Israel's raid on Syria: Prelude to a nuke crisis?

[LawVol]

http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=21426

Although some may argue this falls outside the realm of small wars, I think there may be a nexus. Here are some questions I have:

1) What would the impact of an attack be on the pro-democracy forces within Iran?

2) What effect would it have on our current small wars efforts, especially Iraq? In particular, how would it effect the usefulness of our air assets?

3) I'm not familiar with Iran's conventional power, but assuming it is better than Saddam's army (i.e. it will fight), do we face a hybrid or protean war? In other words, could Iran combine its conventional forces and tactics with its use of hezbollah and other terrorist-type forces to fight the war?

Is it possible that after being attacked, Iran launches rockets and missles (conventional and/or chemical) into Israel, US bases in Iraq/Afghanistan, and other regional US allies? As this is occuring, could not Hezbollah then attack into northern Israel while Quds forces infiltrate more heavily into Iraq? Could not these forces also infiltrate or activate in the US and/or Europe? If so, could we not be fighting a conventional war while simultaneously fighting a small one at various places in the world?

[Rex Brynen]

Assuming that the Israelis really did hit an important, nuclear-related target... (They may have. They may not have. They may have thought they did, but didn't. They may even have been doing something else. based on what is available open-source, it is still not clear whether to file this one under "Osirak" or "al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant, Sudan" or something in between)

http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=21426
1) What would the impact of an attack be on the pro-democracy forces within Iran?

My sense--reinforced by talking with pro-democracy students and some members of the reformist camp in Tehran --is that it would further marginalize them by spurring a considerable "rally around the flag" effect.

2) What effect would it have on our current small wars efforts, especially Iraq? In particular, how would it effect the usefulness of our air assets?

There are two effects to be considered here: the extent to which a conflict with Iran would bleed away resources needed in Iraq, and the extent to which it would complicate the political and military environment within Iraq itself. The two are linked, of course.

I'll leave others to address how much CAS capability might be diverted to Iran (or flying CAPs over Iraq, post-strike).

I do think the Iranians would step up their efforts to complicate the US position in Iraq by several orders of magnitude, even at the risk of destabilizing the (friendly) Maliki government. A US strike would convince Tehran that the removal of US combat forces from Iraq (and Afghanistan) was a vital, overriding national interest--their Cuban Missile Crisis, as it were.

3) I'm not familiar with Iran's conventional power, but assuming it is better than Saddam's army (i.e. it will fight), do we face a hybrid or protean war? In other words, could Iran combine its conventional forces and tactics with its use of hezbollah and other terrorist-type forces to fight the war?

Yes, it will fight, although its massively out-classed. I do hope no one is thinking of inserting conventional ground forces in Iran, however.

Is it possible that after being attacked, Iran launches rockets and missles (conventional and/or chemical) into Israel, US bases in Iraq/Afghanistan, and other regional US allies?

I think Iranian escalation to WMD use is unlikely, unless an attack against its nuclear facilities caused substantial radiological contamination. Conventional retalition is reasonably likely (much depends on the scope and duration of a US attack).

As this is occuring, could not Hezbollah then attack into northern Israel while Quds forces infiltrate more heavily into Iraq?

There's some debate on the former--it would do Hizbullah considerable political damage in Lebanon to be seen to be retaliating at Tehran's behest.. on the other hand, if a US strike were prolonged and very damaging (and targeted vital national assets such as refineries) Iranian pressure on its Lebanese ally to do something would be substantial. Certainly, IRGC activity in Iraq would increase dramatically.

Could not these forces also infiltrate or activate in the US and/or Europe? If so, could we not be fighting a conventional war while simultaneously fighting a small one at various places in the world?

There's a lot of debate over the capabilities of the Iranian MOIS and IRGC abroad, and the willingness to use those for retaliation. There's equal debate on the capabilities of Hizbullah's External Security Organization. It is all rather unclear.

[tequila]

1) What would the impact of an attack be on the pro-democracy forces within Iran?

Akbar Ganji is probably the best person to speak on this, given his place as the most famous and effective dissident inside Iran.

[goesh]

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,....world/mideast

"LONDON — A Syrian military installation rocked by an explosion in July was being used to develop chemical weapons, and Iranian engineers were among those killed, a respected defense publication reported Wednesday.

Jane's Defence Weekly said the blast hit the site of a joint Iranian/Syrian project to fit short-range ballistic missiles with chemical warheads"


http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,297732,00.html

"Israeli commandos seized nuclear material of North Korean origin during a daring raid on a secret military site in Syria before Israel bombed it this month, according to Sunday Times report citing informed sources in Washington and Jerusalem.

The attack was launched with American approval on September 6 after Washington was shown evidence the material was nuclear related, the well-placed sources say."

[georgev]

DEBKAfile Exclusive: Damascus states willingness for early talks with Washington on Golan and “other issues,” denies Israeli attack targeted a Syrian nuclear reactor

October 24, 2007, 11:18 PM (GMT+02:00)

Syria’s openness to dialogue with the United States, according to one statement, covers unspecified “other issues’ related to Israel as well as Lebanon and Iraq.

In a second statement issued Wednesday night, Oct. 24, Damascus denied American media disclosures Wednesday that a nuclear reactor was the target of the Israeli attack near the Syrian Desert village of A-Tibnah on Sept. 6.

The Syrian statements, delivered by Dr. Fawzi Shueiebi, over Syrian state television, cited DEBKAfile and DEBKA-Net-Weekly as primary sources for Syrian policy-making on these issues.

