Wrong agency when talking covert and again not to be confused with clandestine.Originally Posted by invictus0972
Best
Tom
Clandestine vs. Covert
So, NSA is clandestine, not covert? I never really thought of the semantic difference between the two. Is the overall point that the military is involved in strategic level intelligence, covert or clandestine, still valid?
Yes, the military widely collects strategic level intelligence. NSA's niche in this, of course, is SIGINT (and the cryptography necessary to exploit what it collects, plus the mandate to maintain the security of USG communications).
In popular culture, however, I'm struck at how NSA is so often (mis)portrayed as a super-secret version of the CIA, a sort of men-in-black stereotype.
The real men in black, of course, protect us from alien invasion...
Neither, "clan" is HUMINT is and the services and the CIA do that. Covert is black paramilitary as in ops in OEF I. As Rex states NSA is SIGINT all forms, Hollywood loves to play the N Such Agency game and assign it roles and functions it does not do. Certainly the services are involved in strat intel but NSA does not have a management function beyong SIGINT.
Best
Tom
Invictus,
I'd love to tell you the truth about all this stuff, but then I'd have to kill you.(old intel joke)
All of the services have uniformed folks doing work for the various three letter national intel agencies. They all also have their own internal strategic intel shops. However, that said, I'm not sure that you and I have the same understanding of what strategic intelligence is.
I tend to very much agree with you here Adrian, and I particularly like your proposal of reactivating the USIA - with its chain of command going straight to the President and bypassing everyone else. But as I have been thinking about this, I am reminded of Rob Thornton's proposal on one of the other threads for a new SOE-type agency (that part may or may not be necessary for the role you propose in bring back the USIA) that is low on hierarchy and high on individual initiative and the creation of netowrks of contacts. SOE, of course, was highly involved in IO, but as Selil observed, much of the process of SC is similar to that of IO, just sort of in reverse. That sort of model may have some real potential for SC.
Rex, I am rather dubious about both the effectiveness and even the true loyalties of the Men In Black (and the fact that they seem to work hand-in-glove with the Men in (Little) White (Coats) - with butterfly nets:The real men in black, of course, protect us from alien invasion...
Last edited by Norfolk; 12-28-2007 at 10:40 PM.
What's the scoop on the CTCC?
The CTCC is intended to be a small, collaborative, interagency resource with a daily mission of providing the intellectual leadership necessary for countering terrorist ideology and extremist propaganda through coordinated messages.
We need a Domestic Digital Outreach Team.
Indeed. Consider the USMC Strategic Communications Plan, released in July of this year:
http://www.usmc.mil/directiv.nsf/56e...9?OpenDocument
The USMC, for its part, makes a distinction between:
1. "Key Audiences" - both present and potential members of the Marine Corps and their kith and kin; Congress, and Officer of SECDEF.
2. "Targeted Areas of Influence" - Mass Media; "New" Media; Third-Party Spokepersons; and finally Academia.
All of the objects of SC, curiously, are identified as domestic - there appears to be not one word about foreign audiences or targets.
According to the document, "Strategic Communications activities are planned and conducted at the Service level." Furthermore, "There is only one Strategic Communication Plan for the United States Marine Corps." (Boldface original). The Marines have clearly got the message about SC, and have determined that Service Level is the proper place to conduct SC. Given the problems that would follow from an attempt to combine all the Services' SC in one agency, together with the SC of other USG agencies, perhaps a Cabinet-level director to oversee and attempt to provide at least a minimal level of coordination might be a way to go.
This may, or may not, be related to the fact that the NSA's existence was classified til...1975 or so, no?Yes, the military widely collects strategic level intelligence. NSA's niche in this, of course, is SIGINT (and the cryptography necessary to exploit what it collects, plus the mandate to maintain the security of USG communications).
In popular culture, however, I'm struck at how NSA is so often (mis)portrayed as a super-secret version of the CIA, a sort of men-in-black stereotype.
The real men in black, of course, protect us from alien invasion...
Been to Fort Meade lately ?
Been to Fort Meade lately ? If so, which side of the highway did you visit ?
Little has changed since 75 and rightfully so !
Strategic Communications and Economic Warfare
While we discuss military or political control of a strategic communications system, I think we should not lose sight of the private, commercial aspect of strategic communications:
MTV in the Middle East
While the writer of the blog perceives the necessary decrease in human flesh and other aspects of MTV programming as hypocritical, what I see is the underground communication of a message through a commercial entity.
While I wrote this piece: The Hidden War - Send them Levis as a mixed discussion on economic warfare and "the message", I believe it reflects an idea that we should always keep in mind: our private, commercial entities represent one of our strongest and most capable sources of "the message". Privately funded.
I posited the theory that, along with some basic economic pressures and military, the USSR collapsed with the final weight of the black market. Not just because it took money out of the state run economy and placed it in the hands of individuals, but because the products themselves were the message. Levis, pepsi and Michael Jackson (at the time). Music. Red, white and blue cans, and quintessentially American culture in a pair of jeans.The media does not talk about it as part of the war because they don't understand it either. They think of war like most people think of war: explosions, soldiers, bullets, wounded and dead. In this case, in the war you don't know exists, the wounded and dying are idealogues and ideologies. The weapons are wallets, credit cards and cash. The Bullets are western products through which western ideas are infiltrated into states, societies and cultures. The Atomic Bomb is the interglobal communications networks represented by cell phones, internet and satellite dishes.
It's the message of freedom, democracy and capitalism. The thing that the Al Qaida/Qutb ideologues fear the most. And it arrives via satellite dish on MTV.
Kat-Missouri
First, we have Domestic Digital Outreach, and you mentioned in a later post State's DipNote. This is run under PA and not PD and therefore aimed at you and me. Second, let's now forget the President's Press Secretary and all of her/his resources, DoD's Outreach (passive and active), and all the other public affairs / public relations units in the rest of USG. (Don't forget DoA's, among others, video press releases while you're at it.)
