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  1. #1
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    Default Mechanization hurts COIN forces

    Study co-written by Princeton and West Point scholars:

    Empirical evidence suggests that Great Powers and weak states alike are increasingly unable to wage successful counterinsurgency campaigns. We argue that this decline can be explained by rising levels of mechanization within state militaries. Unlike their earlier counterparts, modern militaries possess force structures that inhibit the creation of information-gathering networks among local populations. Mechanized militaries therefore struggle to wield their power discriminately, pushing fence-sitters into the insurgency. We test this claim using a new dataset of 238 insurgencies (1800-2000) and a microlevel comparison of two U.S. Army Divisions in Iraq (2003-04). We find that mechanization is associated with a decreasing probability of incumbent victory; that regime- and power-based explanations only account for nineteenth century outcomes; and that oft-cited factors such as terrain or ethnolinguistic divisions are largely unconnected to outcomes in counterinsurgency warfare.
    http://www.princeton.edu/~jlyall/Rage2.3.pdf

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.

    Mechanized units can (and do) play a valuable role as reaction forces, but one of the major lessons not learned from Vietnam was that most of them needed more dismounted elements. The units in-country learned this, but the lesson faded quickly after the war was over. The paper does make passing reference to the 3rd ACR, but not in the depth the subject may have required.
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    I agree with Steve, I'm not sold. how do you explain that the two biggest COIN successes thus far in Iraq were accomplished by heavily Armored units - i.e. 3 ACR and 1/1 AD? Under this logic, the light units should have much better success records, but they don't, and in the case of some of them, much worse.

    I think the personalities and leadership styles/philosophies of the CO's had much more to do with it than the tools employed. It also picks two easy examples - why not try 1AD in Baghdad, 3rd ID OIF 3, or 1st Cav OIF 2 and contrast....

    The historical argument that lighter forces are more successful at coin over the long run is much stronger, IMO, but the Iraq argument doesn't seem to be nearly as strong.
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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Competing factors at play.

    Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

    Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

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    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    There's also a large difference between an Abrams and a Stryker/LAV. On top of that, and this can be the source of a lot of confusion, there is a dramatic difference between MOUT and COIN. I won't get a chance to read the paper till this weekend - maybe some who have can shed light on whether the authors captured these distinctions.
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    Default Combined arms still needed

    Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.

    We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.

    It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.

    I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.

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    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

    Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:
    Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?
    In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone? Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC. Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support. There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers. Cavguy can probably give some strong examples. Rob's example of the Strykers calling them "trucks" is a good start on how to avoid what you describe. The one thing I don't like about strykers is that they appear to be complicated to operate, i.e. need additional training. The IMV's that I like look and operate like a "truck". Now I have never served in an SBCT so my belief in there complexity may have no basis in reality, but there expense is certainly more then is required for a good IMV.
    Reed
    Last edited by reed11b; 08-20-2008 at 08:43 PM. Reason: spelling

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Talking "Infantry Mobility Vehicles" is a contradiction; Infantry mobility is feets...

    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?
    The assigned drivers for the 2 1/2s in the Airborne units. Now ask me who drove the Tracks from the APC Battalion in the 7th Inf Div (ROCID) in the late 50s. Or ask me who drove the tracks in the Mech Bde I was in in during my 75-76 tour in Korea. Answer's the same, the drivers -- what's your point? Mine is that vehicles need drivers (a person), usually some security (another person or two) or to leave the area. The real point was in a discussion of Mech or mounted units (i.e. assigned vehicles) units, not transported infantry.
    In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone?
    Because in addition to the driver (who as you point out, was not in your examples a member of the Platoon but of a support or another element...) with most modern vehicles you have to leave someone to man the gun. In the Bradley because of the capacity, you also have to leave a third guy behind to pass up additional 25mm to the gunner. So you're confronted with the fact that your seven dismounts (IF you have all of them) are reduced to five or six. You're also stuck with the fact that mounted troops are absolutely not going to get too far away from their vehicles under most circumstances. Recall again, the discussion is on units with assigned vehicles.
    Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC.
    There's that word again. if, indeed...
    Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support.
    No question about that. I however, have no clue how we ever won a fight without all that sruff...
    There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers.
    Sorry, don't understand that???

