How to Think, Not What to Think at Leavenworth

[Rob Thornton]

However, are their future raters ready for independent thinkers who are "raised" to collaborate instead of directing military planning and operations?

I think so. More and more I'm coming into contact with COLs and BGs and MGs whose thoughts have been influenced by OEF and OIF. War has provided the means to examine our leadership and decision making unlike any well resourced training event could ever do. I think in fact that these leaders will come to expect and rely upon the type of junior leaders we've developed over the last 4 years. As more and more leaders ascend to more senior positions they will look for those qualities which help organizations adapt and overcome adversity in the most complex/interactive and changing conditions. I think the greater conditions which gave rise to these positive changes are going to be with us for awhile. These leaders understand that in order to get the most out of people and prevail in the environments we'll operate in they are going to have to decentralize authority to make decisions and empower lower echelons with resources.

I think we unerstand better then we have in a long time that leadership in war entails a certain ammount of risk - and as long as that risk is undertaken with moral and ethical underpinnings, and good common sense as a foundation, it should be supported. Things will not always turn out sunny, but its a process - and even the absolute best decisions that could be made will not always produce optimum results under those conditions. However, good leadership can often produce results where all obvious indications pointed to the probability of failure.

So while a leader who accepts risk may make a decision that creates a temporary setback, we want leaders will only see it as such and figure out a way to achieve the objective. To get there we have to support the type of leaders we've identified we want to build. It takes time, and those leaders are shaped by both command and staff positions - in fact they will spend the preponderance of their career on staff - then one day they will take on BDE or 2, 3 and 4 star commands and have to make decisions that will have long lasting implications.

Best Regards, Rob

[Eden]

It has always amazed me that an institution that produces so many bright, innovative young officers was so incapable of actually brightly innovating. That is, until I passed from my life as a 'regimental' officer to work at higher levels. Then I discovered that it is virtually impossible to bring bright ideas - of which we had rucksacks full - to the attention of decision makers.

The fundamental problem is that leaders are far too busy. Therefore, their immediate staffs make sure that their time is never wasted. The typical chief of staff would count as time wasted presenting the commander any idea that - in the judgment of the chief - the commander would reject or disapprove. Therefore the bright, young thinker has a huge numbers of hoops to jump through before his idea can reach the ear of the decision maker. In the process, the idea is chopped, graded, returned for editing, and all nuance and depth stripped away. If it gets through, it is no longer innovative or bright or very different from the staus quo.

As an example, the typical planner in, say, Afghanistan, has at least three and possibly four levels of bureaucracy to get through before he can lay his scheme before the commander. At every level he will hear how the commander won't like this, has already rejected that, doesn't want to hear the other. After a while, most bright, young thinkers just start censoring themselves.

SO the problem is not our military education system. We do teach critical thinking; we do stress the importance of independent thought, and we do so with a great deal of skill. We educate our officers to be thinkers; the problem is we train them to be groupthinkers.

I agree with the previous post, however. Things will get better when today's generation of majors and captains become generals, but not before.

[JeffC]

As an example, the typical planner in, say, Afghanistan, has at least three and possibly four levels of bureaucracy to get through before he can lay his scheme before the commander. At every level he will hear how the commander won't like this, has already rejected that, doesn't want to hear the other. After a while, most bright, young thinkers just start censoring themselves.

SO the problem is not our military education system. We do teach critical thinking; we do stress the importance of independent thought, and we do so with a great deal of skill. We educate our officers to be thinkers; the problem is we train them to be groupthinkers.

I agree with the previous post, however. Things will get better when today's generation of majors and captains become generals, but not before.

The above example (1st paragraph) is what I've referred to as Poisoning the Well. It is how bureaucracy slowly kills creativity and innovation; whether that bureaucracy is in place in a military institution or at Microsoft.

I hope that you're right about a generational change making a difference, but I suspect that you're not. At Microsoft, for example, many people hope that things will change when Ray Ozzie takes over from Bill Gates in 2008, but Ozzie has said privately that the prevailing culture changes slowly, even incrementally. In my opinion, these big institutions need to take a page out of IBM's book from the 90's, and splinter themselves into smaller, more agile groups.

