Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Cavguy]

I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

Really, no one's written a comprehensive history of that night. Some small stories discussed above, but an enterprising writer/historian could make quite a book of April 2004 - the month that defined the next 2 years in Iraq (Sadr Rebellion and 1st Fallujah). Alternately titled "When the wheels came off the Bus". Actually, I believe the tipping point was the UN Bombing in August 2003, when the NGO's all left immediately afterwards and the terror campaign began full swing.

Were you there that day at the UN Bombing? I watched LTC Calvert get his ass chewed by LTG Sanchez in a supreme display of bad leadership and character given the miracles worked by 2ACR that day. LTG Sanchez's conduct that day still gets me mad. Alternately, I got my first media appearance on CNN. Reporters were running amok just after it happened, and we couldn't control them from running into the rubble with cameras. My BN S3 asked me to get them under control. I shouted "WHO WANTS A BRIEFING!" as loud as I could. It was like throwing those fish food pebbles in a koi pond. Immediately I had 20 cameras shoved in my face, and I gave a ten minute session where I told them essentially that yes, the building was bombed, and no, we didn't know what it was yet. The funniest question was a female reporter who shouted "Was it an RPG?" when behind me was a hotel blown in half.

Did get them out of the rubble while the perimeter was set.

[marct]

Hi Coy,

Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it.

Don't let rank intimidate you out on this site. As long as you stay respectful, chime in! The ROE here is loose. You can disagree with a superior officer/nco here as long as it's making a point, and stays on the professional level. That's the beauty of this forum.

Let me second Cavguy's comments - "Chime in" . Anyway, not everyone here is a serving officer or NCO. Some of us have no military experience at all . Outside of the general "professionally loose" culture here, we really do both want and need input from every rank and POV.

Your experiences provide a tremendous insight as well. Believe it or not, we don't have all the answers. I still encourage you to write an article. Even if you don't think you write well, an editor will clean it up if you give them the meat. Certainly the case in my articles!

Also agree with all of this, even if I'm the one who has to do the editing !

Marc

[Ken White]

jump in. Your perspective will be helpful.

Cav Guy can handle the Ossifers and if any NCOs try to jump your case, I can handle them -- I know I've got time in grade on all of 'em (Which means nothing except I'm old... ).

Seriously, welcome and I'm sure no one will hassle you.

Scouts out...

[selil]

Cavguy,
Sir, Im sorry, I totally missed the intro thread, but honestly I don't intend on ever making more than just this post. Im a Junior NCO so there isn't a whole lot I can add to the CSM/Field Grade Commander level discussions that go on here, nor would I ever attempt it. I just always wondered why C 1/2 ACR isn't normally included as being a participant that night. Now I have an answer. For that, I thank you!

You'll learn a lot more if you participate. Academic credentials aside the highest grade I ever made was corporal.

[Steve Blair]

You'll learn a lot more if you participate. Academic credentials aside the highest grade I ever made was corporal.

First and foremost, we're a discussion board aimed at understanding and exploring the concepts involved with small wars. One of our key concepts is respecting your fellow posters, regardless of rank and status. We're not a military board, so the content of your head is more important than what's on your shoulders.

The mods here will whack someone who's disrespectful of a fellow poster (which isn't the same thing as disagreeing with someone...we have lots of energetic discussions here...the key is to go after the IDEA, not the PERSON).

I'm a big fan of combined arms cav in small wars situations, so I'm especially happy to see more cav guys taking part in the discussion. Welcome aboard!

[RTK]

... and if any NCOs try to jump your case, I can handle them -- I know I've got time in grade on all of 'em (Which means nothing except I'm old... ).

Seriously, Ken had Moses beat on time in grade by almost a full year. He was on con leave during the Red Sea operation...

[William F. Owen]

Seriously, Ken had Moses beat on time in grade by almost a full year. He was on con leave during the Red Sea operation...

Wasn't Ken the chief instructor on the River Crossing Course Moses attended?

[Ken White]

student. He later mistranslated the 10th Commandment, putting an unnecessary 'not' in there.

Crossing prep for the Red Sea was way too slow, it could've been a tactical disaster had he not been lucky...

And I wasn't on leave, just had a bad hangover. Caused me to have to walk across atop the water a little later, evading all the way. Thank Mars for amateurs...

[Cavguy]

I was asked a few months ago to contribute to the Air Land Sea Bulletin a 1500 word essay on the relevance of armored forces in urban terrain. I used the ideas in this thread to write the short piece. While it could use some additional detail, hopefully it adds to the discussion. I also only had a 24h suspense, so it was more of an op-ed than a research case.

