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Thread: Mechanization hurts COIN forces

  1. #81
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Not even close

    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    But if I convert just one more to my point of view, I get a free toaster!
    doesn't count even in horseshoes...
    On the serious side, One of my disagreements with the SBCT concept is that the Styker is so fundamental to it, that even if the METT-TC demanded it, you will never hear "OK boys, were having additional aviation assets attached and were leaving the trucks behind."
    also true of Mech inf and Bradleys or whatever -- thank you for making my point.
    The current MRAPs are in fact better left behind, being poorly designed to do anything other then survive mine blasts, and the RG-31 and similar designs are not what I am referring to when I talk about an IMV. Ideally an IMV should affordable, simple, and provide some degree of protection and operational (not tactical) mobility.
    If it's an 'infantry' vehicle, it needs tactical mobility, period. That generally means 'lighter' thus little or no Armor -- which works for me, Armor is vastly over rated as a protective device; it offers some, no question but it also has a number of down sides. Better operational mobility is generally provided by aircraft for infantry in most circumstances though Armor and Mach do need operational AND tactical mobility in their vehicles. That's achievable.
    Even support vehicles need some degree of protection as we re-learned the hard-way..again.
    METT-TC. Cannot understand why that concept is so hard to accept; one size fits all never works well for warfare. Leslie J. McNair and his stupid 'everything should be GP...' mantra screwed up the thinking of the US Army.

    Support vehicles need some form of protection if -- and only if -- you're going to operate in an environment where it's required. In other -- most -- situations, you're just wasting money on an unneeded capability. Every penny spent on junk not needed is money not spent on training which is needed and which we do not do well -- due to financial constraints. Best solution is not to go with pure protected as some seem poised to do but to have vehicles which can be easily up armored, threat dependent -- which some others are also trying to do.

  2. #82
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Default Not ready to concede just yet

    Ken?
    How “tactically” mobile were the HMMWV and FMTV trucks the infantry relied on before? Sure they “some” off-road capacity, but believe me, I have gotten many a HMMWV stuck. Any of the IMV’s that Wilf or I advocate have the same “tactical” mobility range as these vehicles and are simple enough to be left behind if specialty tracks (like the Australians and Brits have done in East Timor and Afghanistan) or helicopters or plan old forced marches are better suited. Also,
    In the old Airborne Battle Group and Battalion Recon Platoons with the M 151, a third of the strength was driving. My Sons Rifle Platoon in OIF II had a slew of unarmored HMMWVs with no turrets and ad hoc weapons mounts; they carried more people so he only lost a fifth of his strength to the vehicles. Later, in OEF IV (or V, can't recall) he had an Antitank Platoon, armored HMMWVs with turrets -- back to a third or fourth of the strength left with the vehicles.
    as you point out, a signifigent amount of the force gets tied up in vehicles regardless. If an IMV holds as many troops or more then the PC HMMWVs, doesn't that increase the troops available?

    Helicopters do provide potentially better mobility, however, unless you are advocating for decentralized helicopter distribution (which does not work very well either), they have problems as well. They are very expensive to operate, take a great deal of advance planning the way they are currently set up, and have vulnerabilities to MANPADS and planned ambushes. Like you say, METT-TC dictates. The core concept to the IMV is that it is NOT a “system of systems” and simply an affordable force multiplier if METT-TC dictates. Historically, since they have been shown to be the most likely to be utilized, the easiest and most affordable to operate, since they do not require a unique skill set as helicopters and IFVs do, why not make them organic? This means the operators will in-fact have infantry skills. Don’t need them, don’t use them. Need them, and if they are not available, that’s were situations like Somalia and the 2-5 CAV QRF rescue attempt in Sadr City occur.

    One more question.. you state
    Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking (Yes, they need to be trained -- and plain old riflemen training is a good base from which to start), the track commanders were similarly poorly trained and the crew just wanted to transport and not get involved in the fight. Doesn't work that way. So, yes, the training of the crew is very important -- and they should at least have a basic understanding of Infantry tactics. They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.
    But then you state
    A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided...
    IFVs are aggressive fighting vehicles, so why is the first quote be relevant to them? They are designed to get in and mix it up with the enemy. If you do not want to lose the cohesion and training for infantry platoons, then you have to separate the IFVs (and the unique skill sets required to operate them well) and the Infantry squads. Even if they stay in the platoon, the manning can’t come out of the individual squads, or else you are never capable of dismounting an effective infantry squad/platoon, period. So the question is, what is your suggestion to reduce the infantry manpower and skill drain in the Mech units? Having the troops rotate between light and heavy outfits is a good start but it only addresses part of the issue. What else is there? You have been around for a variety of concepts, what works best in your eyes?

