Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Shek]

With the commander variable...I don't know if that can be tied to doctrine either. Good commanders change or modify doctrine (or ignore it) to suit the situation; poor commanders do not. Others go with the flow and fight how they were taught to fight. An aggressive commander with a light unit can cause almost as many problems as a commander with a mechanized unit IF he doesn't understand the situation at hand.

Steve,

I agree that the commander is an omitted variable, but one that I think would be hard to quantify and thus should be addressed qualitatively in the paper. The question is what bias this creates, and the section that I highlighted from your post is what I'd argue is what happens on average, and thus, the bias would be very low.

Commanders are selected based on their performance within the chosen doctrine of the force, and the current incentives reinforce this - grad school is poo poo'd as time spent away from the force while muddy boots assignments are the "tickets" to success. While there is lip service that grad school is good now (although the incentives haven't been changed to match this, e.g., telling boards that civilian graduate school is the equivalent as a second command in Ranger Regiment), I don't think that it is much more than that. Thus, a GEN Petraeus or LTG Chiarelli that can adapt on the first go around in a non-doctrinal scenario is the exception and not the rule. The necessities of the scenario will cause others to adapt and become more effective as time goes on, but I'd still argue that mechanization does have a causal impact (through the effects of doctrine and mindset) on the probability of winning a counterinsurgency.

Essentially, what we would consider a good full spectrum commander may not be the commander that is promoted because the doctrine/mindset doesn't have the same definition of good.

Interesting questions. Certainly makes for good discussion.

Absolutely. The interesting policy question that stems from this is still the same million dollar question - how do you (and can you) develop an Army that can truly be full spectrum and not one that pays lip service to full spectrum operations while treating small wars as the lesser included case?

[Steve Blair]

I think another issue with mechanization in COIN is the basing and logistics requirements it brings. Basing equals a larger "foreign" presence, which in turn creates an issue that an insurgent force can exploit. Since mechanized forces consume and need more in the way of supplies, they require a more extensive support network than light units, in turn creating insurgent-exploitable issues and targets.

You make a good point regarding the possible causal impact of mechanization; one that I think the original paper missed. As for the million-dollar question...it may come down to having units/forces that are trained/optimized for COIN and others that deal with larger conflict issues (which as I recall was one of the original arguments for the light divisions). Mechanized units have a clear place and utility in COIN, but their role is different than what you would see in a more conventional conflict. That might require different training and equipment (a good role for the traditional-style dragoon force slapout mentioned...or the traditional function of US cavalry prior to the world wars). Usually it's a question of force scale, and sadly our institutional "either/or" mindset hinders our ability to find that balance.