[120mm]

Today, we discussed the two articles I earlier linked. During our discussion, we learned how to teach "collaborative learners", but only so far as to not interfere with the calcified, written in stone ELOs and TLOs, which are holy and sacrosanct. When I inquired why the students couldn't determine their own ELOs and TLOs, it was met with blank, uncomprehending stares, and snickers behind hands.

Oh, well. The frickin' Army can masturbate, fantasizing that they actually teach creativity and "collaborative learning" while killing any possibility of ILE being anything but a hoop you must jump through in order to become yet one more drone LTC, who will produce 100+ page powerpoint presentations and mindless crap.

In my opinion, you can teach using Andragogy/Collaborative Learning or lecture your students on how to jump through the hoop. You cannot do both. The harder I look at it, the more I'm convinced it's just bull####.

[Rob Thornton]

Today, we discussed the two articles I earlier linked. During our discussion, we learned how to teach "collaborative learners", but only so far as to not interfere with the calcified, written in stone ELOs and TLOs, which are holy and sacrosanct. When I inquired why the students couldn't determine their own ELOs and TLOs, it was met with blank, uncomprehending stares, and snickers behind hands.

Might just be the instructor and group dynamics out here at ILE Belvoir - but we've been given allot of flexibility - maybe we just take it - so far the folks that have dropped in from LVN have all been pretty happy (although at first they looked both disturbed and concerned) - the staff ride was pretty much student run and the quality of discourse is very good. ELOs & TLOs are introduced and I'd say met, but the real value comes from the interaction in the classroom vs. the readings (which provide a vehicle to jump from) or say the writing assignments (which give you the chance to think a bit more on a subject). I'd say I feel like I got my $$$ worth - but then I'd have to bring up the issues with DFAS - and that since I've pretty much paid my own way through they might use my satisfaction with the course to justify never reimbursing me: The piece I did on non-linearity for the SWJ Blog got picked up on by my History guy - and he said it met the requirement for his paper - as a result I was able to spend more time thinking about other stuff.
Best, Rob

[selil]

It is interesting that the Army is just going down this path. Two years ago I worked on a DOD/NSF grant to build Androgogy into curriculum for the USAF. If you look at the Eric database there is a substantial amount of work that has been done on the topic of adult learners. The term "androgogy" has been dropped in favor of pedogogy due to the prevalence of the literature but it I've noticed a slight resurgence. There are substantial cognitive learning differences between adults and children. Since most educational learning grants are towards science, technology, engineering and math (STEM) for K-12 the learning methods and styles for children then get applied to adults.

When you look at adult learners they have built up "filters" and information is not accepted totally until it is demonstrated. Adult learners have different objectives than children and thus are motivated differently. Much of the early learning of the military isn't actually learning but indoctrination (think boot camp). Sure knowledge, skills, and abilities are instructed and assessed, but comprehension, application, and transferrence of knowledge is not taught or assessed. The structure of most military lessons is very behavioristic and less in the idea of collaborative or cognitivly sound.

Part of the reason I think the military does it their way is becuase it is their way and as a cultural abstract the methods show the actual goals. The military really doesn't want a lot of privates "thinking" about the role and needs of the mission. They want specific reaction to tasking.

Collaborative learning is not self teaching. The general concern is that the outcomes based model (EBO?) of education results in general knowledge but not specific skills. Basically that is malarkey. Scenario based collaborative learning using structured and sustainable learning models are very Socratic method of learning. More importantly though you build KSA's you also get retention and secondary aspects of communication and esprit de corps from the students.

