Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
* An example of that is the statement recently made in a war game prep at Knox to an acquaintance by a senior person regarding reconnaissance; "We (Americans) don't have the patience to sneak and peek, we just mount up and go out looking for trouble and you have to have Armor to do that." I submit that worked in NW Europe at the tail end of WW II; it took the Remagen Bridge, for example, good job. It may work today in a European or even in some Iraqi settings. It did not work in Viet Nam and it does not work in Afghanistan.
This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia. The same goes for at least parts of his staff as well. SOG had the potential to deliver incredible intelligence, but it was often wasted by people who didn't have a good understanding of what they had. Not to mention the constant denial on many levels that the North was taking an active role in the South until late 1966 or so.

I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.