It's here on Page 6. The editor didn't change it at all, (my bad), so there's a few embarassing grammar mistakes. They also got my location/assignment wrong, but that's ok.

[Ron Humphrey]

I was asked a few months ago to contribute to the Air Land Sea Bulletin a 1500 word essay on the relevance of armored forces in urban terrain. I used the ideas in this thread to write the short piece. While it could use some additional detail, hopefully it adds to the discussion. I also only had a 24h suspense, so it was more of an op-ed than a research case.

It's here on Page 6. The editor didn't change it at all, (my bad), so there's a few embarassing grammar mistakes. They also got my location/assignment wrong, but that's ok.

Thought it very clear and easy to understand.

[Surferbeetle]

Thought it very clear and easy to understand.

Cavguy,

I am with Ron on his assessment, you write well and your point is clear. I just caught up with your description of your work in Ramadi in a previous thread (dated first part of 2007) here at SWJ. Words can't really capture my thoughts on this...I am glad that you posted it.

Regards,

Steve

[Entropy]

I was asked a few months ago to contribute to the Air Land Sea Bulletin a 1500 word essay on the relevance of armored forces in urban terrain. I used the ideas in this thread to write the short piece. While it could use some additional detail, hopefully it adds to the discussion. I also only had a 24h suspense, so it was more of an op-ed than a research case.

It's here on Page 6. The editor didn't change it at all, (my bad), so there's a few embarassing grammar mistakes. They also got my location/assignment wrong, but that's ok.

Nice article! I didn't know the Russians got so thrashed in Grozny. Why did they fail so completely while we were so successful?

[Cavguy]

Nice article! I didn't know the Russians got so thrashed in Grozny. Why did they fail so completely while we were so successful?

In order - poor planning, inadequate training, poor leadership, and ill-maintained equipment.

Basically, by 1994 the Russian army had degenerated into a mostly unmotivated conscript force brutally treated by its officers. The officership was also uneven. The motorized brigade actually had more light armor (BRDM and BTR) than anything, and fewer tanks. The Russians arrogantly charged into the center of the city, where the Chechens cut the supply line and proceeded to destroy the Russians in close urban combat. The ill-trained and poorly led Russian soldiers were beaten by motivated urban guerrillas.

The Chechens were highly motivated, reasonably led, and schooled in the vulerabilities of Russian Armor. They led the Brigade into a trap, cut off logistics, and decimated them.

The Russians in turn leveled Grozny. Putin reorganized the army and in 1999 avenged the defeat and mostly crushed the Chechen rebellion. They did it through the "Roman" version of COIN - mass slaughter and intimidation. Also some well targeted campaigns to assassinate Chechen leaders. However, it still festers.

I read a great article awhile back that was a good overview, I think in ARMOR circa 1999. When I attended OBC it was the subject of great study by the Armor Center - and led to many of the conclusions in the paper.

UPDATE: ARMOR article "The Battle of Grozny" by CPT Chad Rupe HERE - should be public access for this one.

"When the Russian columns advanced into the center of Grozny, the men expected to disband poorly trained civilian mobs through a show of force by the Russian Army. Ordered not to fire unless fired upon, the
vehicle commanders did not bother to load their machine guns. Infantrymen slept in the back of their personnel carriers. Vehicle commanders had the audacity and confidence to navigate through the city without large scale maps or guides. But as they ended up on dead end streets and in gardens, the columns quickly lost their confidence and their lives."

"Hunter-killer teams of Chechens brought the columns to an explosive halt. They operated in groups of 15 to 20 personnel, broken down into five or six teams consisting of three to four men each. Each team had an antitank gunner, equipped with an RPG-7 or RPG-18, a machine gunner, an ammunition carrier, and a sniper. As the Russians advanced, the rebels moved in behind and parallel to the columns. Using hand-held radios, rebel scouts, “hunters,” coordinated with infantry, “killers,” to establish ambushes. A group of 15 to 20 personnel moved to overlook each armored column from multi-story buildings.20 Initiating ambushes with RPG fire on the lead and trail vehicles, the rebels quickly destroyed all personnel and vehicles. Lacking air cover and all support, the main effort was annihilated short of its final objective."

"During the first 10 months of the conflict, the Russians lost over 300 armored vehicles, 2,000 men KIA, 600 men MIA, and 6,000 men WIA. In the Battle of Grozny, it is estimated that 25,000 residents, rebels, and Russian solders died"

Bad Day for the Russian Army.

[Entropy]

Fascinating stuff - thanks!

[reed11b]

Mounted units have fewer people to do the on-foot work which COIN requires, period. The Math applies so there's some validity due to that factor in the historical precedent...

