Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread)

[Maximus]

While I don't pretend to be an expert on anthropology, counterinsurgency, Dr. Price, LtCol Nagl, proper documenting methods, Chicago Press, etc., I do have a bit of a clue on how the doctrine process works in the Marine Corps. This said, the simple fact that we have a new counterinsurgency doctrine is in many ways a miracle, especially one that was blessed so quickly by the USMC and US Army! Since publication this new doctrine has already had profound impacts on the training and education process, not to mention the conduct of U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Everyday that the authors could have spent double and triple checking sources, re-wording footnotes, bibliography, etc., is one more day that this mission critical publication would not have been where it needed to be--in the hands of those executing COIN or preparing to execute.

The previous post mentioned that it won't be long before we have quality control circles looking at publications down to the rifle squad level. Maybe. The sad reality is that the vast majority of our publications haven't been updated in more than 20 years because there's usually a 30+ step process before a new reference, warfighting or doctrinal publication is released. While I'm all for accuracy and legitimacy in writing, there's also an element of timeliness that must be met so that slow moving military and government bureaucracies can get the ship headed in the right direction. LtCol Nagl highlights well in Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife that permanent change in western militaries normally requires a new "doctrinal" publication to justify the change. From my perspective, this is a very true statement.

One more thought on the subject... the Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency was put together by 5-10 different people, reviewed by about 10-20 more and then put to print in mass quantity all in a less than 8-month period due to some very high level general officers forcing this book (made to fit in a cargo pocket) through the normal doctrine process. I remember a few days after the pub was released when a person from the USMC doctrine division said that it should have never been published because of the way Dr. Kilcullen phrased Rule #19 Engage the women, beware the children (I think it was covet the women, beware the children initially... I could be wrong here)... anyway, the Small Unit Leader's Guide to COIN has been atop the Marine Forces Central Command reading list for all Marines ever since it was released. Along with the Anbar Awakening, bold and decisive leadership from warriors like Col McFarland, Capt Patriquin, LtCol Alford and many others, I know that FM 3-24 and the Small Unit Leader's Guide to COIN have played an integral role in the changing security environment in Anbar and throughout Iraq as a whole.

In sum, Iraq isn't Harvard or Yale or Foreign Affairs magazine. Therefore, I don't care much about documentation. Get the information in our warriors hands as fast as possible so that we can learn and adapt faster than our enemies.

[marct]

Hi Maximus,

....This said, the simple fact that we have a new counterinsurgency doctrine is in many ways a miracle, especially one that was blessed so quickly by the USMC and US Army! Since publication this new doctrine has already had profound impacts on the training and education process, not to mention the conduct of U.S. forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. Everyday that the authors could have spent double and triple checking sources, re-wording footnotes, bibliography, etc., is one more day that this mission critical publication would not have been where it needed to be--in the hands of those executing COIN or preparing to execute.

I would hope that anyone with two neurons to rub together would agree with your point that the primary aim of any FM is to get doctrine into the hands of the troops as quickly as possible. Furthermore, I totally agree that a lot of citations and footnotes are, in all probability, an interference with an FM as a training document. This is one of the reasons why I totally agree with Adam's comment that there should have been two versions - one with and one without citations.

Let me, for the moment, bring out another aspect to doctrinal writing that hasn't received as much emphasis as it should. It is my understanding, and please correct me if I am wrong, that part of the function of doctrinal writing is to define an "operational reality", i.e. what to look for, how to react to these perceptions and, most importantly, why. In effect, doctrine is applied theory; "praxis" in academic-speak. If this is the case, then doctrine plays an important role in professional military education. It is this function of doctrine that I see as being a very good reason for having a "critical edition" of doctrine available (i.e. full citations, etc.).

The previous post mentioned that it won't be long before we have quality control circles looking at publications down to the rifle squad level.

I'm going to take this on a (somewhat) academic tangent . First, when Ken mentioned Taylor, I really had to laugh since Taylor actually took many of his ideas, filtered 3rd and 4th hand (without citations ), from the beginnings of modern warfare going back to William the Silent and Maurice of Nassau. Second, Demming actually got a lot of his ideas from Mao via, in part, the 1st Marine Raider BTN. The idea of using quality control circles, or some modern variant of them, is actually not too bad. In some ways, the SWC is just a giant quality control circle, as are many of the informal communications networks that exist.