My $0.02 is Adrian's on the ball, as usual. The advantage of USIA was, of course, its independence. Putting such an operation under DoS makes it susciptible to short-term needs and desires that are too often at odds with the long term needs of psychological struggles. DoS is also incredibly dysfunctional and has a proven inability to adapt to the world that's more like the 1940's and 1950's than the 1980's and 1990's for which it is configured for (albeit poorly). Nevermind the requirements of the 21st Century, which is in part the heart of this thread.
Putting it under DoD a) emphasizes our miltiary and b) prevents a persistent presence and encourages a short-term focus. In the first, do we want to represent the U.S. through our military? Today, American public diplomacy wears combat boots, want to dispute that? Is this the best or appropriate image for the United States? The military, absent a significant shift, is not focused on the long haul through rotations and focus on warfighting.
The enemy can lie, we cannot not. We must have the trust of the audience, they do not. To establish trust, we need a long focus. To build relations, "we" need independence of shifting agendas.
Kehenry: "It's the message of freedom, democracy and capitalism. The thing that the Al Qaida/Qutb ideologues fear the most"
I disagree. The thing they fear most is literate Muslims who actually read the Koran, the Hadith, and even Qutb, as well as Muslims who actually have options. General Doug Stone is demonstrating this in his detainee operations in Iraq and Iraqis are showing this around Iraq. Afghanis are also demonstrating the same.
I'd agree with MR on this one, at least in the short term (say, 2 generations). In the long term (3+ generations), it will be a combination of the two in the form of a literate middle class that is theologically sophisticated, although I doubt that it will look much like the US republican system.
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Qutb
Well, I got the idea based on the writings of Qutb. which is interesting considering his rather revolutionary ideas that men don't need leaders or mullahs to know Allah. You could almost feel sympathetic revolutionary tendencies towards the idea since it reflects our own reformation. Except for the part where he then talks about having to destroy the west because it's ideas transmitted through our capitalist relationships with Islamic nations was causing the ideas of materialism, freedom and democracy (the three demonic minions of Great Satan) to infiltrate the Ummah, splitting good Muslims from the worship of Allah and the right path.
Then there was that whole thing about people of all faiths and nations naturally finding the right way to worship Allah if they were only told. With the conflicting concept that there was only one way to read the Qu'ran and anyone who didn't know the right way or followed the other sixteen schools of jurisprudence were actually takfiri and apostates.
Of course, it does reflect the idea that, if young Muslims read the Qu'ran without "proper direction" they might have their own ideas about religion. But isn't that the problem now? You know that Qutb was listed as a heretic at the Cairo University for doing just that.
The irony is interesting.
I don't think, though, that it precludes the ideas that, yes, indeed, democracy, freedom and capitalism aren't an effective message against radicalism.
Kat-Missouri
Sunnism and DOD
I have also noticed a similarity between Sunni/Salafist and Reformation ecclesiology. Perhaps this is another example of the dangers of too much individual religious interpretation!
Concerning some of the comments on SC, I still believe there needs to be a DOD level organization for organizing the SC of all of the core competencies of each branch of the military services. As I understand things, this was one of the reasons the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) was established in 2001. There is so much involved in IO across all the various branches that higher level coordination is necessary. I know this is occurring already, but it seems to me it should occur through a formal department.
I don't think, though, that it precludes the ideas that, yes, indeed, democracy, freedom and capitalism aren't an effective message against radicalism.We are here to help the Vietnamese, because inside every gook there is an American trying to get out. It's a hardball world, son. We've gotta keep our heads until this peace craze blows over.
I do think that democracy, capitalism, and freedom are good things. But the world is not flat, blue jeans did not win the Cold War, materialism will not save us, and all three of those very fine things mean very different things to different people, even in America.
DipNote makes a poor subsitute for an OWI
Back when we declared wars we had Office of Strategic Services Morale Operations providing products to make the enemy despair and an Office of War Information providing products to make the Americans persevere. Many people think we could really use products like the OWI produced, and since .gov/.mil can't/won't, volunteer counterpropagandists/cheerleaders attempt it.
All the other public affairs / public relations units do not address national will, nor, realistically, can they.
Are you seriously suggesting the President's Press Secretary is not about influencing the national will? Rumsfeld's press briefings were not about influencing will?
Unless I'm misunderstanding your statement, what you're really talking about is the failure to put together and follow a coherent and flexible and adaptable communications plan. What we've seen from USG is a brittle plan of "let us worry about the big bad guy" without a serious attempt to recruit the people? Reliance on the monolithic enemy has forced the Administration to adjust its message as the enemy transformed.
Hmmm.... could there be a cycling analogy in here? Lots of little peddle strokes -- i.e. high cadence -- means you can quickly and adroitly adapt to changing terrain. A big slow mashing style means slow adjustment. The enemy is Lance Armstrong and the U.S. is Jan Ulrich (w/ the baggage)?
I don't consider Perino and Rumsfeld public affairs / public relations units
Obviously the President and his political operatives will attempt to make the best use of the bully pulpit they can. Rumsfeld's press briefings were definitely about influencing will. The InterAgency and service PA/PR units are less about bolstering the will of the American people to support the war and more about bolstering the will of Congress to fund the organizations they represent. They really can't get too boisterous in their cheer-leading for fear of offending powerful purse-string holders who seek to undermine support for the war.
Civil servants and career military officers usually attempt to maintain at least a facade of non-partisan professionalism and can't be the people overtly cheer-leading for a war half their political masters oppose. The struggle over bolstering or undermining national will is an internal political one. Approval ratings = freedom of action.
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