Human Terrain & Anthropology (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for this item:

The US Army's Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin for Oct-Dec 2011 is a special issue devoted to the subject. Some of the articles relate to Iraq, but several are devoted to the HTS in Afghanistan, including case studies of Rural Human Terrain in Kandahar, engaging local religious leaders in the Central Helmand River Valley and articles on bilingual data collection and HTS support to Information Operations.

Link to the Bulletin's issue:http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2011_04.pdf

...one of the papers notes: "Difficulties integrating HTS teams into Army units arise because the HTS program brings together two professions (social science and military studies) that tend to operate within different problem-solving paradigms, speak different languages, consist of different personalities, and have misconceptions one about the other. Academia is stereotyped as theoretical, long winded, and perhaps of no practical use at the moment. Military studies are stereotyped as too practical, laconic, and operating under the slogan that a 70 percent solution is good enough right now in the battle space."

Link to Circling:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....ain-teams.html

[ganulv]

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den for this item:

Link to the Bulletin's issue:http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2011_04.pdf

Link to Circling:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....ain-teams.html

Many thanks for these links. I scanned the bulletin just now and will aim to read a couple of the articles tomorrow.

What I have seen of the bulletin so far reinforces my impression that the U.S. military and civilian contingents in Afghanistan seem to be fairly ignorant as to the basics of agriculture. (That's not a criticism. In my experience few Americans know much about where the food they eat comes from.) Am I way off base here?

[marct]

What I have seen of the bulletin so far reinforces my impression that the U.S. military and civilian contingents in Afghanistan seem to be fairly ignorant as to the basics of agriculture. (That's not a criticism. In my experience few Americans know much about where the food they eat comes from.) Am I way off base here?

That matches my impression, and in more areas than just agriculture. Still working through the articles, though....

Cheers,

Marc

[ganulv]

but I still find the case study of the village of fig farmers in Kandahar where no one knew rotted manure is fertilizer to be absolutely bizarre. I have to wonder what you would find if you were able to scratch beneath the surface of that one.

[120mm]

but I still find the case study of the village of fig farmers in Kandahar where no one knew rotted manure is fertilizer to be absolutely bizarre. I have to wonder what you would find if you were able to scratch beneath the surface of that one.

You'd find out HTS members are drooling idiots. But that's ok; they fit in with the rest of the US contingent, there.

[ganulv]

You'd find out HTS members are drooling idiots. But that's ok; they fit in with the rest of the US contingent, there.

In all seriousness, that they happened upon a settlement full of people who farm for a living where no one knows how to manure their fields and didn't go beyond teaching them about organic fertilizer speaks volumes to me. In that kind of situation I would think that either a) they haven't been farming for a living for long and start trying to figure out if there is a recent history of population movement and/or a "development" project or b) the folks in that settlement were actually doing something else for a living. Pursuing those possibilities might really reveal a lot (whether or not ISAF and GIRoA would like the things revealed is another question).

It all could just be a problem with the text. Who knows what got edited out? And I'm not pretending I know the constraints involved with the case. But still, the article leaves me scratching my head.

[JMA]

What I have seen of the bulletin so far reinforces my impression that the U.S. military and civilian contingents in Afghanistan seem to be fairly ignorant as to the basics of agriculture.

Why would the 'US military contingent' need to understand the basics of agriculture?

[Ken White]

Why would the 'US military contingent' need to understand the basics of agriculture?

I've been wondering the same thing while following this thread...

[Bob's World]

I've often been curious about the fixation on Afghan agriculture as well, in regards to how improving it might somehow be a cure for insurgency.

I'm no expert on the topic, but I did grow up in rural Oregon and my undergrad was in forestry so I have some appreciation about those who live close to the land and what works and what doesn't work. I also spent a bit of time flying over Helmand, Oruzgan, Kandahar and Zabul provinces; and being fascinated with the grandeur of the place, and also very interested in the study of terrain as it shapes the fight, and the study of how man works to squeeze a living out of a harsh environment; I spent much of that time staring down at the ground and thinking in those terms.

From this I earned a tremendous respect for the Taliban fighter and his ability to defy our tremendous technology through his equally tremendous hardiness, dedication and ability to become one with his surroundings. Also for the Afghan farmers, who seemed to squeeze every drop of life out of the soil and water available with their efforts.

I also spent a couple hours standing on the roof of the Arghandab District center looking out over the Arghandab valley in conversation with a USDA SME discussing his work, his observations, recommendations, etc. So, no expert, but I have some experience on this topic.