You might be interested in the fact that the University systems are moving to learning communities. In the military you call them cadre. Moving entire groups through from beginning to completion having the students live together, study together, and work together. This is a form of of secondary level collaborative learning that is excellent. The classroom collaborative learning is accomplished in some tasks like table top excercises and such that the military does. But, when you look at a private learning to field strip a rifle and clean it people drop back into the it is just done this way... Really? Why? Hand the private and his partner an already broke down rifle and let them figure it out like a puzzle. Now hand them an M60 (pick your genre machine gun) and let them figure it out. Go back over the weapons and clear up any cognitive disconnects. Reinforce the lessons through instruction. Make them do the first excercise with a sense of urgency (failure is an option). Repeat with basic weapons systems as needed. The result is a better all encompassing and deeper knowledge of how weapons systems work rather than "click, rap, tap, pull, bang, snap".

[Ski]

I remember talking with a former OSD official about doctrinal devlopment in the Vietnam War - specifically about A1 Skyraiders and close air support. He said there was no doctrine on how to use A1's in CAS roles, and that the pilots literally wrote down TTP's on how to employ the aircraft in notebooks.

The bigger problem is the bureaucracy that disseminates the new doctrines from lessons learned in theater.

It has improved with the Internet and sites like Company Commander.com - the bureaucracy has been somewhat isolated by the speed of the electons. When doctrine finally does get written, it is at a strategic level. FM 3.0 has been rewritten how many times in the last decade? War moves faster than the bureaucracy - OODA loops come into play here.

Innovation is almost impossible for "action officers" at the two-four star level. The 3 Star HQ I work at has six layers of decision making before being finalized, and one the effects I have seen from this is that a culture of "management by crisis" occurs because the senior leaders are so busy that they have to focus on the issue at hand. In addition, the powerpoint culture has signifcantly poisoned the military because action officers are now required to take exceeding complex problems and issues and "bulletize" the problems for the GO's. You simply don't get into the depth required in most cases. The most important issues are the ones that come out of the blue (the Black Swan theory) or ones that have a turnaround time of days or weeks.

The other major problem is one of organization. The branch I work in would be best served by having cross-pollination from smart people from plans, logisitics, training, personnel and medical, yet we do not organize to fight. We organize on Uptonian prinicples, where there is a strict heirarchy and defined left and right limits. The complexity of today's issues - in many cases - requires a new organization of staff elements that is a polar opposite of how the organization actually works. I've also learned that the most dangerous (that's a compliment) person is someone who has worked in two different divisions for a period of time and can talk intelligently about these two different subjects - but also can synthesize a new way forward...

The problem there is that the personnel systems do not allow people to stay in a job for more than 18-24 months at a time. The system defeats itself.

[Ken White]

all of it.

We're not going to change until we start training people correctly and trusting them to do their jobs; the Viet Nam syndrome is still with us...

"Train as you will fight" and "Foster Initiative" are two very important lessons we've learned over the years -- and which we routinely body slam and ignore in peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945...

I've lately been adding "Ban Power Point" to my long standing mantra, "Destroy the Hoffman Building." Those two things are a major part of the problem; the Senior Leaders and the Per community both really need to take a long hard look internally...

[Norfolk]

We're not going to change until we start training people correctly and trusting them to do their jobs; the Viet Nam syndrome is still with us...

"Train as you will fight" and "Foster Initiative" are two very important lessons we've learned over the years -- and which we routinely body slam and ignore in peacetime -- and the US Army has been at peace since 1945...

And the pseudo-business/corporate individual careerist culture that predominates at high levels has got to go in order to make that happen, otherwise it never will.

[Rob Thornton]

I'd agree with part of what you said - ref. the realization that a short term stock investment / business model type thinking stands opposed to how war really plays out - ex. in military operations there is often a real reason why you need more resources available to exploit a success or to react to the unexpected and mitigate the effects - we are not a "for profit organization" in that regard, so we should not try and act like one.

I don't know if I agree with the categorization of the culture as a whole - and I know I don't agree with it in regards to the uniformed side. Does it exist - yes, always has - and at every level - the "me first above all others", but I think its by far the exception not the rule. It may be more common in the political appointee side - I don't know, because I've only actually met one of them - and he came across as OK. If it is the case, it probably is partially due to ignorance of why what we do is different then the back ground they came from - I'd be interested to hear Ken's take - I know he's seen many come and go over a diverse number of administrations.

