Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,
good point:

but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles.

There is certainly a trade - if you give anybody the mobility of organic vehicles of any flavor - they now have to be protected and crewed. If you organic crews to the MTO&E it does not take away from your squads and platoons, but if you don't you have to get them from somewhere. If you have vehicles you have to either be willing to cut them loose - i.e put somebody in charge and tell them to return to a place out of contact (like getting dropped off), place them somewhere where organic TTP and vehicle weapon systems can handle the force pro, or limit your movement to where you can always cooperate - i.e. you can't just abandon them without compromising their force pro in an environment where an enemy on foot who blends in well with the population has a natural advantage. Any crew of any combat vehicle is going to have their attention split between seeing to the vehicle, and their other duties. Leadership has pretty much found the balance.

However, there are things you get by having the vehicle. Some I mentioned already - but you also get the powerful communications system - having a VRC with a power amp to get you through the interference found in a city is a good thing, a satellite based BFT or EPLRS FBCB2 with a crew to relay new information, or reach back to request combat multipliers - and bring them into range of dismounted comms allow CDRs to extend their AOR - and more flexibility in planning operations.

I've seen guys operating in sections - but always with at least three vehicles - that is pretty much the rule. The problem with using 1114s or other HMMWV variants for any organization is that it limits the number of people who can dismount. It means that to conduct dismounted operations in normal organic formations, teams, squads and platoons must first assemble at the dismount point. The folks that can retain their mobility in combat vehicles that allow for teams and squads to be dismounted as a unit have an advantage here - hopefully the type of MRAP vehicles which best account for this will find their way into the units which are tasked with doing patrols.

Hey Shek,

However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

Another good point. The effects of technology can be so subtle that once you and everyone else are surrounded by it, it becomes normal. The same can be said with the doctrine and training we followed to put that technology to best effect and fulfill task and purpose. Tom had referred to the days when the MOUT site at Shugart-Gordon was different then it is now. We considered our MOUT sites as independent blocks or villages where when all was said and done, we just could not see visualize the impacts of the tactics we were using to seize or clear it - those were generally the tasks.

Now its hard not to consider those training sites without seeing them plugged into a much larger social system, full of people who have made their homes their for generations, who have no where else to go, families of families who have 6 or more kids all living in small rooms - where we were lucky to get a few folks to a building before (JRTC has come a long way since then).

There is also the problems with heavier vehicles operating on infrastructure that in some cases was built when trade traffic was light, and technology was limited - there have been more then one case where a M1 or M2/M3 crushed some subterranean sewage or water piece that led to further problems. However, those same Brads caught the AIF way off guard when they first appeared and using thermals and coaxial MGs dirupted quite a number of AIF IED complex ambushes to good effect.

Its a tough call, as COL Foresman pointed out in AFJ we have to be capable of full spectrum operations in the complete range of conditions. We want the best tech, but ideally we don't want to be constrained by it. We appreciate leaders who can negotiate and know when to use restraint and let the situation develop and get solved from the inside out, but we also recognize the need for those who can recognize when to kill without hesitation.

So overall I guess our doctrine, mindsets, national and service cultures, TTP, and technology did hinder us in conducting COIN at the outset. However it was the same set of predispositions which was needed to send a large force to the other side of the world, pursue multiple LOOs of division sized elements and sustain them through the fight with minimal casualties. Also worth remembering is the fight in Falluja - now some will say if we'd had the appropriate sized force at the outset, the conditions that gave rise to making that city an insurgent stronghold might never have occurred, but I believe its beside the point. Fog/Friction/Chance will always conspire to throw you a curve ball, and the enemy will always seek to disadvantage you - he gets a vote - the units that cleared Falluja fought a hard combined arms fight and did so to a determined enemy's disadvantage. Also worth considering are some of the other fights that have required a large scale jump up the lethal line - Mosul 11/11/2004, Ramadi in 2006, Baquba was just recently a serious fight, and there are certainly others. It brings me back to the "there are no easy answers, only compromises for the tough questions".

While we must get better at COIN - because I also believe that is probably the majority of the types of conditions we will find ourselves in over the next decade or two - we cannot afford to not be able to fight force on force and have the advantage in doing so (how much of an advantage is needed is debatable). If we divorce ourselves too much from our former selves, somebody else will fill that vacuum - and then one of our tools in bad neighbor behavior modification will be less a couple of teeth. If we want true specialization so we can be good at everything its going to require a much larger force (and allot more $$$) so we can have enough Schlitz to pass around for every occasion - otherwise we have to live with some kind of balance. My cautionary note comes as I more often hear "if all you have is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail" becoming a panacea cliche' to describe all doctrine & force structure solutions. In our business, some (not all) problems will remain nails - and if you have ever tried to drive a nail with a Gerber multi-tool I don't recommend it. We flat out have to be good (better then the other guy) at the full range of military operations.

Best to all, Rob