High Value Target HVT / Political Assassination

[Rex Brynen]

When asked, during a seminar on the subject if he was aware if anyone had conducted a successful operation against a major target he simply said "Not Yet".

The Israelis have had significant success in assassinating significant Palestinian political-military figures. However, this is often bedeviled by the law of unintended consequences, as the Jerusalem Post piece that I started the thread off with suggests.

A case in point: While the assassination of Fateh #2 (and Western Sector commander, effectively PLO Defence Minister) Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) in Tunis in 1988 was regarded at the time as a major operational success, I'm sure they now wish he had been alive 1994-present, given his relatively dovish political views and his probable contribution to a more professional and effective Palestinian Authority security service. Abu Jihad's assassination also did nothing to stop the intifada then underway (although there were some other retaliatory and deterrent goals on the Israeli side that may have been better attained).

[Van]

law of unintended consequences

Yes, a.k.a. Chaos theory, Complexity theory, Fog of War, or Friction... But what real makes me cringe (and reach for the soapbox to stand on) is that most of these consquences are fairly forseable. Example: The (thankfully failed) C.I.A. efforts to kill Fidel Castro in the '60s - did they really want Raul Castro (as he was then, he seems to have mellowed a bit) running the show in Cuba? Did they assess the implications of a compromised operation? I'm pretty sure the answer is 'no' to both, but there is a serious issue with the degree of thought applied to the problem.

O.K. I'll move away from the soapbox.

On a more pragmatic note; the assassination of Yamamoto represents a near ideal case. A clean hit with strategicly trivial direct collateral damage, and little if any long term negative impact to U.S. interests... Unless you count the belief that we can repeat this miracle.