I pulled this from a friend's ILE question regarding COBRA II - I think it does two things - one, consider what we are discussing in ILE, and two to talk about how our culture is different from a "business culture"

The Epilogue of Cobra II starts with a quote from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in response to the lessons of the Iraq War. Secretary Rumsfeld answers, “I think if I had to pull out one lesson that we’ve learned over the past four or five years, it would be that in the twenty-first century we’re going to have to stop thinking about things, numbers of things, and mass, and think also and maybe even first about speed and agility and precision.”

That the former SECDEF would draw this as "the" lesson kind of amazes me. I would think it would be much more strategic and far less tactical - something along the lines on the consequences, responsibilities of using military force and how the use of military force changes the dynamics of the political problem and opens up a broad range of possibilities which might cause more harm then good.

The interaction and discourse surrounding each chapter of COBRA II was typical for our Small Group. Nor was that the highlight of the course - I believe we spent half a day discussing LTC Yingling's article, and the various responses. Everyday, something comes up for debate. The PE type exercises have also been largely good - the current one poses a series of unique problems all at once that require making tough choices and accepting risk in a very tough geographical neighborhood. The freedom to do all of that came out of the institution's recognition, desire and commitment to meet evolving challenges with better leaders. The institutions flexibility and authority to do so had to come from some where as well. I'll say I've met some incredible peers both here and in BSAP and the DA instructors have allowed us to challenge not only them and the materials, but each other and ourselves. Part of an opportunity is what you make of it.

It will be up to us to educate the political appointees why war is different. I'd agree that the tone they set is of critical importance - look what a difference SEC Gates has made. The decision of who becomes the SEC DEF is a political one and reflects allot about the CDR in Chief's priorities at a given time. Again, I'd say that more and more people in the upper echelons of the total Army (AC & RC) have OIF, OEF, CJTF HOA, Philippines or some combination of all. The last AWC class was cited as having better then 75%. Many have a good understanding of Homeland type missions, many more are educated and many more are thinking about how to fix things. A small indicator (we need to keep ourselves in perspective) of this is SWC and other Knowledge forum memberships and patronage.

I'd agree about the dangers of .PPT. I think like many other useful things - it cuts both ways and has an addictive quality. It lends itself to loss of context - particularly when it leaves the immediate possession of those who did the thinking behind the content to go before somebody else making a decision - hence the saying "his knowledge is only .ppt deep." Even the written word is often distilled into a 1-2 pg written point paper. Leaders get bombarded with a variety of glass balls - that somebody believes is the end all be all (and to them it might be). This is true at every level of command - the first time I really realized it was when I went to my BN CDR with a new problem he needed to know about and I realized for every important problem I had, he had 5 (A,B,C, HHC, and the EN CO).

One of the best things I ever heard was attributed to a GO who said he only did those things which only he could do. I was unsure what he meant at first, but then I understood it was a question of prioritizing those things which came his way, because his day also had only 24 hours. This works well with something I recently read from Field Marshall Slim who said (paraphrased) "Its essential that a leader have some leisure time and sleep if he's going to make sound decisions" he was laying out how his day looked even when as CDR of the 14th Army during the early phases of its Kohima/Imphal defense - he knew what was coming and that he'd have to run a marathon not a sprint.

I understand exactly what Ski is saying - I've been around commands that reflected that type of culture. I think the only thing that fixes that is leadership at the top which empowers subordinates to make decisions and demands they do the same with their subordinates. I don't think organizational fixes as a final solution work - only because if you get a leader who wants to subvert an organizational structure, they can - especially if they have the authority to do so. A leader who encourages flexibility and adaptability though fosters an atmosphere where parallel planning occurs, and organizations are free to adapt their organizational structure to the task/problem at hand - no cookie cutters.

Ski's solution:

The branch I work in would be best served by having cross-pollination from smart people from plans, logisitics, training, personnel and medical, yet we do not organize to fight.

is exactly what should be encouraged. It comes down to a leader being willing to trust his subordinates (particularly in a big HQs or Organization) to organize as needed to meet the challenges - which would allow him (or her) to think about things that are further out and make decisions only they can truly make.