I too don't get it.

People tell me how the Afghans don't know how to maximize the agricultural potential of their land. Bull####. With the tools and resources available to them they maximize it very well. Sure, if they had massive tractors, irrigation, computers, etc they could do ma ore to be like Americans farm in Kansas, but hey, Afghanistan isn't Kansas. Who is going to sustain and maintain those capabilities? To provide such a capacity would be as silly as building a massive Western-style Army that they cannot afford to sustain and that is inappropriate to the security concerns of the region...

Second, where in the history of conflict between those who are governed, and those who govern them (insurgency), has it been a function of said populace not knowing how to farm their land?? Not owning the land they farm? Definitely. That is a classic grievance for insurgency, one that Mao leveraged very well. Land ownership is one of the largest problems in Afghanistan today as well, but for very different reasons. In this "winner take all" patronage society, where fortunes have swung 180 degrees so often over the past 40 years there is truly no way to sort out the mess of who has best title to any of the very valuable plots of arable or city land.

But is there a role for military personnel in this? No, not really.

[ganulv]

Why would the 'US military contingent' need to understand the basics of agriculture?

If the strategists have decided upon undertaking a population-centric counterinsurgency and 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture, how could these same strategists even pretend to formulate strategy if they know nothing about agriculture?

But is the implicit question whether or not I think military professionals need to know something about agriculture? I don't see how it would help the young man scanning the Fulda horizon with his field glasses c. 1985; I don't see how it would not help the military governor of an agriculturally rich state then, now, or ever.

And my semi-informed opinion is that with COIN 2.0 the United States Military asks far too much of itself.

[Ken White]

If the strategists have decided upon undertaking a population-centric counterinsurgency and 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture, how could these same strategists even pretend to formulate strategy if they know nothing about agriculture?

Civilian or military, they need agricultural expertise in an advisory capacity, no question. They do not need to possess the knowledge themselves. In fact, I suggest if they were not bona fide agriculturalists / farmers with crop and area specific knowledge they'd do mor harm than good. If the Strategists did possess such knowledge it would be area and crop or product specific to such an extent that it could very easily be superficial and do more harm than good. There are few things more dangerous than a person with directive power who thinks he or she knows more than is the case...

(See Afghanistan and most US sponsored agricultural efforts therein...)

All that begs the question. The military function is combat. Period. Other applications are possible but all will have an adverse impact on the primary function -- and far more importantly, those other jobs will never -- never -- be done very well.

So-called population centric COIN is a holdover from the colonial era when the colony's nominal government was integrated and military governors existed -- with copious civilian expertise provided by other government agencies in a more or less unified effort. We, the US, did not have that tradition, do not have it today and should have foregone the COIN bit with our abject failure in Viet Nam. We're slow learners...

Changes in both US and world societal norms since the 1960s have made those types of operation even more difficult and made even marginal success less possible.

And my semi-informed opinion is that with COIN 2.0 the United States Military asks far too much of itself.

Amen! May or may not be be less than fully informed but it's a quite accurate assessment.

It asks too much of itself and our system of governance and budgeting forces it to do so. It just cannot say "It's not my job..." even though many things it does are clearly not its job and in fact detract significantly from ability to do the principal job.

[JMA]

If the strategists have decided upon undertaking a population-centric counterinsurgency and 80% of the population is engaged in agriculture, how could these same strategists even pretend to formulate strategy if they know nothing about agriculture?

But is the implicit question whether or not I think military professionals need to know something about agriculture? I don't see how it would help the young man scanning the Fulda horizon with his field glasses c. 1985; I don't see how it would not help the military governor of an agriculturally rich state then, now, or ever.

And my semi-informed opinion is that with COIN 2.0 the United States Military asks far too much of itself.

May I offer another perspective on all this.

The assumption that COIN has to be either enemy- or population- centric is an error IMHO.

An analysis of each specific insurgency should lead to a unique course of action being adopted as COIN policy.

Not every grievance cited as contributing to the insurgency can be addressed. If for example the true motivation behind the insurgency is more ideological than economic, more religious than the pursuit of human freedoms or more ethnic than a demand for democracy then a 'political settlement' will be unlikely.

Certainly the current US approach to COIN being what can be called 'cheque-book COIN' where money is thrown around to buy off the opposition and buy support from those caught in the middle is quite ridiculous and destined to fail.