Still, Steve and Cav Guy have it right IMO -- the good Commander (branch immaterial) will do good stuff, a less competent one will fail with the right kind of unit. Like MattC's tag line says:

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?
In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone? Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC. Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support. There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers. Cavguy can probably give some strong examples. Rob's example of the Strykers calling them "trucks" is a good start on how to avoid what you describe. The one thing I don't like about strykers is that they appear to be complicated to operate, i.e. need additional training. The IMV's that I like look and operate like a "truck". Now I have never served in an SBCT so my belief in there complexity may have no basis in reality, but there expense is certainly more then is required for a good IMV.
Reed

[Ken White]

Ken, how often did you have vehicle support from w/i your own battalion? I realize that you actually served during a time when Divisions could deploy as a whole unit, but I am willing to bet there were times that the organic Bat. deuce and halfs gave you a lift. Who drove those trucks?

The assigned drivers for the 2 1/2s in the Airborne units. Now ask me who drove the Tracks from the APC Battalion in the 7th Inf Div (ROCID) in the late 50s. Or ask me who drove the tracks in the Mech Bde I was in in during my 75-76 tour in Korea. Answer's the same, the drivers -- what's your point? Mine is that vehicles need drivers (a person), usually some security (another person or two) or to leave the area. The real point was in a discussion of Mech or mounted units (i.e. assigned vehicles) units, not transported infantry.

In all of my training excerizes AND real world missions (excluding training where we jumped in) we have had some sort of wheeled transport available. The soldiers that operated these vehicles came from battalion. Some were profiles or suppy section workers or S-shop grunts, but they still came from Bat. In Iraq, the norm was to have a platoon not tasked w/ the mission drive the trucks and provide pick up and support. This task would rotate through the squads and platoons. Why would a unit with Infantry Mobilty Vehicles be any differnt? How are you losing personel, as long as the vehicle is not too complicated to be driven by anyone?

Because in addition to the driver (who as you point out, was not in your examples a member of the Platoon but of a support or another element...) with most modern vehicles you have to leave someone to man the gun. In the Bradley because of the capacity, you also have to leave a third guy behind to pass up additional 25mm to the gunner. So you're confronted with the fact that your seven dismounts (IF you have all of them) are reduced to five or six. You're also stuck with the fact that mounted troops are absolutely not going to get too far away from their vehicles under most circumstances. Recall again, the discussion is on units with assigned vehicles.

Protected mobility is simply a force multiplier if it is relevant to the METT-TC.

There's that word again. if, indeed...

Some additional advantages to infantry support vehicles is C2STA abilities (espcially on board IFF tracker and IR) and communications support.

No question about that. I however, have no clue how we ever won a fight without all that sruff...

There are times when dismounting losses the mission even if it drives off the ambushers.

Sorry, don't understand that???

[William F. Owen]

Here are my conclusions on Infantry Mechanisation.

A.) The platoon ORBAT is/should be optimised to fight/operate dismounted. Mechanisation means picking up and transporting folks who are "Light Infantry."

B.) Driving and fighting almost any modern armoured military vehicle is a specialist skill requiring a good dedicated course of instruction. The vehicle crew (always 2 or 2+) does not have to be infantrymen.

C.) The vehicle crew should not be considered part of the section/squad or platoon. Personally, I can see great merit in having a Mech Platoon (14-16 vehicles , so 28-32 men) at the Company level. BN would have "Mech" companies.

D.) There is a world of difference between operating with an MRAP vehicle and a MICV. They are two entirely different doctrines.

MRAPS/JLTV and APCs are protected mobility for "Light Infantry". IMO, It is the minimum standard for all infantry!

MICVs are another thing entirely. Yes, I confess there is now a lot of cross-over between an MICV and some APCs, but my basic contention is that it is almost entirely to do with what you expect of the vehicle.

[reed11b]

you beat me too it. I agree w/ you Ken that Mechanization ; as in Bradlys or other IFVs, does reduce boots on the ground. At the same time it increases area reachable and range of operations. One way to reduce the loss of infantry skill would be to have the IFVs and there operators in a sepperate platoon. A Bradley requires a complex skill set that is very differnt from being an infantryman. There would still be less total troops in a Bradley company, but just as many available for dismount and they could focus on training on there dismount skill sets while bradley operators retained skills at fireing and driving a bradley.
As far as IMV's go, if they can be operated by anyone in the Bat. and you are using vehicles in "light" infantry ops anyway (becouse we and everyone else is too) how does making that mobility protected cost troops on the ground or infantry skills and abilities?
Reed
Sorry I know this could be clearer but it's late and I'm up past my nap time.

