Hi Mike, thanks for the post on CORDS, yes that was me with a request for an evaluation of CORDS. I disagree with you on your qualifications, seems like you are exactly the right person as your post proves. I am at my day job but will post more later.
CORDS and Phoenix
After the war the communist said that the Phoenix program was very successful.
The communist insurgency in Vietnam was beaten many times. In Mark Moyars' Triumph Forsaken he notes that in 1959 the Diem regime had reduced the communist forces down to just 6,000 men.
After the north started sending more troops down, they were defeated again in the early '60's. What helped them in 1963 was their infiltration of the Buddhist movement creating what appeared to be a sectarian strife.
The US fell for the ruse and started putting pressure on Diem to make concessions to the Buddhist leaders who kept moving the goal post. State Department people began back a coup against Diem and were assisted in that effort by Ambassador Lodge and some reporters in Vietnam who later received Pulitzer Prizes for their efforts. The coup caused the South Vietnamese to lose momentum in their war against the communist, and President Johnson's weak response to provocations encouraged them to send more troops south.
If you are interested in counterinsurgency warfare, you will want to read Moyar's book. It only goes through 1965, so you will probably have to wait for the next volume to read about the CORDS program from his perspective.
For a dissenting opinion on CORDs and pacification, I'd strongly recommend reading Eric Bergerud's The Dynamics of Defeat; the Vietnam War in Hau Nghia Province (Westview Press, 1991). Bergerud looks clsely at once province in Vietnam and assess that the pacification efforts could only, at best, achieve a mediocre tie with the VC and that the population, was never in a position to accept the GVN, even when the VC fighters were swept from the battlefield in the "better war" of the Abrams era.
For me Bergerud's book proves the point made by David Galula that the counterinsurgent must be armed with a better idea than the insurgent, and be able to sell that idea.
Thanks for all the feedback thus far. Will be sure to pick up the recommended books.
A few questions and observations that came to mind as I was reading the responses:
Colby described how he sent John Paul Vann down to the Delta region to lead the pacification efforts because the VC had a dominant presence in the region, at least initially. He talked about visiting this region multiple times throughout the book and for a long time it definitely wasn't a nice place. But about a year or so after Vann moved down that way (1970-1971 timeframe), Abrams in charge, pacification/CORDS really the main effort, local elections took place, fairly legitimate central government in place, etc. the Delta had significantly changed, to the point where Colby and Vann would ride around on a motorcycle, stopping in villages for days at a time, while not once being attacked or threatened. He mentioned that they would have certainly been killed had they done this in the mid-to late 1960s.
Did anyone spend time in the Delta region? If yes, please share thoughts on why things changed so dramatically.
This brings to mind all the talk of late over Senator McCain's recent trip to Baghdad. While I haven't been in Baghdad for a few years now, and don't think there are any places where an American would be wise to walk around alone in the city, I do know of significant changes on the ground in this direction in other areas.
For example, a few weeks back I spoke to a Lt that had recently returned from the once "Wild, Wild West" in Anbar. Tomorrow marks the 3-year anniversary of a battlion-sized fight in Husaybah that has proven to be one of the most intense the Marines have had in Anbar since 2004. I'm very close with many of the Marines that fought in Husaybah. One of the guys led a heavy machine gun platoon in the AO in Spring/Fall 2004 and commented that he rarely went anywhere unless he had 6 vehicles and at least 30 Marines with him. Friends from the two battalions that replaced this battalion had similar experiences.
Back to the Lt that I recently spoke to... following the clear/secure, hold, build strategy employed in this AO in late 2005/early 2006, platoons were married up with Iraqi Army and police units (many of the Iraqis were from the area) and moved in with the people. The Lt assumed control of one of these positions for 5 months. Unlike the 30-Marine/lots of machine guns patrols from years past, he routinely sent out fire team (+) to squad (-) dismounted patrols that operated alongside Iraqi security forces. While there was still an occassional threat, ultimately the people were very happy to work with the Marines/ISF, the insurgency lost most of its appeal, the economy took many steps in a positive direction, and politics at the local level began having a significant influence in the AO.
Two major things struck me about his comments:
1) He said the AO was so peaceful that the deployment was boring in many ways, and if sent back to Iraq, part of him wants to go somewhere where he can participate in a "clearing" operation (he understands that it's not a good thing if we continue to have to do "clearing" ops, but part of him feels like this is what infantry Marines are trained/supposed to do).
2) Many of his Marines had previously served in this AO. Initially they didn't believe "higher" when told how much things had changed on the ground. In fact, many thought he was insane when saying that they'd be conducting indepenent squad-sized patrols on their first day in the AO. His squad leaders warned him about how dangerous certain areas were and recommended bringing a larger force. Much to their surprise, the environment had fundamentally changed after clear/secure, hold, build was executed and committed to, now going on almost 16 months.
Thanks in advance for any more thoughts on the subject or feedback on Colby's book.
Last edited by Maximus; 04-16-2007 at 09:17 PM.