Best Regards, Rob

[Norfolk]

Some very good points you made Rob.

My essential perception of the problem revolves around the way each officer and enlisted man is considered in the US Army personnel system - first and foremost as an individual, and with a career (or the prospect for one) that tends to trump group matters. For example, a US Army officer or even soldier does not permanently belong to a Regiment or a Battalion (or as in the German system, a Division); instead, his career advancement track often takes precedence over the needs of his Unit (or Formation) - resulting in an artificially high turnover rate in each unit that hampers training. And this coupled to personnel system that refuses to provide even four full months of basic trade training to its ordinary infantrymen (and that includes specialization training - machine gunner, mortarman, anti-tank gunner, etc.), whereas every other Army in the English-speaking world (as well as a few others) provide not less than six months of basic trade training (and not including any specialization training, just riflemen training).

It comes as no surprise then that there are officers like Major Vandergriff who have been pointing out these very serious impediments to the fighting capability of the US Army, and he is strident in pointing out that the chief obstacle to this is the Army personnel system that effectively treats each officer and soldier as an individual the needs of whose career often come before Unit requirements; regardless of whether the officer or soldier in question is a professional or a "careerist", the system treats them all as "careerists" whether they are in their hearts or not. When, as in the one case he commented on in one of his pieces, a 3-Star General told him that the US Army didn't need to have high training standards because Firepower ensured victory, then how is that sort of resistance to real change for the better overcome? Vandergriff has written extensively on the need for a true Regimental-based system to replace the Individual-based system. I've also noticed that CGSC papers rarely even touch on this subject; but people like Vandergriff find themselves writing about it on the outside.

And I even have the .PPT presentation.

http://belisarius.com/modern_busines...NoCohesion.ppt

[Ken White]

Couple of minor thoughts.

From Rob:

"The Epilogue of Cobra II starts with a quote from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in response to the lessons of the Iraq War. Secretary Rumsfeld answers, “I think if I had to pull out one lesson that we’ve learned over the past four or five years, it would be that in the twenty-first century we’re going to have to stop thinking about things, numbers of things, and mass, and think also and maybe even first about speed and agility and precision.”

To which Rob said:

That the former SECDEF would draw this as "the" lesson kind of amazes me. I would think it would be much more strategic and far less tactical - something along the lines on the consequences, responsibilities of using military force and how the use of military force changes the dynamics of the political problem and opens up a broad range of possibilities which might cause more harm then good.

Consider that his job as SecDef was the application of force and the methodologies thereunto pertaining. The calculations you cite are properly those of State, the NSC, the Intel Community and the President. Does the SecDef get an input? Sure -- but he's only one of many and his real job is insuring the force is capable of the application. SecDefs rarely have much military experience, the military aspects of the thought processes you mention are, I believe, the province of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Combatant Commander involved.

Who's to say Rumsfeld was not thinking and talking strategically? Seriously. He after all was one of those early on who was calling for metrics and may well have come to realize the fallacy of that approach. I do not read it as a tactical suggestion but as a total spectrum; tactical, operational and strategic question. Seems to me that it is applicable to all...

For Norfolk:

Vandergriff has some good ideas and he mostly makes sense -- but he's trying to sell a top down solution and that will not work unless he gets a charismatic champion for Chief of Staff, Army. He needs a Shy Meyer II and I don't see any out there. He should reorient his pitch and convince a slew of Colonels who might make some of that happen in a few years...

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken, Good points - and always worthwhile to consider the possibilities, and in many cases to give a benefit of the doubt.

