Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[Ken White]

This is the title for a new article on Westmoreland and Vietnam by Army Historian Dale Andrade ... Andrade's bigger point is that if we as the United States Army aspire to be a learning organization, a good place to start is by understanding the past; specifically Vietnam and then move to a better understanding of the flawed lessons that we have dervived from that war along with myths in order to get at the truth.

Couldn't agree more with your premise. We certainly should eliminate the flawed lessons of Viet Nam -- however, we should also be very careful not to preselect the lessons we wish to learn -- or eliminate.

My sensing tends to coincide more with Steve Blair than with Andrade. Westmoreland was right -- to an extent. He was also wrong to an extent. IMO, he was more wrong than right, Andrade can differ as can you but there is little denying three salient facts:


- The primary Operational level of effort, COIN, was given only lip service from 1963 until late 1968.

- There were a number of flawed decisions by MACV during that period that ranged from placing the Marines in the wrong CTZ (as Steve pointed out) and the Army having to develop a Riverine capability to operate in 4 CTZ on the fly; the infusion program and the force protection measures that insisted on large unit operations and constant US Artillery cover (two things the VC and NVA quickly learned to exploit). Most of these and more sprang from the NW Europe mentality of Westmoreland and the MACV Staff that could not wrap itself around the flexibility required to confront an agile enemy * .

- The vast majority of contacts were initiated by the enemy, not by us and that is by any measure a significant operational and tactical failure. As that NVA Colonel told Harry Summers, not being whipped in battle was irrelevant.

It did not need to be that way and Westmoreland was in command. So, no, he wasn't right...

In any event, Afghanistan, Iraq and Viet Nam are three very different wars fought against three very different enemies in three very different sets of terrain in a different time and with different levels of troop training and capability. Few of the lessons of Viet Nam translate directly and we should be extremely careful of those we choose to adopt.

* An example of that is the statement recently made in a war game prep at Knox to an acquaintance by a senior person regarding reconnaissance; "We (Americans) don't have the patience to sneak and peek, we just mount up and go out looking for trouble and you have to have Armor to do that." I submit that worked in NW Europe at the tail end of WW II; it took the Remagen Bridge, for example, good job. It may work today in a European or even in some Iraqi settings. It did not work in Viet Nam and it does not work in Afghanistan.

[Steve Blair]

* An example of that is the statement recently made in a war game prep at Knox to an acquaintance by a senior person regarding reconnaissance; "We (Americans) don't have the patience to sneak and peek, we just mount up and go out looking for trouble and you have to have Armor to do that." I submit that worked in NW Europe at the tail end of WW II; it took the Remagen Bridge, for example, good job. It may work today in a European or even in some Iraqi settings. It did not work in Viet Nam and it does not work in Afghanistan.

This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia. The same goes for at least parts of his staff as well. SOG had the potential to deliver incredible intelligence, but it was often wasted by people who didn't have a good understanding of what they had. Not to mention the constant denial on many levels that the North was taking an active role in the South until late 1966 or so.

I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.

[Ken White]

This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia...

I saw the process repeated in a number of units that got good intel from their Recon and LRRP Units and then blithefully ignored it and put more dependence on SPAR info. Dumbbbb...

I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.

True; unfortunately we sort of fell into the same failure (the war we wanted...) post 1989...

[BRUZ_LEE]

...what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe).

Who would like to see that happen ? - At least nobody in Central Europe!

Concerning the failure in South Vietnam it is quite fruitless IMO to discuss the value of "Search & Destroy" missions or reports of SOG troopers about what's happening on remote jungle trails, when you try to back an incapable dictatorship government in S-Vietnam and simultaneously drop bombs on innocent civilians in N-Vietnam.
That's the wrong strategy and doomed to fail anyway.

[Rob Thornton]

Cavguy said:

My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

Ultimately the conditions will drive requirements, but I think Neil gets to the meat of it here, the two are dependent upon each other in ways that get beyond the number of attacks, and toward the rational for continued insurgency. It is a matter of art and decision. Figuring out what makes insurgency the most viable and attractive recourse in terms of what the real objectives are is key to sustainable security - but implementing it offers a different set of challenges.

Having said that, I think if the conditions are such that all the counter insurgent's activities are absorbed in physical security, then allocating resources to development might not be possible - even if the commander knows that is the requirement to get to long term sustainable security. It is event driven to a degree.

