What caused the Yom Kippur / October 1973 War?

[JD]

The war of October 1973 is generally portrayed as a move by Arab states to regain territory lost to Israel in 1967. However, after even a little research, this seems simplistic. There are obviously underlying animosities that extend back to at least WW2 and possibly to biblical times but I can't help but feel that 1973 was about breaking from history rather than continuing it. Was Sadat simply attempting to reinstate his territory and with it national honour or was he attempting to realign his nation with the US in an attempt to secure better economic and development prospects? Did Syria really want to overrun Israel or was it used by Sadat? What role did an engrained sense of honour and justice play in Arab motivations? Did the Soviets or the Americans encourage the war as part of a broader superpower struggle?

I would be interested in any insights anyone would have as I think it is difficult to discern the facts when looking through the lenses of either the contemporary cold war or the current war on terror. Understanding this conflict better may help explain the current situation.

I look forward to your replies.

JD

[Tom Odom]

JD

I used to teach this war at Leavenworth with Dr. George Gawrych. There are levels of understanding as you survey the literature and you have to compare works. The Arabs and the Israelis I taught enjoyed the course ---great debates, noo fist fights--because it exposed them to a variety of works they had not seen.

As for Sadat, he had many goals but the strategic was proving that Egypt was a credible threat and that permanent occupation of Sinai was not possible. Shazli's book is probably the best on this but there is much myth attached and embedded in it.

Syrian goals were similar, targeted toward the Golan, but I believe more radical had they succeeded in breaking through. And they nearly did, as my Isareli students echoed.


Look at Geeorge Gawrych's Leavenworth Paper #21

Here is an intro:

SYNOPSIS OF LEAVENWORTH PAPER 21
Armies appear to learn more form defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967.
This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt’s president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain superior success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance.
The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.

From there broaden out using the bibligrpahy in the LP.

Best

Tom

[JD]

Thanks Tom,
As always, this is excellent.

JD

[Culpeper]

Cold War was a secondary cause or an enabler?

[Tom Odom]

Cold War was a secondary cause or an enabler?

Enabler which almost became a direct extension. Sadat threw the Soviet advisors out as he readied for war. They did not believe the Egyptians could cross the canal.

Best

Tom

[charter6]

First post, but I've been a longtime reader of all these threads.

I think there was a rather fundamental difference between the way Syria and Egypt went about achieving their respective war aims.

Egypt crossed the canal, dug in, and waited for the counter-attack. I think it would be very difficult to credibly suggest that Egypt ever planned to threaten Israeli population centers. The Egyptian goal was to demonstrate to the Israelis that continued occupation of the Sinai would not be possible in the long-term; that it was contestable and that the Egyptian government had the political will and military ability to contest it.

The Syrians showed themselves to be much more ambitious from the get-go. The original Syrian war plan called for commando drops to the rear of the Golan, these were scrapped for political reasons, but the political implications are clear -- Syria wanted the ability to threaten Israel proper. While the Syrian political objective may have been to get the Golan back, the Syrian advance was nothing like the Egyptian one -- it looked much more like a conventional invasion rather than the lure into attritional combat that the Egyptian advance was.