Maybe its just the way he thinks - but it was the focus on speed, agility and precision piece - that seems limited to getting there vs. what to do afterwards that stuck with me. In the list of assumptions that went up to the President - who provided the context that was supposed to go with them - the one that sticks out is that DoS would come in afterwards. If you have appointed an exceedingly strong SECDEF (particularly given the budget and influence the DoD has) - then it potentially sets up an imbalance. I don't know that you'd have ever heard Secretary Rumsfeld calling for a bigger budget for DoS and other agencies. It kind of goes with the his insistence of a the issuance of a National Defense Strategy, the micromanagement of certain things, the comment he reportedly made to Secretary Gates on his way out, etc. I respect anybody who has had to walk in those shoes - but I think when the influence goes beyond what might be the expectations of that authority, then the additional responsibility is incumbent.

I think personality matters - from somebody who'd led differently in their tenure as SecDef - I might have taken the emphasis as part of a broader lesson.

I think your exactly right about how it should work. The CJCS should be talking to President as an independent voice. I think the Geographic COCOM should be working with and through the JCS, as well as talking to the President and SECDEF - little use for egos when so much depends on everyone working together and sharing a common appreciation for the gravity of going to war. I think we had a case where things were not as they should be, and I don't believe it to have been accidental - I think we are much closer to what you described now - it seems in balance.

As always, thanks for making me think!
Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Norfolk - I see where you were going now - let me sleep on that one - its getting late
Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...
Maybe its just the way he thinks - but it was the focus on speed, agility and precision piece - that seems limited to getting there vs. what to do afterwards that stuck with me...

Or an acknowledgment that our massive bureaucracy concentrates on the wrong items and isn't flexible enough or accurate enough in its assessments...

... I don't know that you'd have ever heard Secretary Rumsfeld calling for a bigger budget for DoS and other agencies...

Do we know he didn't?

It kind of goes with the his insistence of a the issuance of a National Defense Strategy, the micromanagement of certain things...

Yeah, he was a bad micromanager, still the National Defense Strategy (flawed it was, but it's the thought that counts...) was long overdue. In fairness, once he got burned for troop strength and a couple of other things, he backed off the micro management and did some good things at DoD that needed doing; things that were in his lane.

I worked for all of the SecDefs except the very first one and the last three. Rumsfeld is in the middle of the pack, nobody was as bad as Louis Johnson or as good as Melvin Laird. I didn't see any leadership from any of them though most did their jobs reasonably well.

I think your exactly right about how it should work. The CJCS should be talking to President as an independent voice. I think the Geographic COCOM should be working with and through the JCS, as well as talking to the President and SECDEF - little use for egos when so much depends on everyone working together and sharing a common appreciation for the gravity of going to war. I think we had a case where things were not as they should be, and I don't believe it to have been accidental - I think we are much closer to what you described now - it seems in balance.

Big flaw in Goldwater-Nichols (well, there are several but one of the biggest) is that only the Chairman is tabbed to advise the Prez and if he's not knowledgeable about ground combat (as is the case with the two of the last three)...

And then, if the geographic CinC is also not too knowledgeable...

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken,
I don't want to get this thread too far off track - however, it still fits though because these are exactly the types of conversations that have been discussed in my ILE Small Group everyday for the last 11 weeks. CIV-MIL relations has been a reoccurring theme because it impacts us at so many levels, because it has touched the audience - about the same % of our SG - maybe 75% have gone to OIF/OEF and because of the satellite campus here at Belvoir is Functional Area representative (the core POI is the same as Leavenworth though) and in the NCR.

I don't think all of what Secretary Rumsfeld did was bad - shortly after he left a list was published with what DoD got done under his watch - it was significant. My criticism is partly due to the manner I believe in which accomplished it. I think I have to qualify it though by saying I've never met the former Secretary - and as such -its anecdotal - but you have to have some manner to consider the actions of people be it the results of their decisions, the content of the evidence left behind, the reports of other people, etc. just to even talk about how those events might have occurred, and how conditions in which they occurred came about. Your right though - you have to be careful when doing so because of personal and public bias.

I have spoken to quite a few uniformed folks who either had direct contact at one time or another, or were in the next set of tiers - so his personality touched them indirectly. I think also with the responsibility for what goes right, a leader also receives credit for at least those large decisions which create systemic conditions that go bad. The difference I think occurs when leaders make a decision that results in a bad consequence, but they learn from it and change course in the future - that acknowledges that bad things will occasionally happen, but also that leader can recognize the short and long term consequences and make changes to correct the mistake and address the problem. If they can't do this, then problems become compounded and it effects the nature of the organization and its culture they have been appointed to lead.