    Walking infantry is equally necessary and valuable
    ALL infantry is walking infantry since they require essentially the same skill set and there job starts once they "dismount". All Infantry needs to be able to utilize IFVs, IMVs and aircraft if the TA-DA! METT-TC determines them to be valuable. The ability to dismount and fight effectivly are determined more by..TA-DA again! training, training and training.
    Reed
    P.S. Do I get my toaster yet?

  3. #83
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Sigh. what's to concede. we have differing opinions.

    That doesn't bother me...
    Quote Originally Posted by reed11b View Post
    Ken?
    How “tactically” mobile were the HMMWV and FMTV trucks the infantry relied on before?
    Before what? The HMMWV is a poor vehicle IMO, yet another example of the compromises the Army must make to achieve the 'GP' functionality it is unduly enamored of. The FMTV is more mobile than its predecessors and that's good; the HMMWV just has a little better ground clearnce and more power. It is a poor military vehicle. Neither is really a tactical vehicle, they are trucks, no more and no less.
    Sure they “some” off-road capacity, but believe me, I have gotten many a HMMWV stuck.
    Proving that tactical driver training, including things not to try, is very, very important.

    I've been stuck, too. learned how to avoid that and, more importantly, teach others how to avoid it. Tracks and wheels. A thrown track by hitting a dip in a a side slope traverse is as much a mobility kill as one blown off. You cannot just put anyone behind the wheel of a tactical vehicle and ever expect good results.
    Any of the IMV’s that Wilf or I advocate have the same “tactical” mobility range as these vehicles
    That's not saying much, better solutions are available.
    and are simple enough to be left behind if specialty tracks (like the Australians and Brits have done in East Timor and Afghanistan) or helicopters or plan old forced marches are better suited.
    Left behind where? In a tactical situation? In theater if you leave? ???
    ...as you point out, a signifigent amount of the force gets tied up in vehicles regardless. If an IMV holds as many troops or more then the PC HMMWVs, doesn't that increase the troops available?
    Obviously -- but you still have the security of the vehicles and the don't get too far away from them syndromes to worry about. I'm not saying never, merely that it's situation dependent and one is probably advised not to try to create an either / or rule.
    Helicopters do provide potentially better mobility, however, unless you are advocating for decentralized helicopter distribution (which does not work very well either)
    Didn't say helicopters, said aircraft; MV22, C27, others. Oh it works very well, it just isn't terribly efficient -- the question is which is important, efficiency or effectiveness?
    they have problems as well. They are very expensive to operate, take a great deal of advance planning the way they are currently set up, and have vulnerabilities to MANPADS and planned ambushes. Like you say, METT-TC dictates.
    Yep -- and anyone who contemplates their use should consider your negatives in their planning.
    The core concept to the IMV is that it is NOT a “system of systems” and simply an affordable force multiplier if METT-TC dictates.
    I agree; IF. Big word, that...
    Historically, since they have been shown to be the most likely to be utilized, the easiest and most affordable to operate, since they do not require a unique skill set as helicopters and IFVs do, why not make them organic? This means the operators will in-fact have infantry skills. Don’t need them, don’t use them. Need them, and if they are not available, that’s were situations like Somalia and the 2-5 CAV QRF rescue attempt in Sadr City occur.
    First, I'd say the 'historical' resord is brief and unclear. Second, depends on how much you want to pay for something you may not need. Or may not do all you think it will do. Can't comment on either Somalia or Sadr City, wasn't there. Found out a long time ago that expounding on actions one was not in was foolish -- commenting on actions one was in can even bring conflicting views from others who saw different things.
    One more question.. you state
    ""Track drivers were poorly trained, tactically speaking ... They will still suffer the fact that they have no loyalty to the unit being transported -- and that does make a difference; a big difference.""
    But then you state
    ""A Mech platoon at company level or a mech company at Bn level is, IMO, an invitation to trouble because, as many point out, Mech and Inf are two entirely different doctrines. Added complication at Bn and below is best avoided.""
    IFVs are aggressive fighting vehicles, so why is the first quote be relevant to them?
    It isn't, the first quote was relevant only to the "put the infantry in carriers of some sort and operated by dedicated crews that are not a part of the transported unit" method. The second applied to Mech units with organic vehicles.
    They are designed to get in and mix it up with the enemy. If you do not want to lose the cohesion and training for infantry platoons, then you have to separate the IFVs (and the unique skill sets required to operate them well) and the Infantry squads.
    Strongly disagree, the carrier of whatever type (and, if any, its weapons) and from where ever becomes part of the tactical operation; they and the dismounts have to train and, when possible, rehearse, together.
    Even if they stay in the platoon, the manning can’t come out of the individual squads, or else you are never capable of dismounting an effective infantry squad/platoon, period.
    Yep.
    So the question is, what is your suggestion to reduce the infantry manpower and skill drain in the Mech units? Having the troops rotate between light and heavy outfits is a good start but it only addresses part of the issue. What else is there? You have been around for a variety of concepts, what works best in your eyes?
    Dismounted and mounted infantry are two different animals and they have many interchangeable or transportable skills but different mindsets pertaining to operating techniques. Mech is mechanized and foot infantry isn't; three versus 30 clicks an hour; aggressively attacking versus letting the weapons do the work; bypass, regas and haul ass; lot of differences.
    ALL infantry is walking infantry since they require essentially the same skill set and there job starts once they "dismount".
    Yes and no. Many skills do transfer but all do not. The mindset does not transfer. Quite simply, in my experience foot infantry is more aggressive and less risk averse than mech infantry. Mech Infantry is needed and has many advantages not least the mobility and the firepower and log support to troops supplied by the vehicles -- but those troops are tied to those vehicles. One can argue about the length of that tie but it is always and emphatically there. Size of the vehicle is usually going to limit the number of dismounts; five (the current norm, all things considered) per track gives you about 20-25 per mech platoon versus about 35-40 for a fairly full rifle platoon. That slight edge in strength give the foot guys more wiggle room and better ability to absorb casualties or other losses and still get a job done.