Responses Re Colby
1) For Tequila: Absolutely--not quite "the highlands" but a slice of territory along the border from the DMZ all the way to the Dellta essentially fell to the enemy in 1972. Stretching it though, to say this (or 1975) was Maoist third stage--After all, the enemy conventional forces were PAVN--a foreign army. This force didn't evolve out of the village guerillas because we had killed those off. Yes, there were still VCI around to provide that army with local support--and we could, based on historical experience, predict pretty well which areas that linkage would resurface--i.e., the surprisingly precise location of the "leopard spots" was no secret. Concur 100 percent that to meet a conventional threat US advisers and tactical air support remained essential. (GVN could have duked it out with local forces forever.) When Song Be was besieged Christmas 1974, I was instructed to tell my counterparts that "the Ambassador says he is very hopeful that Congress will provide the expected assistance funds." Replied the VN Lt. Col. Deputy Sector Commander, "We don't need the aid--we need tactical air support." The ultimate outrage was not congress cutting off funds in 1975--It was the mid-1973 Congressional prohibition on any US military activity anywhere in (or over) Indochina, thus giving the enemy a green light to grossly violate the cease fire.
2) For Merv: Concur completely in Moyar's thesis. Former advisers to the ARVN 7th Division who were in the Delta in 62-63 told me they were convinced Strategic Hamlets had turned the tide in the Delta--unfortunately it all fell apart when Diem was killed. But a far better write up is provided by Dennis Duncanson in Government and Revolution in Viet Nam, Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. This history of VN ends in '67 but if you had to read just one book about VN, this would unquestionably be the one. (Then you might use Sorely to fill in 1968-75.) Duncanson was Bob Thompson's No.2 in BRIAM (UK Adv Mission to VN) throughout the Diem years and knew Diem and Nhu very well--as did then COS Colby. Re Phoenix--The Communist statements I have seen about Phoenix, in their full context, plainly use the term generically to refer to all penetration ops. According to Sorely, the friendlies had even penetrated COSVN. But that had nothing to do with Phoenix, which was a very specific intel coordination effort centered at province and district level.
3) For Phil: I also highly recommend Bergerud. Considering the base line, though, progress in Hau Nghia was impressive. To me the lesson here is that US military withdrawals (in this case 25th ID) were pemature. Two problems with Hau Nghia Province, which I covered intermitently. First, this is a place where the insurgency was entrenched because it was indivisible from family. Membership had been inherited for a couple of generations. This was unusual in the proper South Vietnam--but common in the Central Coast (eg: Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai). Trang Bang District was rubber plantation land since the French days. Among the earliest "cannonfodder" recruits to the Viet Minh in the South (c.1946) were the rubber workers--the true underclass--an impoverished rural proletariate the French had brought down from the North where there was a labor surplus. I'd like to see a study (but haven't found one) looking at whether the hard core VC of Hau Nghia came from those families, as this would explain a lot. Second problem with Hau Nghia was its location on the border and on an infiltration route (Plain of Reeds) pointed toward Saigon. So, close proximity to a PAVN base area was a problem. (Problem with oil spots is that the enemy worked their own.)
4) For Maximus: No question, throughout populated MRIII (but not the jungle areas) I could drive alone and unarmed where it would have been suicide to do so mid 60's. (To be honest, if I wanted to drive over a landmine or get myself captured, I also knew where I could still do that--but lots fewer places than in the 60's.) Laying on security for the Colby trip must have been a hell of an effort. The highlight was a stretch they drove at night! But security had improved greatly. Three points. First, the enemy initiated offensives of 1968-69 caused them great casualties. The locally recruited (i.e., insurgent) forces were decimated and never recovered. And filling the vacuum rapidly with recruitment and deployment of RF/PF (i.e., pacification) allowed the cleared areas to be held. Second, MR IV (the Delta) was not exposed to pressure from long standing enemy base areas (an exception: U Minh Forest) where PAVN resided in division strength. Third, the Delta people (true South Vietnamese as opposed to the Central Vietnamese of MR I and II) did not have the cultural baggage that made their compatriates from farther north such intractable foes. The Deltaic feudal society was essentially pre-nationalist. Anti-colonial chauvinism (likewise anti-Chinese chauvinism) were largely absent. (Personal experience--you're not likely to read this anywhere.) Places like Kien Hoa (Ben Tre) were very exceptional in having a generationally entrenched insurgency. Interestingly, among the more secure provinces in the Delta were those in which a history of land tenure inequity happened to have been the greatest (huge landholdings owned by the oligarchy and farmed by sharecroppers.) Land reform made a difference, but that was after the Colby Vann trip....But such cultural minutiae escaped many Americans...Recognizing that the resonating VC message was not nationalism after all, we might well have charted our course differently.
Finally, Your description of Anbar is reminiscent of the USMC CAP ops in MR I--the most direct US COIN effort in VN (as opposed to advisory activities).
5) For Slapout: Thanks
Cheers,
Mike.
"Bing" West's The Village
Mike,
Thanks so much for the quick and detailed response. You've helped tremendously in my understanding of events on the ground in Vietnam.
I instruct USMC infantry Lts headed to Iraq, most within 3-6 months after graduation. They're required to read The Village, focusing on answering the questions provided in the attached document. We then have a discussion group based on the questions. If you have a few minutes, I'd greatly appreciate it if you would look over the questions and responses that I use to steer the discussion group. Please provide comments/suggestions.
Thanks again.
Semper Fi,
Scott
Last edited by Maximus; 04-17-2007 at 02:05 AM.
Maximus, you may want to check out the unit history of the 3rd Brigade 82nd Airborne. It was 68 or 69 that they worked on heavy clearing operations in the Delta area. I have been to the KIA monument at the division museum at Bragg many times. For only being over there a year it was a pretty tough operation.
Mike inHilo I also asked if you new a friend of mine who was part of Phoenix and I don't think I ever told you but his opinions were very close to yours. The first time I met him and we talked about Vietnam I was just shocked when he flaty said "We could have won if we had wanted to, we just gave up." Thats why I like first hand accounts of situations usually much more accurate.
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