I have often wished for a literature cannon. Seems like it would have a much greater impact than simply telling someone that they need to read a book. (Sorry, couldn't resist!)
I am very interested in seeing some recommendations here.
I have often wished for a literature cannon. Seems like it would have a much greater impact than simply telling someone that they need to read a book. (Sorry, couldn't resist!)
I am very interested in seeing some recommendations here.
Cannons are cool...
I'll take a stab but with a two caveats. First, it's virtually impossible to find a book about Viet Nam that is not biased in one direction or another or about something -- however, a reasonably diligent reader can filter most of that out.
Second, this is A list -- there are hundreds of others that are just a valid. I make no apology for this one and believe it's fair and as balanced as most and do not plan on entertaining futile arguments about it. It is not an Academic's or General Officer's list or one of which most would approve, it is the list of a a working Grunt. It's offered, accept or disregard as you wish.
None of these are perfect or, IMO, error free, they all have omissions and biases but most are pretty good and reasonably well balanced. I start with The Politically Incorrect Guide to the Vietnam War by Phillip Jennings. It is biased -- as stated it is politically incorrect -- but does a decent job of dispelling a number of myths (some of which appear often on this Board). Some of its contentions are problematic but that's true with all books. In any event, it sets the stage for the other books, which are:
Street Without Joy by Bernard Fall
Why Vietnam by Archimides Patti
The Vietnamese War by David Elliot
How We Won the War by Vo Nguyen Giap
The Twenty-Five Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam. by Bruce Palmer Jr.
The Killing Zone by Frederick Downs, Jr.
The Irony of Vietnam; The System Worked by Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts
Backfire by Loren Baritz
Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (Major Problems in American History) by Robert McMahon and Thomas Patterson {tedious but informative... / kw]
I don’t know enough about the topic to claim how any readings would rank in terms of a canon, but I have enjoyed everything I have read and seen by Pierre Schoendoerffer. I found the article below to be well written; it might be of particular interest to members of the Special Forces.
Salemink, Oscar. “Mois and Maquis: the invention and appropriation of Vietnam’s Montagnards from Sabatier to the CIA.” In Colonial situations: essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge, edited by George W. Stocking, 243–84. Vol. 7 in History of Anthropology. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991.
Last edited by ganulv; 06-18-2011 at 11:24 PM. Reason: added a link
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Continuing ...
The Vietnam Literature Cannon - JMM limited edition:
Usually, for me, Vietnam sources = stuff re: the US civilian-military policy interface (e.g., "Pentagon Papers"); Pacification in SVN (e.g., "Military Struggle" and "Political Struggle"); and the PAVN view of conventional and unconventional warfare from 1944 to the end in 1975 (e.g., the unity of the "Military Struggle" and the "Political Struggle").
The following references do not follow that pattern. They look much more to the personal side of that conflict - of which, each person had a unique and different vantage point.
I don't define an "average company grade officer or NCO". The latter group (including buck sergeants) could include such people as William Manchester and Gene Sledge - both very articulate in painting word pictures of their war.
Here are eight "Vietnam" books (links to Amazon pages, with reviews - check Amazon "used") written by folks who were company grade officers or NCOs in the Vietnam War:
Brennan's War: Vietnam 1965-1969 (Matthew Brennan, 1985)
One Soldier (John H. Shook, 1986)Review by RC
Matt explains what a lot of us went through. This book should be one used in schools to teach about the War in Vietnam. I was in the Blues of A Troop 9th Cavalry in 1966. Very well done, Matt.
Once a Warrior King (David Donovan, 1985)Review by B
What puzzled me about "One Soldier," John H. Shook's autobiographical account of his experiences in the Vietnam War, was that it wasn't as popular or widely praised as other famous war-autobiographies (such as Ron Kovic's "Born on the Fourth of July"). I found myself unable to put this book down. Shook begins telling his story from the very moment he receives a draft letter and takes us to boot camp, to Officer Candidate School, and then to the dense, hellish jungles of Vietnam, all without turning his story into one big cliche`. I felt like I was having an intriguing conversation with a veteran, hearing his story, being able to understand where he was coming from. A flawless accomplishment. It's disappointing that Shook's "One Soldier" isn't as highly praised and recognizable as other war stories.
