An Asymmetric War of Ideas

[J Wolfsberger]

Steve,

Well, I think the bit at the end is best left for a different type of discussion board. I personally am a card-carrying, contributing member of the RNC who is also listed in the Heritage Foundation's database of conservative public policy experts and I think the Bush strategy has been a failure of tragic, historic proportion.

I'm in 100% agreement. I didn't amplify out of thinking it might be too inappopriate to this board (and being chicken).

But your analogy of the European religious wars is interesting. I looked at it from a different perspective, though. I kept thinking of the Bush strategy which says there is a "civil war" within Islam and we are going to shape this by "empowering the moderates." That would have been like the Turkish caliph lending his support to the Protestants in Europe. How much would that have helped them?

Again, I agree, and I think that was one among many serious flaws in the Bush admin's approach. Had we taken the approach that we were drawn into a religious war against our will, we'd be in much better shape to implement to type of IO advocated by Jim Guirard at TrueSpeak.

[Tom Odom]

Again, I agree, and I think that was one among many serious flaws in the Bush admin's approach. Had we taken the approach that we were drawn into a religious war against our will, we'd be in much better shape to implement to type of IO advocated by Jim Guirard at TrueSpeak.

But not in keeping with the evangelical mindest grafted on to the in your face behavior that was common in the 7th grade

ok gonna shut up now

Tom

[Rex Brynen]

I think one needs to be careful in distinguishing between the ideology of militant Islamist leaderships, and the sometimes rather different issues and ideas that motivate a great many of their followers and supporters.

In Lebanon and Palestine, very, very few of those who voted for Hizbullah or Hamas bought into the notion of establishing a global Caliphate (indeed, in my experience even many Hamas cadres don't). Rather, they are motivated by nationalist (or, in Lebanon, sectarian and even class) factors, as well as immediate political grievances—to the point that both parties play down their Islamist ideologies at election time.

In Iraq, we know that most of the people who have been shooting at coalition forces are angry Muslims, but not militant Islamists (although the conflict may push them in that direction).

In Afghanistan, the largest share of the Taliban support base very localist, even parochial Pashtun tribes who don't like lots of (non-Muslim) foreigners, and are deeply suspicious of the Karzai government.

These are all sets of grievances that have been mobilized in the past by a broad array of ideological messages, from Arab nationalism (in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq), communism (among some in Iraq and Lebanon), the nationalist new left (ditto), or tribalism (notably in Afghanistan).

Given this, even if one could "defeat" leadership ideology, it would leave many of the subgrievances intact.

What contemporary jihadist groups have done, however, is to project a message of devotion and success, with AQ having set the "gold standard" on 9/11, and Iraq having done almost equal damage in terms of sending a signal of (perceived) American weakness and Islamist success to proto-supporters.

There is a parallel with the Cold War here too--the successes of the USSR in the developing world had a lot to do with a combination of anti-colonialism, legacies of past Western involvement, social inequality and underdevelopment, the benefits offered, and the apparent success of the USSR (in the 1960s and 70s at least) as challenger. While there were many third world socialists, I'm not sure many outside Indochina really bought into the core ideas of the Moscow (or Beijing) communist model.

Ironically, I think in the long term it would have served our cause better if we had landed in Afghanistan and crushed the existing AQ infrastructure, but left the Taliban in control. Then we would have actually had an instance of an "Islamic" state to show to any Muslims attracted by the idea.

..although Saudi Arabia, Iran, and (at times) Sudan, could also make claims to being an "islamic state" and that hasn't made much difference. Moreover, Afghanistan is generally considered such a peripheral backwater of the Muslim world that (Pakistani Pashtuns aside), very few Muslims pay it much attention unless it has Soviet or US troops in it..

[SteveMetz]

In Lebanon and Palestine, very, very few of those who voted for Hizbullah or Hamas bought into the notion of establishing a global Caliphate (indeed, in my experience even many Hamas cadres don't).

Of course. But if you'd ask them if they'd like to see a unified Islam, I suspect most would say yes.

These are all sets of grievances that have been mobilized in the past by a broad array of ideological messages, from Arab nationalism (in Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq), communism (among some in Iraq and Lebanon), the nationalist new left (ditto), or tribalism (notably in Afghanistan).

What makes the jihadist ideology powerful is that it is able to point to these motivations and say, "See--you tried all those things and where did it get you?"

..although Saudi Arabia, Iran, and (at times) Sudan, could also make claims to being an "islamic state" and that hasn't made much difference. Moreover, Afghanistan is generally considered such a peripheral backwater of the Muslim world that (Pakistani Pashtuns aside), very few Muslims pay it much attention unless it has Soviet or US troops in it..

The jihadists say most conclusively that those were not, in fact, true Islamic states. AQ in particular said that Afghanistan was the only one.

[Rex Brynen]

Of course. But if you'd ask them if they'd like to see a unified Islam, I suspect most would say yes.

Among supporters/voters? Preferring a single Muslim umma (in which they would become a small minority)? No, I don't think so at all.

Among cadres? Its harder to tell, but many of the Hamas cadres that I've spoken too are rather more nationalistic than pan-Islamic.

What makes the jihadist ideology powerful is that it is able to point to these motivations and say, "See--you tried all those things and where did it get you?"

Absolutely agreed. But there's an interesting parallel here with radical Arab nationalism, which at its heyday in the Middle East in the 1960s was as popular (roughly) as Islamist groups are today. Radical pan-Arabism didn't decline because it lost a war of ideas in the grand sense--on the contrary, many in the region would still regard its ideas as positive and progressive, and profoundly rooted in history and ethnic self-identity Rather, it lost its appeal because of its failure to deliver on a range of issues: the conflict with Israel, economic development, empowering the marginalized, etc., coupled with the practical realities and benefits of state citizenship (and hence pull of localized identities).

I'm not suggesting that ideas aren't important--I think they absolutely are, and indeed I think as a result that has been a very real COIN cost to the US being seen to lose moral high ground on issues ranginging from Abu Ghraib and Gitmo to ME democratization. I am suggesting (I suppose--I'm trying to sort through my ideas as I post!) that its important to think of the OPFOR here as a coalition, not a formation, linked by diverse grievances and not simply the appeal of an overarching vision of the future. The danger of the "asymetric war of ideas" formulation is it may unitentionally obscure some of this, and hence obscure potential vulnerabilities among radical Islamist groups.

(On a side note, I'm not a fan of using "jihadist" for these groups, given the positive connotations of the term in both Arabic and Islam--I think "takfiri" (accusers of apostasy) works far better, since it highlights the willingness of such groups to kill Muslims, an enormously controversial issue among their potential supporters. Otherwise "militant" or "radical Islamists," which I think is relatively neutral and accurate. It sounds like you've had this conversation before, however, so I won't bother *lol*)

[goesh]

So few are setting the stage for so many to dance on and they have every intention of keeping us proactively on the plane of the mundane and material.