DEBKAfile’s military sources report now that the media disclosures Wednesday in the United States confirm the revelation in DNW 320 of Oct. 5 that Damascus was setting up an installation for making “dirty bombs.”

DNW 321 first reported Washington’s intention to start a dialogue with Damascus on Oct. 12.

[davidbfpo]

This source is of questionable value. I gave up reading it when they reported sometime ago OBL was moving to Iraq! Even Israelis caution as to citing it.

davidbfpo

[goesh]

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satelli...cle%2FShowFull

Oct 25, 2007 0:56 | Updated Oct 25, 2007 5:00
US to speed up stealth fighter delivery

""We asked that for every two jets manufactured for the US, one be manufactured for Israel," a senior defense official said, adding that acquisition of the aircraft would greatly increase Israel's deterrence as Iran races toward nuclear power.
"This plane can fly into downtown Teheran without anyone even knowing about it since it can't be detected on radar," the official said. "

If it is duck-like, it maybe is:

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,304800,00.html


Report: Satellite Images Show Syrian Facility Resembling N. Korean Nuke Reactor
Wednesday, October 24, 2007

I'm trying to track down the source/rumor that is reporting IAF bombed an experimental greenhouse where Palestinian women were working to develop a hybrid olive that is capable of producing tons of olives from a single tree.

[bourbon]

Related Links:

ISIS Imagery Brief: Suspect Reactor Construction Site in Eastern Syria: The Site of the September 6 Israeli Raid? by David Albright and Paul Brannan. INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, October 24, 2007 (PDF)

Phantoms Over Syria: Eveything Israel wants you to know about its secret airstrike, by Philip Giraldi. The American Conservative, October 22, 2007.

[Rex Brynen]

This source is of questionable value. I gave up reading it when they reported sometime ago OBL was moving to Iraq! Even Israelis caution as to citing it.

Yep, agreed.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 24 Oct 07:

The Israeli “Nuclear Reactor Strike” and SyrianWeapons of Mass Destruction: A Background Analysis

The circumstances surrounding an Israeli strike on what may have been a Syrian nuclear reactor are still unclear. It is not yet certain that Syria was building a reactor, and if it were, what capacity it would have for producing fissile material, when it might have produced enough material for a weapon, and how Syria planned to deploy any nuclear capability it developed. Major questions remain about the level of North Korean support Syria did or did not receive, and about the level of Syrian-Iranian cooperation if any.

There are, however, several things that are clear about Syria’s position, and that put any Syrian nuclear efforts in context. In brief:

- Syria has fallen far behind Israel in conventional capability and has no practical chance of catching up.

- Syrian capabilities for asymmetric warfare, and the its ability to use allies like the Hezbollah, can irritate or provoke Israel, but not defeat it or deter it from using its massive supremacy in long-range precision strike capability.

- Syrian chemical and possible biological capabilities do not give it a meaningful deterrent to Israel, do not rival Israel’s status as a nuclear power, and might do more to justify an Israeli use of nuclear weapons in retaliation than achieve strategic benefits.

- The Syrian air force is approaching obsolescence as a force. Although Syria has some “modern aircraft,” it lacks the mix of airborne and groundbased sensor and battle management assets, the mix of munitions, IS&R assets, and sortie sustainability it needs to compete. It faces de facto air supremacy from the Israeli air force.

- Missiles are Syria’s only way of striking at Israel with some confidence of success, but Syria still faces steadily more effective Israeli ballistic missile defenses, plus Israeli ability to target and destroy Syria’s larger missile systems with Israel’s precision strike assets.

Seen from this perspective, a Syrian effort to achieve a “break out” by covertly developing nuclear weapons has a kind of logic.....

Complete 24 page paper at the link.


By the way, Debkafile falls into the same category as WorldNetDaily, the Northeast Intelligence Network and The Enquirer. In the main, it is piled high with steaming crap. At best, it is extremely unreliable as a source. Yet, if you're willing to spend the time trawling through their muck, there are occasionally leads to be gleaned that can be followed to useful information. But you are far better served by the vast spectrum of consistently reliable sources openly available rather than wasting time with their nonsense.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 19 Nov 07: Iran, Israel and Nuclear War: An Illustrative Scenario Analysis

The attached briefing provides the material used in a scenario analysis and interactive game that looks at some of the consequences of a future nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran, and the possible impact of its expansion to cover targets in Syria, Egypt, and the Gulf.

There is no way to predict the forces each side will have in the future, or how they might target those forces and use them in war. It does seem clear, however, that both sides would probably be forced to target the other's population centers in any scenario that escalated beyond an initial demonstrative strike.

It also seems likely that such a conflict would quickly become existential in the sense that both sides would seek to inflict the maximum possible casualties on its opponent, and to destroy its ability to recover as a nation.

The analysis indicates that Israeli might have the near to mid-term advantage in such a struggle, at least in terms of the ability to inflict more damage on the Persian ethnic population and economy of Iran. Iran is much larger than Israel, but its population is heavily urbanized and extremely vulnerable to boosted and thermonuclear weapons.

This advantage seems likely to continue until Iran obtained boosted or thermonuclear weapons. The outcome would be so costly to both sides, however, any such advantage would little or no practical value. It is unclear that either nation could reconstitute itself on anything like a prewar basis, if at all.

Complete 77 slide presentation in a pdf file at the link.