    For a whole lot of reasons, I disagreed with the decision to do away with the 11M MOS. IMO that was done not because there was a recognition that there were not two discrete types of infantry in the US army but to make Infantry OSUT cheaper by single tracking and giving the Per Squirrels the ability to transfer square pegs to round holes at will. The mentality is, as I said, different...

    As far as I'm concerned, Mech Infantry should be Armored Infantry and, while if I were King, I'd do away with Branches all together, if we have to have branches, the Heavy divisions ought to be Armor pure, including the foot combat dismounts.
    All Infantry needs to be able to utilize IFVs, IMVs and aircraft if the TA-DA! METT-TC determines them to be valuable. The ability to dismount and fight effectivly are determined more by..TA-DA again! training, training and training.
    P.S. Do I get my toaster yet?
    No -- but drop the IFVs out and that last paragraph got you closer...
    Last edited by Ken White; 08-22-2008 at 09:50 PM. Reason: Typos

  4. #84
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    As far as I'm concerned, Mech Infantry should be Armored Infantry and, while if I were King, I'd do away with Branches all together, if we have to have branches, the Heavy divisions ought to be Armor pure, including the foot combat dismounts.No -- but drop the IFVs out and that last paragraph got you closer...
    So does this mean the the medieval and ancient distinction of "heavy infantry" and "light infantry".

    If so, this does have considerable merit. We'd have
    "light infantry" with effective protected mobility to enable their light infantry mission - IMVs.
    "heavy infantry" optimised to operate with armour formations.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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  5. #85
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Only a slight modification...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    So does this mean the the medieval and ancient distinction of "heavy infantry" and "light infantry".
    That would work but being a traditionalist (when it suits... ) I'd go for Infantry (period) and Dragoons.
    If so, this does have considerable merit. We'd have
    "light infantry" with effective protected mobility to enable their light infantry mission - IMVs. "heavy infantry" optimised to operate with armour formations.
    Change to:

    Infantry, primarily foot mobile but able to quickly adapt to air or vehicle (including IMV) operations as the mission requires. Dragoons, primarily mounted in vehicles but prepared to dismount to provide close in protection for Armored formations and to provide limited range dismounted action on infantry like missions (added: ) as a component of Armored forces. The Armored force may be mounted in wheeled or tracked vehicles; the defining factor being their training and equipment aimed at highly mobile and predominantly mounted combat.