[Ken White]

I have some experience in the fighting on foot / picking up transporting "light infantry with non-dedicated vehicles. The US Army did that from the late 50s until the mid 60s. Problems: Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking (Yes, they need to be trained -- and plain old riflemen training is a good base from which to start), the track commanders were similarly poorly trained and the crew just wanted to transport and not get involved in the fight. Doesn't work that way. So, yes, the training of the crew is very important -- and they should at least have a basic understanding of Infantry tactics. They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.

A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided...

MRAPS are dangerous; vehicle hugging becomes a driving force (pun intended); the troops don't want to leave the armored (and today, air conditioned) cocoon. The vehicles are unwieldy, cannot ever offer 100% protection and thus provide a false sense of security (as does ALL armor). They need to be left in Iraq and not replicated. I'm not going to waste a lot of time discussing those expensive monstrosities with such limited use. I have no problem with buying special equipment for special purposes or units but the driving force should be military requirements and not a PR problem exacerbated by commentary from ill informed people (or equally ill informed partisan hacks in Congress).

Add to that that Armor can lull you into a false sense of security -- NOTHING is bullet proof, the heavier the vehicle, the less agility it possesses (and, generally, the less the using unit has tactically speaking); the fact that the vehicles must be protected; may or may not (and should or should not) be able to lend to the fight or mission with mounted weapons or even limited maneuver and I suggest that to say, categorically, that vehicles are good and the drivers / crews need not be infantry or a part of the unit is likely to be incorrect.

JLTV and APCs and protected mobility are not a panacea and their use should be totally METT-TC based; there's a time and a place for them, no question -- there's also the fact that they are inimical to some missions and do not suit all terrain and environments. I think the old dictum, 'be careful what you want, you may get it' applies.

Use of any vehicles by Infantry reduce the number of dismounts. In the old Airborne Battle Group and Battalion Recon Platoons with the M 151, a third of the strength was driving. My Sons Rifle Platoon in OIF II had a slew of unarmored HMMWVs with no turrets and ad hoc weapons mounts; they carried more people so he only lost a fifth of his strength to the vehicles. Later, in OEF IV (or V, can't recall) he had an Antitank Platoon, armored HMMWVs with turrets -- back to a third or fourth of the strength left with the vehicles. I do not see how anyone can argue that vehicles in a given situation do not impact the number of troops on the ground. That's true in any circumstance but certainly true if the vehicles are organic.

Mounted troops do not like to leave their vehicles and if forced to, they won't get too far away from them. That's logical and necessary but can be tactically limiting.

There is no question that Mech Infantry and 'Armored' Cavalry are necessary and that the application of force by such units differs from that of infantry. The issue is that in trying to blur the three, you end up with a hybrid that won't do any of the three very different jobs well. I'd submit our Cavalry already suffers from too much Armor / Mech blending and thus is really just a high speed mech outfit that doesn't do Recon at all well, though it's great at economy of force missions. Further, the 'mounting' of all infantry entails a loss of patrolling skill, perhaps the most important and critical infantry effort -- that, BTW, is documented IIRC from a Kilcullen Briefing; it got so bad in Iraq, they had to call in AWG to retrain infantry units in dismounted patrolling. That is pathetic, could have been quite dangerous and we're just lucky Iraq was a relatively benign environment that could tolerate such foolishness.

Cavalry is necessary and valuable, even if we don't do it right due to our impatience.

Mech Infantry is necessary and valuable. Walking infantry is equally necessary and valuable. 'Mounted' infantry is an idea looking for a home, is a hybrid -- and it will not do either job satisfactorily.

Long way of saying I disagree with both of you on this -- and that ought to be okay . I'd just posit that the METT-TC factors drive the train; there is no one size fits all and any use of vehicles entails a loss of foot troopies. Whether that loss is smart or not is totally situation dependent.

[reed11b]

Long way of saying I disagree with both of you on this -- and that ought to be okay . I'd just posit that the METT-TC factors drive the train; there is no one size fits all and any use of vehicles entails a loss of foot troopies. Whether that loss is smart or not is totally situation dependent.

But if I convert just one more to my point of view, I get a free toaster!
On the serious side, One of my disagreements with the SBCT concept is that the Styker is so fundamental to it, that even if the METT-TC demanded it, you will never hear "OK boys, were having additional aviation assets attached and were leaving the trucks behind." The current MRAPs are in fact better left behind, being poorly designed to do anything other then survive mine blasts, and the RG-31 and similar designs are not what I am referring to when I talk about an IMV. Ideally an IMV should affordable, simple, and provide some degree of protection and operational (not tactical) mobility. Even support vehicles need some degree of protection as we re-learned the hard-way..again.
Reed