Quote Originally Posted by Shek View Post
Steve,

Some good points here, but I don't think that they necessarily undermine the authors' thesis that mechanization has a negative impact on outcomes in counterinsurgencies. I'd argue that it is not the mechanization itself, but rather the doctrinal focus that mechanization brings that is your causal relationship. In otherwords, mechanization is a proxy for how your force thinks and/or wants to fight (since I'd imagine that it would be pretty hard to develop and quantify a doctrine variable). Turning your GEN Petraeus example into a question - given the Army's level of mechanization and hence doctrinal focus prior to the start of OIF, on average, do you get a MG Petraeus type division commander or not? As far as Vietnam goes, did mechanization (defined through the use of helicopters) provide a positive or negative impact? The technology may be neutral, but how it affects doctrine is not.

In terms of the examples of the adaptability of leadership since 2003 such that mechanization is not an automatic curse in COIN, this is certainly true. However, the fact still remains that our doctrinal focus and the resulting performance in the early years of Iraq has made achieving victory much more difficult. So, I still think you get a causal impact from mechanization, although its effect is greatest at the outset of the counterinsurgency.
My take is more that mechanization plays into how segments of the military prefer to fight their wars. It's more of an extension of the Word War II mindset. Helicopters increased mobility, but one of the biggest destructive factors in Vietnam aside from airpower was artillery; good old WW2 era-guns. The helicopter also had its downside in the amount of logistic support it required, creating a need to open and secure roads and tie down assets keeping those roads open (many of which were mechanized...a number of division cavalry squadrons spent the bulk of their time securing roads).

Doctrine is also tailored to fight the preferred conflict, not the one that may be close at hand. Thus mechanization is, in my view, tailored to fight "the big one," not to deal with smaller conflicts.

We agree on the impact of doctrine, I think, but I also feel that divorcing mechanization from doctrine (which the study authors seem to do) really undermines their main point. Mechanized units can and have played very important roles in COIN efforts. They make outstanding reaction forces for outlying posts and garrisons; they have the ability to escort relief supplies and protect local improvement projects; and they can respond quickly to any emergency (be it combat or humanitarian)...much quicker than a leg unit in many cases.

With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.