Killing top terrorists is not enough
An opinion piece by David Ignatius, in the WaPo two weeks ago and rediscovered today. Added as it refers to two academic articles that argue the tactic is not enough:http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio...99_story.html?
Only the first article is openly available, the 2014 article in International Security is behind a pay wall:http://informationcollective.org/wp-.../01/Jordan.pdf
davidbfpo
It's true when you attack a network it tends to get stronger, and it is also true that targeting is not a strategy. However, in lieu of a strategy targeting leaders was assumed to disrupt planned attacks (it has some cases) and gradually degrade an organization.Originally Posted by davidbfpo
We disagree on this point, but we are at war with these global Islamists, and we can't win it by occupying Muslim countries. It is apparent that the majority of moderate Muslims are not going to rise up and defeat these groups after years of the false hope of through, by, and with. There are simply too many issues ranging from fanatic hatred, corruption, Shi'a-Sunni split (which frankly may be to our advantage) for the West to come in with its political and economic tool kit to fix. I think our track record in this regard is around zero?
We look at historical parallels and assume these movements will burn themselves out in a few years, but of course we know that is an assumption that may be proven false. The threat they pose to the international order is not exaggerated, a number of states are the verge of failure, with Yemen being the most recent case. They have no intention of limiting their attacks to Muslim nations, so based on logistics it seems logical Europe will be next, then America. We'll react in ways that will change the international order in unpredictable ways. If we ever had an opportunity to build a new international order after the Cold War that would promote a more enduring peace, it seems that opportunity is slipping away, or in the worst case has slipped away.
The bottom line is we still haven't figured out to wage strategic level war against networks. GEN McCrystal mastered the operational approach for dismantling a network in Iraq, but think of what would be required (consensus wise) to do that globally? There is little will for most countries to fight until they are facing a serious threat. We need to do better of getting to the left of bang, and not waiting until a country's survival is in peril and reacting, and reacting narrowly within a state's borders.
Bill,
Within the approach taken by the West (a very general phrase) and its allies against the violent jihadists there has been IMHO no over-arching, agreed strategy beyond containment. Pursuing containment for the West and some allies has been guided by reducing the level of violence and fear, so that in time political and other opportunities can be pursued.
For complex reasons our politicians have been unable to identify opportunities, so they have depended on containment, alongside decapitation (HVT), a very heavy dose of military intervention and a pathetic ideological / information response (IIR). Officialdom, here I would refer mainly to the UK government, which insisted there was a coherent working IIR. Then along came the impact of Syria first, then lately ISIS and the flow of foreign fighters which has "pricked the balloon".
davidbfpo
I agree we haven't figured it out, nor do I have a strategy in mind to offer that would be acceptable to our perspective liberal governments. Our counter narrative has overly focused on the false belief everyone wants to be like us if they only had the chance. We're perplexed by the growing popularity of ISIS/ISIL when we use mirror analysis. I disagree with Bob's perspective that these movements can be countered by so-called legitimate governance alone. It all comes back to legitimate to who? The thousands of Muslims being murdered in the effected areas likely don't consider these jihadists legitimate.
I do think it takes a network to defeat a network, but not in the simplistic terms this phrase is often used. I also think we need to kill and capture at a higher than we have been doing. That means treating it like the war it is, and dismissing the failed attempt to display these terrorist networks on a chart, and then fool ourselves repeatedly by stating if we only remove these two or three nodes the network will collapse. That runs against the grain of the new American way of war where we still apply effects based operations to no discernible end. We also shoot ourselves in the foot when we promote Arab Springs in countries that quite simply are not ready for democracy. The governments in place admittedly are/were terrible and oppressive, but still better than the alternative. We need to help these societies prepare for democracy (assuming the ruling regimes will allow it, but in most cases it will be viewed as subversion) over time, and in the mean time find ways to convince these governments to govern better. I know it seems like, and may be, rainbows and unicorns, but our current approach isn't working.
Targeted killing: alternative views
Now awhile ago I reviewed William Matchett's book 'Secret Victory: The Intelligence War that beat the IRA' in a separate thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...y-intelligence
A "lurker" has pointed to an alternative view by Rory Finegan:Finegan's PhD is 4Mb (probably free to download) and there is a summary here:http://doras.dcu.ie/19724/This study has found that TKs over a prolonged period predicated on accurate intelligence had no discernible deterrent effect on PIRA; the desire for backlash was always inherent but negated by security forces measures; with regard to disruption, TKs as implemented in East Tyrone had a cumulative effect on the operational capability of PIRA; and finally in relation to diminishing capacity while PIRA initiated substitution equally under this pillar TKs caused a gradual but incremental decline in operational efficiency and effectiveness.
The author found in a case study focused on East Tyrone PIRA suggests that TKs however, should not be presented as an absolute proven solution in themselves to patterns of political violence. But when combined with other factors if utilised surgically and in a discrete manner they are a factor and therefore as a counterinsurgency tactic, their utility cannot be dismissed.
There is a second article 'Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970-1998' which is alas behind a pay-wall:https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full...3.2016.1155932
Copied from the Northern Ireland thread.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-07-2019 at 10:06 AM.
davidbfpo
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