Originally Posted by Ken White
Good God, no. Transfering SF back to the regualar Army will only hamstring us. There is a huge difference in mind-set. No good can come from putting us back under big Army control.
SFC W
Great Idea, Long Overdue
Bad Idea, Another Useless Command Structure
Good God, no. Transfering SF back to the regualar Army will only hamstring us. There is a huge difference in mind-set. No good can come from putting us back under big Army control.
SFC W
That will never happen! However, don't kid yourselves when you look at who answers to who in our current theaters of war. If you pay attention, you will see the JSOTF's answering to the conventional commanders on the ground and I won't get into the CAS and trans reliance on the conventional forces as well in each theater. It's a little muddy in the water when you think about UW, but then again what is UW and who is really doing it right now? It's the same debate I hear about FID, who really conducts it and who doesn't? If I go on patrol with ANA or IA, is that FID? What if they're turds and I don't trust them as far as I can throw them? Am I conducting FID? I have seen PowerPoint slides that say 'yes' this is FID, so this debate will rage on like a case of farts after a chili cook-off and smell just as bad. Personally, I think UW is a great concept and in its purest form you saw 5th SFG do it during the earliest days of OEF, but the shame there was the conventional guys didn't have the slighest CONOP on Afghanistan, so when they rushed into theater to do the hand-off to take C2 of the war they were less than prepared.
PT
With caveat
OK, I'll join the chorus but with a caveat. There are times when reorganization actually does provide a solution to a problem. The only way to fix DOD in the 1980s was something like Goldwater-Nichols (full name, the DOD Reorganization Act of 1986). Incidentally, it was supplemented by the Cohen-Nunn Amendment that created USSOCOM and ASD/SO-LIC which also was a real problem solver. That said, it was the implementation by the first CINCSOC, GEN Jim Lindsay, that really resolved the problems the new organization was meant to address. Lindsay conceived of a Joint Mission Analysis process that served to get the regional CINCs behind him and defined SOCOM's mission. A better solution to the current problem than another reorganization might well be a Linsay like initiative to revisit the Joint Mission analysis for SOCOM. Do it honestly and take its findings to heart.
Cheers
JohnT
Heh. Thought that might get some attention...
Having been there in another lifetime when the Groups did work for big Army, it isn't that bad.
Parochialism exists today and the fact that you guys work for SOCOM possibly exacerbates the friction on the ground more than it would if you were all working for the same Commander...
There will always be conflict between the plodders and the hot-shots. Those, terms, by the way are not pejorative and not accurate but are merely hyperbolic usage to illustrate the perceptions of some people in each grouping.
That conflict is as old as warfare and is probably not going to go away.
Recall also that I -- and I know I'm not alone in this thought -- have bemoaned the fact that SF as a branch has eliminated to a too great extent the movement of Officers between big Army and the Groups. Both have suffered from that loss.
In any event, it's unlikely to happen.
Just in case, though, I'm using my chemistry set and am working on a Non Parochial Just Get the Job Done pill to be called Nopajugjodone...
Hey Ken will
it have one of those cool commercials like Cialis and Viagra? Or will it just have a tag that says..."continued use could make you more effective.... however if you turn purple for more then 2 missions see your branch rep for an assignment to the Pentagon"Just in case, though, I'm using my chemistry set and am working on a Non Parochial Just Get the Job Done pill to be called Nopajugjodone...
Best regards, Rob
I'll have to get back to you on that. My people
are talking to Bob Dole's people...it have one of those cool commercials like Cialis and Viagra? Or will it just have a tag that says..."continued use could make you more effective.... however if you turn purple for more then 2 missions see your branch rep for an assignment to the Pentagon"
Best regards, Rob
On the side effects, the one you cite is a problem; the solution is to lengthen WesPac tours, expand Thule and reopen Several compounds up north in Korea...
Then use Jack Singlaub's solution to the Pentagon problem.
Oh, How I remember
my first WestPac- it was 1986 and my world was different- and for that matter so was I
Best, Rob
Thought I better clarify something
I hope everyone understands that was a harken back to days gone by (and a soldier's compliment) - while from what I know of Stan through SWC - I'd trade 100 guys for 10 Stans in any fight somebody was sending me to - I'd be a bit wary of accompanying Stan to say Pataya Beach, Thailand - I could see myself getting into trouble real fast - and having allot of explaining to do when I got backyep that would do it - if I sound off anymore Dave or Bill will accuse me of sounding like Stan
Stan I think (from what I know of him through the site & the guys I know like him) is the guy you want next to you when somebody drops you off alone in some #### hole with 1000 lbs of the wrong stuff, and clock is ticking away while people who don't much like you are figuring out ways to make life miserable or end it. He will make his own luck, procure those things you need, find people who you can work with, provide the most common sense answers that have somehow eluded you, and keep you alive so the mission gets done. He is a professional, tactically and technically competent SNCO - he keeps us straight and focused.
But going on liberty/R&R - he'll also know where all the ladies and alcohol are at!
God bless Stan and all those like him!
I will state up-front that I fall into the group-think crowd in the belief that creating yet another separate command just for UW would be a bad idea. However, I figured that I would throw this older NPS thesis into the mix:
Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare, Jun 04
Complete 129 page document at the link.Our “Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare” argues for the establishment of a new branch of military service called the Department of Strategic Services. The single mission for this new branch of service would be the conduct of Unconventional Warfare (UW). The thesis statement is: Unconventional Warfare is a viable tool for achieving national security objectives under certain circumstances. There are two hypotheses. Hypothesis One states that in order for UW to be effective it must be managed in accordance with specific principles. Hypothesis Two states that, to optimize UW, a new branch of service under the Department of Defense is required.
The first part of this study thoroughly deals with the concept of UW. Chapter II establishes the strategic requirement and lays the foundation of our argument by explaining the differences between UW and conventional warfare. Chapter III explains the requirements for dealing with substate conflicts. The salient point is that substate conflicts are essentially local conflicts. Therefore, intimate “microclimate” knowledge of a given local level environment is necessary for proper solutions to be applied. Chapter IV is essentially the heart of this study. In it we articulate our operational construct for UW, which revolves around an indigenous-based force used to provide security at the local level in order for the US to gain influence in a targeted population. A UW Model is offered to support this operational construct.
In the second half of this thesis we build our case for the creation of a new UW branch. Chapter V analyzes policy directives given to the DoD by civilian leadership, military doctrine, and schooling. In sum, these reveal a conventional military aversion to the use of UW. Chapter VI includes a comparative case study analysis of US Special Forces efforts in the Vietnam War and El Salvador. The conceptual discussion in Chapters I thru IV supported by the research and analysis of Chapters V and VI together make up “A Bold Case for UW”.
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