That being said, let's take it back to doctrine and FM 3-24. A good critical edition of FM 3-24 would serve as a solid basis for for the development of expansions to, and specific applications of counter-insurgency operations. I believe that is one of the reasons why we saw the use of paradoxes in the manual. I am not saying that the critical edition should have come first, just that it should be there. One final comment and then I'll leave off: I fully expect that the authors of the manual draft chapters included references in their drafts, and I would ask that anyone on the SWC who was an author or reviewer if this was so. If it was, then the production of a critical edition of FM 3-24 could have been produced at the same time as the regular edition.

Marc

[SteveMetz]

Furthermore, I totally agree that a lot of citations and footnotes are, in all probability, an interference with an FM as a training document. This is one of the reasons why I totally agree with Adam's comment that there should have been two versions - one with and one without citations.

The thing is, though, that by far the major source for doctrine is the collective experience of the community of practice, not the work of scholars. The primary method of establishing validity in document is the extensive vetting process, not reflection of an existing body of published scholarship. So I'm just not sure what the value of a "critical edition" would be.

To beat my dead horse a little more, for Dr. Price to criticize the doctrine for a paucity of citations would be the same as the doctrine writers criticizing him for not vetting his critical essay with them. It would be unreasonable for doctrine writers to expect a scholar to follow their method of establishing validity just as it is unreasonable for Price to expect doctrine writers to follow his method of establishing validity (while again noting that Price's questioning the scholarship of the manual was a red herring since what he was really concerned with was propagating his personal political ideology).

I suspect that the lesson future doctrine writers may draw from this little episode is that the "value added" of trying to integrate scholarly work isn't worth the hassle.

[Rex Brynen]

Since we're beating dead horses..

None of the verbatim borrowings from scholars are big ideas--they're simply textbook-type statements of core concepts. I haven't been suggesting that a Field Manual be footnoted (only arguing that "we don't do notes" isn't an effective defence in a document that, even in its non UChicago military form, does have notes and quotation marks).

More important, it wouldn't have taken more than an hour to rewrite the key concepts in original language, and avoid the entire "FM 3-24 is plagiarized" charge.

OK, I think I've really killed my horse now

[SteveMetz]

OK, I think I've really killed my horse now

When I taught at Leavenworth in the late '80s, there was a sign in one of my classrooms that read, "No horse is so dead that it can't be beaten a little more."

[marct]

Hi Steve,

The thing is, though, that by far the major source for doctrine is the collective experience of the community of practice, not the work of scholars.

Point taken, at least in the general case. But how about the specific case of FM 3-24 and, especially, chapter 3? Yes, I agree that the community of practice provides the source of collective experience but, I think in the specific case of chapter 3 of FM 3-24, the scholarship was providing a specific set of concepts to discuss this collective experience. In effect, it was establishing part of the "universe of discourse" as an interface between the scholarly world and the community of practice.

Let me just bring out one example where I think the idea of a critical edition would be useful.

Counterinsurgency Manual, section 3-51: Cultural Forms(1)

"A ritual is a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects performed to influence supernatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interest."

Unacknowledged Source:

Religious ritual is "a stereotyped sequence of activities involving gestures, words, and objects, performed in a sequestered place, and designed to influence preternatural entities or forces on behalf of the actors' goals and interests." (Turner, Victor. W. "Symbols in African Ritual". In J. Dolgin, et al., eds., Symbolic Anthropology. Columbia Univ. Press, 1977. P. 2.)

Now, I have done a lot of work with Victor Turner's ideas on ritual and, especially, on extending his formulation of rites of passage theory beyond the generally "religious" context (2). More importantly, the current version is quite limited; Turner was brilliant, and this doesn't even begin to touch his insights on ritual. By not having the citation available, people who are interested in ritual (like this thread) have to rely on either finding someone who does know the area and will talk about it or doing their own research without much of a starting point.

The primary method of establishing validity in document is the extensive vetting process, not reflection of an existing body of published scholarship. So I'm just not sure what the value of a "critical edition" would be.