Each situation is likely to be different - Vietnam is not Iraq, nor are any two provinces or cities wholly alike. They are all driven by politics at a number of levels. While I do believe that History offers unique insights into the present and future, to get its full value we have to acknowledge its limitations. We can look back and recognize where there were seemingly non-linear outcomes, mistakes and vindications, but its hard to account for the number of potential outcomes that come through interaction as you look forward.

The two are different. Using History to draw useful observations about a past event to think about the future is one thing. Drawing conclusions and absolutes about the future based on historical events that are by nature frozen in time and no longer interactive is dangerous business, and offers to great an opportunity to inject bias.

Best, Rob

[Sargent]

Andrade's analysis is on point if the threat to South Vietnam came from without. North Vietnam certainly had its own agenda regarding unification. However, those plans would have gone the way of North Korea's had South Vietnam not had its own very serious internal problems, had there not been a serious disconnect between the government and the governed. Whether American counterinsurgency efforts could have changed this is unknown. However, it does make clear that however successful the conventional war could have been, it would not have been enough to secure South Vietnam as a viable, independent entity.

From this perspective, there is an interesting connection with Iraq -- there is often a temptation to conflate the foreign fighter problem with the bulk of the security issues in Iraq. But there are serious internal issues regarding relations between the localities and the central government. Even those Iraqis who are working to support the American effort are not entirely comfortable with the emerging model of a central government that controls more of daily life than has ever been the norm -- for example, even under Hussein Fallujah was pretty much left alone to run its own affairs. I would argue that this antipathy to the center is expressed in the black market activities in oil - while some amount of the theft is tied to supporting anti-government/American military activities, some is simply about building the strength of local actors. In any case, solving the foreign fighter problem is never going to pacify Iraq. The problems are within, and they are going to require a whole different set of answers - many of which exceed the capabilities of the military or the use of military force, either conventionally or in COIN.

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north.

Jill

[Ken White]

All good, but particularly these two:

"The problems are within, and they are going to require a whole different set of answers - many of which exceed the capabilities of the military or the use of military force, either conventionally or in COIN.

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north."

That last very important point is missed by most...

[Tom Odom]

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north."

All good, but particularly these two:That last very important point is missed by most...

To echo Steve, Ken, and Sargent, in fact the regime in Hanoi actively purged surviving members of the VC infrastructure, military and political, after the collapse of Saigon in 1975. The rewrite of history to exclude the southern comrades began then and has never stopped.

For example see:

History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre

In 1978 the Political General Department of the Vietnam People's Army adopted the policy of having cadres who worked and fought on the battlefields write memoirs about our nation's glorious war against the United States and recommended that I write about the B2 theater during the victorious spring of 1975: "How did the B2 theater carry out the mission assigned it by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee?" How did it contribute to that glorious spring?"

Along with the other battlefields throughout the nation the B2 theater, in order to fulfill its glorious mission, contributed considerably to our people's great victory. The B2 theater and its people are proud of being part of the heroic Vietnamese fatherland, of the heroic Vietnamese people. Recalling and recording the events that occurred there is an honor and a responsibility of all cadres, enlisted men, and people of B2. I accepted the recommendation...

But what was B2? Perhaps even now there are many people who are not very clear about that. To help the reader better understand the events about which I have written, I believe that it is necessary to mention some of the features of the B2 theater.

"B2" was the code name of the land and people in the southernmost part of the homeland during the anti-U.S. war period. Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel was divided into four theaters....

B2 consisted of the rest of South Vietnam, from the former Gia Nghia Province (part of the present Dac Lac Province), Lam Dong, Thuan Hai, and on down to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Con Son, Ha Tien, and Phu Quoc....

Our B2 theater accounted for about half of the land and about two-thirds of the population of South Vietnam...The people of B2 are honest and loyal and are independent in nature and their deeply patriotic ancestors came from north and central Vietnam. They always think of our beloved Uncle Ho and Hanoi, the capital and the ancient Thang Long, with an immortal sentiment..

and in the second chapter:

However, during Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. For that reason, although that decision was wise, ingenious, and timely, and although its implementation was well organized and bold, there was excellent coordination on all battlefields, everyone acted very bravely, sacrificed their lives, and there was created a significant strategic turning point in Vietnam and Indochina, we suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 so that the revolution could stand firm in the storm.