Vietnam War Collection: books plus

[Ken White]

the housing of friendly Montagnards who promptly penned their pigs in them and built new elevated thatched huts for themselves nearby...

We gotta admit the bicycle powered paddy irrigation water pump was a good idea, though.

We're getting smarter (not). Like the US standards hospital in Mosul we designed and donated with a built in O2 distribution system. Which will be great when and if someone starts producing O2 locally in a volume that will be adequate to fill the tanks...

[slapout9]

Interesting piece about how the Air Force would have used PGM's on the Ho Chi Trail IF they had been invented back then.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a.../saunders.html

[William F. Owen]

SOG OP-35 did some good work, in that Recon Teams can did have "sensor-shooter" loops that were reactive to target in less than 15 mins.

The most effective method of interdiction seems to have been physically dug in troops with on call CAS. I think the last big "Road Block" was conduct in November 1970.

Contrary to popular belief, the NVA were reliant on trucks routes. That is what they put 90% of their effort into building and maintaining.

[Mike in Hilo]

Wilf-- Sorely quotes Abrams, Weyand, CG Third regional Assistance Command Hollingsworth, and Kissinger as concluding that Lam Son 719 (aka the Laotian Incursion) of Feb '71 prevented the annual enemy dry season offensive that year, delaying it until 1972, when, Kissinger is quoted as noting, the enemy's main thrust was over the DMZ rather than farther south where their supply system had been disrupted by both the 1970 Cambodian incursion and LS 719.
Journalists, incidentally, were quick and seemingly unanimous in declaring the op a dismal failure....

Cheers,
Mike.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf-- Sorely quotes Abrams, Weyand, CG Third regional Assistance Command Hollingsworth, and Kissinger as concluding that Lam Son 719 (aka the Laotian Incursion) of Feb '71 prevented the annual enemy dry season offensive that year, delaying it until 1972, when, Kissinger is quoted as noting, the enemy's main thrust was over the DMZ rather than farther south where their supply system had been disrupted by both the 1970 Cambodian incursion and LS 719.
Journalists, incidentally, were quick and seemingly unanimous in declaring the op a dismal failure....

Yes, I talked to Lewis Sorely about that. NVA were seriously worried by main force incursions.

However IIRC, 719 as headed for Tchepone, which was the junction of several major routes. Any damage done took months to repair. The Cambodia Operations really only hit base areas, and because of the very flat terrain, did minimal damage to the trail network. ... but yes, consistent main force incursions did more damage than anything else.

[Steve Blair]

SOG OP-35 did some good work, in that Recon Teams can did have "sensor-shooter" loops that were reactive to target in less than 15 mins.

The most effective method of interdiction seems to have been physically dug in troops with on call CAS. I think the last big "Road Block" was conduct in November 1970.

Contrary to popular belief, the NVA were reliant on trucks routes. That is what they put 90% of their effort into building and maintaining.

True. The company-size ops tended to be very effective, although they did consume a great deal of airpower and SOG resources. It did show that it took eyes on the ground to evaluate targets, roadblocks to bottle up resources further up the trail (rendering it vulnerable to strikes), and sufficient resources to exploit what the ground force turned up.

Given the technology available at the time, I think this was the only viable interdiction option short of a major US incursion in the tri-border area to physically cut the trail.

[Granite_State]

There was a good article in Foreign Affairs, sometime in the mid-Sixties, that demonstrated (by truck, sampan, bicycle, and elephant (!) load) how little the VC needed in terms of daily supplies. Wish I could be more specific, I had a photocopy but misplaced it I think. It was in the same issue as an article by Templer of Malaysia fame.

[slapout9]

From 1978 Air University Review about C-130 gun ships and Ho Chi Interdiction.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...b/gilster.html

[William F. Owen]

There was a good article in Foreign Affairs, sometime in the mid-Sixties, that demonstrated (by truck, sampan, bicycle, and elephant (!) load) how little the VC needed in terms of daily supplies. Wish I could be more specific, I had a photocopy but misplaced it I think. It was in the same issue as an article by Templer of Malaysia fame.