    Armor also needs mounted engineer / pioneer types, specifically trained for the mission. I'm still searching for a name. Neither Drappers nor Sagoons seems to work very well...
    Last edited by Ken White; 08-23-2008 at 05:23 PM. Reason: Noted addendum

  6. #86
    Council Member Mark O'Neill's Avatar
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    Thumbs down As a Sapper I can tell you

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Armor also needs mounted engineer / pioneer types, specifically trained for the mission. I'm still searching for a name. Neither Drappers nor Sagoons seems to work very well...
    that you are spot on with that observation! Ken, please don't do us anymore favours with 'new' names, we are happy enough with the one we have.

  7. #87
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Spot on with the mission

    or with the fact that my names don't work well???

    ArmorSaps would not be good, huh?

    Sigh, no one appreciates the artistry in my soul...

    (Ken exits stage left to seek solace in the glass...)

  8. #88
    Council Member Tom Odom's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    or with the fact that my names don't work well???

    ArmorSaps would not be good, huh?

    Sigh, no one appreciates the artistry in my soul...

    (Ken exits stage left to seek solace in the glass...)
    Arsssaps?

  9. #89
    Council Member Mark O'Neill's Avatar
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    Wink Now you are just being silly .....really

    I am not sure that changing the name would help the infantry or cavalry anyway - they are quite used to yelling out 'Follow the Sapper...." when things need to get moving.

  10. #90
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Touche,

    Mate, touché...

  11. #91
    Council Member 82redleg's Avatar
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    Default 3 Kinds of Infantry

    In the July-August 1985 issue of Infantry, COL (then) Huba Wass de Czege wrote an article describing the necesity for 3 kinds of infantry - he called them armored, regular and light.

    Armored infantry's "primary mission is to support the advance of the tank." He concluded that the M2 Bradley equipped mechanized infantry (as then organized in the US Army) met this requirement well.

    Light infantry is "specialized for rapid air transportability, clandestine insertion, very rugged terrain, night operations, infiltrations, raids, and ambushes."

    Regular infantry, the force in between these forces, supporting tanks at the operational level, but supported by tanks at the tactical level.

    He identifies a trend to skip the regular infantry, and push all infantry toward either light or armored.

    In the Sep-Oct 1986 issue of Infantry, in an article titled "More on Infantry", he expands on this idea more, describing a void in the middle. It seems to me that this void is exactly the void that has been discussed in this thread- criticizing both light and armored infantry organizations for their weaknesses at regular infantry tasks. In this article, he identifies the "motorized" infantry of the 9th ID as "a 'light' variant of the regular infantry". SBCTs- which I see as a modern type of the regular infantry- seem popular in this thread.

    On another interesting note, in the 1986 article, he discusses organizing "modular" division headquarters with the capability to C2 different types of brigades that are logistically self-sufficient and tied directly into the COSCOM logistics chain. This seems very like the current BCT structure.
    Last edited by Jedburgh; 09-09-2008 at 02:25 PM. Reason: Added links - AKO log-in required.

  12. #92
    Council Member sullygoarmy's Avatar
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    I am coming in late to this discussion but will add my $.02 worth. I started out as a light infantry officer with the 82d and eventually became an Armor officer in 1ID. Bottom line: it was all about trying to achieve a balance. In the 82d, I had a commander in the delta company (AT HMMWVS) that refused to get out of his truck and did not his 11Hs getting out their trucks...stupid but that was his take on how to conduct mounted operations. Not smart, not effective but his. Of course as soon as he was out of eyeshot, the NCOs kicked out a guy to recon up to IV lines, stash the trucks and conduct dismounted sweeps. See "Boot on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations" by John McGrath (OP 16 at CSI website) and so did the tankers of A/1-63 Armor. We added in dismounted road marches, patrolling, reflexive fire courses and urban (dismounted) operations to sharpen their skills. They were just as good as the infantry companies I was with in the 82d and great tankers to boot.

    While the authors of this study do have some valid points in terms of the amount of available troops to conduct dismounted patrolling in mechanized forces, I do not believe their theory is valid anymore. The majority of units, NCOs and Officers understand you need to get out of your vehicles in a COIN environment. The vehicles provide advantages: mobility, firepower, communications platform, supply point, etc be it a HMMWV, MRAP, Bradley or Abrams. It comes down to balance.

