Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[J Wolfsberger]

There's also a large difference between an Abrams and a Stryker/LAV. On top of that, and this can be the source of a lot of confusion, there is a dramatic difference between MOUT and COIN. I won't get a chance to read the paper till this weekend - maybe some who have can shed light on whether the authors captured these distinctions.

[Merv Benson]

Most people recognized that sufficient mounted armor forces could have made a significant difference in the Blackhawk Down battle in Mogadishu.

We also know that dismounted forces are more effective at going into a neighborhood and protecting the people and also gathering intelligence on enemy activity.

It is also inarguable that we have a real advantage against the enemy when we can call in an air strike on on a sniper trying to pin down the dismounted troops.

I am not sure why there is an argument against the combined arms approach, Historically, it has been been pretty effective. We shouldn't be arguing about driving a vehicle with one of its wheels removed.

[Ski]

I'm not sure if mechanization leads to stalemate or defeat more often. I have to read the paper with more attention to detail when I have more free time.

I do understand that mechanized forces are far more expensive to operate and maintain, and that we are spending vast amounts of cash in order to achieve results that are mediocre on average.

A lot to chew on here - my gut feeling is that this is a piece to a much larger puzzle - that includes leadership, adaptability by individual and unit, tactics, cultural/religious/ethnic differences, and maybe a few other major criteria.

Until I get into the weeds, I'm certainly not sold on mechanization = defeat in COIN, but I;m not dismissing it completely.

[Tom Odom]

I will read it also. I have long thought there is a significant internal cultural difference between heavy and light forces when it comes to dealing with people and dealing with systems. Many heavy leaders are by their training and inclinations "systems" as in combat systems oriented. They think by nature of their training in map sheets not kilometers aand almost never in meters. Light leaders are prople oriented and all planning and think is human-centric and done one foot at a time. That makes many light leaders more adaptive (or accepting) of human-centric adaptations.

Now before RTK and CAVGuy shoot me, I used the term many and not most. It is always a question of leadership and some leaders are adaptive and some are not. But in a macro sense, I see this as a trend that has continued for some time. How it plays out in COIN is certainly debatable.

But I would also say that we do have to be careful in talking COIN in an urban environment versus a full-blown MOUT fight. No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Tom,

No argument at all on the need for combined arms in MOUT; them that use combined arms win the Shugart-Gordon fight here (at least when we were doing them). That is however a different world than cordon and knock or TSE.

If I can amplify a bit on combined arms: I'll concede to the Air Force the potential utility of a 2000 lb. bomb in MOUT. In COIN, I not only can't see any utility, I think ANY use would be seriously counterproductive.

By the same token, an Abrams in COIN has a terrific psychological effect, one I'm sure is more profound than a Stryker/LAV. But I also believe, and I'll defer to RTK and CavGuy, that the Stryker/LAV has much greater COIN utility as transport and occasional base of fire for the dismounts. And it's the dismounts who will ultimately decide the outcome.

[Dennis]

I also haven't read this in depth yet, but my first response is is there really a difference between getting out of a brad/striker to getting out of an uparmored vehicle?

[goesh]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

[Steve Blair]

I see alot of humping grunts on tv from the safety of my living room

Sure....but I think the points of interest (at least in terms of this study) are
a) What unit do they come from (mech or leg)?
b) How many of those grunts does the unit have to put on patrol?
c) Does that tie into success in COIN?

The questions raised are important for this conflict...and the one after it...and the one after that...

[Schmedlap]

This reminds me of a study that concluded that homes with more books in them tend to have children who are better readers. One should not conclude from that study that if you drop your entire paycheck at Barnes & Noble that your 6-year-old will be reading at the 12th grade level. It was not the presence of the books that made the kids better readers. The parents thought that reading was worthwhile and that good reading skills were important, so they owned lots of books. The children inherited the values of their parents. They thought that reading was enjoyable and important and put forth more effort to become better readers.

Likewise, there is a root cause to mechanization that correlates with a reluctance to do necessary dismounted work, but this does not imply a causal relationship. I would assert that militaries become more mechanized only after their country has modernized. An increase in modernization correlates with less tolerance for casualties in the so-called “middle wars” that include COIN. Less tolerance for casualties leads a military to reduce exposure to enemy actions by placing more armor between the Soldier and the enemy, as in Iraq, or to neglect the armor protection and then retreat in short order after fatalities hit double-digits, as in Mogadishu.