I'd be extremely interested to see that. My own research pretty comes down on the side that the NVA romanticised a good deal about "the trail." Without Soviet trucks, they would have been lost. Bicycles and porters could not effectively sustain the tonnage's of supplies needed, and whole NVA units, manning the trail frequently went hungry and were forced to grow their own food. There is also some evidence (from the Chinese) that the trail was massively inefficient, with as little of 30% of resources, that entered the Mu Gai pass, actually reaching combat units in the South.

[davidbfpo]

Just tried the Foriegn Affairs website search function and it found two possible issues: July 1965 and April 1968.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search...l+Text=templer

Tried the July 1965 issue and nothing appears to match Granite State's recollection: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1964/4.html

April 1968 seems a better match, as there are two articles 'Must We Invade the North?' by Roger Hilsman ( http://www.foreignaffairs.org/196804...the-north.html ) and 'Squaring the Error' by Sir Robert Thompson (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/196804...the-error.html ).

Hope this helps all those interested; note the articles are a summary and paid access is then the option - unless you are near a very good library.

davidbfpo

[Granite_State]

Just tried the Foriegn Affairs website search function and it found two possible issues: July 1965 and April 1968.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/search...l+Text=templer

Tried the July 1965 issue and nothing appears to match Granite State's recollection: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/1964/4.html

April 1968 seems a better match, as there are two articles 'Must We Invade the North?' by Roger Hilsman ( http://www.foreignaffairs.org/196804...the-north.html ) and 'Squaring the Error' by Sir Robert Thompson (http://www.foreignaffairs.org/196804...the-error.html ).

Hope this helps all those interested; note the articles are a summary and paid access is then the option - unless you are near a very good library.

davidbfpo

Thank you, almost positive April 1968 was the one, confused between Templer and Thompson. I think it was Hilsman's article then, he might have made the case that since interdicting supplies from the North was hopeless, the VC would always have a sanctuary and supplier in Hanoi. Will keep an eye out for my copy, but doesn't look like it survived the trip home across the Atlantic.

[sapperfitz82]

Moyar's book does an excellent job covering the growth, total tonnage moved but what means, and the effect of this on the insurgency and later invasion by NVA.

It seems that the bombing did work quite well, but because Pres. Johnson only pursued it in fits and starts, the long term result was an negative.

Surprisingly, a great deal of supply was brought by sea until a co-ordinated campaign by the navy finally brought a halt to this. The reason the water routes were used is because the GSVN troops had severed the trail in the Central Highlands.

Well documented read on this particular issue.

[Surferbeetle]

Ken,

With the benefit of hind sight would more MCO or COIN or some combo thereof have made a difference on the M side of DIME?

My 2009 Economist Pocket World in Figures tells me Vietnam's GDP per head is currently running at $720 and that 58% of the workforce is in Agriculture. 21.6% of its export trade is the US while 5.6% is with China.

Wikipedia says:

In 1986, it instituted economic and political reforms and began a path towards international reintegration. By 2000, it had established diplomatic relations with most nations. Its economic growth had been among the highest in the world in the past decade.

Nationmaster has some interesting Vietnam statistics.

During OIF 1 it was my impression that if we had consistently and heavily focused upon the populace across the country within the first six months after the initial MCO we could have kept/flipped enough folks to have kept the lid on. The combination of summer heat, little or no electricity, mass 'downsizing' among the workforce, and deteriorating population security snuffed out that candle however and we all know the rest...

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

With the benefit of hind sight would more MCO or COIN or some combo thereof have made a difference on the M side of DIME?

However, all things considered and given the goal of an independent, democratic (western version) nation, probably neither would've made much difference in the long run -- the nationalistic strain was too powerful. All out MCO could've taken us to Hanoi in less than six months -- but the Eurocentric staff at MACV / USARV would not have known how to handle the resultant COIN effort and the South was not ready for it at the time. In any event, we went in with a 'limited objective' in mind and "all out" wasn't in the cards. Shades of I-rak, 40 years later...

During OIF 1 it was my impression that if we had consistently and heavily focused upon the populace across the country within the first six months after the initial MCO we could have kept/flipped enough folks to have kept the lid on. The combination of summer heat, little or no electricity, mass 'downsizing' among the workforce, and deteriorating population security snuffed out that candle however and we all know the rest...

Agreed. Missteps by the 2/82 in April of '03 followed by the doofus decision to disband the Army and Police allied with a total lack of knowledge (and combat arms ego-centric disinclination to use CA) of what to do doomed us to what occurred. Replacing McKiernan with Sanchez was also abysmally stupid...