Agreed on the vetting process as the main source of validity, although I would also suggest that that is for preliminary validity, and the post-publication validity would be established through, as it were, field trials . As I said, I think the value of a critical edition would be primarily in the area of professional military education and in the subsequent expansion of doctrine - not in the specific training function.

I suspect that the lesson future doctrine writers may draw from this little episode is that the "value added" of trying to integrate scholarly work isn't worth the hassle.

Agreed, and it is one of the major reasons why I am rather angry with his article. I believe that it probably will have this effect; an effect that will

1. only serve to polarize an already existing division, and
2. be a disservice to both the Military and Anthropology.

I will continue to believe that it is worth the hassle to integrate scholarly work into doctrine but, as Stan has occasionally noted, I am a hopeless romantic (3).

Marc

*****
The Critical Edition (4)
Endnotes:

1. Price, David, Pilfered Scholarship Devastates General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Manual, Counterpunch, October 30th, 2007 available at http://www.counterpunch.org/price10302007.html dl: Nov 4, 2007

2. Tyrrell, Marc W.D. "At the Cusp of the Information Age: Outplacement as a Rite of Passage in Late 20th Century Canada." Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Carleton University, Ottawa. available upon request.

3. Stan, post at SWC, September 25, 2007 available at http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...4&postcount=44 dl: Nov 4, 2007

4.

[marct]

on the current to and fro.

Nagl Responds to Price

Our good friends at Small Wars Journal have provided another forum for discussion of David Price’s article on plagiarism and Field Manual 3-24, aka the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Lt. Col. John Nagl, one of the manual’s authors, has published a piece at SWJ directly responding to Price.

[Ken White]

We all know that but even the Forces occasionally succumb to the siren lure of 'process.' Seemingly forgetting every few years that form over function is antithetical to success in combat.

...
. . .
... It is this function of doctrine that I see as being a very good reason for having a "critical edition" of doctrine available (i.e. full citations, etc.).

We can disagree on that. I think the process of producing the document and compiling and annotating and filing the references to include detailed cites is adequate. Seems to me your approach would add to costs with no tangible benefit to the doctrinal producer. Admittedly, such an approach would be an asset to scholars but I submit that's an ancillary effect not justifying the expense of tax dollars -- or effort on the part of the developers..

...First, when Ken mentioned Taylor, I really had to laugh since Taylor actually took many of his ideas, filtered 3rd and 4th hand (without citations ), from the beginnings of modern warfare going back to William the Silent and Maurice of Nassau. Second, Demming actually got a lot of his ideas from Mao via, in part, the 1st Marine Raider BTN...

Why do you think Ken mentioned those two? You may not have known or may have forgotten to add that "their ideas" were rolled back into military training (and not just in the US) with poor modifications in the 70s and 80s, much to the detriment of said training. Great detriment...

Much 'modern' management theory actually was developed in the US in the 1940-45 time frame by the armed forces and industry for the worldwide conduct of the war. After the war, industry continued to adapt it and then some of the civilian Educational Specialists hired by DoD and the services reinvented the wheel by 'introducing' these techniques in the service schools in the 70s -- not realizing that many of the precepts had been modified to maximize profit and lessen costs. Need in industry, dangerous in combat. Thus the Armed forces of the US began to teach what to think instead of how to think.

...The idea of using quality control circles, or some modern variant of them, is actually not too bad. In some ways, the SWC is just a giant quality control circle, as are many of the informal communications networks that exist.

With the note that SWC is an informal 'QC' of sorts -- and thus works simply because it has not been institutionalized, we again disagree. That too has been done with almost ludicrous effects; I've seen it attempted in the training institutions and on high level staffs. The effort has merit where widgets are made and a tax write off can occur if they are improperly assembled -- it has less merit where unnecessary deaths can recur from cockamamie ideas. That doesn't even address the problem of convincing a crusty flag officer that a group of lesser mortals has determined his idea in not sound...

The second point is not trues in all cases, in those where it is, it needs to be corrected; no question the services are too heirarchical in many respects. However, the first is the real problem.

Fortunately, the experimentation with Deming et.al, QC and such like seems to have run its faddish course. Before QC we had Organizational Development (O.D) and then Organizational Effectiveness (O.E.). My fear was that the next step would be O.F. -- organizational failure -- and we almost achieved that.