About the CJCS and Geographic CINC not being ground guys - well - you make a strong argument, and the process should not be a rotating one based on service equal opportunity. However, if the leader selected for the position was selected on the basis of the character of the person, his demonstrated attributes, ability to think about the scope of their responsibilities in a manner consistent with them, and an ability to foster a team who is balanced and complete - I think much of what their foundation might be missing can be mitigated. I agree though, that it'd be hard to overcome ingrained, subliminal biases built up over years over service in something else besides a ground service. I'd have to admit the possibility though that a leader can get beyond it, and that while the qualities of that person might not be optimal, if they possess sufficient character to overcome shortfalls, while also possessing other qualities which weighed in their favor during selection - it may work out better then if someone had been selected solely on the basis of the service they grew up in. I suppose the same can be said for anyone "selected" to do a job - and in that regard the qualities of the person doing the selection and the basis for that selection are almost as important as those of the selected.

As you say though - seems like some of the shortfalls could be mitigated if GN had called for better representation across the JCS.

Best, Rob

[John T. Fishel]

Guys, the 7 post G-N CJCS were:
1. Navy - Crowe
2. Army - Powell
3. Army - Shali
4. Army - Shelton
5. Air Force - Myers
6. Marines - Pace
7. Navy - Mullen
The VJCS, by law, is different service. In the longer view, since 1986 four of the CJCS have been ground force guys. For 14 of the last 21 years the CJCS has been a ground guy. Final note: there was an article I read a while back (wish I could remember the author and title) that pointed out that at the highest levels of decision making, people at least partly shed their organizational identities and interact as individuals. It's a point that can be developed from Graham Allison's Essence of Decision.

Cheers

JohnT

[Rob Thornton]

John,
Good info. I had not seen you around on the Council for awhile - good to hear from you
Best, Rob

[Ski]

One other issue that should be addressed is what I call "information addiction."

It's the concept that leadership two and three levels (if not higher) above you have a unusual desire to know the absolute last details about everything. It's micromanagement, but it's micromanagement that has become addictive because no one wants to look bad...by simply not having the answer to a question.

It's maddening. Goes back to lack of trust.

[Eden]

I think 'info addiction' stems from three sources.

1. We train officers in the western tradition of rational analysis (and indeed they learn the same from civil schooling). One of the tenets of this is to gather as much information as possible; the more information one has, the better your analysis will be, and your decision making will be of a higher quality. Generals make important decision, so in one sense they are only doing their duty by attempting to extract as much information as possible from the staff.

2. The modern staff has its origins in the 19th century realization that wars were too big and complex for the general to gather the info he needed by riding around on a horse. The staff, in part, was designed to gather and funnel hard-to-come-by information to the general so he can make high-quality decisions.

3. Some generals are smart, some are not; some are personable, some are not; some get it, some don't. What they all have in common is skill at getting promoted. And one of the primary rules to live by is 'never get blindsided.' By definition, you only get blindsided by things you didn't know, so the more you know, the less chance your boss will blindside you.

Now, why 'info addiction' is so dysfunctional:

1. The info well is now effectively bottomless. There is always more info to be gathered, so the motivated general is limited only by time. Thus the staff expends more effort for additional information that only brings diminishing returns.

2. Staffs need to be 'info filters' nowadays, not 'info funnels'. Staff officers have to be trusted agents who can decide what the general needs to know and what he does not need to know in order to make decisions. By forcing them to be funnels, they are conditioned not to fulfill this role.

3. Generals are highly motivated and usually competent. To ask them not to address problems that they have all the tools to solve is to expect them to deny human nature. This is why the intelligent staff officer today will conceal problems from the boss - not because he's embarrassed, but simply because he doesn't want the boss' help.

As somebody who can remember offices that had ashtrays but no computers, I find the whole issue fascinating.