Both wars were hobbled by very poor pre attack intel and an overweening sense of hubris at the WH that didn't pay enough attention to the intel that was available. Add to that Army egos which refused to listen to FAOs and others who knew the area and the people; Commanders who selected campaign goals that were flawed; and an overall inadequately trained Army...

All problems that could've and should've been avoided.

[Surferbeetle]

Both wars were hobbled by very poor pre attack intel and an overweening sense of hubris at the WH that didn't pay enough attention to the intel that was available. Add to that Army egos which refused to listen to FAOs and others who knew the area and the people; Commanders who selected campaign goals that were flawed; and an overall inadequately trained Army...

All problems that could've and should've been avoided.

Ken,

Realistic training is more important than high dollar weapons systems; getting a consensus (as evidenced by sufficient resources) on what is realistic training however is always tough.

Keeping in mind that we do not have a habit of religiously following doctrine and instead we often seem to rely on adaption to existing ground conditions, there is an Oct 06 document that may still be floating around on CALL which covers an analysis of a battalion planning process. There are some points worth considering in there, despite the obvious influence of the MBA types Here is a first hand account which might be of help in the analysis of the worth/lack of worth of portions of that planning process.

As with most things cookie cutter solutions do not work everywhere and as you know even better than I, we are playing for all of the marbles everytime we step onto a battlefield, even with the benefit of that 'sure-fire plan'.

Regards,

Steve

[Ken White]

Realistic training is more important than high dollar weapons systems; getting a consensus on what is realistic training however is always tough.

I don't think realism in training is nearly as important as complete training -- realism is nice and makes a difference but when we leave out most of the basics because they're hard to train and don't produce good looking go rates or scores, all the realism in the world in what little is trained will not help much. We spend half the time on initial entry training, officer and enlisted of most western Armies and it shows...

There is consensus on what those basics are; we just tab a lot of them from the institution out to units where many things get forgotten or not done due to the alligators wandering about. The consequence is a group of marginally trained 2LTs and Troops and a lack of willingness to trust them on the part of Commanders plus a lack of trust of all subordinates due to that known training shortfall...

Keeping in mind that we do not have a habit of religiously following doctrine and instead we often seem to rely on adaption to existing ground conditions, there is an Oct 06 document that may still be floating around on CALL which covers an analysis of a battalion planning process. There may be some points worth considering in there, despite the obvious influence of the MBA types

The Battalion planning process is not a problem; that can be done by the Bn Cdr on the fly -- unless one is more concerned with form than function.

As with most things cookie cutter solutions do not work everywhere and as you know even better than I, we are playing for all of the marbles everytime we step onto a battlefield, even with the benefit of that 'sure-fire plan'.

I read that when it was first posted. Agree with parts, disagree with parts. Planning is vastly over rated; one does not have time to do that bureaucratic foolishness in a war of movement. Emphasis on the process merely breeds bad habits that will hurt us later, mark my words.

You're correct on the cookie cutter not being adaptable to the US Army. Yet, we continually try to force mediocrity on everyone. It's frustrating.

We have to KNOW what to do -- and it isn't that hard. Fighting wars, as they say, is not Rocket Science. Trying to make it complicated to dazzle the uninitiated only befuddles things.

Sorry if this is abrupt; you hit a sore spot. We spend entirely too much time on processes and not enough on the product. We train better than we ever have in many respects but there are still some glaring shortfalls -- that get people killed. As does the concern for form over function, that and stupid turf battles.

[Bill Moore]

Ken, "Hearts and Minds" and "Carrots and Sticks" are overly simplistic and often misunderstood and misapplied. Unfortunately "hearts and minds" is too often interpreted as some politically correct feel good crap, and carrots and sticks while understood almost always turns out to be nothing but carrots when put into practice. However, when the phrases are correctly understood they can be useful guidelines to developing your strategy.

Frequently strategists define the center of gravity as the will to fight, while I don't think it is that simple, I do think that is critically important. How do you influence their will their fight?