[marct]

Hi Ken,

We can disagree on that. I think the process of producing the document and compiling and annotating and filing the references to include detailed cites is adequate. Seems to me your approach would add to costs with no tangible benefit to the doctrinal producer. Admittedly, such an approach would be an asset to scholars but I submit that's an ancillary effect not justifying the expense of tax dollars -- or effort on the part of the developers..

It might and you are quite right that it may just be my academic biases at work. Again, I would like to know, in this particular case, if there were cites in the original drafts. If there were, and they were later edited out for training clarity, then the time and effort to add them back in for a critical edition, such as the U of C one, would be minimal.

Why do you think Ken mentioned those two? You may not have known or may have forgotten to add that "their ideas" were rolled back into military training (and not just in the US) with poor modifications in the 70s and 80s, much to the detriment of said training. Great detriment...

Because he is a really smart dude who knows his history ? I did know that they had been brought back in, but I wasn't sure when. I also knew, at least from the Canadian side, that they had been butchered almost beyond recognition.

With the note that SWC is an informal 'QC' of sorts -- and thus works simply because it has not been institutionalized, we again disagree. That too has been done with almost ludicrous effects; I've seen it attempted in the training institutions and on high level staffs. The effort has merit where widgets are made and a tax write off can occur if they are improperly assembled -- it has less merit where unnecessary deaths can recur from cockamamie ideas. That doesn't even address the problem of convincing a crusty flag officer that a group of lesser mortals has determined his idea in not sound...

I didn't know that it had been tried - thanks for letting me know . BTW, I do agree that most of the attempts at institutionalization I have run across, mainly in private industry, have been abject failures (if anyone really wants the cites, I can get them ).

Fortunately, the experimentation with Deming et.al, QC and such like seems to have run its faddish course. Before QC we had Organizational Development (O.D) and then Organizational Effectiveness (O.E.). My fear was that the next step would be O.F. -- organizational failure -- and we almost achieved that.

Oh, yeah, business fads come and go. I keep hoping and praying that we as a species can develop some type of institutional form that focuses on integrating results and theory. I'm still waiting...

[Ken White]

...
It might and you are quite right that it may just be my academic biases at work. Again, I would like to know, in this particular case, if there were cites in the original drafts. If there were, and they were later edited out for training clarity, then the time and effort to add them back in for a critical edition, such as the U of C one, would be minimal.

Those and any copyright releases will be in the Background File and were almost certainly not included in the Drafts. I strongly believe that the inclusion of references and notes excessively enlarge and complicate doctrinal material and that such inclusion should be totally avoided. In my experience, the Army is pretty punctilious about such stuff.

I suspect the major issue here is essentially political, is very much predicated on the fact that several contributors have advanced degrees and that the U of Chicago sought or was sought to publish a 'civilian' edition. Why the Manual wasn't simply okayed for release by the GPO or picked up by Praeger or one of the publishers who specialize in such stuff I don't know. Maybe because someone got stooopid?

...I also knew, at least from the Canadian side, that they had been butchered almost beyond recognition.

Same down here. It almost seemed they picked out the bad to implement while discarding the good...

... BTW, I do agree that most of the attempts at institutionalization I have run across, mainly in private industry, have been abject failures (if anyone really wants the cites, I can get them ).

Yet, the seekers of Nirvana press on. Are Consultancy and Snake Oil related...

Oh, yeah, business fads come and go. I keep hoping and praying that we as a species can develop some type of institutional form that focuses on integrating results and theory. I'm still waiting...

Me, too. Sigh...

[marct]

I suspect the major issue here is essentially political, is very much predicated on the fact that several contributors have advanced degrees and that the U of Chicago sought or was sought to publish a 'civilian' edition. Why the Manual wasn't simply okayed for release by the GPO or picked up by Praeger or one of the publishers who specialize in such stuff I don't know. Maybe because someone got stooopid?

Could be !

It almost seemed they picked out the bad to implement while discarding the good...

One thing I find fascinating is the backflow. I remember spending 20 minutes trying to explain to a very intelligence business colleague of mine what the differences were between Strategy, Operations and Tactics. Personally, I find the inclusion of military conceptualizations of organization, the 70's and 80's variety that is, to be totally counter-productive in any business that couldn't be fully automated.