Platoon Leader: A Memoir of Command in Combat (James R. McDonough, 1985)Review by RB
I was stationed in Duc Pho, Southern I Corp, and spent over 8 months living in a remote village with my platoon during 1969 and 1970. I saw so very much and understood so little. This book brought back the conflicts that haunted me for years and helped me come to grips with the most significant year of my life. Fear, anxiety, exhaustion, isolation, and confusion blended into an environment that this book describes like none that I have read.
Only War We Had: A Platoon Leader's Journal of Vietnam (Michael Lee Lanning, 1987)Review by RJM
Lt. McDonough writes of his experiences in Viet Nam in such straight forward language with little embellishment and an honest and humble attitude. This is one of the best written depictions of combat I've ever read. His experiences commanding a platoon in the heart of VC country surpass anything that has been portrayed by Hollywood in terms of the difficulty of the mission and the horror of day to day survival in a combat situation. This is one gritty and tough account of day to day life in the Viet Nam war that should be widely read. Ranks right up there with Philp Caputo, Michael Herr, Tim O'Brien and Tobias Wolff as a contribution to the definitive written record of grunt life in the war.
The 13th Valley (John M. Del Vecchio, 1982)Review by AC
The thing that sets this book apart from others like it is the fact that it is the author's personal journal from his tour as a platoon leader in Vietnam. It lacks the "story-telling" quality that most other personal accounts of the Vietnam War have. Often it is not well-written or completely coherent, but that only serves to help the reader understand the conditions under which the entries were made. The entries are sopplemented by the author's reflections upon preparing them for publication. The events in this book were recorded as they occured - not years later - and that's what makes its special.
Vietnam-Perkasie: A Combat Marine Memoir (W. D. Ehrhart, 1983)Review by REW
Although "The 13th Valley" is a novel, it is based on a very real operation conducted by the 2/502nd, 1st Brigade 101st Airborne Division, temporarily assigned to th 3rd Brigade near the end of the "Texas Star" operation. At that time, the U.S. was in gradual withdrawal from Vietnam. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 3rd Marine divisions had already left I Corp leaving the 101st to manage an area 4 times their previous area of responsibility. As a last push into the famed A Shau Valley area, the 3rd Brigade was heavily involved in a siege at Firebase Ripcord. Surrounded by an estimated 12,000 NVA regulars, this battle was longer and claimed more casualties on both sides than occurred at "Hamburger Hill". The Battle at Firebase Ripcord remained a secret for many years. Both armies not wanting to publicize the battle as we were disengaging from the war and the NVA took thousands of casualties. the 3rd Brigade defenders were lifted out without being captured. The 2/502nd "Strike Force" gained some level of revenge by attacking the 13th Valley and leaving the NVA Headquarters and camp in shambles. As a former member of the 2/502nd in Vietnam, I have reread this great book many times and can attest that, although a novel, most stories are based in fact on true events of the 2/502. I highly recommend this great book and encourage those interested to also read about "Firebase Ripcord".
The Village (Bing West, 1972)Review by DK
Bill Ehrhart's work for too long has been neglected. VIETNAM-PERKASIE is one of the most memorable first-hand accounts of the war which America loves to forget. This memoir is gritty, real, and vastly underrated. It should be made into a film.
(cont. in part 2)Review by DF
This is a wonderful book. It tells the story of 15 marines assigned to defend a hamlet, working with about the same number of Popular Force militiamen. Of that original band, 7 are killed in the first half of the book, most of them in a single firefight when their "fort" is over-run. (The PFs suffer losses at roughly the same rate.) But they love the work, get along fine with the villagers, and exact an even higher toll on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese units sent against them.
"Westmoreland was Right" in Vietnam
This is the title for a new article on Westmoreland and Vietnam by Army Historian Dale Andrade in the just released issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies. Pasted below is the abstract to the article along with an additional paragraph. Andrade's bigger point is that if we as the United States Army aspire to be a learning organization, a good place to start is by understanding the past; specifically Vietnam and then move to a better understanding of the flawed lessons that we have dervived from that war along with myths in order to get at the truth.