Ken's (good) point about the use of foreign troops to support the 'state' is valid. And of course the US know that the longer the troops stay in the country the more the locals see them as occupiers and want them to go (this also happened to the Cubans in Angola).

It is well worth having another look at Wilf's paper 'Killing your way to Control'

If we accept that at the highest level 80% of the COIN policy is political the 20% comprising the military action will often prove to be critical in determining the outcome of the insurgency.

It should be obvious that the armed 'wing' of the insurgency must be confronted with armed force. The armed insurrection must be suppressed or at least contained to to allow the political process to run its course. If the armed insurrection is not suppressed then it is not possible to negotiate from a position of strength (as is the case in Afghanistan).

Wilf writes:

The population will obey whoever exercises the power of law over them. Power creates support.

IMHO I would use the word 'submission' rather than support.

The people need to submit to the rule of law. The people need to submit to peaceful negotiations (whether a minority gets what it wants or not). etc etc

Those who resort to violence must be met with kind.

...So I would not spend a cent on agriculture in Afghanistan... in fact the next trick should be to destroy their irrigation system if they use continue to use them to cultivate poppies. Just give them the Gypsy's warning on that... and if they don't listen... then let the Engineers have a little fun with demolitions.

[Dayuhan]

An analysis of each specific insurgency should lead to a unique course of action being adopted as COIN policy.

Agree completely with that, but I'd hope that analysis would be conducted not only to determine what course of action is needed, but also to determine whether any action is called for at all. One of the problems with all our talk of COIN is the visceral assumption that insurgency by definition is something that needs to be countered, even if the specific insurgency in question is really not something we need to be concerned with.

The people need to submit to the rule of law. The people need to submit to peaceful negotiations (whether a minority gets what it wants or not). etc etc

Those who resort to violence must be met with kind.

What if it's the government that ignores the rule of law, refuses to negotiate, and resorts to violence? It happens, and it's a good reason to be very careful about choosing what governments we want to support and deciding what insurgents need to be countered.

[ganulv]

Wilf writes:

The population will obey whoever exercises the power of law over them. Power creates support.

IMHO I would use the word 'submission' rather than support.

IMHO the use of force can almost always ensure compliance but it may or may not ensure cooperation. In a scenario in which you possess unlimited recourse to violence and they do not you can bludgeon them into compliance before they are entirely exterminated. (Probably.) You might even mistake that compliance for cooperation. But should your recourse to violence decrease and theirs increase they might give you a nasty lesson in the difference between the two.

[JMA]

IMHO the use of force can almost always ensure compliance but it may or may not ensure cooperation. In a scenario in which you possess unlimited recourse to violence and they do not you can bludgeon them into compliance before they are entirely exterminated. (Probably.) You might even mistake that compliance for cooperation. But should your recourse to violence decrease and theirs increase they might give you a nasty lesson in the difference between the two.

This is exactly why I said 'submission' and not 'support'.

This is also why I stated (elsewhere) that the US needed to make greater use of proxies to fight these wars because - like in Rodesia but not in Zimbabwe - the US is not willing to indulge in the brutality required to defeat the insurgents and match their methods which force the population into the submissive compliance required.

[davidbfpo]

A large number of the recent posts concern the Afghan drug problem (cultivation) not HTT and after a review have been moved to the existing thread on those issues:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=1234

[davidbfpo]

After what I see as a lull Human Terrain System HTS is back on the agenda. There is today SWJ Blog 'System Failure: Anthropologists on the Battlefield', which links to a very poor USA Today piece:http://www.usatoday.com/story/nation...gists/2640297/

There is a far better link to a NYT column 'How to Read Afghanistan':http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/op...pagewanted=all

Bearing in mind another thread on lessons learnt this phrase is so simple:

GOOD intelligence requires good reading; you can’t have one without the other.

The article concludes:

What happened to Paula Loyd reminds us that understanding what motivates our enemies and the people we’re fighting among is a long and painful undertaking. But turning away from this effort, as many in the military did in the wake of Vietnam, ensures only that more Americans will die in other wars, in other far-flung corners of the world.

Finally, with hat tip to the UK-based blog on Afghanistan, Circling the Lion's Den:

US security writer John Stanton has written many articles over the last few years on the US Army's Human Terrain System, some of which have been referenced by this blog. Now 115 of his pieces have been published as a collection. The US Army Terrain System 2008-2013: The Program from Hell costs just $6.66 (ooh er!!), but is worth every penny.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....n-terrain.html