Yet, the seekers of Nirvana press on. Are Consultancy and Snake Oil related...

Probably, although I hate to say it since one of my other hats is as a consultant .

Marc

[marct]

Hi Folks,

I'm wondering if it wouldn't be possible, and possibly profitable, to reframe the debate a touch. I'd like to toss out a few statements and see what people think about them.

1. Field manuals are designed for an audience that will apply their contents, whether it be a manual on how to repair a vehicle or a counter-insurgency manual. As such, their writing focus should, and must, be on the application of the knowledge contained in the manual and anything else is, for that audience, unimportant.

2. The subject matter of field manuals varies widely in terms of the predictive validity of the knowledge contained in the manual. In some cases, the knowledge should be prescriptive (i.e. do X, Y and Z and the equipment will work), while in other cases the knowledge should be either descriptive (i.e. this has worked in some situations) or attempting to produce highly interactive and adaptable courses of action in a broadly defined environment (sorry, can't come up with a single word for that).

3. The value add of references, citations, links to other sources in any format vary based on the nature of the knowledge presented.

• In cases where the writing is prescriptive, references, citations, etc. are just useless verbiage.
• In cases where the writing is descriptive, they may prove useful but could easily be in the form of an bibliography and reading list.
• In that third, unnamed, case they may be useless in the immediate form for training, but are quite useful for those who wish to go deeper into the subject since they help frame the debate.

4. Manual are NOT scholarly works but, in both the second and third case, contain or may contain scholarly elements.

5. Especially in that 3rd case, the scholarly elements contained in the work are likely to be part of ongoing debates with a low predictive value. In other words, since they can't be tested directly in many cases, they are interpretations. Being able to follow up on these debates, should individuals choose to do so, is valuable to the long term reworking of the doctrine.

Marc

[selil]

Would you footnote an operational order (tactical)? Doctrine from what I understand and the FM's specifically are the materials to write those orders from (strategic).

What is lost is the audience and the specific needs of the document. It's not for academics. It was released because academics wanted to read it. Now it is being judged not on it's merits or how it effects the audience but on an artificial expectation of academic citation. If it were cited in MLA (English) would it then be characterized as wrong by the APA5 (Psychology) crowd? If entire pages were ripped off from sources (above lets say 250 words) there would be a copyright violation. However, copyright and scholarship are NOT bound at the hip. In fact they could be considered mutually exclusive concerns since scholarship is exempt from most copyright by the fair use doctrine. Citation in academia is about attribution, claim of original authorship, proof of reflection on the science, and ability to recreate the study/science.

I can only see this being used in funny shaped building to drive more research to contractors and away from academia. I can see this as being used as a wedge for secrecy and used as a reason for less transparency. The obvious political punditry of Dr. Price may be heralded by his colleagues but the tone and tenor brings into question his actual goals. I wonder what Steven Aftergood would say about this... I'll think I'll ask him.

[Adam L]

Everyday that the authors could have spent double and triple checking sources, re-wording footnotes, bibliography, etc., is one more day that this mission critical publication would not have been where it needed to be--in the hands of those executing COIN or preparing to execute.

It does not take days to do this. If they had good research skills (I'm sure they did considering where their degrees are from) it is a simple matter. Also, they shouldn't have been doing it themselves. That's what interns are for. Also, if they had time to wait for comments on the manual they certainly had time for this. This FM was not turned out in such short order (3-8 weeks) that I could understand this justification. I don't have a problem with them quickly sending off a version to the troops, but before letting U of C publish it they should have polished things up and put in the citiations for them. This is not a matter of copyright law. It is a matter of plagarism.

The previous post mentioned that it won't be long before we have quality control circles looking at publications down to the rifle squad level. Maybe. The sad reality is that the vast majority of our publications haven't been updated in more than 20 years because there's usually a 30+ step process before a new reference, warfighting or doctrinal publication is released. While I'm all for accuracy and legitimacy in writing, there's also an element of timeliness that must be met so that slow moving military and government bureaucracies can get the ship headed in the right direction. LtCol Nagl highlights well in Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife that permanent change in western militaries normally requires a new "doctrinal" publication to justify the change. From my perspective, this is a very true statement.