    Good leaders understand the need to achieve balance in both training and war. Training programs back in the states have to emphasize both sides of the mechanized world: maneuver and dismounted operations. It is the same in combat. GEN Petraeus' quote "You cannot commute to COIN" is a perfect example. You do have to commute sometimes. Even the COPs smack dab in the middle of towns and neighborhoods require some sort of vehicular support for resupply, casevac, and firepower. Once in the neighborhood, however, everyone from the Brits doing Imperial Policing, to your local law enforcement organizations realize you have to get out of the vehicle and meet the people. Leaders who understand this (and there are many...experience is a tough teacher) are the ones you see doing a better job of implenting this key tactic. In return, those units are the ones having the best success in making progress in the COIN realm.
    "But the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet withstanding, go out to meet it."

    -Thucydides

  13. #93
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 82redleg View Post
    Armored infantry's "primary mission is to support the advance of the tank." He concluded that the M2 Bradley equipped mechanized infantry (as then organized in the US Army) met this requirement well.
    That is doctrinally incorrect and illogical. Infantry are that component of the combined arms team that fights on foot. Protecting armour is not, and never should be their "primary mission."

    Light infantry is "specialized for rapid air transportability, clandestine insertion, very rugged terrain, night operations, infiltrations, raids, and ambushes."
    These are all things that any good infantry formation should be able to achieve. They are all issues merely associated with training, equipment and organisation. Again, fighting on foot is the key issue

    Regular infantry, the force in between these forces, supporting tanks at the operational level, but supported by tanks at the tactical level.
    I am fairly astounded by these pronouncements. Infantry are the most numerous, and most flexible element of the combined arms team. I am very much of the view that everyone exists to support the infantry as, only the infantry can deliver military capability in a spectrum of violence and across almost all terrain.

    I agree with HDV that there may be three types, in some minds. However for that construct to be valid we have to do some pretty poor reasoning and this is not what the reality should reflect.
    Last edited by William F. Owen; 09-09-2008 at 02:45 PM.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  14. #94
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Dragoons, Wilf, Dragoons...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    That is doctrinally incorrect and illogical. Infantry are that component of the combined arms team that fights on foot. Protecting armour is not, and never should be their "primary mission."
    Dragoons to the rescue!!!
    These are all things that any good infantry formation should be able to achieve. They are all issues merely associated with training, equipment and organisation. Again, fighting on foot is the key issue.
    Agreed. The 'light Infantry' (US version, which isn't really that light) is a semantic construction created in the 1970s to justify the slicing of TOEs to the bone to produce 12 (lighter) US Army Divisions from 8 (heavier). The result was nine man vs. the earlier and far better 11 man Squads and a structure unable to sustain itself.
    I am fairly astounded by these pronouncements. Infantry are the most numerous, and most flexible element of the combined arms team. I am very much of the view that everyone exists to support the infantry as, only the infantry can deliver military capability in a spectrum of violence and across almost all terrain.

    I agree with HDV that there may be three types, in some minds. However for that construct to be valid we have to do some pretty poor reasoning and this is not what the reality should reflect.
    Wass de Czege was justifying in salable form, the retention of a more robust Infantry Division without treading on the toes of either the Infantry School (who had earlier justified the 'light' foolishness) or the Armor School (Clank, clank -- but without giving them Dragoons... ).

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default Dragoons indeed

    Yes, Dragoons, but Dragoons still fought on foot, or should have done. They dismounted to shoot, but eventually became a form of Cavalry, but without real Cavalry missions. I fear the same has happened here.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Gotta solve the close in protection of Armor

    problem some way...

  17. #97
    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Default I'm not sure armour is the problem

    I think MBTs and infantry should be mutually supporting. Under most conditions neither has primacy. MICVs are a sort of chimera I am still trying to wrestle with. My first thought was "they work but they shouldn't". I know have a better of idea of how well they work, and what it actually costs the infantry to get there. MRAPs are actually the object lesson in this regard. They are APCs.