More than thirty years after the fall of Saigon, historians still argue about the lessons of the Vietnam War. Most fall into two schools of thought: those who believe that the United States failed to apply enough pressure - military and political - to the Communist government in Hanoi, and those who argue that the Americans failed to use an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. Both arguments have merit, but both ignore the Communist strategy, and the result is a skewed picture of what sort of enemy the United States actually faced in Vietnam. The reality is that the United States rarely held the initiative in Vietnam. Hanoi began a conventional troop build up in South Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s, and by the time of the US ground force intervention in 1965 the allies already faced a large and potent conventional Communist army in the South. Simply employing a 'classic' counterinsurgency strategy would have been fatal from the beginning. Despite this fact, the US military has tended to embrace flawed historical analysis to explain our failure, often concluding that there was a 'strategic choice' in Vietnam - a right way to fight and a wrong way. Most blame General William C. Westmoreland as choosing the wrong way and argue that if he had eschewed a big unit 'search and destroy' strategy, the war might have turned out differently. However, this article argues that this is untrue. Westmoreland could not have done much differently than he actually did given the realities on the ground. The flawed interpretations of the Vietnam War are not only bad history, but they also lead military and political policymakers to bad decisions in current counterinsurgency strategy. As the US military finds itself embroiled in unconventional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it needs clear lessons from America's longest counterinsurgency campaign - the Vietnam War.
Last edited by Jedburgh; 06-03-2008 at 10:49 PM. Reason: Changed link, edited content.
Tried to access it but got hit with a password request asking for my name and SSN to view.
Not too hot giving out my SSN, even to USMA.
If...If...If...If !!!
If the ports of Haiphong and Vinh Thinh had been closed by the U.S. Navy in 1965, and not left open until 1972....
If the B-52s had leveled North Vietnam's Transportation and Power Distribution networks in 1965, and not limited to low risk missions over South Vietneam and Laos until after the election of 1972....
If the U.S. Marines had been used as a mobile amphious force to interdict and destroy up and down the Vietnamese coastline, rather than to defend the DMZ....
But most of all...
If the Marxist-sympathizing and Democratically-controlled Congress had allocated just a fourth of the funds lavished on the Israelis in 1974 toward the South Vietnamese instead....
South Vietnam would have become as great a testament to American resolve as South Korea. The military which fought in Vietnam was better-prepared, better-supported, and better-led than the one which fought in Korea.
The Vietnamese War was not a "small war" either, although the typical battle was fought with company-sized units. At the Tet Offensive of 1968, General Weyand had 9 maneuver Divisions at his disposal. Colonel Rheault had almost 100,000 indigenous and Special Forces under his command. And the ARVN had over a million men.
The mistakes which affected the outcome of the war were not made at Khe Sanh or at MAAC-V. They were not made at the War College and certainly not at the Infantry School! They were made in the Oval Office, on Capital Hill and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Closing the ports that early wouldn't have made much difference, because the North wasn't engaged in a major conventional offensive (the rail routes from China were more significant during the early periods, as was the land route from Cambodian ports). Nor would bombing the transportation network, because there wasn't much of one to bomb and it wasn't being used heavily for the war effort at that time. It was different in 1972 because the North chose to launch a conventional offensive that required much more in the way of supplies than their earlier campaigns and thus exposed them to interdiction and airpower. Operations prior to the Easter Offensive used minimal supplies (an average of five truckloads per NVA DIVISION if memory serves), so there wasn't much to bomb.Originally Posted by AGBrina
The Marines would have been better used in the IV Corps CTZ where they could have focused on population security (and training ARVN in similar techniques). It just so happened that they were the first large US force deployed and once they got in I Corps CTZ they were more or less stuck there.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
I concur to a degree. In the early days, the product delivered by OPS-35 was pretty variable, and only covered a very small AO. By 1968, B-52 strikes were being put in based on OPS-35 product.
...however, and I say this as a man with many friends who served in the OPS-35 Recon Teams, the role of the NSA in Laos (Angry Talker, and Polaris 2) has never really been researched. As far as I can tell, most of the targets run in 1969/70 were based on Angry Talker intercepts.
What crippled ARVN was oil prices. Giving ARVN more equipment (which was what the IDF needed to replace 1973 losses - (and US support broke the will of Jordan and Egypt to continue by military means) ARVN just lacked training and mostly combat power across the board. Giving RVN more M113s and F4E's would not have altered the military outcome.
However, it would have saved Cambodia! - a nation truly betrayed by the US Congress and a few other people. I've never wanted to talk to Jane Fonda about Hanoi, but I would love to chat about Cambodia!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
If we're talking about if...