If we're the counterinsurgent, then winning hearts means convincing the populace that their interests are best served if we win. This requires a considerable amount of information engagement to clearly deliniate the differences between an insurgent and government victory to the target audience. They don't have to love us, but they need to understand an insurgent victory will be a less desirable outcome. Relating back to Jone's Populace Centric Engagement argument, if we can't convince them that this is the case, then we probably can't win without employing draconian measures.

Winnng minds means convincing the populace that we're going to win both the short and long term fight. The short term fight means we can protect them from insurgent coercion, and the long term fight means they know we're going to go the distance and do what it takes to win. If they think otherwise, then it would be to their benefit to support the insurgency since they will continue to live there regardless of who wins.

Written by Mike,

Love that last line, Ken.....Far away and long ago, lots of hamlets in various provinces where economic prosperity seemed almost incongruous (indicators include power tillers having replaced buffalo, proliferation of well-built, new stucco houses, etc. )--Yet they remained insecure to the GVN...VCI ran the hamlets, usually in tandem with the menacing effect of a nearby enemy base area. (one example, southern panhandle of my first province, Tay Ninh, with NVA base area across the border in Svay Rieng)...

We failed to protect the populace, you can't win their hearts our minds unless we do. This is my biggest beef with our Civil Affairs folks, they do great work, and their projects make excellent Kodak Picture moments with smiling kids standing around the new school, etc., but it doesn't mean anything if we don't continue to exert continued presence in that area to ensure that the populace is protected and that they answer to State Law, not insurgent law.

This involves tough love, aggressive tactics, and higher risk operations (more exposure to attack).

Actually, in Malaya the British -- correctly -- first went after the CTs and removed their ability to terrorize minds; then they terrorized the Malays and the Chinese civilians not playing CT by virtually eliminating Civil Rights and moving the majority of them into 'New Villages.' There was no winning of hearts and the minds involved were coerced, not coaxed.

I don't think they terrorized the Malays, but they did control them so they could eliminate the threat. War is tough, I think the measures that were taken were effective and I think they are in line with the hearts and minds concept. That approach won't work in most countries, the tactics you use to control the populace must be based on local factors.

""People will act in their perceived self interest and they will follow their heart -- but they will not let you win that heart. Nor do you need to...""

We have to find what their self interests are and show how a government victory is better aligns with those interests than an insurgent victory. If you don't do that you may have to do a lot more killing, which in the information age is not generally a feasible course of action.

[Surferbeetle]

We failed to protect the populace, you can't win their hearts our minds unless we do. This is my biggest beef with our Civil Affairs folks, they do great work, and their projects make excellent Kodak Picture moments with smiling kids standing around the new school, etc., but it doesn't mean anything if we don't continue to exert continued presence in that area to ensure that the populace is protected and that they answer to State Law, not insurgent law.

Bill,

What the American taxpayer is looking for is a low cost solution to his problem in country X, or even better yet no problem in country X. SOF are there to see if they can prevent or resolve problems by working with the local culture to provide an acceptable and long term solution.

Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services when provided by local people provide long term solutions. If we are taking the lead on population security or building new schools, providing government services, etc. then the solutions that we are providing are not reaching the 'hearts and minds' that we are aiming at, nor are they long term. Nobody likes charity. What people are looking for is a partner to commiserate with, perhaps teach them a few things, and to help them out of a bind.

Admiral Olson gave an interesting talk at the CNAS which spoke to the importance of the ability of being able to provide both direct and indirect solutions. He is able to address this concept better than I can.

Steve

[Ken White]

I don't think we're in much disagreement at all. My comments to which you refer were made four weeks ago but I haven't changed my mind on any of them and I don't think any -- other than a semantic quibble about 'hearts' -- dispute what you say.

[Bill Moore]

Population Security, Good Governance, and Government Services when provided by local people provide long term solutions.

This is granted, but there are two concerns here.

1. When we're in the lead, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan (armed nation building vice COIN), then we are the ones who have to initiate and execute the strategy. The first goal is to gain some semblance of stability, then transition to a HN lead. That takes time, sometimes a lot of time......

2. When we're truly conducting FID by providing assistance to the HN, and the HN is in the lead the "hearts and minds" concepts still apply (even more so), and we as advisors must push, nudge, cajole, our partners to pursue an appropriate strategy that takes these concepts into consideration.

The idea applies to whoever the counterinsurgent is (HN preferably, or in rare cases us).

Ken, I misunderstood your comments.