    Where is sit right now, is that the man getting out of a M2 should not be an infantryman, and the M2 should be an M3. Same goes for UK Warrior but that's another can of worms.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

  18. #98
    Council Member reed11b's Avatar
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    Default I think I speak Wilfese

    Ken,
    That means Wilf more or less agrees w/ you btw, as do I. However, Infantry still have a role in "mechanized warefare" so "dragoons" are still only part of the answer. Infantry is still the job that is done when dismounted, regardless of the mode of transportation, so this "light, Medium, Heavy, Pink or cyborg types" of infantry is silly and defeats good training and interoperability.
    Reed

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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Default Questions for Lyall/Wilson

    Some issues with Dr. Lyall's/LTC Wilson's thesis:

    Theory:

    1) Given the changes in regime types, international order, information distribution, public goods, and international laws over the same time period (1918+), why do you think Mechanization is the causative factor of declining COIN performance?

    2) What was the rationale of counting settlements as losses? If they are coded as wins, does the data result change? What was the criteria of defining a win/loss/draw?

    3) Why would a foraging army, taking goods from the populace, gain cooperation from the same? If you steal my stuff, I'm certainly not giving you intel willingly, unless you suggest coercive methods are used. Why do foragers obtain better information, as you suggest? Or are you suggesting mechanization also reduces use of coercive intelligence gathering?

    4) Are certain COIN tactics used in the 19th Century still usable today? The campaigns against the Native American tribes were extremely successful COIN, but certainly the methods used are taboo in the 20th century. Does this affect your argument?

    5) Is a better determinant of mechanization's effect on a force the assessment of the opponent it will likely fight? If one has a largely mechanized force, he envisions fighting a similar enemy in decisive battle. Therefore doctrine and training align against the most dangerous threat, which is usually conventional. Therefore heavily mechanized armies are less likely to study/practice for COIN. This is far more plausible than foraging/logistics as an explanation for any declining COIN performance associated with vehicles.

    Case Study:

    1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?

    2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?

    3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.

    4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?

    5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division? (Think COL Steele)

    6) What are the policy implications of your paper? How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?

    7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?

    8) How does the counterguerrilla performance of 11ACR in Vietnam align with your argument?

    Just a few of the issues raised in our response, which I can send PM to those interested but not publish yet.
    Last edited by Cavguy; 08-26-2009 at 02:03 AM.
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  20. #100
    Council Member jkm_101_fso's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post

    Case Study:

    1) If General Petraeus commanded the 4th ID and General Odierno the 101st in OIF1, would each division's performance have been the same?
    No. Petraeus had it pretty much right in '03. Odierno had to learn.

    2) Why are officers, identically educated and often assigned between light and heavy units during careers, allegedly worse at COIN when paired with vehicles in OIF?
    We all used vehicles in OIF...some units used different types. There were failures in light and heavy units. I'd attribute it to leadership and their inability/unwillingness to learn or change.

    3) How do you explain the major COIN success of 3d ACR in Tal Afar (2005), the most mechanized unit of its size in the Army? What about 1/1 AD in Ramadi (2006-2007)? There are more examples, but these are the most striking.
    Leadership, innovation and many more reasons

    4) How does the performance of the light 82d Airborne in OIF 1 contrast with the 101st AA, and the performance of 4th ID with the similarly configured 1AD in 2003-2004? What about the performance of later mechanized formations?
    Can't speak for any except 101. From my very small foxhole, Petraeus made his intent to the BDE/BN commanders very clear. As far as I know, we had no "rogue" BNs or BDEs doing their own thing. Everyone seem to be on the same page as far as security and stability ops (what we called it then)

    5) Why did some units of the 101st turn in a mediocre to poor COIN performance during 2005/2006? What changed in 2004-2005 that so altered the COIN ability of this division?
    Lack of Div Cdr's guidance, IMO. I don't really know any other explaination. But the 101 Div HQ was in 3 BCT AO. I was in 1/101, in the AO adjacent (east) of 3rd BCT, but we seemed to be doing things far different (not that we were much more effective). They were probably too aggressive, we probably weren't enough. I could go on and on...

    6) How should the Army configure its units for COIN? Should Armor be reduced or eliminated from the battlefield?
    Has anyone tossed out the idea of specifically training BCTs for COIN? Officers and NCOs could "bounce back and forth" between COIN and HIC units maybe. I don't know...just a thought.

    Armor should not be eliminated, nor reduced. It's a mode of transportation, like a Humvee or MRAP, but with different capabilities. The people in them are the same as any other unit.

    7) Are mechanized units more or less able to adapt to an insurgent environment than light units? Why? What recent performance data bears this out?
    No. Both types of units have had successes and failures. Performance in a COIN environment is about 90% leadership, as I mentioned.
    Sir, what the hell are we doing?

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