into Sadr City was pure Armor with NO Infantry or Scouts. It was NOT pure Armor and there were Scouts and Infantry Assaulting forward, mounted and dismounted, capturing terrain, and sucessfully holding it. On top of that, accounts of the units involved in the counter attack into the city to reach the cut off troops and recapture key infrastructure claim ONLY Task Force 2/37 tank companies were sent into the fight, and this is simply not true! Coincidentally that was the SECOND time that half of C Troop 1/2 ACR went into the City during the fight. The first time was at 1800 with COL Mark Calvert,( at that time LTC Calvert). Two platoons of Scouts from C Troop, in 8 unarmored Humvees, and a Squadron Commander went in, maneuvered, engaged enemy combatants,captured one of Sadr's Leaders, and came back out, all alive, all vehicles operational. However, everyone, every account, every article written, acts like none of those things ever happened. Can anybody tell me why? I mentioned the awards received by the unit earlier because the orders for the awards received through out the Scout and Mortar Platoons are verifiable and undeniable proof of the involvement of the Troop with date, times, and actions. What I cant understand is why Commanche Troop 1/2 ACR participation on April 4 2004 is either omitted or complete denied all together? How can 120 Scouts and Mortars in unarmored humvees, shooting their way up the middle of the city, linking up with Armor, and continuing the attack, be "forgotten or denied"? And my biggest question is, why? Is it because we did something that we shouldn't have been able to? Is it because it would raise some questions it shouldnt? Is it perhaps because a unit that light doing what it did would steal the thunder from someone's "Pure Armor COIN Fight" concept? Or does the admission of C Troop 1/2 ACR in that fight open some kind of Pandora's box I don't know about?

[Cavguy]

Sirs and Senior NCO's
Normally in a forum such as this, I would just read and learn. However, for a long time and in a quite a few articles that have been published surrounding the units that responded to and fought in Sadr City on April 4, 2004, one unit who attacked straight through the middle of the city has either been overlooked completely or Identified as something it was not. That unit was C Troop, 1st Squadron 2D ACR. In spite of this, the Article listed here https://www.knox.army.mil/armormag/c.../6moore04c.pdf
claims that the force that attacked into Sadr City was pure Armor with NO Infantry or Scouts. Is it perhaps because a unit that light doing what it did would steal the thunder from someone's "Pure Armor COIN Fight" concept? Or does the admission of C Troop 1/2 ACR in that fight open some kind of Pandora's box I don't know about?

Whoa whoa whoa - you're misinterpreting the event discussed and what CPT Moore meant, and talking about a separate action. There were multiple fights occuring in different areas, CPT Moore's article discusses one. Also I don't think CPT Moore thought it was the bright to attack without scout/infantry backup, he simply had no choice. Trust me, everyone in 2-37 loved 2ACR's scouts. If that's what you got out of it, you read it wrong.

You're talking about 1/2 ACR, and their attack out of WarEagle to the East side of Sadr City. CPT Geoff Wright with B/2-37 supported you guys with tanks attacking in the raid you describe, which was combined. I know because I commanded his company after we got back, and heard the stories. We had A/1/2 in our task org. BLUF, love the 19D's in the regiment. GREAT fighters.

The article expressly talks about the rescue of one platoon of C/2-5 CAV by CPT Moore and C/2-37 AR. It's about his action, not the WHOLE action. I know his account is true, I battle-tracked the fight and also ran the log support and had to account for the wounded and dead from TF 2-37. He also received the Silver Star for his action at the recommendation of COL (P) Abrams and BG May, the regimental commander.

But like all articles, it is a soda straw view. 1/2 ACR and LTC (now COL) Calvert raided east side targets, and established blocking positions. 2/5 CAV attempted to rescue their guys in the back of LMTV's. TF 1-37 and TF 1-36were in action on the west side of Sadr City that night. Hell of a fight that night, lots of stories to tell. Various elements secured the Sadr City DAC. Of course, later we all went south, you guys to Al Kut, us to Najaf, and 3/2 to Diawaynah and Najaf.

(I was with 2-37 - in your task org) Thanks for posting. Please post your intro in the thread. so we can tap into your experience.

I would say no one knows about it because no one has written it, and no embedded reporters were around at the time. You never know about the stories you never tell. I suggest writing your experiences down for ARMOR. Would be an interesting read!

As a side note, I just wrote the first article about Ramadi from mid-2006 to early 2007 in Military Review. When writing abbreviated accounts it's tough to mention everyone and everything, which is hard, because you want to do them all justice. But sometimes you just have to focus on the absolute key actions to get a coherent narrative togther. There's about six more articles needed to flesh out that account, and I'm sure CPT Moore faced the same writing his. It also can be that he only saw the action through his POV, and like all stories, there are multiple ones needed to create the full picture.

BTW, you ever read "The Long Road Home"? It mainly focuses on 2/5 CAV's losses that day.

Toujours Pret!

[Coy R. Greer]

Cavguy,
Sir, Im sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intend on ever making more than just this post. Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it. I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
Sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intending on ever making more than just this post. Im just a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I even attempt it. I have just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

Don't let rank intimidate you out on this site. As long as you stay respectful, chime in! The ROE here is loose. You can disagree with a superior officer/nco here as long as it's making a point, and stays on the professional level. That's the beauty of this forum. Everyone here abides by that concept - I've disagreed vehemently on this forum with superior officers on certain subjects.

Your experiences provide a tremendous insight as well. Believe it or not, we don't have all the answers. I still encourage you to write an article. Even if you don't think you write well, an editor will clean it up if you give them the meat. Certainly the case in my articles!

[Cavguy]

I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

Really, no one's written a comprehensive history of that night. Some small stories discussed above, but an enterprising writer/historian could make quite a book of April 2004 - the month that defined the next 2 years in Iraq (Sadr Rebellion and 1st Fallujah). Alternately titled "When the wheels came off the Bus". Actually, I believe the tipping point was the UN Bombing in August 2003, when the NGO's all left immediately afterwards and the terror campaign began full swing.

Were you there that day at the UN Bombing? I watched LTC Calvert get his ass chewed by LTG Sanchez in a supreme display of bad leadership and character given the miracles worked by 2ACR that day. LTG Sanchez's conduct that day still gets me mad. Alternately, I got my first media appearance on CNN. Reporters were running amok just after it happened, and we couldn't control them from running into the rubble with cameras. My BN S3 asked me to get them under control. I shouted "WHO WANTS A BRIEFING!" as loud as I could. It was like throwing those fish food pebbles in a koi pond. Immediately I had 20 cameras shoved in my face, and I gave a ten minute session where I told them essentially that yes, the building was bombed, and no, we didn't know what it was yet. The funniest question was a female reporter who shouted "Was it an RPG?" when behind me was a hotel blown in half.

Did get them out of the rubble while the perimeter was set.

[selil]

Cavguy,
Sir, Im sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intend on ever making more than just this post. Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it. I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

You'll learn a lot more if you participate. Academic credentials aside the highest grade I ever made was corporal.