Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[Rob Thornton]

Cavguy said:

My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.

Ultimately the conditions will drive requirements, but I think Neil gets to the meat of it here, the two are dependent upon each other in ways that get beyond the number of attacks, and toward the rational for continued insurgency. It is a matter of art and decision. Figuring out what makes insurgency the most viable and attractive recourse in terms of what the real objectives are is key to sustainable security - but implementing it offers a different set of challenges.

Having said that, I think if the conditions are such that all the counter insurgent's activities are absorbed in physical security, then allocating resources to development might not be possible - even if the commander knows that is the requirement to get to long term sustainable security. It is event driven to a degree.

Each situation is likely to be different - Vietnam is not Iraq, nor are any two provinces or cities wholly alike. They are all driven by politics at a number of levels. While I do believe that History offers unique insights into the present and future, to get its full value we have to acknowledge its limitations. We can look back and recognize where there were seemingly non-linear outcomes, mistakes and vindications, but its hard to account for the number of potential outcomes that come through interaction as you look forward.

The two are different. Using History to draw useful observations about a past event to think about the future is one thing. Drawing conclusions and absolutes about the future based on historical events that are by nature frozen in time and no longer interactive is dangerous business, and offers to great an opportunity to inject bias.

Best, Rob

[Sargent]

Andrade's analysis is on point if the threat to South Vietnam came from without. North Vietnam certainly had its own agenda regarding unification. However, those plans would have gone the way of North Korea's had South Vietnam not had its own very serious internal problems, had there not been a serious disconnect between the government and the governed. Whether American counterinsurgency efforts could have changed this is unknown. However, it does make clear that however successful the conventional war could have been, it would not have been enough to secure South Vietnam as a viable, independent entity.

From this perspective, there is an interesting connection with Iraq -- there is often a temptation to conflate the foreign fighter problem with the bulk of the security issues in Iraq. But there are serious internal issues regarding relations between the localities and the central government. Even those Iraqis who are working to support the American effort are not entirely comfortable with the emerging model of a central government that controls more of daily life than has ever been the norm -- for example, even under Hussein Fallujah was pretty much left alone to run its own affairs. I would argue that this antipathy to the center is expressed in the black market activities in oil - while some amount of the theft is tied to supporting anti-government/American military activities, some is simply about building the strength of local actors. In any case, solving the foreign fighter problem is never going to pacify Iraq. The problems are within, and they are going to require a whole different set of answers - many of which exceed the capabilities of the military or the use of military force, either conventionally or in COIN.

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north.

Jill

[Ken White]

All good, but particularly these two:

"The problems are within, and they are going to require a whole different set of answers - many of which exceed the capabilities of the military or the use of military force, either conventionally or in COIN.

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north."

That last very important point is missed by most...

[Tom Odom]

Steve's point re the use of North Vietnamese histories is a good one. They tend to downplay the role of the southern agents -- and their very different agendas, many of which did not include unification with the north."

All good, but particularly these two:That last very important point is missed by most...

To echo Steve, Ken, and Sargent, in fact the regime in Hanoi actively purged surviving members of the VC infrastructure, military and political, after the collapse of Saigon in 1975. The rewrite of history to exclude the southern comrades began then and has never stopped.

For example see:

History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre

In 1978 the Political General Department of the Vietnam People's Army adopted the policy of having cadres who worked and fought on the battlefields write memoirs about our nation's glorious war against the United States and recommended that I write about the B2 theater during the victorious spring of 1975: "How did the B2 theater carry out the mission assigned it by the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee?" How did it contribute to that glorious spring?"

Along with the other battlefields throughout the nation the B2 theater, in order to fulfill its glorious mission, contributed considerably to our people's great victory. The B2 theater and its people are proud of being part of the heroic Vietnamese fatherland, of the heroic Vietnamese people. Recalling and recording the events that occurred there is an honor and a responsibility of all cadres, enlisted men, and people of B2. I accepted the recommendation...

But what was B2? Perhaps even now there are many people who are not very clear about that. To help the reader better understand the events about which I have written, I believe that it is necessary to mention some of the features of the B2 theater.

"B2" was the code name of the land and people in the southernmost part of the homeland during the anti-U.S. war period. Vietnam south of the 17th Parallel was divided into four theaters....

B2 consisted of the rest of South Vietnam, from the former Gia Nghia Province (part of the present Dac Lac Province), Lam Dong, Thuan Hai, and on down to the Ca Mau Peninsula, Con Son, Ha Tien, and Phu Quoc....

Our B2 theater accounted for about half of the land and about two-thirds of the population of South Vietnam...The people of B2 are honest and loyal and are independent in nature and their deeply patriotic ancestors came from north and central Vietnam. They always think of our beloved Uncle Ho and Hanoi, the capital and the ancient Thang Long, with an immortal sentiment..

and in the second chapter:

However, during Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. For that reason, although that decision was wise, ingenious, and timely, and although its implementation was well organized and bold, there was excellent coordination on all battlefields, everyone acted very bravely, sacrificed their lives, and there was created a significant strategic turning point in Vietnam and Indochina, we suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 so that the revolution could stand firm in the storm.

[TX Grayman]

'Victory has a thousand fathers and Defeat is an orphan.' As a Vietnam War infantry soldier I subscribe to the critiques of U.S. Army Infantry combat operations in Vietnam by LTC Anthoney Herbert and COL David Hackworth.