Unconventional Warfare Command?

[SWJED]

Support Grows for Standing up an Unconventional Warfare Command - Sean Naylor, Armed Forces Journal.

An idea that wouldn't die may be getting a new lease on life. Despite years of the idea being shot down at the highest levels, there are again growing calls from inside and outside the military for the establishment of an "unconventional warfare command" that would oversee those special operations forces whose primary mission is not killing and capturing the enemy.

Recent leadership changes in Congress, the Defense Department and U.S. Special Operations Command have given supporters of the idea fresh hope that the PowerPoint slides might finally become reality.

At the core of the debate are the Army's Special Forces, who specialize in working "by, with and through" indigenous forces. They have long complained that they play second fiddle in U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) to those units that specialize in direct action, i.e. missions focused on capturing or killing enemies. SOCom gives direct-action units, particularly those that fall under Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), priority in resourcing, and it is from those units that most of SOCom's leadership is drawn, they say. Only by the creation of an unconventional warfare command will the special ops units that emphasize indirect action get a fair shake on the battlefield and inside the bureaucracy, their argument goes...

[Stan]

Let those soldiers do their job, unimpeded.

The SOCs and JSOCs are working, but not to full potential.

Why do we tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing ? Back in 2004, DTIC thought we had a gap to bridge between operations and command. That never really went anywhere, but years later, we're back on the carousel.

Seems we're back at stashing all our special toys in one box, under one command, and no joy.

We don't need to reorganize, just fine tune and get off the micro management stool.

[redbullets]

Seems to me, this should remain SOCOM's job, and should be command-directed and resourced accordingly. DHS is still getting itself sorted out how many years after its creation? Creating new commands or cabinet-level departments is not the solution. Providing resources and command emphasis to those already tasked is, or should be.

Cheers,

[TROUFION]

Creating a new command structure is a waste of time. The issue lies within the force providers, the Services as force providers decide what forces to create and source. If you want UW capability that is effective you dont need new command lines you need dedicated forces, that comes from the Services. This will not happen unless the Pres and SECDEF say do it. ( I am not advocating any changes just pointing out whay a new COMMAND would be a waste of resources). Think of the wasted manpower: a new command = a 4 star, and several thousand staffers UGLYwaste of manpower in a time when manpower is already strained.

[Rob Thornton]

It seems to me that it would be one of those "solutions" that avoids the real problems, and only complicates making real headway in addressing the threats we face. It would just add more layers of misplaced bureaucracy and CMD structure. Useful change has to come from evolving our existing institutions and having better understanding of the world and how it effects us; our enemies and how they attempt to deter/injure/destroy us; and the objectives that protect our vital interests, and our allies or who share common interests and goals.
Regards, Rob

[Ken White]

Let SOCOM do the DA bit, transfer the the SF groups back to the Army proper and move on. That is a worse idea for a separate command than even SOCOM.

If they just gotta stand up a new Joint command, do it with a Medical Command -- that's dumb but with only one 'b'b and it won't do nearly as much damage as as a UWCom -- which anyway would sound too much like EuCom and confuse the media even more than their normal state...

Come to think of, it if we really want to improve things, we should try the Singlaub apparoach to DoD.

[tolsen]

Why not create a service specifically for "Counter-Insurgencies" and generally mixed military-police roles (overseas ONLY of course)? Maybe something that is roughly to the army what the Coast Guard is to the Navy.

The biggest problem I see is the opposition from the established services - no one wants to give up their "turf".

[Abu Suleyman]

Why not create a service specifically for "Counter-Insurgencies" and generally mixed military-police roles (overseas ONLY of course)? Maybe something that is roughly to the army what the Coast Guard is to the Navy.

The biggest problem I see is the opposition from the established services - no one wants to give up their "turf".

That was actually proposed a while back, and I believe that the Italian Carabinieri were held up as an example as a successful model. Of course the turf war would be a problem, but I think that even bigger and issue would be budgeting. Who would front it, and then where would the leaders come from? Would you simply start from scratch, or would you take from all the services?