Thanks for all the feedback thus far. Will be sure to pick up the recommended books.
A few questions and observations that came to mind as I was reading the responses:
Colby described how he sent John Paul Vann down to the Delta region to lead the pacification efforts because the VC had a dominant presence in the region, at least initially. He talked about visiting this region multiple times throughout the book and for a long time it definitely wasn't a nice place. But about a year or so after Vann moved down that way (1970-1971 timeframe), Abrams in charge, pacification/CORDS really the main effort, local elections took place, fairly legitimate central government in place, etc. the Delta had significantly changed, to the point where Colby and Vann would ride around on a motorcycle, stopping in villages for days at a time, while not once being attacked or threatened. He mentioned that they would have certainly been killed had they done this in the mid-to late 1960s.
Did anyone spend time in the Delta region? If yes, please share thoughts on why things changed so dramatically.
This brings to mind all the talk of late over Senator McCain's recent trip to Baghdad. While I haven't been in Baghdad for a few years now, and don't think there are any places where an American would be wise to walk around alone in the city, I do know of significant changes on the ground in this direction in other areas.
For example, a few weeks back I spoke to a Lt that had recently returned from the once "Wild, Wild West" in Anbar. Tomorrow marks the 3-year anniversary of a battlion-sized fight in Husaybah that has proven to be one of the most intense the Marines have had in Anbar since 2004. I'm very close with many of the Marines that fought in Husaybah. One of the guys led a heavy machine gun platoon in the AO in Spring/Fall 2004 and commented that he rarely went anywhere unless he had 6 vehicles and at least 30 Marines with him. Friends from the two battalions that replaced this battalion had similar experiences.
Back to the Lt that I recently spoke to... following the clear/secure, hold, build strategy employed in this AO in late 2005/early 2006, platoons were married up with Iraqi Army and police units (many of the Iraqis were from the area) and moved in with the people. The Lt assumed control of one of these positions for 5 months. Unlike the 30-Marine/lots of machine guns patrols from years past, he routinely sent out fire team (+) to squad (-) dismounted patrols that operated alongside Iraqi security forces. While there was still an occassional threat, ultimately the people were very happy to work with the Marines/ISF, the insurgency lost most of its appeal, the economy took many steps in a positive direction, and politics at the local level began having a significant influence in the AO.
Two major things struck me about his comments:
1) He said the AO was so peaceful that the deployment was boring in many ways, and if sent back to Iraq, part of him wants to go somewhere where he can participate in a "clearing" operation (he understands that it's not a good thing if we continue to have to do "clearing" ops, but part of him feels like this is what infantry Marines are trained/supposed to do).
2) Many of his Marines had previously served in this AO. Initially they didn't believe "higher" when told how much things had changed on the ground. In fact, many thought he was insane when saying that they'd be conducting indepenent squad-sized patrols on their first day in the AO. His squad leaders warned him about how dangerous certain areas were and recommended bringing a larger force. Much to their surprise, the environment had fundamentally changed after clear/secure, hold, build was executed and committed to, now going on almost 16 months.
Thanks in advance for any more thoughts on the subject or feedback on Colby's book.
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