The Political Officer as a Counter-Insurgent (merged thread)

[DGreen]

I read a lot of the posts on the SWC, even if I don't comment, and I read each SWJ. All I can say is that I am grateful someone from State has come forward and written an excellent work that I think breaks down some of the visions of grandeur and provides a commonsense way ahead.



I knew this already, but what a great reminder that not everyone you come across in COIN has a potential for true impact.



Even better, visit the units that recently returned from your future area of operations. You'll be better able to assimilate true understanding vs. just knowledge, when you meet with the leadership face-to-face.



Don't forget the venerable AK-47. Are you always going to find yourself out and about with only coalition troops? What about indigenous security forces...are they playing a role in movement security?



I have a slight disagreement with the thrust of this statement. Don't we want to (on the select occasions) to be seen as favoring one "side" in order influence our control over all sides? The resounding theme through much of this article reminds me of the NGO's greatest concern - achieving acceptance. I would argue that in a COIN environment, achieving acceptance doesn't mean you always have to be impartial and fair. The underlying goal is to drive the populace to believe it is their best interest to work with you. I recognize that the quote above is a generic guideline, but there are nuances that are critical to recognize.



Be wary that lending an ear to these concerns actually subverts the authority and status of the "governor" and other officials.



If Mr. Green would care to comment, what are we talking about in terms of a "political program"?

Hi jcustis,

I'm glad you liked my essay. Of course, now that I see it in print I want to add a whole bunch more to it. I absolutely agree with you about the AK-47. Sometimes it's a whole lot easier to get your hands on an AK than getting an M-4 or M-9.

I am a strong advocate of rewarding your friends but my point in that part of the essay was simply to reinforce the idea that you take your time getting to know the lay of the land before you start to get the PRT involved in things. People will definitely take advantage of your lack of knowledge.

I think we should be perceived as impartial and fair even though we are working with the government authority of the area. In my situation, the governor had been appointed by the central government, versus being elected, and many tribes and individuals didn't like the man because he did not administer the government evenly across the province. I think we should support the government but recognize that it may lack efficacy and standing in the community because its leaders are corrupt, inefficient, repressive, etc. I think it's very important that other groups know they can talk with you even though you still support the government.

What I meant by political program is covered in the last appendix that we are working to get out. What I mean is a general political plan of attack on the governance, development, and reconstruction front in order to eliminate the population's grievances the insurgent feeds off of and to complement the security strategy. I realize that last sentence contains a lot of ideas but I largely go into that in the "Craft a Political Strategy and Make It Operationally Useful" section and in the appendices.

[jcustis]

Thanks for the reply Mr. Green. Great ideas all-around were in that document, so please keep 'em coming.

[Kingdaddy]

I added a pointer and a few words of praise here. As I say in the blog posting, it's important for a general audience to learn how different conventional and counterinsurgency warfare are, so I wouldn't recommend the article to specialists only.