Yes, accuracy can take a long time and we need to get manuals into the field. That's what "interim" manuals are for.

One more thought on the subject... the Small Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency was put together by 5-10 different people, reviewed by about 10-20 more and then put to print in mass quantity all in a less than 8-month period due to some very high level general officers forcing this book (made to fit in a cargo pocket) through the normal doctrine process. I remember a few days after the pub was released when a person from the USMC doctrine division said that it should have never been published because of the way Dr. Kilcullen phrased Rule #19 Engage the women, beware the children (I think it was covet the women, beware the children initially... I could be wrong here)... anyway, the Small Unit Leader's Guide to COIN has been atop the Marine Forces Central Command reading list for all Marines ever since it was released. Along with the Anbar Awakening, bold and decisive leadership from warriors like Col McFarland, Capt Patriquin, LtCol Alford and many others, I know that FM 3-24 and the Small Unit Leader's Guide to COIN have played an integral role in the changing security environment in Anbar and throughout Iraq as a whole.

8-months is a long time. Fine it was written by 5-10 people, but I'm sure each of them had a few research assistants. The research is the time consuming part, writing isn't. If it was written under such time pressure with so little review, then it almost immediately should have been re-anylized, edited and reviewed on a larger scale. This leading to a "revised" edition 3-6-18 months down the road. A revised version of "#19" along with all other possible mistakes should have been sent in memos to troops so they could correct their copies (as well as thier perception of that entry) until they recieved an updated version.

In sum, Iraq isn't Harvard or Yale or Foreign Affairs magazine. Therefore, I don't care much about documentation. Get the information in our warriors hands as fast as possible so that we can learn and adapt faster than our enemies.

A copy with documentation is necessary not only for ethical reasons, but also to allow those studying, or in the future revising it, to see the sources from which the authors drew their information. This will allow them to understand the authors thought process and conlusions. Without this it is difficult to understand why certain oppinions where reached.

Adam

[SteveMetz]

A copy with documentation is necessary not only for ethical reasons, but also to allow those studying, or in the future revising it, to see the sources from which the authors drew their information. This will allow them to understand the authors thought process and conlusions. Without this it is difficult to understand why certain oppinions where reached.

Adam

Well, as I suggested above, the primary source for doctrine is the collective wisdom of the community of practice as validated by vetting, not written sources. If it was up to me, I would have a bibliography but no foot- or endnotes. I think it's a mistake to give the impression that you're creating a work of scholarship if, in fact, you're not.

[Adam L]

Well, as I suggested above, the primary source for doctrine is the collective wisdom of the community of practice as validated by vetting, not written sources. If it was up to me, I would have a bibliography but no foot- or endnotes. I think it's a mistake to give the impression that you're creating a work of scholarship if, in fact, you're not.

Footnotes and endnotes have NOTHING to do with scholarship (other than that they are quite often neccesary for scholarship), they are simply a common method used to achieve clarity, depth as well attributions. Footnotes are used in a lot of ways. Put a bibliography in fine, but make sure you can reference it if anything specific is taken from a source.

Adam

[SteveMetz]

Footnotes and endnotes have NOTHING to do with scholarship (other than that they are quite often neccesary for scholarship), they are simply a common method used to achieve clarity, depth as well attributions. Footnotes are used in a lot of ways. Put a bibliography in fine, but make sure you can reference it if anything specific is taken from a source.

Adam

The key word there is "if." In doctrine, only a small portion of the information is taken from a discernible or discrete source. That's the point I've been trying to make--if you do, in fact, cite those few things that are citable, people outside the military community are going to be critical because so much of it is not cited. To me, that is not a flaw in the doctrine development process, but simply an indication that some in the scholarly world don't understand that process.

I think it's relevant here that the Army and Marine Corps, as institutions, are not responding to Dr. Price. John Nagl happens to care because he is both a scholar and a soldier. While I could be proven wrong, I don't think the Army and the Marine Corps as institutions given a gnat's posterior about what Dr. Price thinks.

This has struck a raw nerve with me because it is one element of a bigger issue: in order to grant degrees, military staff and war colleges have had to take on some of the trappings of academia. But because of their nature, they do it half way--they have to have "academic freedom" policies in order to get accredited, but they have subtle and not so subtle ways of enforcing a type of academic freedom that no civilian institution would tolerate. They require their students to do "research," but it's often research that no quality civilian graduate institution would accept.