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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    Interesting study, but it does contain (IMO) some flaws. By focusing exclusively on mechanization, the authors miss some key variables in terms of unit doctrine. To draw on their own example - would the 4th ID have operated differently if Petraeus had commanded it instead of the 101st? And would the 101st have behaved differently under a different commander? The example of Vietnam is also flawed in that the Marines were using the CAP theory, while the Army did not. Since the majority of Army units in-country were not mechanized, they could have followed the same operational doctrine but chose not to (although there were doctrinal changes later on). This isn't an issue of mechanization as much as it is doctrine and operational style.
    Steve,

    Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

    In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Shek View Post
    Steve,

    Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.
    That was my suspicion, that a heavily mechanized Army (probably unavoidable up to the present) reinforces some of the worst aspects of the "American Way of War." Especially given the current situation.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Light Infantry is willing to fight in squad sized elements

    Mech, to include Strykers doesn't do that. Mech has to protect their vehicles and Rob misunderstood my earlier comment; yes, Mech can put out a substantial force (particularly the SBCTS) but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles. There is also a comfort factor, the Mech guys I've know were reluctant to get too far from their vehicles. That may not be the case with SBCTs but I suspect it is with the Bradley guys...

    Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...

    That's not to take anything away from the re-roled guys who are doing better than expected or anyone who's over there busting their hump.

    I agree that the mounted mentality adversely impacted our efforts in Iraq early on; that and I'll also restate my earlier point that the right Commander will do his METT-T thing and do well regardless of background or type of unit involved and the wrong one will err regardless of what type units available.

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    Council Member Rob Thornton's Avatar
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    Default Pros and Cons

    Ken,
    good point:
    but there are still vehicles to be protected and crew elements to be left in those vehicles.
    There is certainly a trade - if you give anybody the mobility of organic vehicles of any flavor - they now have to be protected and crewed. If you organic crews to the MTO&E it does not take away from your squads and platoons, but if you don't you have to get them from somewhere. If you have vehicles you have to either be willing to cut them loose - i.e put somebody in charge and tell them to return to a place out of contact (like getting dropped off), place them somewhere where organic TTP and vehicle weapon systems can handle the force pro, or limit your movement to where you can always cooperate - i.e. you can't just abandon them without compromising their force pro in an environment where an enemy on foot who blends in well with the population has a natural advantage. Any crew of any combat vehicle is going to have their attention split between seeing to the vehicle, and their other duties. Leadership has pretty much found the balance.

    However, there are things you get by having the vehicle. Some I mentioned already - but you also get the powerful communications system - having a VRC with a power amp to get you through the interference found in a city is a good thing, a satellite based BFT or EPLRS FBCB2 with a crew to relay new information, or reach back to request combat multipliers - and bring them into range of dismounted comms allow CDRs to extend their AOR - and more flexibility in planning operations.

    I've seen guys operating in sections - but always with at least three vehicles - that is pretty much the rule. The problem with using 1114s or other HMMWV variants for any organization is that it limits the number of people who can dismount. It means that to conduct dismounted operations in normal organic formations, teams, squads and platoons must first assemble at the dismount point. The folks that can retain their mobility in combat vehicles that allow for teams and squads to be dismounted as a unit have an advantage here - hopefully the type of MRAP vehicles which best account for this will find their way into the units which are tasked with doing patrols.

    Hey Shek,

    However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.
    Another good point. The effects of technology can be so subtle that once you and everyone else are surrounded by it, it becomes normal. The same can be said with the doctrine and training we followed to put that technology to best effect and fulfill task and purpose. Tom had referred to the days when the MOUT site at Shugart-Gordon was different then it is now. We considered our MOUT sites as independent blocks or villages where when all was said and done, we just could not see visualize the impacts of the tactics we were using to seize or clear it - those were generally the tasks.

    Now its hard not to consider those training sites without seeing them plugged into a much larger social system, full of people who have made their homes their for generations, who have no where else to go, families of families who have 6 or more kids all living in small rooms - where we were lucky to get a few folks to a building before (JRTC has come a long way since then).

    There is also the problems with heavier vehicles operating on infrastructure that in some cases was built when trade traffic was light, and technology was limited - there have been more then one case where a M1 or M2/M3 crushed some subterranean sewage or water piece that led to further problems. However, those same Brads caught the AIF way off guard when they first appeared and using thermals and coaxial MGs dirupted quite a number of AIF IED complex ambushes to good effect.

    Its a tough call, as COL Foresman pointed out in AFJ we have to be capable of full spectrum operations in the complete range of conditions. We want the best tech, but ideally we don't want to be constrained by it. We appreciate leaders who can negotiate and know when to use restraint and let the situation develop and get solved from the inside out, but we also recognize the need for those who can recognize when to kill without hesitation.

