Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
Yeah, I'd like to see some documentation on the burning NCO issue.

We also have to ensure that we don't hijack the thread. If there is specific fodder for the canon on the NCO issue, fire away!
I disagree with that place to the extent I won't even link to it -- but since it's you, I 'll tell you where documentation can be found.

I'll also defer to Steve Blair who's historical documentation knowledge certainly exceeds mine. My recollection is that overall VN KIA rate was about 1% while that for NCOs was 2.5% mostly SGT / SSG. That doesn't count the 1,400 or so fragging incidents, 80 some odd Officers or NCOs killed...

However, just for grins, the fact that NCOs were being burned out is amply shown by the simple existence of the NonCommissioned Officer Candidate Course -- and the fact that their KIA rate was over 5%.

For the other NCOs, the burnout came from a year in Viet Nam doing pretty much the same job (few promotions or incountry rotations for NCOs as opposed to Officers and Troops) and about 10 months in the States before returning to the SEA Follies. That was unsustainable so by 1968, third tours coming up and still shortfalls in mid and senior grade NCOs (and Officers, many of whom resigned -- the NCOs could not) led the US Army's fine Battalion Commanders by sheer necessity to lean on new LTs and SGTs and thus reinforced and enhanced micromanagement as a life style.

I know many NCOs with five tours all in combat units but I know few officers with more than two. Of course, I also know some NCOs who served in the period with no tours -- tankers and support folks, mostly -- and I know an Officer with six tours (one in Laos and one in [theoretically]Thailand). It was simply a function of the system and times. We do it a little better today, I hope...

The evidence of that burnout lies in the immediate post Viet Nam Army which suffered from a significant dearth of NCO leadership. Most were too tired to care.