Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[Mike in Hilo]

De Forrest's Slow Burn is definitely worth reading. I note that the author is also quite critical of Phoenix (but not of the Phoenix advisers, for whom he has well deserved high regard); laudatory of the RF; and dismissive of the "useless" RD Cadre. As I've pointed out elswhere on this site, De Forrest was able to be as successful as he was because his job with CIA enabled him to conduct a unilteral op. Phoenix/Phuong-Huang was a US-advised indig op, and therein lay the problem. (CIA, by the way, was not within CORDS). Stu Herrington was the Phoenix Adviser on the Hau Nghia Province CORDS team--same province which is the subject of Bergerud's Dynamics of Defeat.

Cheers,
Mike

[Old Eagle]

I been here before -- and last time it really hurt.

I haven't read Colby's book, and don't know how he handles the issue of GVN competence. In my fading recollection is concern expressed by U.S. advisors that the Thieu government "didn't get it." Success in the field could not make up for lack of legitimacy in the central government. The same is true in every COIN fight. Ouch.

As I recall, the military had advisors in GVN civilian departments because more civilian experts were not available. Ouch.

Baghdad. Ouch.

[Maximus]

Old Eagle: Colby generally had good things to say about the Thieu government. I recall him crediting Thieu for understanding the importance of pacification, dedicating the appropriate assets to the CORDS effort (as best he could), coordinating the actions of military and regional and local forces, and continuously supervising regional and local leaders to make sure they were performing. I probably wrote "supervision works... inspect what you expect" 15-20 times throughout the book when Colby discussed Thieu's leadership style.

All things being equal, I think Colby would gladly take the Thieu government over Maliki's in Iraq today.

And as you suggest, this is definitely not a good thing 4 years into this war.