Here's an even bigger if... what about IF we'd actually listened to these rather prescient conclusions from 1951 (cited by jmm on another thread):
The bold portions are added by me, emphasis probably unnecessary. At least somebody was looking at the situation clearly. Pity nobody listened.In October 1951, the student conclusions to their study of US policy in Southeast Asia were presented to the college. Although opinions were somewhat divided, a large majority opposed any major US involvement. The conclusions of the majority could be summarized as follows:
(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.
(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially, Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.
(3) General war planning by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the US forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia, the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Strait of Malacca and populous, richly endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.
(4) Militarily, the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for US forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military agression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographic conformation combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.
(5) Politically and psychologically, the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvatages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel ["-iel", not "-ial"] military aid.
"US Policy in Southeast Asia". Reports of Student Committees #13-17 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: US Army War College, 1951), cited in Bruce Palmer Jr, The 25-Year War (1984) - with HT to Ken White for suggesting this book.
There a chapter in Cold War Hot which basically applies Westmoreland's "plan" and posits a US victory. There's also an alternative COIN plan based upon Thompson's recommendations that leads to a US victory.
Already read the article. Once again it's a case of "either/or" thinking with no real attempt to find a good middle ground. Westmoreland was "right" in a sense, but he was also "wrong" in a sense. He was correct in that larger units were needed to break up the main force VC units and to keep them away from populated areas (although the only real way to do that would have been to physically cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail...an option that was never really on the table), but he was wrong in his lack of attention to population security (leaving that mostly for ARVN after the force had been configured by its advisors to fight a regular enemy...even though as I recall their own leadership had hoped for training oriented more toward dealing with insurgent forces). Westmoreland paid lip service to finding a balance, but in practice he failed to do so. Most people were looking at a Korea scenario and past what they were actually facing on the ground. That is the truth of that situation. Korea and the Chinese intervention colored the majority of policy thinking in the Johnson administration, and a lack of attention to anything other than conventional war colored the evaluation of many military thinkers, to include Westmoreland. Vietnam required a blended solution, and that's something that I'm not sure we could come up with even today.
I also found Andrade's use of the communist histories interesting, as their current spin is to deemphasize the role of the VC in operations. This has more to do with the political and social split that existed between Northerners and Southerners at the time than actual objective history. It's easy to forget that they have an interest in presenting the history of the War of Liberation to fit their own domestic goals...not unlike the motives often attributed to Western commentators writing about the war.
If there's a flaw, it's the same one that we seem to be incapable of escaping...the "either/or" mindset. Vietnam was a blended situation. We missed that then, and we seem to be missing that again.
Cavguy...you should be able to log into the article through the library there without giving up any information. If not, PM me.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
COL Gentile and Shek both sent me copies - Share many of the same opinions of the article. There is some merit to the argument that development is impossible without baseline security, and security requires force. Therefore, the author's argument is that Westmorland was right to do 'search and destroy', and his 'search and destroy' ops enabled Abrams to focus on pacification.
He gets to it in the last paragraphs when he states the main takeaway:
I disagree with his conclusion here. My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.
What is the bio/background of the author?
Last edited by Cavguy; 06-03-2008 at 06:18 PM.
Sure, but again I tend to think the discussion is another case of "either/or" thinking. Westmoreland was right to use 'search and destroy' to push main force units back from the population centers, but he was also remiss in not focusing some real priorities on population security or at the very least insuring that ARVN could do so (which its training effectively precluded since it was focused on main force combat).
Andrade is one of the historians at the CMH and has written on both the Phoenix program and some aspects of SOG. He also wrote a good study of the Easter Offensive. Steve (Metz, that is) might be more familiar with him.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
An opinionated No and Yes...
Not really; nor did Tet and the general VC (the very few left) and NVA (lots and lots of them replacing those killed) toll allow it as some postulate; Abrams simply changed the emphasis as Palmer had been urging all along. Westmoreland could have done it two years earlier; he chose not to do so.Exactly....My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.
Very unpersuasive
Couldn't agree more with your premise. We certainly should eliminate the flawed lessons of Viet Nam -- however, we should also be very careful not to preselect the lessons we wish to learn -- or eliminate.
My sensing tends to coincide more with Steve Blair than with Andrade. Westmoreland was right -- to an extent. He was also wrong to an extent. IMO, he was more wrong than right, Andrade can differ as can you but there is little denying three salient facts:
- The primary Operational level of effort, COIN, was given only lip service from 1963 until late 1968.