Being caught in the middle of this, I wish the staff and war colleges would just stop trying to be ersatz universities and be what they are. The problem is that once one service started giving graduate degrees (and this means YOU, Naval War College), penis envy kicked in and the other ones had to follow. Basically, the Navy recognized that because of its deployment patterns, it was very hard for its officers to get advanced civilian degrees. This was seen to put them at a competitive disadvantage in higher level joint staffs. So the Naval War College became an accredited degree granting institution. So then all the rest had to follow.

The Army War College is a case in point. Something like 80% of our Army students come with a master's degree, but we insist on giving them another. I know lots of Army officers with 2, 3, even 4 master's degrees. In other words, there wasn't really a need for the degree but we couldn't have the Naval and Air war colleges giving master's degrees and us not. So that put us in a position of having to do things to get accredited which, in my opinion, did not contribute the professional education of senior military leaders.

OK, /rant.

[Adam L]

I've been re-reading this thread...

You wrote earlier that the "primary source for doctrine is collective wisdom of the community of practice." If the information/ideas in FM 3-24 were based on either a group's general knowledge/wisdom or were sufficiently original not to need citation or other attribution, or if releases were obtained, and if, as the U of Chigago ed. (at xlviii) states all copyrighted material is id'd with footnote and other sources are id'd in source notes, why didn't john Nagl just write about that in refuting Price? If a good faith effort was made to comply, and some citations were in fact missed, and picked up by a nit-picker in furtherance of another agenda... it happened.

Instead, Nagl's respone to Price in part tried to justify the failure to cite all sources as a matter of "societal" differences. The argument about not being an academic pursuit seems to lose some power given the number of non-military degrees held by those involved with FM 3-24. Nagl also writes that Field Manuals are not designed to be judged 'by the quality of thier sourcing' but instead of leaving it there, he goes on to write that because they are indended to be used by soldiers, "authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively. This is not the academic way, but soldiers are not academic; it is my understanding that htis longstanding practice in doctrine writing... is well within the provisions of "fair use" copyright law." If he had only bothered referencing where his understanding came from and how the Manual met with the it and/or the Army Publishing procedures (thanks, Rex) it would have been very helpful.

In any event, I was curious about why all this struck a "raw nerve." I understand that being compulsively academic can blind people to the merits of the substance of this subject matter, but i don't understand why formal academic rules would get in the way of educatioin at the military staff and war colleges. I would think they woudl enforce ideas of disciplined htought and thoroughness. I am also curious about what would be unacceptable about research and from what perspective. Is this a difference in ethical approaches or in the formality of the methodology? What is it about the accreditation process that changes the character of the colleges, and makes them try to be "ersatz universities" rather than what they are?

Adam

[selil]

AdamL,

Plagiarism strikes a raw nerve with academics because in a world where so little counts for much the little things count for a lot. In academia the only thing you trade upon are your ideas. Ideas may be reprsented in books or patents, but those ideas are your product. If you stole bread from a baker you would understand the theft. In the realm of intellectual exchange the trade of cash for bread is in the attribution. Academics are given accolades for being cited and creating dialog.

Academics are rarely paid extensive sums of money for their work and the only acknowledgment of their work is the report that citation bibliometrics provide. Attribution is about giving due recognition for others work and not claiming others work as yours. In academia you can publish an annotated bibliography which is nothing but citations and have that considered scholarship. There are other reasons such as recreating the science for attribution, but in general I think it is about credit. A history of science shows good scientists being claim jumped by better politically connected scientists which led to funding and respect.

I understand why the Army and Marine Corps would do things a particular way and I'll even take their side, but I'll be honest I walk on hot coals with my colleagues doing so and jeopardize my career. Even just doing so here on SWC. I think Steve Metz and MarcT would back me up in saying in academia plagiarism is not about the money and many careers have ended for less than what these accusations entail. When you talk about ideas being the coin of the realm what appears to be of no consequence can have extreme effects.

