I read a lot of the posts on the SWC, even if I don't comment, and I read each SWJ. All I can say is that I am grateful someone from State has come forward and written an excellent work that I think breaks down some of the visions of grandeur and provides a commonsense way ahead.
I knew this already, but what a great reminder that not everyone you come across in COIN has a potential for true impact.Knowing who is a real player can only be known by being familiar with the personal histories of local personalities and a thorough knowledge of the province and its history. Look for non-verbal cues as to who is a real player. Look for these signs: people stand up when the person enters the room, they kiss his hand or cheek in a sign of respect, they give him a seat at the front of the room, people in the room don’t talk when he does. These and other clues will give you the information you need to make an assessment of whether you are talking with the real players.
Even better, visit the units that recently returned from your future area of operations. You'll be better able to assimilate true understanding vs. just knowledge, when you meet with the leadership face-to-face.Locate the website of the military unit you’ll be working with and print off all of their press releases, reports home, and biographies of the major leaders. Seek out the websites of military units that have previously worked in your area; while information will be dated it is still quite useful because you need to understand as much of what has happened before you arrive because the locals certainly will.
Don't forget the venerable AK-47. Are you always going to find yourself out and about with only coalition troops? What about indigenous security forces...are they playing a role in movement security?Also make a point of getting weapons qualified. If you can’t do it before you arrive in Afghanistan or Iraq, do it when you get there. At minimum, learn how to use the pistol and the M-4 rifle and how to quickly load and unload them, clean them, and maintain them.
I have a slight disagreement with the thrust of this statement. Don't we want to (on the select occasions) to be seen as favoring one "side" in order influence our control over all sides? The resounding theme through much of this article reminds me of the NGO's greatest concern - achieving acceptance. I would argue that in a COIN environment, achieving acceptance doesn't mean you always have to be impartial and fair. The underlying goal is to drive the populace to believe it is their best interest to work with you. I recognize that the quote above is a generic guideline, but there are nuances that are critical to recognize.Be very careful about doing favors for people, especially at this early stage in your tour. People will always try to involve you in things that the PRT should rightfully not participate. Always be perceived as an honest broker who does not favor any one tribe, individual, or faction.
Be wary that lending an ear to these concerns actually subverts the authority and status of the "governor" and other officials.Local residents and members of the government will sometimes turn to you to complain about military operations, factional leaders will seek you out to complain about how the governor mistreats them, and members of the U.N. will want to talk with you because they want to have the U.S. Embassy’s support.
If Mr. Green would care to comment, what are we talking about in terms of a "political program"?Because you can operate easily between different units, you can help provide the crucial political leadership that is needed if you plan to initiate a political program that requires the synchronized efforts of a number of different players.
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