- There were a number of flawed decisions by MACV during that period that ranged from placing the Marines in the wrong CTZ (as Steve pointed out) and the Army having to develop a Riverine capability to operate in 4 CTZ on the fly; the infusion program and the force protection measures that insisted on large unit operations and constant US Artillery cover (two things the VC and NVA quickly learned to exploit). Most of these and more sprang from the NW Europe mentality of Westmoreland and the MACV Staff that could not wrap itself around the flexibility required to confront an agile enemy * .
- The vast majority of contacts were initiated by the enemy, not by us and that is by any measure a significant operational and tactical failure. As that NVA Colonel told Harry Summers, not being whipped in battle was irrelevant.
It did not need to be that way and Westmoreland was in command. So, no, he wasn't right...
In any event, Afghanistan, Iraq and Viet Nam are three very different wars fought against three very different enemies in three very different sets of terrain in a different time and with different levels of troop training and capability. Few of the lessons of Viet Nam translate directly and we should be extremely careful of those we choose to adopt.
* An example of that is the statement recently made in a war game prep at Knox to an acquaintance by a senior person regarding reconnaissance; "We (Americans) don't have the patience to sneak and peek, we just mount up and go out looking for trouble and you have to have Armor to do that." I submit that worked in NW Europe at the tail end of WW II; it took the Remagen Bridge, for example, good job. It may work today in a European or even in some Iraqi settings. It did not work in Viet Nam and it does not work in Afghanistan.
This shows quite clearly in Westmoreland's lukewarm reception of intelligence provided by SOG teams working the Trail in Laos and (later) Cambodia. The same goes for at least parts of his staff as well. SOG had the potential to deliver incredible intelligence, but it was often wasted by people who didn't have a good understanding of what they had. Not to mention the constant denial on many levels that the North was taking an active role in the South until late 1966 or so.
I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Good post.
I saw the process repeated in a number of units that got good intel from their Recon and LRRP Units and then blithefully ignored it and put more dependence on SPAR info. Dumbbbb...True; unfortunately we sort of fell into the same failure (the war we wanted...) post 1989...I think one of the most important takeaways from Vietnam is the lesson that each situation needs to be analyzed and appreciated on its own merits and realities, not warped by what happened before (Korea) or what we would like to see happen (tanks roaring across the plains of central Europe). We failed both tests in Vietnam.
Who would like to see that happen ? - At least nobody in Central Europe!
Concerning the failure in South Vietnam it is quite fruitless IMO to discuss the value of "Search & Destroy" missions or reports of SOG troopers about what's happening on remote jungle trails, when you try to back an incapable dictatorship government in S-Vietnam and simultaneously drop bombs on innocent civilians in N-Vietnam.
That's the wrong strategy and doomed to fail anyway.
hard won observation
Cavguy said:
Ultimately the conditions will drive requirements, but I think Neil gets to the meat of it here, the two are dependent upon each other in ways that get beyond the number of attacks, and toward the rational for continued insurgency. It is a matter of art and decision. Figuring out what makes insurgency the most viable and attractive recourse in terms of what the real objectives are is key to sustainable security - but implementing it offers a different set of challenges.My personal experience in Ramadi and Tal Afar suggest that it is not sequential but somewhat parallel, or at least intersecting curves - you have to do both LOO's (security and development) simultaneously. You never get real security without development/pacification and you can never do effective development without a minimum level of security that interdicts enemy freedom of movement.
Having said that, I think if the conditions are such that all the counter insurgent's activities are absorbed in physical security, then allocating resources to development might not be possible - even if the commander knows that is the requirement to get to long term sustainable security. It is event driven to a degree.
Each situation is likely to be different - Vietnam is not Iraq, nor are any two provinces or cities wholly alike. They are all driven by politics at a number of levels. While I do believe that History offers unique insights into the present and future, to get its full value we have to acknowledge its limitations. We can look back and recognize where there were seemingly non-linear outcomes, mistakes and vindications, but its hard to account for the number of potential outcomes that come through interaction as you look forward.
The two are different. Using History to draw useful observations about a past event to think about the future is one thing. Drawing conclusions and absolutes about the future based on historical events that are by nature frozen in time and no longer interactive is dangerous business, and offers to great an opportunity to inject bias.
Best, Rob
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