Those outside of academia can belittle the specifics of intellectual pursuit that academics engage in, but they are lesser individuals for that. Every career has it's way of dealing with acknowledgement and attribution for acts. In the military medals, and rank are given based on the deeds of the soldier. In academia awards and academic rank are given based on the quality and quantity of scholarship. In the military wearing medals not earned are nearing culturally the same level of abhorrence as plagiarism in academia.

It might not make sense to everybody but you have to respect it. I'm sure there is some silly anthropologist theory about it, but I call it respect.

[SteveMetz]

I've been re-reading this thread...

You wrote earlier that the "primary source for doctrine is collective wisdom of the community of practice." If the information/ideas in FM 3-24 were based on either a group's general knowledge/wisdom or were sufficiently original not to need citation or other attribution, or if releases were obtained, and if, as the U of Chigago ed. (at xlviii) states all copyrighted material is id'd with footnote and other sources are id'd in source notes, why didn't john Nagl just write about that in refuting Price? If a good faith effort was made to comply, and some citations were in fact missed, and picked up by a nit-picker in furtherance of another agenda... it happened.

Instead, Nagl's respone to Price in part tried to justify the failure to cite all sources as a matter of "societal" differences. The argument about not being an academic pursuit seems to lose some power given the number of non-military degrees held by those involved with FM 3-24. Nagl also writes that Field Manuals are not designed to be judged 'by the quality of thier sourcing' but instead of leaving it there, he goes on to write that because they are indended to be used by soldiers, "authors are not named, and those whose scholarship informs the manual are only credited if they are quoted extensively. This is not the academic way, but soldiers are not academic; it is my understanding that htis longstanding practice in doctrine writing... is well within the provisions of "fair use" copyright law." If he had only bothered referencing where his understanding came from and how the Manual met with the it and/or the Army Publishing procedures (thanks, Rex) it would have been very helpful.

In any event, I was curious about why all this struck a "raw nerve." I understand that being compulsively academic can blind people to the merits of the substance of this subject matter, but i don't understand why formal academic rules would get in the way of educatioin at the military staff and war colleges. I would think they woudl enforce ideas of disciplined htought and thoroughness. I am also curious about what would be unacceptable about research and from what perspective. Is this a difference in ethical approaches or in the formality of the methodology? What is it about the accreditation process that changes the character of the colleges, and makes them try to be "ersatz universities" rather than what they are?

Adam

As I mentioned above, John's decision to try to answer Price is, as far as I know, his own. The Army and Marine Corps themselves have not. With hindsight, I wish John had just ignored him and simply said, "this is a government document for which academic standards do not apply."

The fact that many of the 3-24 authors have advanced degrees is absolutely irrelevant. I have an advanced degree and I'm working on a briefing that I will give later this week. I feel no compunction to make this meet academic standards because it is not an academic product. In fact, that's exactly what distinguishes the authors of 3-24 from Dr. Price: they understand the difference between an academic and non-academic product and he, apparently, does not.

I'm not sure why you think John Nagl (or anyone associated with the military for that matter) is obligated to justify the military doctrine development process to those who are not participants. If I were to question the content of Dr. Price's courses, would he be compelled to explain his university's curriculum development process to me?

What I was getting at in my comments on the war colleges is that all the things they have to do to get accreditation have real or opportunity costs, sometimes both. To give just one of many examples, it takes a huge amount of faculty and administrative time (and taxpayer money) to meet accreditation's requirements. That is time they are not spending augmenting their professional knowledge. Ultimately, staff and war colleges are not designed to produce scholars. They are designed to produce professional military leaders.

And I think you're just wrong in your intimation that only academic methods "enforce ideas of disciplined htought and thoroughness." There are many ways of doing that other than academic methods. To repeat an example I used earlier, doctrine manuals are vetted by and briefed to literally hundreds of professional experts before they are published. Does your average academic article undergo that degree of scrutiny? In my experience, if an author can get two or three referees (who very well may be his friends given the degree of hyperspecialization) to go along, there's a good chance of a work being published. Given that, I would contend that despite having a bunch of citations, your average academic publication has undergone a much less rigorous quality check than your average doctrine manual. Between the author of an academic article, the people who refereed it, and the people who were cited, it often reflects the collective wisdom of, at most, a couple of dozen people. A doctrine manual reflects the collective wisdom of hundreds.