It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

[Ken White]

...
. . .
It’s not mechanization. It’s modernization.

In all the aspects you cited.

...That from the resident dinosaur...

[Rob Thornton]

I don't know if we've just mitigated it through leadership and training, or its a question of adaptation over time, but I do know this. While there I saw three different BCTs rotate through Mosul. The 172nd SBCT out of AK was on the ground when I first got there - and after their RIP TOA with 3/2 SBCT from FLW they went South. 3/2 was on the ground just long enough to get things laid out (however this was much of that units 2nd time in Mosul) before they too were sent South. 3/2 was replaced with 4/1 CAV out of FT Hood. They were all good units, had quality leaders and good soldiers.

The two SBCTs had lots of soldiers in vehicles tailor made to move lots of Infantry quickly, with good protection for the conditions and enough firepower to overcome any enemy you'll find in most COIN conditions I think - there are about 170 soldiers in a SBCT Rifle Co, you get three of those in an SBCT BN, and a good size HHC as well - lots of snipers in the BN MTO&E and within the BDE you get lots of extras to provide lots of organic Combined Arms. You also get a lot of C4ISR and in addition to the three IN BNs you get a RSTA Sqdn, an EN CO, and a AT CO - so as Ken points out - the number of folks you can put on the ground is substantial. I promise even though Shek and I are products of the SBCTs - we're not biased (much) This provides lots of options for the CDR. Both of those SBCTs were well led and well employed both in Mosul, Baghdad and Baquba.

However, the unit that seemed to adjust the quickest to its surroundings and be able to move from lethal to non-lethal-to lethal, etc. (I could use kinetic/non-kinetic - but it just seems anti-septic to do so) was 4/1 CAV. I really wondered about that - so I started just asking the EMs, NCOs, LTs and CPTs about their experiences. For many, this was their 2nd and 3rd tours - many had been to different places and gone with different types of units. Many also discussed their MRE (Mission Readiness Exercise) at the CTC - all agreed the training had gotten to where within reason (talking resources) it reflected what they knew about the COIN environment, many had gone through the COIN Academy in Taji - and said that the training there was valuable, many had been involved with LPDs/OPDs/NCOPDs focused to COIN at Home Station, undergone special training with EMS, LE and other Civil organizations. They were well read. They were smart. These soldiers and leaders could run in Bradleys and Tanks on one day and work out of 1114s the next with no issues.

This is not to sell the two previous units short - just to point out that over time (not very long at all if we are looking at individuals, leaders and specific units) we have gotten much better at COIN regardless of the type of unit. Also that conditions change in an area - 1/25th SBCT had been in Mosul prior to the 172nd and had a different set of challenges, and I believe the situation got progressively better to where when 4/1 came in they had 1 x IN TF conducting CF ops (but partnered with a variety of folks to include ISF) and 1 x AR TF that had been given the mission to stand up an ISF cell and partner with what was then the IAG TTs at various levels (DIV through BN) to provide greater training capability with the ISF - so you have to consider the requirement to be flexible and take advantage of opportunities as they emerge.

As others have pointed out, its really about providing leadership at every level, and being able to employ the right tool or adapt it to the task at hand. I found few (if any) stereo-types in those three units, just leaders trying to the best they could (and their best was very, very good) as they understood the mission - as time has continued, our soldiers and leaders understand the mission and supporting tasks better and better -

I think at this point the light/heavy comparison is OBE except in the raw sense of MTO&E. If we're talking about the formations that provide the most flexibility in those terms - then I'd advocate more soldiers and more capabilities as it applies to good mobility (keep in mind while more and more people live in urbanized areas - some still live in remote, hard to get to places), adequate protection given the conditions of METT-TC, enhanced C4ISR - (everything from low level comms, to access to raw information and feeds), reasonable firepower that means in a COIN environment we are never the ones who show up to a gunfight with a knife, and the host of low density MOS that seem to be ever more critical and ever growing since DOD is the 800lb gorilla and the Inter-Agency just can't fill out fast enough. These types of units are going to be expensive because there are allot of people, and allot of capabilities and you have to provide them with the type of training that sets them up for success. This is not meant to translate directly into a SBCT - but you could come up with a hybrid given the amount of MRAP we are trying to acquire - the actual vehicle is just a platform that we have wired up with good computers and comms - the important piece is the soldier and leader.

Best Regards, Rob