    So overall I guess our doctrine, mindsets, national and service cultures, TTP, and technology did hinder us in conducting COIN at the outset. However it was the same set of predispositions which was needed to send a large force to the other side of the world, pursue multiple LOOs of division sized elements and sustain them through the fight with minimal casualties. Also worth remembering is the fight in Falluja - now some will say if we'd had the appropriate sized force at the outset, the conditions that gave rise to making that city an insurgent stronghold might never have occurred, but I believe its beside the point. Fog/Friction/Chance will always conspire to throw you a curve ball, and the enemy will always seek to disadvantage you - he gets a vote - the units that cleared Falluja fought a hard combined arms fight and did so to a determined enemy's disadvantage. Also worth considering are some of the other fights that have required a large scale jump up the lethal line - Mosul 11/11/2004, Ramadi in 2006, Baquba was just recently a serious fight, and there are certainly others. It brings me back to the "there are no easy answers, only compromises for the tough questions".

    While we must get better at COIN - because I also believe that is probably the majority of the types of conditions we will find ourselves in over the next decade or two - we cannot afford to not be able to fight force on force and have the advantage in doing so (how much of an advantage is needed is debatable). If we divorce ourselves too much from our former selves, somebody else will fill that vacuum - and then one of our tools in bad neighbor behavior modification will be less a couple of teeth. If we want true specialization so we can be good at everything its going to require a much larger force (and allot more $$$) so we can have enough Schlitz to pass around for every occasion - otherwise we have to live with some kind of balance. My cautionary note comes as I more often hear "if all you have is a hammer, then every problem looks like a nail" becoming a panacea cliche' to describe all doctrine & force structure solutions. In our business, some (not all) problems will remain nails - and if you have ever tried to drive a nail with a Gerber multi-tool I don't recommend it. We flat out have to be good (better then the other guy) at the full range of military operations.

    Best to all, Rob
    Last edited by Rob Thornton; 09-20-2007 at 11:49 AM.

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post

    Still, the biggest difference is in the mindset and willingness to kick out Squads and even Teams in some case versus fighting as a platoons -- and doing it all on foot...
    Ken,

    I don't necessairly disagree with you, but will make two observations from Iraq experience:

    1) Your dismounted, vehicle unsupported squad is attacked by 5-10 AIF. Your soldiers return fire and the enemy begins to displace. Your soldiers give chase, but are unable to move quickly enough to catch them because he is weighted down with 25 lbs of armor plus his weapons, ammo, etc. Being able to rapidly mount, maneuver, and disembark a team in urban warfare is key to getting the insurgents. Secondairly, if you get pinned down, joint patrolling near your vehicle provides cover, firepower, and rapid CASEVAC.

    2) In my Sa'ad neighborhood efforts in Tal Afar, my infantry platoon patrolled exclusively dismounted. We began to discover more and more small IED's hidden that were only effective against dismounted troops. While reacting to a mortar attack against the patrol base, one of these IED's killed one and wounded two more of my soldiers in what I believe was a baited ambush. The IED was a remote controlled IED, which a HMMWV with countermeasures following the squad would have interdicted.

    I completely agree that COIN must be done dismounted and interacting with the people, but in urban warfare getting too far away from your supporting vehicles can be dangerous, in my experience.

    (Another TTP we used was to drop the patrol, and the vehicle section maneuvered in the area, but not with, the patrol, sometimes to "Beat the bush")

    Again, it's your task, purpose, and method for the patrol, not the asset itself. A dismounted only team without backup in a place like Ramadi in 2006 is asking to take unnessary casualties.

    But I think we agree in principle.
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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Shek View Post
    Steve,

    Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

    In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.
    My take is more that mechanization plays into how segments of the military prefer to fight their wars. It's more of an extension of the Word War II mindset. Helicopters increased mobility, but one of the biggest destructive factors in Vietnam aside from airpower was artillery; good old WW2 era-guns. The helicopter also had its downside in the amount of logistic support it required, creating a need to open and secure roads and tie down assets keeping those roads open (many of which were mechanized...a number of division cavalry squadrons spent the bulk of their time securing roads).

    Doctrine is also tailored to fight the preferred conflict, not the one that may be close at hand. Thus mechanization is, in my view, tailored to fight "the big one," not to deal with smaller conflicts.

    We agree on the impact of doctrine, I think, but I also feel that divorcing mechanization from doctrine (which the study authors seem to do) really undermines their main point. Mechanized units can and have played very important roles in COIN efforts. They make outstanding reaction forces for outlying posts and garrisons; they have the ability to escort relief supplies and protect local improvement projects; and they can respond quickly to any emergency (be it combat or humanitarian)...much quicker than a leg unit in many cases.

    With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

    Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.
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    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
    With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.
    Steve,

    I agree that the commander is an omitted variable, but one that I think would be hard to quantify and thus should be addressed qualitatively in the paper. The question is what bias this creates, and the section that I highlighted from your post is what I'd argue is what happens on average, and thus, the bias would be very low.

    Commanders are selected based on their performance within the chosen doctrine of the force, and the current incentives reinforce this - grad school is poo poo'd as time spent away from the force while muddy boots assignments are the "tickets" to success. While there is lip service that grad school is good now (although the incentives haven't been changed to match this, e.g., telling boards that civilian graduate school is the equivalent as a second command in Ranger Regiment), I don't think that it is much more than that. Thus, a GEN Petraeus or LTG Chiarelli that can adapt on the first go around in a non-doctrinal scenario is the exception and not the rule. The necessities of the scenario will cause others to adapt and become more effective as time goes on, but I'd still argue that mechanization does have a causal impact (through the effects of doctrine and mindset) on the probability of winning a counterinsurgency.

    Essentially, what we would consider a good full spectrum commander may not be the commander that is promoted because the doctrine/mindset doesn't have the same definition of good.

    Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair
    Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.
    Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?

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    Moderator Steve Blair's Avatar
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    I think another issue with mechanization in COIN is the basing and logistics requirements it brings. Basing equals a larger "foreign" presence, which in turn creates an issue that an insurgent force can exploit. Since mechanized forces consume and need more in the way of supplies, they require a more extensive support network than light units, in turn creating insurgent-exploitable issues and targets.

    You make a good point regarding the possible causal impact of mechanization; one that I think the original paper missed. As for the million-dollar question...it may come down to having units/forces that are trained/optimized for COIN and others that deal with larger conflict issues (which as I recall was one of the original arguments for the light divisions). Mechanized units have a clear place and utility in COIN, but their role is different than what you would see in a more conventional conflict. That might require different training and equipment (a good role for the traditional-style dragoon force slapout mentioned...or the traditional function of US cavalry prior to the world wars). Usually it's a question of force scale, and sadly our institutional "either/or" mindset hinders our ability to find that balance.
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    In reading the above only; I fear they may have a rather narrow view of COIN opns, as I found myself relating their rhetoric to urban efforts to dismount police from their cruisers.

    I would also very much like to read the 238 "insurgencies" to see how neatly fit that monicker is. I suspect their may be some false-flag, anarchies, shill-surgencies and faux-surgencies skewing the data.

    Pardon my ignorrance the link wasn't responding to me just now but I'll relish the read.

    If fire and maneuver are an integral part of war waging facilities then "Mechanization", as the West consensually uses the term, is an essential advancement that must be utilized. Or do I much mistake?

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    Default Armor and COIN

    This seems to be somewhat of a hot topic recently, which is good for me since I'm working on a thesis on military policy and I want to focus on the use of armor (and probably also airpower) in asymmetric warfare, but more specifically COIN operations.

    SWJ Blog recently posted this http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/more-on-armor/ and Tom Ricks' recent post on Armor is generating some good discussion as well http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...t#commentspace.

    So first let me make a couple things clear: I am not interested in whether US armor is becoming defunct or outdated, and I do not believe that armor should be sacrificed in the face of asymmetric warfare. Ricks' note that X number of Staff Sergeants are not qualified on the M1, or commenters' discussion of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon are really aside from what I'm interested in.

    My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?

    I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

    Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.

    Thank you for any feedback you can give me on this!

  19. #19
    Council Member
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    Oct 2009
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    Default Tanks

    Do you lose the population once the tanks move in? Probably. At least you are set back to square one (Order maintenance) The scenario may be like I encountered when command threatened to bring tanks into the small town and level every sympathizers home. Good threat but if he had done it How long would it take to recover?

    If you have the big gun you may not have to use it. Better to have than want. Show of force, power, and awe. Nothing says power like the earth rumblin beneath your feet but if that power is foreign the circle of love continues.

  20. #20
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Oct 2007
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    Lansing, KS
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    361

    Default A liability...

    Short answer -- No!!!
    If used improperly, yes but...
    a clankety clank and whop whop are real useful tools in the COIN tool kit...
    FM 3-24 doesn't do a good enough job of saying this, but COIN does not mean you don't kill bad guys, and insurgent forces sometimes gather to conduct direct action against govt forces (especially if you don't have adequate firepower)....
    From a strictly COIN perspective... I might not need an armor division in Northern Iraq, but an AR BN sure is handy...
    Hacksaw
    Say hello to my 2 x 4

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